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on 13 February, 2016

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE THEÆTETUS.

THE following very learned and admirable dialogue is on a ſubject which, to a rational being, is obviouſly of the utmoſt importance. For what can be more important to ſuch a being than an accurate knowledge of things human and divine, practical and theoretic? And as ſuch a knowledge cannot be obtained without ſcience, the inquiry what ſcience is, muſt conſequently rank among thoſe inveſtigations that are the moſt uſeful and neceſſary to man.

As this dialogue is wholly of the maieutic kind, Socrates, with admirable ſkill, acts the part of a midwife towards Theætetus, one of the principal perſons of the dialogue, in leading forth his conceptions concerning ſcience into light. For this purpoſe, he, in the firſt place, aſks him what ſcience is? and Theætetus replies, that ſcience is geometry and arithmetic, together with other diſciplines of this kind, and the ſeveral arts. This anſwer is however rejected by Socrates, as by no means according with the queſtion; becauſe, when aſked what ſcience is, he replies by enumerating how many ſciences there are, and on what ſubjects they are employed. In the next place, Socrates introduces the definition of Protagoras, that ſcience is ſenſe. For Protagoras aſſerted, that man is the meaſure of all things, and that every thing was to every man ſuch as it appeared to him. This doctrine was, indeed, founded in the philoſophy of Heraclitus, of which the principal dogma was this, that nothing is permanent, but that all things are in a continual flux. Socrates, however, confutes this opinion, becauſe, if it were admitted, the perceptions of the intoxicated and inſane, of thoſe who dream, and of thoſe whoſe ſenſes are vitiated by diſeaſe, would be true, becauſe they appear to be ſo, though at the ſame time they are evidently falſe. From this

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hypotheſis alſo, all men would be ſimilarly wiſe, the opinions of the moſt illiterate in geometry would be as true as any geometrical theorems; and in the actions of human life the means of accompliſhing any end would be indifferent, and conſequently all deliberation and conſultation would be vain [1].

In order to demonſtrate that ſcience is not ſenſe, Socrates, in the firſt place, obtains this from Theætetus, that ſenſe ariſes from the ſoul perceiving corporeal things externally ſituated, through ſeveral organs of the body. And ſecondly, that one ſenſe, or organical perception, cannot take cognizance of the object of another; as ſight cannot ſee ſounds, nor the hearing hear light and colours. Hence he infers, that when we compare the objects of ſeveral ſenſes together, and conſider certain things which are common to them all, this cannot be ſenſe, or organical perception, becauſe one ſenſe cannot conſider the object of another. And if there is any thing common to both, it cannot perceive it by either organ. Thus, for inſtance, when we conſider ſound and colour together, and attribute ſeveral things to them in common, as, in the firſt place, eſſence, and in the next place, ſameneſs in each with itſelf, and difference from the other; when we alſo conſider that both of them are two, and each of them one, by what ſenſe or organ does the ſoul perceive all theſe things which are common both to ſound and colour? It cannot be by the ſenſes of ſight or hearing, becauſe theſe cannot conſider each other's objects; nor can any other corporeal organ be found by which the ſoul may paſſively perceive all theſe, and conſider the objects of both thoſe ſenſes of ſight and hearing. Hence, Theætetus is made to confeſs that the ſoul does not organically perceive theſe things by any ſenſe, but by itſelf alone without any corporeal organ.

Theætetus, therefore, being convinced that ſcience is not ſenſe, in the next place defines it to be true opinion. This, however, is confuted by Socrates, becauſe rhetoric alſo produces true opinion when its aſſertions are true, but yet cannot produce ſcience. For there never can be any ſcience of

[1] This abſurd opinion is very ſubtilely oppoſed by Sextus Empiricus. If, ſays he, every imagination be true, then the imagination that not every imagination is true will alſo be true, and ſo the aſſertion that every imagination is true will be falſe. Ει πασα φαντασια εστιν αληθης, και το μη πασαν φαντασιαν ειναι αληθη, κατα φαντασιαν ὑφισταμενον εσται αληθες· και ὁυτω το πασαν φαντασιαν ειναι αληθη γενησεται ψευδος.

things

things which are perpetually in motion, and which ſubſiſt differently at different times. Such, however, are human affairs with which orators are converſant, eſpecially when they induce their hearers to believe that of which they are themſelves doubtful. After this, Theætetus adds the definition of Leucippus and Theodorus the Cyrenæan, that ſcience is true opinion in conjunction with reaſon; and hence, that things which poſſeſs reaſon can be known, but by no means thoſe which are deprived of it. This, however, is alſo confuted by Socrates, who ſhows, that whether reaſon (logos) ſignifies external ſpeech, or a proceſſion through the elements of a thing, or definition, ſcience cannot be true opinion in conjunction with reaſon.

Though Socrates, therefore, confutes all theſe definitions of ſcience, as being erroneous, yet he does not inform us what ſcience is; for this would have been contrary to the character of the dialogue, which, as we have already obſerved, is entirely maieutic, and conſequently can do no more than preſent us with the conceptions of Theætetus fairly unfolded into light. As all theſe conceptions, therefore, are found to be falſe, we muſt ſearch elſewhere for an accurate definition of ſcience.

What then ſhall we ſay ſcience is, according to Plato? We reply, that conſidered according to its firſt ſubſiſtence, which is in intellect, it is *the eternal and uniform intelligence of eternal entities*; but in partial ſouls, ſuch as ours, it is *a dianoëtic perception of eternal beings*; and is, conſequently, a perception neither eternal nor uniform, becauſe it is tranſitive, and accompanied with the intervention of oblivion.

THE

THE THEÆTETUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

EUCLID [1], SOCRATES,
TERPSIO, THEODORUS,
And THEÆTETUS [2].

ARE you juſt now come, O Terpſio, or is it ſome time ſince you came from the country?

TER. I have left the country for a conſiderable time, and have been ſeeking for you about the forum, and wondered that I could not find you.

EUC. I was not in the city.

TER. Where then was you?

EUC. As I was going down to the port, I met with Theætetus, who was carried along from the camp at Corinth to Athens.

TER. Was he alive or dead?

EUC. He was living, but could hardly be ſaid to be ſo: for he was in a very dangerous condition, through certain wounds: and, what is worſe, he was afflicted with a diſeaſe while in the camp.

TER. Was it a dyſentery?

EUC. It was.

[1] This Euclid was a celebrated philoſopher and logician of Megara. The Athenians having prohibited the Megarians from entering their city on pain of death, this philoſopher diſguiſed himſelf in woman's clothes that he might attend the lectures of Socrates. After the death of Socrates, Plato and other philoſophers went to Euclid at Megara to ſhelter themſelves from the tyrants who governed Athens.

[2] This Theætetus is mentioned by Proclus on Euclid (lib. ii. p. 19.), where he gives a ſhort hiſtory of geometry prior to Euclid, and is ranked by him among thoſe contemporary with Plato, by whom geometrical theorems were increaſed, and rendered more ſcientific.

TER. What a man do you ſpeak of as in a dangerous condition!

EUC. A worthy and good man, O Terpſio: for I juſt now heard certain perſons paying him very great encomiums for his military conduct.

TER. Nor is this wonderful: but it would be much more wonderful if this had not been the caſe. But why was he not carried to Megara?

EUC. He haſtened home; for I both entreated and adviſed him to do ſo: but it was againſt his will. And beſides this, attending him in his journey, when I again left him, I recollected, and was filled with admiration of Socrates, who often ſpoke in a prophetic manner about other things, and likewiſe about this. For a little before his death, if I am not miſtaken, meeting with Theætetus, who was then a young man, and diſcourſing with him, he very much admired his diſpoſition. Beſides this, when I came to Athens, he related to me his diſcourſes with Theætetus, which very much deſerve to be heard; and obſerved, that he would neceſſarily be renowned, if he lived to be a man. And it appears indeed that he ſpoke the truth.

TER. But can you relate what thoſe diſcourſes were?

EUC. Not verbally, by Jupiter: but as ſoon as I returned home, I committed the ſubſtance of them to writing, and afterwards at my leiſure wrote nearly the whole of them, through the aſſiſtance of memory. As often too as I came to Athens, I aſked Socrates about ſuch particulars as I could not remember, and, on my return hither, made ſuch emendations as were neceſſary; ſo that I have nearly written the whole diſcourſe.

TER. True. For I have heard you aſſert the ſame thing before: and in conſequence of always deſiring to urge you to relate this diſcourſe I am come hither. But what ſhould hinder this from taking place at preſent? For I am perfectly in need of reſt, as coming from the country.

EUC. I likewiſe accompanied Theætetus as far as Erineus; ſo that reſt will not be unpleaſant to me. Let us go, therefore, and while we reſt a boy ſhall read to us.

TER. You ſpeak well.

EUC. This then is the book, O Terpſio. But it was not compoſed by me, as if Socrates related it to me, as in reality he did, but as if he was diſcourſing with the perſons with whom he ſaid he diſcourſed. But he ſaid that theſe were, the geometrician Theodorus, and Theætetus. That

we

we may not, therefore, in the courſe of the writing, be troubled with the frequent repetition of I ſay, and He ſaid, He aſſented, or He denied, I have introduced Socrates himſelf diſcourſing with them.

Ter. And this is not at all improper, O Euclid.

Euc. Here, boy, then, take the book and read.

Soc. If, O Theodorus, I was more attentive to thoſe in Cyrene than to any others, I ſhould inquire of you reſpecting them, if any young men there applied themſelves to geometry, or any other philoſophic ſtudy. But now, as I love thoſe leſs than theſe, I am more deſirous to know which of our young men are likely to become worthy characters. For ſuch as theſe I explore myſelf as far as I am able, and inquire after them of others, with whom I ſee young men aſſociating. But you have by no means a few followers: and this very juſtly. For you deſerve to be followed, both for other things, and for the ſake of geometry. If, therefore, you have met with any young man who deſerves to be mentioned, it would give me pleaſure to hear ſome particulars reſpecting him.

Theo. Indeed, Socrates, it is in every reſpect fit both that I ſhould relate, and that you ſhould hear, what a youth I have met met with from among your citizens. And if he were beautiful, I ſhould be very much afraid to mention him, leſt I ſhould appear to be enamoured with him. But, now, (do not be indignant with me,) he is not handſome. For he reſembles you, having a flat noſe, and prominent eyes: but he has theſe in a leſs degree than you. You ſee I ſpeak freely to you. Know then, that I have never yet met with any young man (though I have aſſociated with many) who naturally poſſeſſes a good diſpoſition in ſuch a wonderful degree. For it is difficult to find one who is docile, remarkably mild, and who beſides this may compare with any one for fortitude. Indeed, I do not think there ever were any, nor do I ſee any with theſe qualifications. For ſome are acute indeed, as this one, ſagacious, and of a good memory; but they are for the moſt part prone to anger, and are hurried along precipitately like ſhips without their ballaſt, and are rather naturally furious than brave. And again, thoſe whoſe manners are more ſedate are in a certain reſpect ſluggiſh and full of oblivion, when they apply themſelves to diſciplines. But the young man I am ſpeaking of applies himſelf to diſciplines and inveſtigations in ſo eaſy, blameleſs, and ready a manner, that it may be compared to the ſilent

flux of oil; ſo that it is wonderful that ſuch a great genius ſhould accompliſh theſe things in ſuch a manner.

Soc. You announce well. But of which of our citizens is he the ſon?

Theo. I have heard the name, but I do not remember it. But he is in the middle of thoſe who are now approaching to us. For both he, and theſe who are his companions, were juſt now anointed beyond the ſtadium; but now they appear to me, in conſequence of having been anointed, to come hither. Conſider, however, if you know him.

Soc. I do know him. He is the ſon of Euphronius the Sunienſian, who was entirely ſuch a man as you have juſt related the ſon to be; and who, beſides being a worthy character, left behind him a very large eſtate.

Theo. His name, O Socrates, is Theætetus. But certain of his guardians appear to me to have diſſipated his eſtate. However, notwithſtanding this, he is wonderfully liberal with reſpect to money, Socrates.

Soc. You ſpeak of a generous man: Order him to come to me, and ſit with us.

Theo. I will.—Theætetus, come hither to Socrates.

Soc. By all means come, Theætetus, that I may behold myſelf, and ſee what ſort of a face I have. For Theodorus ſays it reſembles yours. But if we had each of us a lyre, and he ſhould ſay that they were ſimilarly harmonized, ought we immediately to believe him, or ſhould we conſider whether he ſays this as being a muſician?

Theæ. We ſhould conſider this.

Soc. On finding, therefore, this to be the caſe, ſhould we not be perſuaded by him? but, if he was ignorant of muſic, ſhould we not diſbelieve him?

Theæ. True.

Soc. Now, therefore, I think, if we are at all careful reſpecting the ſimilitude of our faces, that we ſhould conſider if he ſpeaks as being a painter, or not.

Theæ. So it appears to me.

Soc. Is, therefore, Theodorus a painter?

Theæ. Not that I know of.

Soc. Nor is he a geometrician?

Theæ. He is perfectly ſo, Socrates.

Soc. Is he alſo ſkilled in aſtronomy, logiſtic, muſic, and ſuch other diſciplines as follow theſe?

Theæ. He appears to be ſo to me.

Soc. If, therefore, he ſays that we reſemble each other in a certain part of our body, at the ſame time praiſing or blaming this reſemblance, it is not altogether worth while to pay much attention to him.

Theæ. Entirely ſo, Socrates.

Soc. Take notice, therefore, O friend Theætetus, it is your buſineſs to evince, and mine to conſider. For know, that Theodorus having praiſed in my hearing many ſtrangers and citizens, has not praiſed any one of them ſo much as juſt now he did you.

Theæ. It is well, Socrates; but conſider whether he did not ſpeak jocoſely.

Soc. It is not uſual for Theodorus to do ſo. But do not reject what is granted, in conſequence of believing that he ſpoke this in jeſt, leſt he ſhould be compelled to bear witneſs. For no one can object to what he ſaid. Perſiſt, therefore, confidently in what is granted.

Theæ. It is proper, indeed, to do ſo, if it ſeems fit to you.

Soc. Tell me, then,—Do you learn any geometry of Theodorus?

Theæ. I do.

Soc. Do you, likewiſe, learn things pertaining to aſtronomy, harmony, and computation?

Theæ. I endeavour to do ſo.

Soc. For I alſo, O boy, both from this man, and from others who appear to me to underſtand any thing of theſe particulars, endeavour to learn them; but, at the ſame time, I am but moderately ſkilled in them. There is, however, a certain trifling thing of which I am in doubt, and which I wiſh to conſider along with you, and theſe that are preſent. Tell me, therefore, whether to learn is not to become wiſer in that which any one learns?

Theæ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. But I think that the wiſe are wiſe by wiſdom.

Theæ. Certainly.

Soc. But does this in any reſpect differ from ſcience?

Theæ. What?

Soc.

Soc. Wiſdom. Or are not thoſe who have a ſcientific knowledge of any thing, alſo wiſe in this thing?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Is, therefore, ſcience the ſame as wiſdom?

THEÆ. Yes.

Soc. This, therefore, is that which I doubt; and I am not able ſufficiently to determine by myſelf what ſcience is. Have we then any thing to ſay to this? What do you ſay it is? And which of us can firſt give this information? But he who errs, and is perpetually detected in an error, ſhall ſit as an aſs, as the boys ſay when they play at ball. But he who ſhall be found to ſpeak without error ſhall be our king, and ſhall order whatever he wiſhes us to anſwer. Why are you ſilent? Have I, O Theodorus, behaved in a ruſtic manner, through my love of converſation, and through my deſire to make you diſcourſe and become friends with each other?

THEO. A thing of this kind, O Socrates, is by no means ruſtic. But order ſome one of theſe young men to anſwer you. For I am unaccuſtomed to this mode of diſcourſe; and my age does not permit me to become accuſtomed to it now. But a thing of this kind is adapted to theſe young men, and they will be greatly improved by it. For, in reality, youth is adapted to every kind of improvement. But, as you began with, do not diſmiſs Theætetus, but interrogate him.

Soc. Do you hear, Theætetus, what Theodorus ſays? whom I am of opinion you will not diſobey. For you would neither be willing to do ſo, nor is it lawful for a young man to be unperſuaded by a wiſe man, when he commands in things of this kind. Tell me, therefore, in a proper and ingenuous manner, what ſcience appears to you to be?

THEÆ. It is fit to comply, Socrates, ſince you command me. And if I in any reſpect err, do you correct me.

Soc. We ſhall by all means do ſo, if we are able.

THEÆ. It appears to me, then, that ſciences are ſuch things as any one may learn of Theodorus, ſuch as geometry, and the other particulars which you juſt now enumerated. And beſides theſe, the ſhoemaker's art, and the arts of other workmen; and that all and each of theſe are no other than ſcience.

Soc. Generouſly and munificently, O friend, when aſked by me concern-

ing one thing, have you given many, and things various, inſtead of that which is ſimple.

THEÆ. How ſo? Why do you ſay this, Socrates?

SOC. Perhaps what I ſay is nothing: but I will tell you what I think. When you ſpeak of the ſhoemaker's art, do you ſpeak of any thing elſe than the ſcience of making ſhoes?

THEÆ. Of nothing elſe.

SOC. But what when you ſpeak of the carpenter's art? Do you ſpeak of any thing elſe than the ſcience of operations in wood?

THEÆ. Of nothing elſe than this.

SOC. In both therefore you define that of which each is the ſcience.

THEÆ. I do.

SOC. But that which we aſked, O Theætetus, was not this, of what things there is ſcience, nor how many ſciences there are; for we did not inquire, wiſhing to enumerate them, but in order to know what ſcience itſelf is. Or do I ſay nothing?

THEÆ. You ſpeak with perfect rectitude.

SOC. But conſider alſo this. If any one ſhould interrogate us reſpecting any vile and obvious thing, as, for inſtance, clay, what it is, if we ſhould anſwer him, that clay is that from which pans, puppets and tiles are made, or certain other artificial ſubſtances, ſhould we not be ridiculous?

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo.

SOC. In the firſt place, indeed, what can we think he who aſks this queſtion can underſtand from our anſwer, when we ſay that clay is that from which pans, puppets and tiles, or certain other artificial ſubſtances are made? Or do you think that any one can underſtand the name of a thing, when he does not know what that thing is?

THEÆ. By no means.

SOC. Neither, therefore, will he underſtand the ſcience of ſhoes who does not know what ſcience is.

THEÆ. Certainly not.

SOC. Nor, again, will he underſtand the currier's art, nor any other art, who is ignorant of ſcience.

THEÆ. It is ſo.

SOC. The anſwer, therefore, is ridiculous, when any one, being aſked what ſcience

ſcience is, gives for an anſwer the name of any art. For he anſwers, that there is a ſcience of a certain thing, when this is not what he was aſked.

THEÆ. It ſeems ſo.

SOC. And, in the next place, when he might have given a ſhort and ſimple anſwer, he wanders immenſely. As in the queſtion concerning clay, a ſhort and ſimple anſwer might have been given, that clay is earth mingled with moiſture. At the ſame time, diſmiſſing the conſideration of that which is compoſed of clay.

THEÆ. Now, indeed, Socrates, it thus appears to me to be eaſy. For you ſeem to aſk that which lately came into my mind as I was diſcourſing with your nameſake here, Socrates.

SOC. What was that, Theætetus?

THEÆ. Theodorus here has written a treatiſe on powers, concerning magnitudes of three and five feet, evincing that they are not commenſurable in length[1] to a magnitude of one foot: and thus proceeding through every number as far as to a magnitude of ſeventeen feet, in this he ſtops his inveſtigation. A thing of this kind, therefore, occurred to me, ſince there appear to be an infinite multitude of powers, we ſhould endeavour to comprehend them in one thing, by which we may denominate all theſe powers.

SOC. Is a thing of this kind diſcovered?

THEÆ. It appears ſo to me. But do you alſo conſider.

SOC. Speak then.

THEÆ. We give to the whole of number a twofold diviſion: one, that which may become equally equal, and which we aſſimilate among figures to a ſquare, calling it quadrangular and equilateral.

SOC. And very properly.

THEÆ. But that number which ſubſiſts between this[2], ſuch as three and five, and every number which is incapable of becoming evenly even, but which is either more leſs, or leſs more, and always contains a greater and a leſſer ſide, we aſſimilate to an oblong figure, and call it an oblong number.

[1] Magnitudes commenſurable in length are ſuch as have the proportion to each other of number to number. As the ſquare roots, therefore, of 3 and 5 feet cannot be obtained, thoſe roots are incommenſurable in length with the ſquare root of one foot.

[2] Equally equal, or ſquare numbers, are ſuch as 4, 9, 16, 25, &c. and the numbers which ſubſiſt between theſe, and which Plato calls oblong, are 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, &c.

SOC.

Soc. Moſt excellent. But what follows?

Theæ. Such lines as ſquare an equilateral and plane number, we define to be length; but ſuch as ſquare an oblong number, powers; as not being commenſurate[1] to them in length, but to planes, which are capable of being commenſurable. And about ſolids there is another thing of this kind.

Soc. Beſt of men, O boys: ſo that Theodorus cannot, as it appears to me, be accuſed of giving a falſe account.

Theæ. But, indeed, Socrates, I am not able to anſwer you concerning ſcience as I am concerning length and power; though you appear to me to inquire after a thing of this kind. So that again Theodorus appears to be falſe.

Soc. But what? If, praiſing you for running, he ſhould ſay that he never met with any youth who ran ſo ſwift, and afterwards you ſhould be vanquiſhed in running by ſome adult who is a very rapid runner, do you think he would have leſs truly praiſed you?

Theæ. I do not.

Soc. But with reſpect to ſcience, (as I juſt now ſaid,) do you think it is a trifling thing to find out what it is, and not in every reſpect arduous?

Theæ. By Jupiter, I think it is arduous in the extreme.

Soc. Confide, therefore, in yourſelf, and think what Theodorus ſaid. Endeavour, too, by all poſſible means to obtain a reaſon both of other things, and likewiſe of ſcience, ſo as to know what it is.

Theæ. It appears we ſhould do ſo, O Socrates, for the ſake of alacrity.

Soc. Come then: for you explained juſt now in a beautiful manner. Endeavour, imitating your anſwer reſpecting powers, that juſt as you comprehended theſe, which are many, in one ſpecies, ſo you may comprehend many ſciences in one reaſon or definition.

Theæ. But know, O Socrates, that I have often endeavoured to accompliſh this, on hearing the queſtions which are diſcuſſed by you. But I can neither perſuade myſelf that I can ſay any thing ſufficient on this occaſion, nor that I can hear any one diſcourſing as you adviſe; nor yet am I able to deſiſt from inveſtigation.

[1] That is to ſay, the ſides or roots of oblong numbers, ſuch as the above, are incommenſurable in length, or are ſurds.

Soc.

Soc. You are tormented with the pangs of labour, friend Theætetus, not becauſe you are empty, but becauſe you are full.

Theæ. I do not know, Socrates: but I tell you what I ſuffer.

Soc. O ridiculous youth, have you not heard that I am the ſon of the generous, and at the ſame time ſevere, midwife Phænarete?

Theæ. I have heard this.

Soc. And have you alſo heard that I ſtudy the ſame art?

Theæ. By no means.

Soc. Know, however, that it is ſo: but do not betray me to others. For they are ignorant, my friend, that I poſſeſs this art; and in conſequence of being ignorant of this, they do not aſſert this reſpecting me, but they ſay that I am a moſt abſurd man, and that I cauſe men to doubt. Or have you not heard this?

Theæ. I have.

Soc. Shall I tell you the reaſon of this?

Theæ. By all means.

Soc. Conceive every thing pertaining to midwives, and you will eaſily underſtand what I mean. For you know, that none of them deliver others, while they yet conceive and bring forth themſelves, but when they are no longer capable of conceiving.

Theæ. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But they ſay that Diana is the cauſe of this; who being herſelf a virgin takes care of births. She does not, therefore, permit thoſe that are barren to be midwives, becauſe human nature is too imbecil to undertake an art in which it is unexperienced: but ſhe orders thoſe to exerciſe this profeſſion, who from their age are incapable of bearing children; by this honouring the ſimilitude of herſelf.

Theæ. It is likely.

Soc. And is not this alſo probable and neceſſary, that thoſe who are pregnant, or not, ſhould be more known by midwives than by others?

Theæ. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Midwives, likewiſe, by medicaments and enchantments, are able to excite and alleviate the pangs of parturition, to deliver thoſe that bring forth with difficulty, and procure a miſcarriage when the child appears to be abortive.

THEÆ. It is ſo.

SOC. Have you not alſo heard this concerning them, that they are moſt ſkilful bride-maids, as being perfectly wiſe, with reſpect to knowing what kind of man and woman ought to be united together, in order to produce the moſt excellent children?

THEÆ. I did not altogether know this.

SOC. But you know that they glory in this more than in cutting the navel. For do you think it belongs to the ſame, or to a different art, to take care of and collect the fruits of the earth, and again, to know in what ground any plant or ſeed ought to be ſown?

THEÆ. To the ſame art.

SOC. But in women, my friend, do you think the art pertaining to the care of offspring differs from that of collecting them?

THEÆ. It is not likely that it does.

SOC. It is not. But through the unjuſt and abſurd conjunction of man and woman, which is called bawdry, midwives as being chaſte avoid acting in the capacity of bride-maids, fearing leſt by this mean they ſhould be branded with the appellation of bawds, ſince it alone belongs to legitimate midwives to act as bride-maids with rectitude.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

SOC. Such then is the office of midwives; but it is leſs arduous than the part which I have to act. For it does not happen to women, that they ſometimes bring forth images, and ſometimes realities. But this is a thing not eaſy to diſcriminate. For, if it did happen, to diſtinguiſh what was true from what was falſe would be to midwives the greateſt and the moſt beautiful of all works. Or do you not think it would?

THEÆ. I do.

SOC. But to my art other things belong which pertain to delivery; but it differs in this, that it delivers men and not women, and that it conſiders their ſouls as parturient, and not their bodies. But this is the greateſt thing in our art, that it is able to explore in every poſſible way, whether the dianoëtic part of a young man brings forth an image, and that which is falſe, or ſomething prolific and true. For that which happens to midwives happens alſo to me: for I am barren of wiſdom. And that for which I am reproached by many, that I interrogate others, but that I do not give an

anſwer

anſwer to any thing, is truly objected to me, owing to my poſſeſſing nothing of wiſdom. But the cauſe of this is as follows: Divinity compels me to act as a midwife, but forbids me to generate. I am not, therefore, myſelf in any reſpect wiſe; nor is there any invention of mine of ſuch a kind as to be the offspring of my ſoul. But of thoſe who converſe with me, ſome at firſt appear to be entirely void of diſcipline, but all to whom Divinity is propitious, during the courſe of the converſation, make a wonderful proficiency, as is evident both to themſelves and others. This likewiſe is clear, that they do not learn any thing from me, but that they poſſeſs and diſcover many beautiful things in themſelves: Divinity indeed, and I being the cauſe of the midwife's office. But this is evident from hence: Many, in conſequence of not knowing this, but believing themſelves to be the cauſe, and deſpiſing me, perhaps through the perſuaſions of others, have left me ſooner than was proper; and after they have left me through aſſociating with depraved characters, have become as to what remains abortive. Likewiſe, through badly nouriſhing what they have brought forth through my aſſiſtance they have deſtroyed it, in conſequence of preferring things falſe and images to that which is true. Laſtly, they have appeared both to themſelves and others to be unlearned. One of theſe was Ariſtides the ſon of Lyſimachus, and many others; who when they again came to me, in conſequence of wanting my converſation, and being affected in a wonderful manner, ſome of them my dæmoniacal power reſtrained me from converſing with, but with others he permitted me to converſe, who at length made a conſiderable proficiency. For thoſe that aſſociate with me ſuffer this in common with the parturient; they are tormented, and filled with doubt and anxiety, and this in a far greater degree than the parturient. This torment my art is able both to excite and appeaſe. And ſuch is the manner in which they are affected. But ſometimes, O Theætetus, I very benignantly unite in marriage with others thoſe who do not appear to me to be pregnant, as I know that they do not require my aſſiſtance; and (as I may ſay in conjunction with Divinity) I very ſufficiently conjecture with whom it will be advantageous to them to be united. And many of theſe indeed I have delivered to Prodicus, and many others to wiſe and divine men. For the ſake of this, O moſt excellent youth, I have been thus prolix in relating theſe things to you. For I ſuſpect, as you alſo think, that you are tormented in conſe-

quence of being pregnant with ſomething internally. Commit yourſelf therefore to me as being the ſon of a midwife, and as being myſelf ſkilled in what pertains to parturition. Endeavour, too, cheerfully to anſwer me what I ſhall aſk you, and to the beſt of your ability. And if in conſequence of conſidering what you ſay, it ſhall appear to me that you have conceived an image, and not that which is true, do not be angry with me, like women who are delivered of their firſt child, if I privately remove and throw it away. For many, O wonderful young man, are ſo affected towards me, that they are actually ready to bite me, when I throw aſide any trifle of theirs, not thinking that I do this with a benevolent deſign; ſince they are very far from knowing that no divinity is malevolent to men, and that I do not perform any thing of this kind through malevolence. But it is by no means lawful for me to admit that which is falſe, and deſtroy that which is true. Again, therefore, from the beginning O Theætetus, endeavour to inform me what ſcience is; but by no means endeavour to ſpeak beyond your ability. For if Divinity is willing and affords you ſtrength, you will be able.

THEÆ. Indeed, Socrates, ſince you thus urge me, it would be baſe for any one not to offer what he has to ſay, with the greateſt alacrity. It appears then to me that he who has a ſcientific knowledge of any thing, perceives that which he thus knows; and, as it now ſeems, ſcience is nothing elſe than ſenſe.

SOC. Well and generouſly anſwered, O boy: for it is requiſite thus to ſpeak what appears to be the caſe. But come, let us conſider this in common, whether this offſpring is any thing ſolid or vain. Do you ſay that ſcience is ſenſe?

THEÆ. I do.

SOC. You appear, indeed, to have given no deſpicable definition of ſcience, but that which Protagoras [1] has given: though he has ſaid the ſame thing, in a ſomewhat different manner. For he ſays that man is the meaſure of all things; of beings ſo far as they have a being, and of non-beings ſo far as they are not. Have you ever read this?

[1] This ſophiſt was of Abdera in Thrace. He was the diſciple of Democritus, and an atheiſt. This his abſurd opinion that ſcience is ſenſe, may however be conſidered as the fountain of experimental philoſophy.

THEÆ. I have read it often.

SOC. Does he not, therefore, ſpeak thus: ſuch as particulars appear to me, ſuch are they to me; and ſuch as they appear to you, ſuch are they to you: but you and I are men?

THEÆ. He does ſpeak in this manner.

SOC. But do you not think it probable that a wiſe man will not triſle, nor ſpeak like one delirious? Let us, therefore, follow him thus: When the ſame wind blows, is not ſometimes one of us ſtiff with cold, and another not? And one in a ſmall degree, but another extremely cold?

THEÆ. This is very much the caſe.

SOC. Whether, therefore, ſhall we ſay, that the wind at that time is in itſelf cold or not cold? Or ſhall we be perſuaded by Protagoras, that to him who is ſtiff with cold, the wind is cold; but to him who is not, that it is not cold?

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

SOC. Does it, therefore, appear ſo to each?

THEÆ. Yes.

SOC. But for a thing to appear, is it the ſame as to be perceived?

THEÆ. It is.

SOC. Phantaſy, therefore, and ſenſe are the ſame in things hot, and every thing elſe of this kind. For ſuch as every one perceives things to be, ſuch they are and appear to be to every one.

THEÆ. So it ſeems.

SOC. Senſe, therefore, is always of that which has a being, and is without falſehood, as being ſcience.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

SOC. Whether or no, therefore, by the Graces, was Protagoras a man perfectly wiſe; and did he obſcurely ſignify this to us who rank among the vulgar, but ſpeak the truth to his diſciples in ſecret?

THEÆ. Why, Socrates, do you ſay this?

SOC. I will tell you, and it is by no means a deſpicable aſſertion. There is not any thing which is itſelf eſſentially one thing [1]; nor can you properly denominate

[1] This is true only of the ſenſible world; nor does Socrates make this aſſertion with a view to any thing elſe than the flowing and unreal condition of matter and its inherent forms. For the ſenſible world, as I have before obſerved in a note on the Orphic hymn to Nature, from its

denominate any thing, as endued with ſome particular quality. But if you denominate it as great, it will appear to be ſmall; and if heavy, light. And all things ſubſiſt in ſuch a manner, as if nothing was one thing, or any thing particular, or endued with a certain quality. But from their lation, motion, and mixture with each other, all things become that which we ſaid they were, and are not rightly denominated by us. For there is not any thing, which at any time *is*, but it is always in generation, or *becoming to be*. And in this all the wiſe in ſucceſſion conſent, except Parmenides [1]; viz. Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles: and of the poets, thoſe who rank the higheſt in each kind of poetry, in comedy, indeed, Epicharmus, and in tragedy, Homer. For when this latter calls Ocean [2] and mother Tethys the origin of the Gods, he aſſerts that all things are the progeny of flux and motion. Or does he not appear to ſay this?

THEÆ. To me he does.

SOC. Who then can contend againſt ſuch an army, and which has Homer for its leader, without being ridiculous?

THEÆ. It is not eaſy, O Socrates.

SOC. It is not indeed, Theætetus. Since this may be a ſufficient argument in favour of their aſſertion, that motion imparts to things the appearance of being, and of becoming to be; but reſt of non-being, and periſhing. For heat and fire, which generate and govern other things, are themſelves generated from lation and friction. But theſe are motions. Or are not theſe the origin of fire?

material imperfection, cannot receive the whole of divine infinity at once; but can only partake of it gradually and partially, as it were by drops in a momentary ſucceſſion. Hence it is in a continual ſtate of flowing and formation, but never poſſeſſes real being; and is like the image of a lofty tree ſeen in a rapid torrent, which has the appearance of a tree without the reality; and which ſeems to endure perpetually the ſame, yet is continually renewed by the continual renovation of the ſtream.

[1] See the Sophiſta and Parmenides.

[2] Ocean, conſidered according to its firſt ſubſiſtence, as a deity, belongs, according to the Grecian theology, to that order of Gods which is called intellectual, and of which Saturn is the ſummit. This deity alſo is called a fontal God, πηγαιος θεος, and is ſaid by Homer to be the origin of the Gods, becauſe he gives birth to their proceſſion into the ſenſible univerſe. In ſhort he is the cauſe to all ſecondary natures of every kind of motion, whether intellectual, pſychical, or natural. but Tethys is the cauſe of all the ſeparation of the ſtreams proceeding from Ocean, conferring on each a proper purity of natural motion. See more concerning theſe deities in the Notes on the Cratylus.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. They are.

SOC. And beſides this, the genus of animals originates from the ſame things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. But what? Is not the habit of the body corrupted by reſt and indolence, but for the moſt part preſerved by exerciſe and motion?

THEÆ. It is.

SOC. But does not habit in the ſoul poſſeſs diſciplines through learning and meditation, which are motions; and is it not thus preſerved and made better? But through reſt, which is negligence and a privation of diſcipline, it does not learn any thing, or if it does, it forgets it. Is not this the caſe?

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

SOC. Motion, therefore, is good, both with reſpect to ſoul and body; but reſt is the very contrary.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

SOC. I add further, with reſpect to times of ſerenity and tranquillity, and all ſuch as theſe, that reſt putrifies and deſtroys, but that other things preſerve. And beſides this, I will bring the affair to a concluſion by forcing the golden chain into my ſervice. For Homer intended by this to ſignify nothing elſe than the ſun [1]; becauſe, as long as the ſun and its circulation are moved, all things will be, and will be preſerved, both among Gods and men. But if this ſhould ſtand ſtill, as if it were bound, all things would be diſſolved, and that which is proverbially ſaid would take place, viz. all things would be upwards and downwards.

THEÆ. But Homer appears to me alſo, O Socrates, to ſignify that which you ſay.

SOC. In the firſt place, therefore, O beſt of young men, conceive thus reſpecting the eyes: that which you call a white colour is not any thing elſe external to your eyes, nor yet in your eyes; nor can you aſſign any place

[1] Agreeably to this explanation of Homer's golden chain, Plato, in the ſixth book of his Republic, calls the light of the ſun "a bond the moſt honourable of all bonds." Hence, according to Plato, the circulation of the ſun connects and preſerves all mundane natures, as well as its light; and as the ſun has a ſupermundane as well as a mundane ſubſiſtence, as we ſhall ſhow in the notes on the Cratylus, it muſt alſo be the ſource of connection to thoſe Gods that are denominated ſupermundane.

to it. For, if you could, it would now have an orderly poſition, and would abide, and be no longer in generation.

THEÆ. But how?

SOC. Let us follow what we juſt now ſaid, eſtabliſhing nothing as eſſentially one thing; and thus black and white, and any other colour, will appear to us to be generated from the darting forth of the eyes to a convenient lation. And every thing which we denominate a colour, will neither be that which darts forth, nor that which is darted forth, but ſomething between theſe, which becomes peculiar to every thing. Or do you ſtrenuouſly contend, that ſuch as every colour appears to you, ſuch alſo it appears to a dog, and every other animal?

THEÆ. Not I, by Jupiter.

SOC. But what with reſpect to another man? Will you contend that any thing appears to him in a ſimilar manner as to you? Or rather, that a thing does not appear the ſame to you, becauſe you are never ſimilar to yourſelf?

THEÆ. This appears to me to be the caſe rather than that.

SOC. If, therefore, that which we meaſure, or that which we touch, was great, or white, or hot, it would never, by falling upon any thing elſe, become a different thing, becauſe it would not be in any reſpect changed. But if that which is meaſured or touched by us, was either great, or white, or hot, it would not, in conſequence of ſomething elſe approaching to it, or becoming paſſive, become itſelf any thing elſe, as it would not ſuffer any thing. Since now, my friend, we are in a certain reſpect eaſily compelled to aſſert things wonderful and ridiculous, as Protagoras himſelf would acknowledge, and every one who aſſents to his doctrines.

THEÆ. How is this, and what things do you ſpeak of?

SOC. Take a ſmall example, and you will underſtand all that I wiſh. If we compare four to ſix dice, we ſay that the ſix are more than four, and that the two are to each other in a ſeſquialter ratio: but if we compare twelve to the ſix, we ſay that the ſix are leſs than, and are the half of, twelve. Nor is it poſſible to ſay otherwiſe. Or can you endure to ſay otherwiſe?

THEÆ. Not I, indeed.

SOC. What then? If Protagoras, or any other, ſhould ſay to you, O Theætetus, can any thing become greater or more in any other way than by being increaſed? What would you anſwer?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. If, O Socrates, I ſhould anſwer to the preſent queſtion, what appears to me to be the caſe, I ſhould ſay that it cannot: but if I ſhould reply to the former queſtion, in order that I might not contradict myſelf, I ſhould ſay that it might.

SOC. Well and divinely ſaid, by Juno, my friend. But, (as it appears) if you ſhould anſwer that it is ſo, that ſaying of Euripides might be adopted: for the tongue would be irreprehenſible for us, but not the mind.

THEÆ. True.

SOC. If, therefore, I and you were ſkilful and wiſe, after we had examined every thing belonging to our minds, we ſhould then make trial of each other from our abundance, and ſophiſtically approaching to this conteſt, ſhould make our arguments ſtrike againſt each other. But now, as being rude and unſkilful, we wiſh, in the firſt place, to contemplate the things themſelves in themſelves, that we may know what it is which we dianoëtically perceive, and whether we accord with each other, or not.

THEÆ. I wiſh this to be the caſe by all means.

SOC. And ſo do I. But ſince we are thus diſpoſed, let us in a quiet manner, as being abundantly at leiſure, again conſider, not moroſely, but examining ourſelves in reality, what the nature is of theſe appearances within us. And, on the firſt conſideration of theſe, we ſhall ſay (as I think) that nothing at any time ever becomes greater or leſſer, neither in bulk, nor in number, as long as it is equal to itſelf. Is it not ſo?

THEÆ. It is.

SOC. And, in the ſecond place, that to which nothing is either added or taken away, will neither at any time ever be increaſed, or corrupted, but will always be equal.

THEÆ. And, indeed, very much ſo.

SOC. And ſhall we not alſo ſay, in the third place, that a thing which was not formerly, but ſubſiſts afterwards, cannot exiſt without making and being made?

THEÆ. So, indeed, it ſeems.

SOC. Theſe three things, then, which are acknowledged by us, oppoſe each other in a hoſtile manner in our ſoul, when we ſpeak about dice, as above, or when we ſay that I, who am ſo old, am neither increaſed, nor ſuffer a contrary paſſion in myſelf; while you, who are a young man, are now

greater,

greater, and afterwards leſs, ſince nothing is taken away from my bulk, but yours is increaſed. For, through a length of time, I am what I was not formerly, being no longer in a ſtate of progreſſive increaſe: for without making, it is impoſſible that a thing can be made. But loſing nothing of my bulk, I do not at any time become leſs. And there are ten thouſand other things of this kind, which happen to ten thouſand other perſons, if we admit theſe things. Speak, Theætetus: for you appear to me not to be unſkilled in things of this kind.

THEÆ. By the Gods, Socrates, I wonder in a tranſcendent manner what theſe things are: and, truly, ſometimes looking at them, I labour under a dark vertigo.

SOC. Theodorus, my friend, appears not to have badly conjectured concerning your diſpoſition; ſince to wonder is very much the paſſion of a philoſopher. For there is no other beginning of philoſophy than this. And he who ſaid[1] that Iris is the daughter of Thaumas[2], did not genealogize badly. But whether do you underſtand on what account theſe things, from which we ſay Protagoras ſpeaks, are ſuch as they are, or not?

THEÆ. I do not yet appear to myſelf to underſtand.

SOC. Will you not, therefore, thank me, if I unfold to you the concealed truth of the conceptions of this man, or rather, of celebrated men?

THEÆ. How is it poſſible I ſhould not? Indeed, I ſhould thank you exceedingly.

SOC. Looking, round, therefore, now ſee that no profane perſon hears us. But *thoſe are profane who think there is nothing elſe than that which they are able to graſp with their hands; but do not admit that actions, and generations, and every thing which is inviſible, are to be conſidered as belonging to a part of eſſence.*

THEÆ. You ſpeak, Socrates, of hard and refractory men.

SOC. They are indeed, O boy, very much deſtitute of the Muſes: but there are many others more elegant than theſe, whoſe myſteries I am about to relate to you. But the principle of theſe men, from which all that we

[1] i. e. Heſiod in Theog. v. 780.

[2] i. e. Of *wonder*. Iris, therefore, being the daughter of Wonder, is the exciting cauſe of this paſſion in ſouls.

have juſt now ſaid is ſuſpended, is this:—That this univerſe is motion [1], and that beſides motion there is nothing. Likewiſe, that of motion there are two ſpecies; each of which is infinite in multitude, but that one ſpecies has the power of acting, and the other of ſuffering. From the congreſs and mutual friction of theſe a progeny is produced, infinite in multitude, but twofold in ſpecies: one, indeed, being that which is ſenſible, but the other ſenſe, which always concurs and ſubſiſts together with ſenſible. And the ſenſes, indeed, are denominated by us as follows, ſeeing, hearing, ſmelling, taſting, and the touching things hot and cold. Pleaſures and pains, deſires and fears, innumerable other paſſions without a name, and an all-various multitude which are denominated, follow theſe. But to each of theſe the ſenſible genus is allied, viz. all-various colours to all-various ſights; and in a ſimilar manner, voices to hearings, and other ſenſibles are allied to other ſenſes.

[1] Plato here preſents us with the ſubſtance of the atomical or mechanical philoſophy, which aſſerted that the univerſe was produced by nothing elſe but the motion of indiviſible particles, by means of which all things are generated and corrupted. It likewiſe aſſerted that all theſe ſenſible qualities which are noticed by the ſeveral ſenſes, ſuch as colours, ſounds, ſapors, odours, and the like, are not things really exiſting external to us, but paſſions or ſenſations in us, cauſed by local motions on the organs of ſenſe. This atomical philoſophy, according to Poſſidonius the Stoic, as we are informed by Strabo*, is more antient than the times of the Trojan war, and was firſt invented by one Moſchus a Sidonian, or rather, if we prefer the teſtimony of Sextus Empiricus †, a Phœnician. This Moſchus is doubtleſs the ſame perſon with that Moſchus the phyſiologiſt, mentioned by Jamblichus ‡ in his Life of Pythagoras. For he there informs us that Pythagoras, during his reſidence at Sidon in Phœnicia, converſed with the prophets that were the ſucceſſors of Moſchus the phyſiologiſt, and was inſtructed by them. Hence it appears that this phyſiology was not invented either by Epicurus or Democritus.

Plato, as may be collected from his Timæus, adopted this phyſiology: for he there reſolves the differences of the four elements into the different geometrical figures of their inſenſible parts; and in ſo doing he likewiſe followed the Pythagoreans. However, he differed from the atomiſts in this, as I have obſerved in the Introduction to the Timæus, that he aſſigned commenſuration and active fabricative powers to theſe inſenſible figures, which they did not; and he likewiſe differed from them in his arrangement of earth.

* Εἰ δει πιστευσαι τῳ Ποσιδονιῳ το περι των ατομων δογμα παλαιον εστιν, ανδρος Σιδονιου Μοσχου προ των Τροϊκων χρονων γεγονοτος. Lib. xvi.

† Adverſ. Mathemat. p. 367.

‡ Τοις τε Μοσχου του φυσιολογου προφηταις απογονοις και τοις αλλοις, και Φοινικιοις ἱεροφανταις.

What then is the intention of this diſcourſe, O Theætetus, with reference to the former? Do you underſtand what it is?

THEÆ. Not very much, Socrates.

SOC. But ſee whether it can in a certain reſpect be finiſhed. For it wiſhes to aſſert that all theſe things are, as we have ſaid, moved, and that there is ſwiftneſs and ſlowneſs in their motions. So far, therefore, as their motions are ſlow, they poſſeſs motion in the ſame, and towards things near, and thus generate. But things thus generated are more ſlow. And again, ſo far as their motions are ſwift, they poſſeſs a motion towards things at a diſtance, and thus generate: but the things thus generated are more ſwift. For they are borne along, and their motion naturally ſubſiſts in lation. When, therefore, the eye and any thing commenſurate to this generate by approximation, whiteneſs, and the ſenſe connate to this, which would never have been produced if each of theſe had been directed to ſomething elſe, then, in the interim, ſight tending to the eyes, and whiteneſs to that which together with it generates colour, the eye becomes filled with viſion, and then ſees, and becomes not ſight, but an eye ſeeing. But that which in conjunction with it generates colour becomes filled with whiteneſs, and is made not whiteneſs, but a thing white; whether it is wood or ſtone, or any thing elſe which may happen to be coloured with a colour of this kind. And in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to other things, ſuch as the hot and the hard, &c. we muſt conceive that no one of theſe is eſſentially any thing; but, as we have already obſerved, that all things, and of all-various kinds, are generated in their congreſs with each other, from motion. Since, as they ſay, there is no ſtability in conceiving, that either that which acts, or that which ſuffers, is any one thing. For neither is that which acts any thing till it meets with that which is paſſive, nor that which is paſſive till it meets with that which acts. For that which meets with and produces any thing, when it falls upon another, then renders that which is paſſive apparent. So that from all this, that which we ſaid in the beginning follows, that there is not any thing which is eſſentially one thing, but that it is always becoming to be ſomething to ſome particular thing, but is itſelf entirely exempt from being. Indeed, juſt now we frequently uſed the term *being*, compelled to this by cuſtom and ignorance; but, according to the aſſertions of the wiſe,

we ought not to predicate any thing, either of any other, or of myſelf, or of this, or that, or call it by any other name which ſignifies permanency, but we ſhould affirm according to nature, that they are generated and made, corrupted and changed. For, if any one aſſerts that they ſtand ſtill, he may eaſily be confuted. But it is requiſite thus to ſpeak of things ſeparately, and of many things collected together; in which collection, man, a ſtone, every animal, and ſpecies are placed. Do not theſe things, O Theætetus, appear to you to be pleaſant; and are they not agreeable to your taſte?

THEÆ. I do not know, Socrates: for I cannot underſtand reſpecting yourſelf, whether you aſſert theſe things as appearing to be ſo to you, or in order to try me.

SOC. Do you not remember, my friend, that I neither know any of theſe particulars, nor make any of them my own, but that I am barren of them? Likewiſe, that I act the part of a midwife towards you, and that for the ſake of this I enchant you, and place before you the doctrines of each of the wiſe, that you may taſte them, till I lead forth your dogma into light? But when I have led it forth, I then examine whether it appears to be vain and empty, or prolific. But boldly and ſtrenuouſly, in a becoming and manly manner, anſwer what appears to you to be the truth reſpecting the things I ſhall aſk you.

THEÆ. Aſk then.

SOC. Tell me then again, whether it is your opinion that nothing has a being, but that the good, and the beautiful, and every thing which we juſt now enumerated, always ſubſiſt in becoming to be?

THEÆ. When I hear you diſcourſing in this manner, the aſſertion appears to be wonderful, and it ſeems that what you diſcuſs ſhould be admitted.

SOC. Let us, therefore, not omit what remains. But it remains that we ſhould ſpeak concerning dreams, diſeaſes, and, beſides other things, of inſanity; likewiſe, concerning whatever is ſeen or heard, or in any other way perceived perverſely. For you know that in all theſe the doctrine which we juſt now related, will appear without any diſpute to be confuted; ſince the ſenſes in theſe are more deceived than in any thing elſe: and ſo far is it from being the caſe that things are ſuch as they appear to every one, that, on the contrary, no one of thoſe things which appear to have a being can in reality be ſaid to be.

THEÆ. You ſpeak with the greateſt truth, Socrates.

SOC. What then, O boy, can remain for him to ſay, who aſſerts that ſenſe is ſcience, and that things which appear to every one are to that individual what they appear to be?

THEÆ. I am averſe to reply, Socrates, ſince I know not what to ſay; becauſe juſt now when I was ſpeaking you terrified me. For, in reality, I cannot heſitate to grant, that thoſe who are inſane, or dreaming, think falſely, ſince ſome among the former of theſe conſider themſelves as Gods, and thoſe that dream think they fly like birds.

SOC. Whether or no, therefore, are you aware of this dubious queſtion concerning theſe particulars, and eſpecially concerning perceptions in ſleep, and when we are awake?

THEÆ. What queſtion is this?

SOC. That which I think you have often heard, when it is aſked, as at preſent, by what arguments any one can evince, whether we are aſleep, and all our thoughts are dreams, or whether we are in a vigilant[1] ſtate, and in reality diſcourſe with each other.

THEÆ. And indeed, Socrates, it is dubious by what arguments any one can evince this. For all things follow, as it were, reciprocally the ſame things. For, with reſpect to our preſent diſcourſe, nothing hinders but that our appearing to converſe with each other may be in a dream: and when in ſleep we appear to relate our dreams, there is a wonderful ſimilitude in this caſe to our converſation when awake.

SOC. You ſee, then, it is not difficult to doubt, ſince it is dubious whether things are dreams or vigilant perceptions; and eſpecially ſince the time which we devote to ſleep is equal to that which we devote to vigilance: and in each of theſe our ſoul anxiouſly contends, that the preſent dogmas are the moſt true. So that in an equal time we ſay that theſe things and thoſe are true; and in a ſimilar manner we ſtrenuouſly contend for their reality in each.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

SOC. The ſame may be ſaid, therefore, reſpecting diſeaſe and inſanity, except that in theſe the time is not equal.

[1] Senſe is nothing more than a dreaming perception of reality; for ſenſibles are merely the images of true beings.

THEÆ. Right.

SOC. What then? Shall truth be defined by the multitude and paucity of time?

THEÆ. But this, indeed, would be very ridiculous.

SOC. Have you any thing elſe by which you can clearly ſhow which of theſe opinions are true?

THEÆ. It does not appear to me that I have.

SOC. Hear, therefore, from me, what they will ſay who define appearances to be always true to thoſe to whom they appear. For I think they will ſay, interrogating you in this manner: O Theætetus, does that which is in every reſpect different, poſſeſs a certain power which is the ſame with another thing? And muſt we not admit, that a thing in every reſpect different is not partly the ſame, and partly different, but that it is wholly different?

THEÆ. It is impoſſible, therefore, that it ſhould poſſeſs any thing the ſame, either in power, or in any thing elſe, ſince it is altogether different.

SOC. Muſt we not, therefore, neceſſarily confeſs, that a thing of this kind is diſſimilar?

THEÆ. It appears ſo to me.

SOC. If, therefore, any thing happens to become ſimilar or diſſimilar to any thing, whether to itſelf or to another, ſo far as it is ſimilar muſt we not ſay it becomes ſame, but, ſo far as diſſimilar, different?

THEÆ. It is neceſſary.

SOC. Have we not ſaid before, that there are many, and indeed an infinite number of things which act, and in a ſimilar manner of things which ſuffer?

THEÆ. Yes.

SOC. And beſides this, that when one thing is mingled with another and another, it does not generate things which are the ſame, but ſuch as are different?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Shall we ſpeak of me and you, and other things after the ſame manner? As, for inſtance, ſhall we ſay that Socrates when well is ſimilar to Socrates when ill, or diſſimilar?

THEÆ. Do you mean to aſk whether the whole of Socrates when ill is ſimilar or diſſimilar to the whole of Socrates when well?

SOC. You underſtand me perfectly well. This is what I mean.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. I anſwer, then, that it is diſſimilar and different.

SOC. Whether, therefore, is it ſo, conſidered as diſſimilar?

THEÆ. It is neceſſary.

SOC. And would you ſpeak in a ſimilar manner reſpecting thoſe that are aſleep, and all ſuch particulars as we juſt now diſcuſſed?

THEÆ. I ſhould.

SOC. But does not each of thoſe things which are naturally capable of effecting any thing, when it receives Socrates as well, uſe me as a different man from what it does when it receives me as ill?

THEÆ. Is it poſſible it ſhould not?

SOC. And do we not generate from each things that are different, I being the patient, and that thing the agent?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. But when I drink wine, being well, it appears to me to be pleaſant and ſweet.

THEÆ. Certainly.

SOC. But, from what has been granted, an agent and a patient generate ſweetneſs and ſenſe, both being borne along together. And ſenſe, indeed, exiſting from the patient, cauſes the tongue to perceive; but ſweetneſs, from the wine being borne along about it, cauſes the wine both to be and to appear ſweet to a healthy tongue.

THEÆ. The former particulars were entirely allowed by us to ſubſiſt in this manner.

SOC. But when I drink wine, being diſeaſed, my tongue does not in reality receive it the ſame as before: for it now approaches to that which is diſſimilar.

THEÆ. It does.

SOC. But Socrates thus affected, and the drinking the wine again generate other things; about the tongue a ſenſation of bitterneſs; but about the wine, bitterneſs generated and borne along. And the wine, indeed, is not bitterneſs, but bitter; and I am not ſenſe, but that which is ſentient.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

SOC. I therefore, thus perceiving, do not ever become any thing elſe. For of a different thing there is a different ſenſe, which renders the perceiver various and different. Nor does that which thus affects me become a thing

of

of this kind, by concurring with another thing, and generating the ſame. For, generating another thing from another, it would become itſelf various.

THEÆ. Theſe things are ſo.

SOC Nor, indeed, am I ſuch to myſelf, nor is that thing generated ſuch to itſelf.

THEÆ. Certainly not.

SOC. But it is neceſſary that I ſhould become ſentient of ſomething, when I become ſentient: for it is impoſſible that I ſhould be ſentient, and yet ſentient of nothing. And it is likewiſe neceſſary that that thing ſhould become ſomething to ſome one, when it becomes ſweet or bitter, or any thing of this kind. For it is impoſſible that a thing can be ſweet, and yet ſweet to no one.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

SOC. It remains then, I think, that we ſhould mutually be, if we are; and if we are becoming to be, that we ſhould be mutually in generation; ſince neceſſity binds our eſſence. But it does not bind it to any other thing, nor yet to ourſelves. It remains, therefore, that we are bound to each other. So that, if any one ſays a certain thing is, or is becoming to be, it muſt be underſtood that it is, or is becoming to be ſomething, or of ſomething, or to ſomething. But it muſt not be ſaid that it is in itſelf either that which is, or which is becoming to be. Nor muſt we ſuffer this to be ſaid, either by the thing itſelf, or by any other, as the diſcourſe we have already diſcuſſed evinces.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo, Socrates.

SOC. Since that which affects me, belongs to me and not to another, do not I alſo perceive it, and not another?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. My ſenſe, therefore, is true to me. For it always belongs to my eſſence. And I, according to Protagoras, am a judge of things which have a being pertaining to myſelf, that they are, and of non-beings, that they are not.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

SOC. How then is it poſſible, ſince I am not deceived, and do not ſtagger in my dianoëtic part, either about things which are, or things in generation, that I ſhould not poſſeſs ſcientific knowledge of things which I perceive?

THEÆ. There is no reaſon why you ſhould not.

SOC. It was beautifully, therefore, ſaid by you, that ſcience is nothing elſe than ſenſe. And the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus, and all of this

tribe,

tribe, that all things are moved like ſtreams, accords with that of the moſt wiſe Protagoras, that man is the meaſure of all things; and with that of Theætetus, that, things ſubſiſting in this manner, ſenſe is ſcience. For do we not, O Theætetus, ſay, that this is as it were your offspring recently born, but delivered by me by the midwife's art? Or how do you ſay?

THEÆ. It is neceſſary to ſay ſo, Socrates.

SOC. But this, as it appears, we have ſcarcely been able to generate, whatever it may be. Since however it is delivered, celebrating the uſual ſolemnities on the fifth day after the nativity, let us run through a circle of diſputations, conſidering whether it does not deceive us, and is not worthy of being educated, but is vain and falſe. Or do you think that you ought by all means to nouriſh your offspring, and not abandon it? Or could you endure to ſee it reprobated, and not be very much offended if any one ſhould take it away from you, as being your firſt born?

THEO. Theætetus, Socrates, could endure this. For he is not moroſe. But by the Gods tell me, if this is not the caſe.

SOC. You are ſincerely a philologiſt, and a good man, Theodorus: for you think I am a ſack of diſcourſe, out of which I can eaſily take words, and ſay that theſe things are not ſo. But you do not underſtand the truth of the caſe, that no aſſertions proceed from me, but always from him who diſcourſes with me. Indeed I know nothing, except a ſmall matter, viz. how to receive a reaſon from another wiſe man, and apprehend it ſufficiently. And now I endeavour to determine this queſtion, by means of Theætetus, and not from myſelf.

THEO. You ſpeak well, Socrates; and, therefore, do as you ſay.

SOC. Do you know, Theodorus, what it is I admire in your aſſociate Protagoras?

THEO. What is it?

SOC. In other reſpects his aſſertion, that a thing is that which it appears to any one, is, I think, a very pleaſant one; but I wonder that at the beginning of his diſcourſe, when he ſpeaks of truth, he did not ſay, that a ſwine or a cynocephalus [1], or any other more unuſual thing endued with ſenſe, is the meaſure of all things, that he might begin to ſpeak to us magnificently, and in a manner perfectly contemptuous; evincing that we ſhould admire

[1] An animal which has nothing pertaining to a dog except the head.

him

him for his wiſdom as if he were a God, when at the ſame time with reſpect to underſtanding, he is not at all ſuperior to a little frog, much leſs to any other man. Or how ſhall we ſay, Theodorus? For if that of which each perſon forms an opinion through ſenſe is true to each, and no other *paſſion* [1] of any one judges better than this, and one perſon is not better qualified to judge whether an opinion is true or falſe than another, but, as we have often ſaid, every one is alone able to form an opinion of things pertaining to himſelf, and all theſe are right and true,—then why, my friend, is Protagoras ſo wiſe, that he is thought to be juſtly worthy of inſtructing others, and receiving a mighty reward for ſo doing, while we are conſidered as more unlearned, and are adviſed to become his diſciples, though each perſon is the meaſure of his own wiſdom? Or how is it poſſible not to ſay that Protagoras aſſerts theſe things in order to ſeduce the people? I paſs over in ſilence, what laughter both myſelf and my obſtetric art muſt excite; and beſides this, as I think, the whole buſineſs of diſcourſe. For will not the conſideration and endeavour to confute the phantaſies and opinions of others, ſince each is true, be nothing more than long and mighty trifles, if the truth [2] of Protagoras is true, and he does not in ſport ſpeak from the adytum of his book?

THEO. As I am a friend, Socrates, to Protagoras, as you juſt now ſaid, I cannot ſuffer with my conſent that he ſhould be confuted, nor yet am I willing to oppoſe your opinion. Again, therefore, take to yourſelf Theætetus; for he appears to have attended to you in a very becoming manner.

SOC. If then, Theodorus, you ſhould go to the palæſtræ at Lacedæmon, and ſhould ſee among thoſe that are naked ſome of a baſe form, would you not think it worth while to exhibit your own naked figure?

THEO. But what do you think, if, complying with my requeſt, they ſhould permit me, as I hope you will at preſent, to be a ſpectator without being drawn to the gymnaſium, my limbs being now ſtiff, and engaging in wreſtling with one who is younger, and whoſe joints are more ſupple than mine?

SOC. But if this be the caſe, Theodorus, and it is friendly to you, then, according to the proverb, it is not hoſtile to me. Let us, therefore, again go to the wiſe Theætetus. But anſwer me, in the firſt place, Theætetus, to what we juſt now diſcuſſed, Would you not wonder, if on a ſudden you

[1] Socrates here very properly calls ſenſe a *paſſion*; for it is a paſſive perception of things.

[2] Socrates ſays this in deriſion of what Protagoras calls the truth.

ſhould appear to be not inferior in wiſdom, either to any man or God? Or do you think that the Protagorean meaſure pertains leſs to Gods than to men?

THEÆ. I do not by Jupiter. And I very much wonder at your queſtion. For when we diſcuſſed in what manner it might be ſaid, that what appears to any one is true to any one, it appeared to me to be perfectly well ſaid, but now the very contrary has rapidly taken place.

SOC. My dear boy, you are as yet a youth, and are therefore eaſily obedient to and perſuaded by converſation. For to theſe things Protagoras or any one of his ſect would ſay: O generous boys, and aged men, you here ſit together, converſing and calling on the Gods, concerning whom, whether they are or are not, I do not think it proper either to ſpeak or write. Likewiſe hearing the things which the multitude admit, theſe you aſſert: and among others, that it would be a dire thing if every man did not far ſurpaſs every brute in wiſdom; but you do not adduce any demonſtration, or neceſſity, that it ſhould be ſo, but only employ probability. Which if Theodorus, or any other geometrician, ſhould employ when geometrizing, he would be conſidered as undeſerving of notice. Do you, therefore, and Theodorus conſider, whether you ſhould admit perſuaſion and probable arguments, when diſcourſing about things of ſuch great conſequence.

THEÆ. But, Socrates, both you and we ſhould ſay that this would not be juſt.

SOC. Now, however, as it appears from your diſcourſe, and that of Theodorus, another thing is to be conſidered.

THEÆ. Entirely another thing.

SOC. Let us, therefore, conſider this, whether ſcience is the ſame with ſenſe, or different from it? For to this in a certain reſpect the whole of our diſcourſe tends: and for the ſake of this we have agitated theſe particulars, which are both numerous and wonderful. Is it not ſo?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Do we then acknowledge that all ſuch things as we perceive by ſeeing and hearing, we at the ſame time ſcientifically know? So that for inſtance, ſhall we ſay, that we do not hear the Barbarians, when they ſpeak, before we have learned their language or that, without this, we both hear them and at the ſame time know what they ſay? And again, whether

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when ignorant of letters, but looking at them, we do not ſee them, or ſhall we ſtrenuouſly contend that we know, if we ſee them?

THEÆ. We ſhould ſay this, Socrates, that, if we ſee and hear things, we know them ſcientifically; and that in the latter of theſe inſtances, on perceiving the figure and colour we ſcientifically know the letters; and that in the former inſtance, we at the ſame time both hear and know the ſharpneſs and flatneſs of the ſounds: but that what grammarians and interpreters teach reſpecting theſe things, we neither perceive nor ſcientifically know by ſeeing or hearing.

SOC. Moſt excellently ſaid, Theætetus. Nor is it worth while to oppoſe you in theſe things, that you may thence make a greater proficiency. But conſider alſo this other thing which will take place, and ſee how it may be repelled.

THEÆ. What is that?

SOC. It is this: If any one ſhould aſk whether it is poſſible that a perſon can be ignorant of that which he has a ſcientific knowledge of, while he yet remembers it, and preſerves it, then when he remembers it. But I ſhall be prolix, as it appears, through deſiring to inquire whether any one does not know that which he has learnt and remembers.

THEÆ. But how is it poſſible he ſhould not, Socrates? For, otherwiſe, what you ſay would be a prodigy.

SOC. Do I, therefore, rave or not? Conſider. Do you not then ſay that to ſee is to perceive, and that ſight is ſenſe?

THEÆ. I do.

SOC. Has not, therefore, he who ſees any thing a ſcientific knowledge of that which he ſees, according to the preſent diſcourſe?

THEÆ. He has.

SOC. But what, do you not ſay that memory is ſomething?

THEÆ. Yes.

SOC. But whether is it of nothing or ſomething?

THEÆ. Of ſomething, doubtleſs.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, of thoſe things which he learns and perceives?

THEÆ. It is of ſuch things as theſe.

SOC. But what, does any one ever remember that which he ſees?

THEÆ. He does remember it.

Soc. Does he likewiſe when he ſhuts his eyes? or, when he does this, does he forget?

THEÆ. But this, Socrates, would be a dire thing to ſay.

Soc. And yet it is neceſſary to ſay ſo, if we would preſerve the former diſcourſe: but if not, it muſt periſh.

THEÆ. And I indeed by Jupiter ſuſpect ſo, though I do not ſufficiently underſtand: but tell me in what reſpect it muſt be ſo.

Soc. In this. We ſay that he who ſees any thing has a ſcientific knowledge of that which he ſees: for it is confeſſed by us that ſight and ſenſe, and ſcience are the ſame.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But he who ſees, and has a ſcientific knowledge of that which he ſees, if he ſhuts his eyes, he remembers indeed that thing, but does not ſee it. Is it not ſo?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. But not to ſee is not to know ſcientifically; ſince to ſee is to have a ſcientific knowledge.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. It happens, therefore, that when any one has a ſcientific knowledge of any thing, and ſtill remembers it, he does not know it ſcientifically, ſince he does not ſee it; which we ſay would be monſtrous, if it ſhould take place.

THEÆ. You ſpeak moſt true.

Soc. But it appears that ſomething impoſſible would happen, if any one ſhould ſay that ſcience and ſenſe are the ſame.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

Soc. Each, therefore, muſt be confeſſed to be different.

THEÆ. So it ſeems.

Soc. As it appears then, we muſt again ſay from the beginning what ſcience is. Though what ſhall we do, Theætetus?

THEÆ. About what?

Soc. We appear to me, like dunghill cocks, to leap from our diſputation, before we have gained the victory, and begin to crow.

THEÆ. How ſo?

Soc. Though we have aſſented to the eſtabliſhed meaning of names, yet

we appear to have contradicted this meaning, and to have been delighted in ſo doing, in our diſcourſe: and though we have confeſſed ourſelves not to be contentious but wiſe, yet we are ignorant that we do the ſame as thoſe ſkilful men.

THEÆ. I do not yet underſtand what you ſay.

SOC. But I will endeavour to explain what I underſtand about theſe things. For we inquired whether any one who has learnt and remembers a thing, has not a ſcientific knowledge of that thing: and we evinced that he who knows a thing, and with his eyes ſhut remembers it, but does not ſee it, at the ſame time is ignorant of and remembers it. But that this is impoſſible. And ſo the Protagorean fable is deſtroyed, and at the ſame time yours, which aſſerts that ſcience and ſenſe are the ſame.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

SOC. But this I think, my friend, would not be the caſe if the father of the other fable were alive, but he would very much defend it. But now, being an orphan, we reproachfully deride it. For the guardians which Protagoras left, and of which Theodorus is one, are unwilling to aſſiſt it. But we, for the ſake of juſtice, ſhould venture to give it aſſiſtance.

THEO. Indeed, Socrates, I am not one of the guardians of the doctrine of Protagoras, but this ought rather to be ſaid of Callias the ſon of Hipponicus. For we very rapidly betook ourſelves from mere words to geometry. Nevertheleſs, we ſhall thank you if you aſſiſt this doctrine.

SOC. You ſpeak well, Theodorus. Conſider, therefore, the aſſiſtance which I ſhall give. For he who does not attend to the power of words, by which, for the moſt part, we are accuſtomed to affirm or deny any thing, muſt aſſent to things more dire than thoſe we have juſt mentioned. Shall I tell you in what reſpect, Theætetus?

THEO. Tell us in common, therefore: but let the younger anſwer. For, if he errs, it will be leſs diſgraceful.

SOC. But I ſpeak of a moſt dire queſtion; and I think it is this. Is it poſſible that he who knows any thing can be ignorant of this thing which he knows?

THEO. What ſhall we anſwer, Theætetus?

THEÆ. I think it is not poſſible.

SOC. But this is not the caſe, if you admit that to ſee is to know ſcientifically.

ſically. For what ought you to reply to that inevitable queſtion, which, as it is ſaid, is ſhut up in a well, if any one ſhould aſk you, O intrepid man, whether, on covering one of your eyes with your hand, you can ſee your garment with the covered eye?

THEÆ. I think I ſhould ſay, Not with this, but with the other eye.

SOC. Would you not, therefore, ſee, and at the ſame time not ſee, the ſame thing?

THEÆ. I ſhould in a certain reſpect.

SOC. But he will ſay, I neither ordered you to anſwer thus, nor did I aſk in what reſpect you might be ſaid to ſee, but whether, if knowing a thing ſcientifically, you alſo did not ſcientifically know it. But now you confeſs that not ſeeing, you ſee: and prior to this you acknowledged, that to ſee was to have a ſcientific knowledge, and that not to ſee, was not to know ſcientifically. Think what will happen to you from theſe things.

THEÆ. I think the very contrary to what we admitted will take place.

SOC. But, perhaps, O wonderful youth, you will ſuffer many things of this kind, if any one ſhould aſk you whether it is poſſible to know ſcientifically, in an acute and dull manner, and near, but not at a diſtance; vehemently and with remiſſion, and in ten thouſand other ways. For an inſidious man, armed with a ſhield, and led to diſcuſſion by hire, when you admit ſcience and ſenſe to be the ſame, will drive you to hearing, ſmelling, and ſuch like ſenſes, and there detaining, will confute you, and will not diſmiſs you, till having admired his exquiſite wiſdom you are bound by him. And being thus brought into captivity and bound, you will be obliged to redeem yourſelf for a ſum of money which is agreed upon by him and you. But you will perhaps ſay, After what manner can Protagoras defend his opinions? Shall we endeavour to ſay ſomething elſe?

THEÆ. By all means.

SOC. But all this which we have ſaid in defence of him, will, I think, be ineffectual. For, deſpiſing us, he will ſay: That good man, Socrates, when he was aſked by a boy, whether any one could at the ſame time remember a thing, and be ignorant of it, was frightened, and in his fear denied that any one could; and, through being unable to look ſtraight forward, made me appear ridiculous in his diſcourſes. But, moſt ſluggiſh Socrates, the thing is thus: When by inquiry you conſider any one of my aſſertions, if he whom you

you interrogate anſwers in the ſame manner as I ſhould anſwer, and is deceived, in this caſe I am confuted. But if he anſwers in a different manner, he alone whom you interrogate is deceived. For, in the firſt place, do you think that any one would grant you, that memory can be preſent to him who no longer ſuffers a paſſion of ſuch a kind as he once ſuffered? It is far from being the caſe. Or do you think he would heſitate to acknowledge, that the ſame thing may at the ſame time be both known and not known? Or, if he ſhould fear to aſſert this, do you think he would admit that any one thing is diſſimilar to another, before it is itſelf made diſſimilar to that which has a being? Or rather, that this is ſomething, and not thoſe; and that thoſe will become infinite if diſſimilitude has a ſubſiſtence; admitting that it is requiſite to avoid the mutual hunting of words. But, (he will ſay) O bleſſed man, approach in a ſtill more generous manner to what I ſay, and confute, if you are able, my aſſertion, that peculiar ſenſes do not belong to each of us; or that, if they are peculiar, that which appears will not any thing the more belong only to one individual. Or, if it is neceſſary it ſhould exiſt, it may be denominated by him to whom it appears. But when you ſpeak of ſwine and cynocephali, you not only grunt yourſelf, but you perſuade thoſe that hear you to do this at my writings; and in this reſpect do not act well. For I ſay, that the truth ſubſiſts, as I have written: for each of us is the meaſure both of beings and non-beings. But one thing differs widely from another, becauſe they appear to one perſon different from what they do to another. I am likewiſe far from aſſerting, that there is any ſuch thing as wiſdom, or a wiſe man. But I call him a wiſe man who, changing the condition of him to whom things appear and are evil, cauſes them to appear and to be good to ſuch a one. Do not, therefore, purſue my diſcourſe in words only, but ſtill in a clearer manner thus learn what I ſay. And in order to this, recollect what was ſaid before, that to a ſick man the things which he taſtes appear and are bitter; but that to him who is well they are and appear to be the contrary. But it is not proper to make either of theſe the wiſer on this account: (for this is impoſſible) nor muſt it be aſſerted, that he who is ſick is an ignorant perſon, becauſe he entertains ſuch opinions, and that he who is well is wiſe, becauſe he thinks differently; but that he is changed into a different habit. For one habit is better than another. In a ſimilar manner, too, in erudition, there is a mutation from one habit to a better. But the phyſician

effects

effects a mutation by medicines, and the ſophiſt by diſcourſes. For no one can cauſe him who thinks falſely to think afterwards truly. For it is not poſſible for any one to have an opinion of things which are not, or of things different from what he ſuffers. But the things which he ſuffers are always true. And I think that he, who, through a depraved habit of ſoul, forms opinions of things allied to himſelf, may, through a good habit, be made to entertain opinions of different things, which ſome, through ignorance, denominate true phantaſms. But I ſay that ſome things are better than others, but that they are by no means more true. Likewiſe, friend Socrates, I am far from calling the wiſe frogs. But I call thoſe that are wiſe in things pertaining to bodies, phyſicians; and in things pertaining to plants, huſbandmen. For I ſay that theſe men inſert in their plants, when any one of them is diſeaſed, uſeful, healthy, and true ſenſes, inſtead of ſuch as are depraved: but that wiſe men and good rhetoricians cauſe things that are good to appear juſt to cities, inſtead of ſuch as are baſe. For ſuch things as appear to each city to be juſt and beautiful, theſe are to that city ſuch as it thinks them to be. But a wiſe man, inſtead of ſuch particulars as are noxious to cities, cauſes them to become and to appear to be advantageous. After the ſame manner a ſophiſt, when he is thus able to diſcipline thoſe that are inſtructed, is a wiſe man, and deſerves a great reward from thoſe he inſtructs. And thus ſome are more wiſe than others, and yet no one entertains falſe opinions. And this muſt be admitted by you, whether you are willing or not, ſince you are the meaſure of things. For this aſſertion is preſerved in theſe; againſt which, if you have any thing elſe which you can urge from the beginning, urge it, by adducing oppoſing arguments. But if you are willing to do this by interrogations, begin to interrogate. For neither is this to be avoided, but is to be purſued the moſt of all things, by him who is endued with intellect. Act, therefore, in this manner, leſt you ſhould be injurious in interrogating. For it is very abſurd, that he, who, by his own confeſſion, applies himſelf to the ſtudy of virtue, ſhould in diſcourſe accompliſh nothing elſe than injuſtice. But he acts unjuſtly in a thing of this kind, who does not exerciſe himſelf ſeparately in contending, and ſeparately in diſcourſing: and who in the former jeſts and deceives as far as he is able, but in the latter acts ſeriouſly, and corrects him with whom he diſcourſes; alone pointing out to him thoſe errors by which he was deceived, both by himſelf and the former

former diſcuſſions. If, therefore, you act in this manner, thoſe who diſcourſe with you will accuſe themſelves of their own perturbation and perplexity, but not you. They will likewiſe follow and love you, but hate themſelves, and will fly from themſelves to philoſophy; that, becoming different from what they were, they may liberate themſelves from their former habits. But if you act in a manner contrary to this, as is the caſe with the multitude, the very contrary will happen to you; and you will cauſe thoſe that aſſociate with you, when they become elderly, to hate this purſuit, inſtead of being philoſophers. If, therefore, you will be perſuaded by me, then, as was ſaid before, bringing with you a mind neither moroſe nor hoſtile, but propitious and mild, you will truly conſider our aſſertion, that all things are moved, and that whatever appears to any one, whether to an individual or a city, is that very thing which it appears to be. And from hence you will conſider, whether ſcience and ſenſe are the ſame with, or different from, each other; nor will you, as was the caſe juſt now, diſcourſe from the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of words and names, which drawing the multitude in a caſual manner, mutually involve them in all-various doubts. Such, O Theodorus, is the aſſiſtance, which to the utmoſt of my power I have endeavoured to give to your aſſociate. Theſe are ſmall things, indeed, from the ſmall. But, if he were alive, he would more magnificently defend his own doctrines.

THEO. You jeſt, Socrates: for you have very ſtrenuouſly aſſiſted the man.

SOC. You ſpeak well, my friend. But tell me: Do you take notice that Protagoras juſt now, when he was ſpeaking, reproached us, that when we were diſcourſing with a boy, we oppoſed his doctrines with a puerile fear; and beſides this, that forbidding us to jeſt, and venerating moderation in all things, he exhorted us to diſcuſs his doctrines ſeriouſly?

THEO. How is it poſſible, Socrates, I ſhould not take notice of this?

SOC. What then? Do you order us to obey him?

THEO. Very much.

SOC. Do you ſee, therefore, that all theſe, except you, are boys? If then we are perſuaded by him, it is requiſite that you and I, interrogating and anſwering each other, ſhould ſeriouſly examine his doctrine, that he may not have to accuſe us that we have again conſidered his aſſertion, jeſting, as it were, with young men.

THEO. But what? Will not Theætetus much better follow you in your inveſtigation than many that have long beards?

SOC. But not better than you, Theodorus. Do not, therefore, think that I ought by all poſſible means to aſſiſt your deceaſed aſſociate, but not afford you any aſſiſtance. But come, beſt of men, follow me a little, till we ſee this, whether you ought to be the meaſure of diagrams, or whether all men are, like you, ſufficient with reſpect to aſtronomy, and other things in which you deſervedly appear to excel.

THEO. It is not eaſy for him, O Socrates, who ſits with you, to refuſe an anſwer to your queſtions. But I juſt now ſpoke like one delirious, when I ſaid that you would permit me not to diveſt myſelf of my garments, and that you would not compel me like the Lacedæmonians. But you appear to me rather to tend to the manners of Sciron[1]. For the Lacedæmonians order us either to ſtrip or depart: but you ſeem to me rather to act like Antæus. For you do not diſmiſs him who engages with you, till you have compelled him to wreſtle with you in arguments, naked.

SOC. You have moſt excellently, Theodorus, found out a reſemblance of my diſeaſe. But I am, indeed, more robuſt than theſe. For an innumerable multitude of Herculeses and Theſeuses, who were very powerful in diſcourſe, have contended with me, and have been very much wearied: but, notwithſtanding this, I have not in the leaſt deſiſted; with ſo dire a love of this exerciſe am I ſeized. Do not, therefore, through envy, refrain from exerciſing yourſelf with me, and benefiting at the ſame time both me and yourſelf.

THEO. I ſhall no longer oppoſe you. Lead me, therefore, wherever you pleaſe. For it is perfectly neceſſary that he who is confuted ſhould endure this fatal deſtiny which you have knit; yet I ſhall not attempt to exert myſelf beyond what I promiſed you.

SOC. This will be ſufficient. But diligently obſerve this with reſpect to me, that I do not, through forgetfulneſs, adopt a puerile mode of diſcourſe, ſo as that we may again be expoſed to cenſure.

THEO. I will endeavour to do this, as far as I am able.

[1] This was a celebrated thief in Attica, who plundered the inhabitants of the country, and hurled them from the higheſt rocks into the ſea, after he had obliged them to wait upon him, and to waſh his feet. Theſeus attacked him, and treated him as he had treated travellers.

SOC.

Soc. Let us, therefore, again reſume this in the firſt place, which we diſcuſſed before, and ſee whether we properly or improperly reprobate the aſſertion of Protagoras, that every one is ſufficient to himſelf with reſpect to wiſdom. For Protagoras has granted us, that even ſome among the wiſe differ with reſpect to better and worſe. Has he not?

Theo. Yes.

Soc. If, therefore, he being himſelf preſent acknowledges this, and we do not admit it through his aſſiſtance, there is no occaſion to eſtabliſh it by reſuming the arguments in its favour. But now, ſince ſome one may conſider us as not ſufficient aſſertors of his doctrine, it will be better, as the caſe is, to aſſent to this poſition in a ſtill clearer manner. For it is of no ſmall conſequence whether this takes place or not.

Theo. It is true.

Soc. Not from other things, therefore, but from his own aſſertions, we acquire our mutual aſſent in the ſhorteſt manner poſſible.

Theo. How ſo?

Soc. Thus. Does he not ſay that what appears to any one is that very thing to him to whom it appears?

Theo. He does ſay ſo.

Soc. Therefore, O Protagoras, we ſpeak the opinions of a man, or rather of all men, and we ſay, that no one can partly think himſelf wiſer than others, and others partly wiſer than himſelf. But in the greateſt dangers, when in armies, or in diſeaſes, or in tempeſts at ſea, do not men look to the governors in each of theſe as Gods, and conſider them as their ſaviours; theſe governors at the ſame time being ſuperior in nothing elſe than in knowledge? And in all human affairs, do not men ſeek after ſuch teachers and governors, both of themſelves and other animals, as are thought to be ſufficient to all the purpoſes of teaching and governing? And in all theſe, what elſe ſhall we ſay, than that men are of opinion that there is wiſdom and ignorance among themſelves?

Theo. Nothing elſe.

Soc. Do they not, therefore, think that wiſdom is true dianoëtic energy, but ignorance falſe opinion?

Theo. Undoubtedly.

Soc. What then, O Protagoras, ſhall we aſſert? Shall we ſay that men always form true opinions; or that their opinions are ſometimes true and ſometimes falſe? For, from both theſe aſſertions, it will happen that they do not always form true opinions, but both true and falſe. For conſider, Theodorus, whether any one of the followers of Protagoras, or you yourſelf, will contend, that there is no one who thinks that there is not ſome one who is unlearned, and forms falſe opinions.

Theo. But this is incredible, Socrates.

Soc. But the aſſertion, that man is the meaſure of all things, neceſſarily leads to this.

Theo. How ſo?

Soc. When you judge any thing from yourſelf, and afterwards declare your opinion of that thing to me, then, according to the doctrine of Protagoras, your opinion is true to you; but, with reſpect to us, may we not become judges of your judgment? Or ſhall we judge that you always form true opinions? Or ſhall we not ſay that an innumerable multitude of men will continually oppoſe your opinions, and think that you judge and opine falſely?

Theo. By Jupiter, Socrates, there is, as Homer ſays, a very innumerable multitude who will afford me ſufficient employment from human affairs.

Soc. But what? Are you willing to admit we ſhould ſay, that you then form true opinions to yourſelf, but ſuch as are falſe to an innumerable multitude of mankind?

Theo. This appears to be neceſſary, from the aſſertion of Protagoras.

Soc. But what with reſpect to Protagoras himſelf? Is it not neceſſary, that if neither he ſhould think that man is the meaſure of all things, nor the multitude, (as, indeed, they do not think this,) that this truth which he has written ſhould not be poſſeſſed by any one? But if he thinks that man is the meaſure, but the multitude do not accord with him in opinion, do you not know, in the firſt place, that by how much greater the multitude is to whom this does not appear to be the caſe, than to whom it does, by ſo much the more it is not than it is?

Theo. It is neceſſary; ſince, according to each opinion, it will be and will not be.

Soc. In the next place, this thing will ſubſiſt in the moſt elegant manner. For he, with reſpect to his own opinion, will admit, that the opinion of thoſe that diſſent from him, and by which they think that he is deceived, is in a certain degree true, while he acknowledges that all men form true opinions.

Theo. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Will he not, therefore, admit that his own opinion is falſe, if he allows that the judgment of thoſe who think he errs is true?

Theo. It is neceſſary.

Soc. But others will never allow themſelves to be deceived; or do you think they will?

Theo. They will not.

Soc. Protagoras, however, from what he has written, will acknowledge that this opinion is true.

Theo. It appears ſo.

Soc. From all, therefore, that Protagoras has aſſerted, it may be doubted, or rather will be granted by him, that when he admits that he who contradicts him forms a true opinion, neither a dog, nor any man, is the meaſure of all things, or of any one thing, which he has not learned. Is it not ſo?

Theo. It is.

Soc. Since, therefore, this is doubted by all men, the truth of Protagoras will not be true to any one, neither to any other, nor to himſelf.

Theo. We attack my aſſociate, Socrates, in a very violent manner.

Soc. But it is immaniſeſt, my friend, whether or not we are carried beyond rectitude. For it is likely that he, as being our elder, is wiſer than we are. And if ſuddenly leaping forth he ſhould ſeize me by the ſhoulders, it is probable that he would prove me to be delirious in many things, as likewiſe you who aſſent to me, and that afterwards he would immediately vaniſh. But I think it is neceſſary that we ſhould make uſe of ourſelves ſuch as we are, and always ſpeak what appears to us to be the truth. And now then ſhall we ſay that any one will grant us another thing, that one man is wiſer or more ignorant than another?

Theo. It appears ſo to me.

Soc. Shall we ſay that our diſcourſe ought eſpecially to perſiſt in this to which we have ſubſcribed, in order to aſſiſt Protagoras,—I mean, that many things

things which are apparent are ſuch as they appear to every one, viz. things hot, dry, ſweet, and all of this kind? And if in ſome things it ſhould be granted that one perſon diffents from another, as about things ſalubrious and noxious, Protagoras would aſſert, that not every woman, boy, and brute, is ſufficient to cure itſelf by knowing what is ſalubrious, but that in this caſe, if in any, one differs from another.

THEO. So it appears to me.

SOC. With reſpect to political concerns, therefore, ſuch as things beautiful and baſe, juſt and unjuſt, holy and unholy, are ſuch opinions reſpecting theſe, as each city legally eſtabliſhes for itſelf, true opinions to each? And in theſe, is neither one individual, nor one city wiſer than another? But in the eſtabliſhment of what is advantageous, or the contrary, to a city, Protagoras would doubtleſs grant that one counſellor is better than another, and that the opinion of one city is more true than that of another. Nor will he by any means dare to ſay, that what a city eſtabliſhes in conſequence of thinking that it is advantageous to itſelf, is to be preferred before every thing. But cities, with reſpect to what is juſt and unjuſt, holy and unholy, are willing ſtrenuouſly to contend, that none of theſe have naturally any eſſence of their own, but that what appears to be true in common is then true when it appears, and as long as it appears. And thoſe who do not altogether ſpeak the doctrine of Protagoras, after this manner lead forth their wiſdom. But with reſpect to us, Theodorus, one diſcourſe employs us emerging from another, a greater from a leſs.

THEO. We are not, therefore, idle, Socrates.

SOC. We do not appear to be ſo. And indeed, O bleſſed man, I have often as well as now taken notice, that thoſe who have for a long time been converſant with philoſophy, when they go to courts of juſtice deſervedly appear to be ridiculous rhetoricians.

THEO. Why do you aſſert this?

SOC. Thoſe who from their youth have been rolled like cylinders in courts of juſtice, and places of this kind, appear, when compared to thoſe who have been nouriſhed in philoſophy and ſuch-like purſuits, as ſlaves educated among the free-born.

THEO. In what reſpect?

SOC.

Soc. In this, that theſe latter, always, as you ſay, abound in leiſure, and at leiſure peaceably diſcourſe, juſt as we at preſent engage in a digreſſive converſation for the third time. In like manner, they, if any queſtion occurs more pleaſing to them than the propoſed ſubject of diſcuſſion, are not at all concerned whether they ſpeak with brevity, or prolixity, if they can but be partakers of reality. But the others when they ſpeak are always buſily engaged; (for defluent water urges) nor is it permitted them to diſcourſe about that which is the object of their deſire; but their opponent places before them neceſſity, and the formula of a book, without which nothing is to be ſaid, which they call an oath reſpecting calumny, on the part of the plaintiff and defendant. Their diſcourſes too are always concerning a fellow ſlave, againſt the maſter, who ſits holding the action in his hand. Their conteſts likewiſe never vary, but are always about the ſame thing: and their courſe is often reſpecting life itſelf. So that, from all theſe circumſtrances, they become vehement and ſharp, knowing that the maſter may be flattered by words, and that they ſhall be rewarded for it in reality; and this becauſe their ſouls are little and diſtorted. For ſlavery from childhood prevents the ſoul from increaſing, and deprives it of rectitude and liberty; compelling it to act in a diſtorted manner, and hurls into tender ſouls mighty dangers and fears; which not being able to endure with juſtice and truth, they immediately betake themſelves to falſehood and mutual injuries, and become much bent and twiſted. So that, their dianoëtic part being in a diſeaſed condition, they paſs from youth to manhood, having rendered themſelves as they think ſkilful and wiſe. And ſuch are men of this deſcription, O Theodorus. But are you willing that I ſhould give you an account of men belonging to our choir, or that, diſmiſſing them, we ſhould again return to our propoſed inveſtigation; leſt, as we juſt now ſaid, we ſhould too much digreſs?

Theo. By no means, Socrates. For you very properly obſerved, that we, as being in the choir of philoſophers, were not ſubſervient to diſcourſe, but diſcourſe to us, and that it ſhould attend our pleaſure for its completion. For neither a judge nor a ſpectator, who reproves and governs, preſides over us, as is the caſe with the poets.

Soc. Let us ſpeak then, ſince it is agreeable to you, about the Coryphæi.

phæi[1]. For why ſhould any one ſpeak of thoſe that are converſant with philoſophy in a depraved manner? In the firſt place then, the Coryphæi, from their youth, neither know the way to the forum, nor where the court of juſtice or ſenate houſe is ſituated, or any other common place of aſſembly belonging to the city. They likewiſe neither hear nor ſee laws nor decrees, whether promulgated or written. And as to the ardent endeavours of their companions to obtain magiſtracies, the aſſociations of theſe, their banquets, and wanton feaſtings accompanied with pipers, theſe they do not even dream of accompliſhing. But whether any thing in the city has happened well or ill, or what evil has befallen any one from his progenitors, whether male or female, theſe are more concealed from ſuch a one than, as it is ſaid, how many meaſures called choes the ſea contains. And beſides this, he is even ignorant that he is ignorant[2] of all theſe particulars. For he does not abſtain from them for the ſake of renown, but in reality his body only dwells and is converſant in the city; but his dianoëtic part conſidering all theſe as trifling, and of no value, he is borne away, according to Pindar, on all ſides, geometrizing about things beneath, and upon the earth, aſtronomizing above the heavens, and perfectly inveſtigating all the nature of the beings which every whole contains, but by no means applying himſelf to any thing which is near.

THEO. How is this, Socrates?

SOC. Juſt, O Theodorus, as a certain elegant and graceful Thracian

[1] The virtues are either phyſical, which are mingled with the temperaments, and are common both to men and brutes; or they are ethical, which are produced from cuſtom and right opinion, and are the virtues of well-educated children; or they are political, which are the virtues of reaſon adorning the rational part as its inſtrument; or they are cathartic, by which the ſoul is enabled to withdraw from other things to itſelf, and to free itſelf, as much as the condition of human nature permits, from the bonds of generation; or they are theoretic, through which the ſoul, by giving itſelf wholly to intellectual energy, haſtens to become as it were intellect inſtead of ſoul. This laſt order of the virtues is that by which Plato now characterizes the Coryphæan philoſophers. The other virtues are alſo mentioned by him in other dialogues, as we ſhall ſhow in our notes on the Phædo.

[2] The multitude, as I have elſewhere obſerved, are ignorant that they are ignorant with reſpect to objects of all others the moſt ſplendid and real; but the Coryphæan philoſopher is ignorant that he is ignorant, with reſpect to objects moſt unſubſtantial and obſcure. The former ignorance is the conſequence of a defect, but the latter of a tranſcendency of gnoſtic energy.

maid-

maid-ſervant, is reported to have ſaid to Thales, when while aſtronomizing he fell into a well, that he was very deſirous of knowing what the heavens contained, but that he was ignorant of what was before him, and cloſe to his feet. In the ſame manner all ſuch as are converſant in philoſophy may be derided. For, in reality, a character of this kind is not only ignorant of what his neighbour does, but he ſcarcely knows whether he is a man or ſome other animal. But what man is, and what a nature of this kind ought principally to do or ſuffer, this he makes the object of his inquiry, and earneſtly inveſtigates. Do you underſtand, Theodorus, or not?

THEO. I do: and you ſpeak the truth.

SOC. For in reality, my friend, when a man of this kind is compelled to ſpeak (as I ſaid before) either privately with any one, or publicly in a court of juſtice, or any where elſe, about things before his feet, and in his view, he excites laughter not only in Thracian maid-ſervants, but in the other vulgar, ſince through his unſkilfulneſs he falls into wells and every kind of ambiguity. Dire deformity, too, cauſes him to be conſidered as a ruſtic. For when he is in the company of ſlanderers he has nothing to ſay reproachful, as he does not know any evil of any one, becauſe he has not made individuals the objects of his attention. Hence, not having any thing to ſay, he appears to be ridiculous. But when he is in company with thoſe that praiſe and boaſt of others, as he is not only ſilent, but openly laughs, he is conſidered as delirious. For, when he hears encomiums given to a tyrant, or a king, he thinks he hears ſome ſwineherd, or ſhepherd, or herdsman proclaimed as happy, becauſe he milks abundantly; at the ſame time, he thinks that they feed and milk the animal under their command in a more moroſe and inſidious manner. And that it is neceſſary a character of this kind ſhould be no leſs ruſtic and undiſciplined through his occupation, than ſhepherds; the one being encloſed in walls, and the other by a ſheep-cot on a mountain. But when he hears any one proclaiming that he poſſeſſes ten thouſand acres of land, or a ſtill greater number, as if he poſſeſſed things wonderful in multitude, it appears to him that he hears of a very trifling thing, in conſequence of being accuſtomed to ſurvey the whole earth. As often, too, as any one celebrates the nobility of his family, evincing that he has ſeven wealthy grandfathers, he thinks that this is entirely the praiſe of a dull mind, and which ſurveys a thing of a trifling

nature; through want of diſcipline being incapable of always looking to the univerſe, and of inferring by a reaſoning proceſs, that every man has had innumerable myriads of grandfathers and progenitors, among which there has often been an innumerable multitude of rich and poor, kings and ſlaves, Barbarians and Grecians. But when any one celebrating his progenitors enumerates five-and-twenty of them, and refers their origin to Hercules the ſon of Amphitryon, it appears to him a thing unworthy to be mentioned. For, as it is entirely owing to fortune that any one is able to enumerate five-and-twenty progenitors from Hercules, he would laugh even if any one could enumerate fifty from the ſame origin; conſidering ſuch as unable to reaſon, and liberate themſelves from the arrogance of an inſane ſoul. But, in every thing of this kind, the coryphæus we are deſcribing will be ridiculed by the vulgar, partly becauſe he will be conſidered by them as arrogant, and partly becauſe he is ignorant of and dubious about things before his feet.

THEO. You entirely, Socrates, ſpeak of things which take place.

SOC. But when any one, my friend, draws him on high, and is willing that he ſhould abandon the conſideration of whether I injure you, or you me, for the ſpeculation of juſtice and injuſtice, what each of them is, and in what they differ from all other things, or from each other; or that, diſmiſſing the inquiry whether a king is happy who poſſeſſes abundance of gold, he ſhould aſcend to the contemplation of a kingdom, and univerſally of human felicity and miſery, of what kind they are to any one, and after what manner it is proper for human nature to acquire this thing and fly from that;—about all theſe particulars, when that little ſharp ſoul ſo converſant with law is required to give a reaſon, then he in his turn is affected worſe than the coryphæus. For he becomes giddy, through being ſuſpended from a loſty place of ſurvey, and being unaccuſtomed to look ſo high. He is alſo terrified, filled with uncertainty, and ſpeaks in a barbaric manner; ſo that he does not, indeed, excite laughter in the Thracian vulgar, nor in any other undiſciplined perſon (for they do not perceive his condition), but in all thoſe whoſe education has been contrary to that of *ſlaves*. And ſuch, O Theodorus, is the condition of each; the one whom we call a philoſopher, being in reality nouriſhed in liberty and leiſure; and who, though he ought not to be blamed, yet appears to be ſtupid and of no value, when he engages in ſervile offices, ſince he neither knows how to bind together bundles of coverlids,

lids, nor to make ſauce for banquets, nor compoſe flattering ſpeeches. But the other of theſe characters is able to accompliſh all theſe ſervile offices with celerity and eaſe, but knows not how to clothe himſelf dexterouſly in a liberal manner; nor how in harmonious language properly to celebrate the true life of the Gods and bleſſed men.

THEO. If, O Socrates, you could perſuade all men to aſſent to what you ſay, as you have perſuaded me, there would be more peace and leſs evil among men.

SOC. But it is impoſſible, Theodorus, that evils ſhould be deſtroyed; (for it is neceſſary that there ſhould be always ſomething contrary to good) nor yet can they be eſtabliſhed in the Gods; but they neceſſarily revolve about a mortal nature, and this place of our abode. On this account we ought to endeavour to fly from hence thither, with the utmoſt celerity. But this flight conſiſts in becoming as much as poſſible ſimilar to divinity. And this ſimilitude is acquired by becoming juſt and holy, in conjunction with prudence. But, O beſt of men, it is not altogether eaſy to procure perſuaſion, that vice is not to be avoided, and virtue purſued, for the ſake of thoſe things which the vulgar adopt, viz. that we may not ſeem to be vicious, but may ſeem to be good: for theſe are, as it is ſaid, the nugacities of old women, as it appears to me. The truth however is as follows: Divinity is never in any reſpect unjuſt, but is moſt juſt. And there is not any thing more ſimilar to him, than a man when he becomes moſt juſt. About this, the true ſkill of a man, his nothingneſs and ſloth are converſant. For the knowledge of this is wiſdom and true virtue; but the ignorance of it, a privation of diſcipline, and manifeſt improbity. Every thing elſe which appears to be ſkill and wiſdom, when it takes place in political dynaſties, is troubleſome, but when in arts illiberal. It will be by far the beſt, therefore, not to permit him who acts unjuſtly, and who ſpeaks or acts impiouſly, to be ſkilled in any art, on account of his cunning. For a character of this kind will exult in his diſgrace, and will not think that he is a mere trifle, and the burthen of the earth, but he will conſider himſelf to be ſuch a man as ought to be preſerved in a city. The truth, therefore, muſt be ſpoken, that ſuch men as theſe are by ſo much the more that which they think they are not, from their not thinking the truth reſpecting themſelves. For they are ignorant of the puniſhment of injuſtice, of which

they ought by no means to be ignorant. For this puniſhment does not conſiſt, as it appears to me, in ſtripes and death (which thoſe who do not act unjuſtly ſometimes ſuffer), but in that which it is impoſſible to avoid.

THEO. What do you mean?

SOC. Since, my friend, there are two paradigms in the order of things, one of a divine nature, which is moſt happy, the other of that which is deſtitute of divinity, and which is moſt miſerable, theſe men, not perceiving that this is the caſe, through folly and extreme inſanity, ſecretly become ſimilar to one of theſe paradigms, through unjuſt actions, and diſſimilar to the other. But for ſuch conduct they are puniſhed, while they lead a life correſpondent to that to which they are aſſimilated. If, likewiſe, we ſhould ſay that theſe men, unleſs they are liberated from their dire conduct, will not, when they die, be received into that place which is pure from evil, but that after death they will always retain the ſimilitude of the life they have lived upon earth, the evil aſſociating with the evil,—if we ſhould thus ſpeak, theſe dire and crafty men would ſay that they were hearing nothing but jargon and reverie.

THEO. And very much ſo, Socrates.

SOC. I know they would ſpeak in this manner, my friend. But this one thing happens to them, that if at any time it is requiſite for them to give a reaſon privately reſpecting the things which they blame; and if they are willing to continue diſputing in a manly manner for a long time, without cowardly flying from the ſubject, then at length, O bleſſed man, this abſurdity enſues, that they are not themſelves pleaſed with their own aſſertions, and their rhetoric ſo entirely fails them, that they appear to differ in no reſpect from boys. Reſpecting men of this kind, therefore, let thus much ſuffice, ſince our diſcourſe for ſome time has been entirely a digreſſion. For, if we do not ſtop here, in conſequence of more matter always flowing in, the ſubject which we propoſed from the firſt to diſcuſs will be overwhelmed. Let us, therefore, return to our former inquiry, if it is agreeable to you.

THEO. Things of this kind, Socrates, are not unpleaſant to me to hear. For, in conſequence of my age, I can eaſily follow you. But let us, if you pleaſe, reſume our inquiry.

SOC. We were, therefore, arrived at that part of our diſcourſe in which we ſaid, that thoſe who conſidered eſſence as ſubſiſting in lation, and that a thing

thing which appeared to any one is always what it appears to be, to him to whom it appears, were willing ſtrenuouſly to aſſert this in other things, and not leſs ſo reſpecting what is juſt; as that what any city eſtabliſhes as appearing juſt to itſelf, this more than any thing is juſt, ſo far as it continues to be eſtabliſhed. But, with reſpect to good, no one is ſo bold as to contend, that whatever a city eſtabliſhes, through an opinion of its being uſeful to itſelf, will be uſeful to it as long as it is eſtabliſhed, unleſs any one ſhould aſſert this of a mere name. But this would be a ſcoff with reſpect to what we are ſaying. Or would it not?

THEO. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But does not a city conſider the thing named, and not merely the name?

THEO. Undoubtedly.

SOC. But that which it denominates, that it doubtleſs regards in the buſineſs of legiſlation, and eſtabliſhes all the laws, ſo far as it is able, moſt uſeful to itſelf. Or does it eſtabliſh laws, looking to any thing elſe?

THEO. By no means.

SOC. Does it, therefore, always accompliſh its purpoſe, or is it often deceived in its opinion?

THEO. I think it is often deceived.

SOC. If any one, however, ſhould inquire reſpecting every ſpecies, in what the uſeful conſiſts, he would ſtill more readily acknowledge this. But the uſeful in the buſineſs of legiſlation is in a certain reſpect concerning the future time. For, when we eſtabliſh laws, we eſtabliſh them that they may be uſeful in futurity.

THEO. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Let us, therefore, thus interrogate Protagoras, or any one of his votaries. Man, as you ſay, O Protagoras, is the meaſure of all things, of things white, heavy, light, and the like. For, as he contains a criterion in himſelf, and thinks conformably to the manner in which he is acted upon, he forms an opinion of things true to himſelf, and which are true in reality. Is it not ſo?

THEO. It is.

SOC. Shall we alſo ſay, O Protagoras, that he contains in himſelf a criterion of things future; and that ſuch things as he thinks will happen, ſuch things

things do happen to him thinking ſo? So that, for inſtance, when any idiot thinks that he ſhall be attacked with a fever, and that a heat of this kind will take place, but a phyſician is of a different opinion, which of theſe opinions ſhall we ſay will be verified in futurity? Or ſhall we ſay that both will be verified? and that the phyſician will not be affected either with heat or fever, but that the idiot will ſuffer both?

THEO. This, indeed, would be ridiculous.

SOC. But I think, likewiſe, that the opinion of the huſbandman, and not of the harper, would prevail, reſpecting the future ſweetneſs or roughneſs of wine.

THEO. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Nor would a maſter of the gymnaſium think better reſpecting that conſonance, or diſſonance, which would in future appear to him to be conſonant or diſſonant, than a muſician.

THEO. By no means.

SOC. And when a banquet is to be prepared, will not the opinion of a cook reſpecting its future agreeableneſs be preferred to that of any other perſon who is unſkilled in ſeaſoning? For we do not oppoſe the aſſertion reſpecting that which is, or was, agreeable; but, reſpecting that which in future will appear, and will be agreeable to any one, whether is every one to himſelf the beſt judge, or whether are you, O Protagoras, better able to foreſee what will probably take place in doubtful affairs than an idiot?

THEO. I think, Socrates, that Protagoras profeſſes in theſe greatly to excel all men.

SOC. O miſerable man! no one, by Jupiter, would have followed him, and given him a conſiderable ſum of money, if he had not perſuaded his diſciples that in future it would happen, and would appear to be the caſe, that neither any diviner, nor other perſon, would judge better than himſelf.

THEO. Moſt true.

SOC. But does not the eſtabliſhment of laws, and the uſeful, regard futurity? And does not every one acknowledge, that a city, though governed by laws, often neceſſarily wanders from that which is moſt uſeful?

THEO. Very much ſo.

SOC. We have, therefore, ſufficiently urged againſt your preceptor, that he muſt neceſſarily confeſs, that one man is wiſer than another, and that

ſuch

ſuch a one is a meaſure; but that there is no neceſſity that I, who am void of ſcience, ſhould become a meaſure, as his diſcourſe juſt now compelled me to be, ſince, whether I am willing or not, I am ſo.

THEO. From that, Socrates, it appears to me, that his doctrine is particularly convincing, and from this alſo, that it makes the opinions of others valid. But cities reprobate his aſſertions, and by no means think them to be true.

SOC. In many other things, Theodorus, it may be inferred, that not every opinion of every one is true. But, with reſpect to the paſſion preſent to every one, from which the ſenſes and opinions according to theſe are produced, it is more difficult to apprehend that they are not true. But, perhaps, I ſay nothing to the purpoſe. For, when they occur, they cannot be confuted: and thoſe who ſay that they are clear and ſciences, perhaps ſay the truth. And Theætetus here did not aſſert foreign from the purpoſe, that ſenſe and ſcience are the ſame. Let us, therefore, approach nearer, as the doctrine of Protagoras orders us, and conſider whether this eſſence, which is thus borne along, emits an entire or a broken ſound. For the contention about it is neither mean nor among a few.

THEO. It is very far, indeed, from being mean, but it is very much circulated about Ionia. For the followers of Heraclitus diſcourſe about it very ſtrenuouſly.

SOC. On this account, friend Theodorus, we ſhould rather conſider this affair from the beginning, in the ſame manner as it is diſcuſſed by them.

THEO. By all means, therefore. For, with reſpect to theſe Heraclitics, Socrates, or as you ſay Homerics, and ſuch as are ſtill more antient than theſe, about Epheſus, and who wiſh to be conſidered as ſkilful perſons, it is no more poſſible to diſcourſe with them than with men raging mad. For their writings are indeed borne along. But as to waiting patiently in diſcourſe and inquiry, and continuing quiet during queſtioning and anſwering, this is preſent with them leſs than nothing; or rather, theſe men are ſo far from poſſeſſing any reſt, that their privation of it even tranſcends that which is leſs than nothing. But if any one aſks them a queſtion, they immediately draw, as from a quiver, certain dark ænigmatical words, and dart them at you. And if you aſk the reaſon of this, they will again ſtrike you with another dark ſhower of words, but with the names changed. But you will

never bring any thing to a concluſion with them, nor do they ever conclude any thing among themſelves. Indeed, they take very good care that there ſhall not be any thing ſtable, either in their diſcourſe, or in their ſouls; thinking, as it appears to me, that this very thing itſelf is ſtable. But theſe are the weapons with which they ſtrenuouſly fight, and which, as far as they are able, they on all ſides hurl forth.

Soc. Perhaps, Theodorus, you have ſeen theſe men fighting, but have never ſeen them when peaceably diſpoſed. For they are not your aſſociates. But I think they ſpeak ſuch things as theſe, when at leiſure, to their diſciples, whom they wiſh to render ſimilar to themſelves.

Theo. What diſciples, bleſſed man? For, among men of this kind, one is not the diſciple of another, but they ſpring up ſpontaneouſly, wherever each of them happens to be ſeized with a fanatic fury; and at the ſame time each thinks that the other knows nothing. From theſe, therefore, as I juſt now ſaid, neither willingly nor unwillingly will you ever receive a reaſon. But it is neceſſary that we ſhould conſider the affair as if it was a problem.

Soc. You ſpeak to the purpoſe. But, with reſpect to the problem, we receive one thing from the antients, (who concealed in verſe their meaning from the multitude,) that Ocean and Tethys are the generation of all other things, that all things are ſtreams, and that nothing abides. But from the moderns, as being more wiſe, the thing is ſo clearly demonſtrated, that even curriers, on hearing them, are able to learn their wiſdom, and lay aſide their fooliſh opinion, that ſome things ſtand ſtill, and others are moved. And learning that all things are moved, they venerate the authors of this doctrine. But we have almoſt forgotten, Theodorus, that others evince the very contrary to this opinion; I mean, that the proper name of the univerſe is the immovable, and ſuch other aſſertions as the Meliſſeans and Parmenideans, oppoſing all theſe, ſtrenuouſly defend—as, that all things are one, and that this one abides in itſelf, not having a place in which it can be moved. What then ſhall we ſay to all theſe, my friend? For, proceeding by ſmall advances, we have ſecretly fallen into the midſt of both of them. And if we fly, without in any reſpect reſiſting, we ſhall be puniſhed like thoſe in the palæſtræ playing in a line, who, when they are caught on both ſides, are drawn in contrary directions. It appears therefore to me, that we ſhould firſt of all conſider thoſe with whom we began—I mean the flowing philoſophers—and,

if they appear to ſay any thing to the purpoſe, that we ſhould draw ourſelves together with them, and endeavour to fly from the others. But if thoſe who conſider the univerſe as ſtable ſhall appear to have more truth on their ſide, we ſhould fly to them from thoſe who move even things immovable. And if it ſhall appear that neither of them aſſert any thing ſufficient, we ſhall become ridiculous, in conſequence of thinking that we, who are men of no importance, can ſay any thing to the purpoſe, when we only reprobate men very antient, and perfectly wiſe. Conſider therefore, Theodorus, whether it is expedient to proceed into ſuch a mighty danger.

THEO. Nothing ought to prevent us, Socrates, from conſidering what each of theſe men ſay.

SOC. Let us conſider their aſſertions then, ſince you ſo earneſtly deſire it. It appears, therefore, to me, that this ſpeculation ſhould commence from motion,—I mean, what that motion is by which they ſay all things are moved. But what I wiſh to ſay is this: whether they ſay there is one ſpecies of motion, or, as it appears to me, two. Nor do I alone wiſh to know this myſelf, but that you alſo may partake, together with me, of this information, that we may in common be affected in ſuch a manner as is proper. Tell me, therefore, do you ſay a thing is moved when it changes one place for another, or is turned round in the ſame place?

THEO. I do.

SOC. Let this, therefore, be one ſpecies. But when any thing abiding in the ſame place becomes old, or, from being white, becomes black, or, from being ſoft, hard, or is changed by any other internal change, may not this be deſervedly called another ſpecies of motion?

THEO. It appears ſo to me.

SOC. It is neceſſary, therefore, that there ſhould be theſe two ſpecies of motion, viz. alliation, or internal change, and lation.

THEO. Rightly ſaid.

SOC. Having, therefore, made this diviſion, let us now diſcourſe with thoſe who aſſert that all things are moved, and thus interrogate them: Whether do you ſay that every thing is moved both ways, viz. according to lation and alliation, or that one thing is moved both ways, and another only in one way?

THEO. By Jupiter, I know not what to ſay, but I think they would reply, that every thing is moved both ways.

SOC. Otherwiſe, my friend, things would appear to them to be both moved and ſtand ſtill, and it would not be in any reſpect more proper to aſſert that all things are moved, than that they ſtand ſtill.

THEO. Moſt true.

SOC. Since, therefore, it is neceſſary they ſhould be moved, and that no one thing ſhould not be moved, all things will always be moved with every kind of motion.

THEO. It is neceſſary.

SOC. Conſider, likewiſe, this reſpecting their aſſertions,—I mean concerning the generation of heat, or whiteneſs, or any thing elſe. Do we not ſay that they aſſert, that each of theſe is borne along, together with ſenſe, between the agent and the patient? And that the patient, indeed, is ſenſible, but not yet become ſenſe: but that the agent is that which effects ſomething, but is not quality? Perhaps, therefore, quality may appear to you to be an unuſual name, and you do not underſtand me thus ſpeaking collectively. Hear me, then, according to parts. For the agent is neither heat nor whiteneſs, but becomes hot and white; and ſo with reſpect to other things. For do you not recollect that we have obſerved before, that nothing is any one thing eſſentially, neither that which is an agent, nor that which is a patient, but that from the concourſe of both with each other, ſenſe, and things ſenſible, being generated, ſome things became certain qualities, but others ſentient?

THEO. I recollect. For how is it poſſible I ſhould not?

SOC. As to other things, therefore, we ſhall omit the conſideration, whether they ſpeak in this manner concerning them, or not. But let us alone attend to this thing, for the ſake of which we are now diſcourſing; and let us aſk them, are all things moved, and do they flow as you ſay? For is not this what they ſay?

THEO. Yes.

SOC. Are they not, therefore, moved with both thoſe motions which we enumerated, viz. lation and alliation?

THEO. Undoubtedly; ſince it is neceſſary that they ſhould be perfectly moved.

Soc. If, therefore, they were only borne along, but were not internally changed, we might be able to ſay what kind of things flow that are borne along. Or how ſhall we ſay?

Theo. Thus.

Soc. But ſince neither a flowing white thing permanently continues to flow, but is changed, ſo that there is even a flux of its whiteneſs, and a tranſition into another colour, and we are not able to diſcover that it abides in this, can we with rectitude pronounce it to be any particular colour?

Theo. But how is it poſſible, Socrates, that we can pronounce this of a thing white, or of any thing elſe of a ſimilar kind, ſince, while we ſpeak about it, it is always privately departing, becauſe continually flowing?

Soc. But what ſhall we ſay of any one of the ſenſes, as of ſeeing or hearing? Does any thing in ſeeing or hearing ever abide?

Theo. This ought not to be the caſe, ſince all things are moved.

Soc. We muſt ſay, therefore, that neither does any one ſee more than not ſee, or uſe any other of the ſenſes more than not uſe them, ſince all things are in every reſpect moved.

Theo. We muſt ſay ſo.

Soc. But ſenſe is ſcience, as we ſay, I and Theætetus.

Theo. You do ſay ſo.

Soc. On being aſked, therefore, what ſcience is, we muſt anſwer, that it is not more ſcience than not ſcience.

Theo. So it appears.

Soc. An emendation, therefore, of the anſwer will very opportunely preſent itſelf to us, when we deſire to evince that all things are moved, in order that the anſwer may appear to be right. But this it ſeems will appear, that if all things are moved, every anſwer to every queſtion will be ſimilarly right which ſays, that a thing ſubſiſts and yet does not ſubſiſt in a certain particular manner, or, if you will, that it is in generation, that we may not ſtop them by our diſcourſe.

Theo. Right.

Soc. Except in this, Theodorus, that we ſhould ſay it is ſo, and yet is not ſo. But it is requiſite not even to ſpeak in this manner, (for neither will it be any longer moved thus, nor yet not thus,) but another word muſt be employed by thoſe that ſpeak in this manner, becauſe they have no words by which

they can denominate things according to their hypotheſis, unleſs, perhaps, they uſe the expreſſion *not in any particular manner*. But this will be particularly adapted to them, when ſpoken an infinite number of times.

THEO. It will thus, indeed, be accommodated to them in the higheſt degree.

SOC. We have therefore, Theodorus, done with your friend, nor can we grant him, that every man is the meaſure of all things, or any man, unleſs he is endued with wiſdom. Nor muſt we admit that ſcience is ſenſe, according to the doctrine that all things are moved; unleſs Theætetus here ſays otherwiſe.

THEO. You ſpeak moſt excellently, Socrates. For, theſe things being brought to a concluſion, it is proper that I alſo ſhould have done with Protagoras, according to our compact.

THEÆ. But not ſo, Theodorus, till you and Socrates have diſcuſſed the doctrine of thoſe who aſſert that the univerſe is immovable, as you juſt now mentioned.

THEO. As you are a young man, Theætetus, you teach thoſe that are advanced in years to act unjuſtly, by tranſgreſſing compacts. But prepare yourſelf to anſwer Socrates in the remaining part of this inquiry.

THEÆ. Doubtleſs I ſhall, if he wiſhes it: yet it would give me great pleaſure to hear what I mentioned.

THEO. You incite horſes to the plain when you incite Socrates to diſcourſe. Aſk, therefore, and hear.

SOC. But, O Theodorus, I appear to myſelf as if I ſhould not comply with Theætetus in his requeſt.

THEO. But why ſhould you not comply?

SOC. Though I ſhould be aſhamed to ſpeak concerning Meliſſus and others, who aſſert that the univerſe is one and immovable, leſt I ſhould appear to revile them in an inſolent manner, yet I ſhould be leſs aſhamed with reſpect to them than with reſpect to Parmenides. For, that I may uſe the words of Homer, Parmenides appears to me to be both venerable and ſkilful. For I was acquainted with him when I was very young and he was very much advanced in years, and he appeared to me to poſſeſs a certain profundity perfectly generous. I am afraid, therefore, leſt we ſhould neither underſtand the meaning of his words, and much more, leſt we ſhould be deficient

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in apprehending the conceptions contained in his writings: and what is greateſt of all, leſt with reſpect to the ſubject of our preſent inquiry, what ſcience is, we ſhould leave the conſideration of it unfiniſhed, through employing contumelious language. Beſides, the queſtion which we have now excited, and which contains in itſelf an ineffable multitude of particulars, would be unworthily treated, if diſcuſſed in a careleſs manner; and on the other hand, if it is extended to too great a length, it will prevent the diſcovery of ſcience. But it is proper that neither of theſe ſhould take place, but that we ſhould endeavour, by the obſtetric art, to free from confinement the fœtus of Theætetus reſpecting ſcience.

THEÆ. It is proper indeed to do ſo, if it ſeems requiſite to you.

SOC. Again, therefore, Theætetus, in addition to what has been ſaid above, conſider this. Do you ſay that ſcience is ſenſe or not?

THEÆ. I do.

SOC. If then any one ſhould aſk you, by what it is that a man ſees things white and black, and hears ſounds flat and ſharp, you would anſwer, I think, that it is by the eyes and ears.

THEÆ. I ſhould.

SOC. But to uſe nouns and verbs with facility, without entering into an accurate inveſtigation of them, is for the moſt part a thing not ignoble; but rather the contrary to this is ſervile. Sometimes, however, this is neceſſary: as in the preſent caſe we are compelled to examine whether your anſwer is right or not. For, conſider whether the anſwer is more right, that we ſee by, or that we ſee through, the eyes; and that we hear by, or that we hear through, the ears?

THEÆ. It appears to me, Socrates, that it is more proper to conſider the eyes and ears as things through which, rather than as things by which, we perceive.

SOC. For it would be a dire thing, O boy, if many ſenſes were ſeated in us, as in wooden horſes, and did not all of them tend to one certain idea, whether this is ſoul, or whatever elſe it may be proper to call it; and by which, through the ſenſes as organs, we perceive ſenſible objects.

THEÆ. This appears to me to be the caſe, rather than that.

SOC. On this account I diligently inveſtigate theſe things with you, that we may diſcover whether by one certain thing belonging to us we perceive things

things black and white, through the eyes, but certain other particulars through the other organs of ſenſe; and whether, when interrogated, you are able to refer all ſuch things as theſe to the body. But perhaps it will be better that you ſhould anſwer to theſe inquiries, than that I ſhould be entangled with a multiplicity of queſtions from you. Tell me, therefore: Do you admit that the things through which you perceive the hot and the dry, the light and the ſweet, belong each of them to the body, or to any thing elſe?

THEÆ. To nothing elſe.

SOC. Are you alſo willing to acknowledge that ſuch things as you perceive through one power it is impoſſible to perceive through another? As, that what you perceive through hearing you cannot perceive through ſeeing, and that what you perceive through ſeeing you cannot perceive through hearing?

THEÆ. How is it poſſible I ſhould not be willing?

SOC. If, therefore, you dianoëtically perceive any thing about both theſe, you do not accompliſh this through any other organ [1], nor yet through any other do you perceive reſpecting both of them.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly not.

SOC. But, with reſpect to ſound and colour, do you not, in the firſt place, dianoëtically conceive this concerning both of them, that both have a ſubſiſtence?

THEÆ. I do.

SOC. And, therefore, that the one is different from the other, and the ſame with itſelf?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. And again that both are two, and each one?

THEÆ. And this alſo.

SOC. Are you alſo able to conſider whether they are ſimilar or diſſimilar to each other?

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo.

SOC. But through what is it that you dianoëtically conceive all theſe things about them? For you can neither apprehend any thing common

[1] That is, this is not accompliſhed through any other organ than the dianoëtic power. Plato very properly here uſes the word διανοη, becauſe he is *ſcientifically* conſidering what *ſcience* is.

reſpecting

reſpecting them, through the hearing, nor the ſight. Further ſtill, this alſo is an inſtance of what we ſay. For, if it were poſſible to conſider this of both, whether or not they are ſalt, you know you would be able to aſſign that by which you conſidered this; and this would appear to be neither ſight nor hearing, but ſomething elſe.

THEÆ. But what ſhould hinder this power from operating through the tongue?

SOC. You ſpeak well. But with reſpect to that power which through a certain thing ſhows you that which is common to all things, and that which is common to theſe, and through which you denominate a thing to be, or not to be, through what inſtruments does it perceive the ſeveral particulars about which we were juſt now inquiring?

THEÆ. You ſpeak of eſſence and non-being, ſimilitude and diſſimilitude, ſame and different, and the two ſpecies of numbers. For it is evident that you inquire through what inſtrument of the body we perceive by the ſoul, the even and the odd, and ſuch other things as are conſequent to theſe.

SOC. You follow, Theætetus, ſurpaſſingly well; for theſe are the very things about which I interrogate.

THEÆ. But by Jupiter, Socrates, I know not what to ſay, except that which appeared to me at firſt, that there is not any peculiar organ to theſe as there is to ſenſible particulars, but it appears to me that the ſoul itſelf conſiders by itſelf ſuch things as are common in all things.

SOC. You are beautiful, Theætetus, and not, as Theodorus ſaid, deformed. For he who ſpeaks beautifully is beautiful and good. But, beſides being beautiful, you have done well with reſpect to me. For you have liberated me from a very copious diſcourſe, ſince it appears to you that the ſoul conſiders ſome things by itſelf, and others through the powers of the body. For this was what appeared to me to be the caſe, and which I wiſhed might likewiſe appear ſo to you.

THEÆ. It certainly does appear ſo to me.

SOC. Among what things, therefore, do you place eſſence? For this eſpecially follows in all things.

THEÆ. I place it among thoſe things which the ſoul itſelf by itſelf aſpires after.

SOC.

Soc. Do you ſay the ſame of the ſimilar and the diſſimilar, of ſame and different?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. But what of the beautiful and the baſe, good and evil?

THEÆ. It appears to me that the ſoul principally conſiders the eſſence of theſe in mutually comparing them with each other, and conſidering in itſelf things paſt and preſent with reference to ſuch as are future.

Soc. Take notice alſo of this: the ſoul perceives the hardneſs of a thing hard, through the touch, and in a ſimilar manner the ſoftneſs of a thing ſoft; or does it not?

THEÆ. It does.

Soc. But the eſſence of theſe, what they are, their mutual contrariety, and the eſſence of this contrariety, the ſoul endeavours to diſcriminate by retiring into herſelf, and comparing them with each other.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But is not a power of perceiving ſuch paſſions as extend to the ſoul through the body naturally preſent both with men and brutes, as ſoon as they are born? And is not reaſoning about the eſſence and utility of theſe, generated in thoſe in whom it is generated, with difficulty, in a long courſe of time, through a variety of particulars, and through diſcipline?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Can we, therefore, apprehend the truth by that by which we cannot apprehend eſſence?

THEÆ. Impoſſible.

Soc. But can any one poſſeſs ſcience of a thing, when at the ſame time he does not apprehend the truth of that thing?

THEÆ. But how can he, Socrates?

Soc. Science, therefore, is not inherent in paſſions, but is inherent in a reaſoning proceſs about them. For by this, as it appears, we may be able to touch upon eſſence and truth? But this cannot be effected by paſſions.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

Soc. Can you, therefore, call paſſion and ſcience the ſame thing, when there is ſuch a great difference between them?

THEÆ. It would not be juſt to do ſo.

Soc. But what name do you give to ſeeing, hearing, ſmelling, taſting, becoming hot, and becoming cold?

Theæ. I ſhould give to all theſe the name of perception. For what other name can be given to them?

Soc. Do you, therefore, call the whole of this ſenſe?

Theæ. Neceſſarily ſo.

Soc. But we ſaid that this was not capable of touching upon truth, becauſe it could not apprehend the eſſence of a thing.

Theæ. It certainly cannot.

Soc. Neither, therefore, can it touch upon ſcience.

Theæ. It cannot.

Soc. Science, therefore, and ſenſe, Theætetus, can never be the ſame.

Theæ. It appears, Socrates, they cannot.

Soc. And now it becomes moſt eminently apparent, that ſcience is ſomething different from ſenſe. But we did not begin this converſation for the ſake of finding out what ſcience is not, but that we might diſcover what it is. At the ſame time, we have advanced thus far, as to be convinced that we muſt not at all ſeek for it in ſenſe, but in that name which the ſoul then poſſeſſes when it is converſant with beings, itſelf by itſelf.

Theæ. But this, Socrates, is I think called *to opine*.

Soc. You ſuſpect [1] rightly, my friend. And now again conſider from the beginning, obliterating all that has been already ſaid, whether you can ſee more clearly, ſince we have proceeded thus far. And again tell me what ſcience is.

Theæ. It is impoſſible, Socrates, to ſay that every opinion is ſcience, becauſe there are falſe opinions. But it appears that true opinion is ſcience. And this is my anſwer. But if in the courſe of the inquiry it ſhall not appear to be ſo, as it does at preſent, I ſhall endeavour to ſay ſomething elſe.

[1] Socrates, in ſaying that Theætetus *ſuſpects rightly*, indicates that he has not a dianoëtic and ſcientific conception of the name in which ſcience is to be found. For this name is *dianoia*, or the dianoëtic power of the ſoul, whoſe very eſſence, as we have elſewhere obſerved, conſiſts in reaſoning ſcientifically. Hence he very properly ſays ορθως γαρ οιει, You ſuſpect rightly. For his conception was nothing more than a vague conjecture or ſuſpicion; at the ſame time that it was as *accurate* as could be obtained by mere ſuſpicion.

Soc. In this manner, Theætetus, it is proper to act—I mean, to ſpeak with alacrity, and not, as you were at firſt, be averſe to anſwer. For, if we thus conduct ourſelves, we ſhall either find that which is the object of our ſearch, or we ſhall in a leſs degree think that we know that which we do not by any means know. Nor will a thing of this kind be a deſpicable gain. And now then what do you ſay? Since there are two ſpecies of opinion, one true, and the other falſe, do you define ſcience to be true opinion?

THEÆ. I do. For this now appears to me to be the caſe.

Soc. Is it, therefore, worth while again to reſume the diſcourſe about opinion?

THEÆ. What do you mean?

Soc. I am now diſturbed, and often have been, ſo that I am involved in much doubt, both with reſpect to myſelf and others, as I am not able to ſay what this paſſion in us is, and after what manner it is generated in the ſoul.

THEÆ. How is this?

Soc. I am now ſpeaking of falſe opinion; and am conſidering whether we ſhall omit the diſcuſſion of it, or ſpeculate about it in a different manner from what we did a little before.

THEÆ. But why ſhould you be dubious in this affair, Socrates, if you ſee the manner in which it is proper to act? For you and Theodorus ſaid juſt now not badly, reſpecting leiſure, that nothing urges in inquiries of this kind.

Soc. You very properly remind me. For perhaps it will not be foreign from the purpoſe again to tread in the ſame ſteps. For it is better to finiſh a little well, than much inſufficiently.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. What then ſhall we ſay? Shall we ſay that every opinion is falſe? or that ſome of us entertain falſe opinions, and others true—as if this was naturally the caſe with reſpect to opinions?

THEÆ. We ſhould doubtleſs ſpeak in this manner.

Soc. Does not this happen to us, as well about all things, as about each thing, that we either know or do not know? For at preſent I omit to ſpeak of learning and forgetting, as ſubſiſting between theſe, becauſe it contributes nothing to our deſign.

THEÆ. But, Socrates, nothing elſe remains reſpecting every particular, except knowing or not knowing it.

Soc.

Soc. Is it not therefore neceſſary, that he who forms an opinion ſhould either form an opinion of things of which he knows ſomething, or of things of which he knows nothing?

THEÆ. It is neceſſary.

Soc. Is it not likewiſe impoſſible, that he who knows a thing ſhould not know it, or that he who does not know it ſhould know it?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Does, therefore, he who opines falſely reſpecting the things which he knows, opine that theſe are not the things which he knows, but different from them, but of which he has at the ſame time a knowledge? And though he knows both, is he ignorant of both?

THEÆ. But this, Socrates, is impoſſible.

Soc. Does he, therefore, think that the things of which he is ignorant are certain other things of which likewiſe he is ignorant? And can he who neither knows Theætetus nor Socrates ever be induced to think that Socrates is Theætetus, or Theætetus Socrates?

THEÆ. How is it poſſible he can?

Soc. Nor, again, can any one think that the things which he knows are the ſame as thoſe of which he is ignorant; or that the things of which he is ignorant are the ſame as thoſe which he knows.

THEÆ. For this would be monſtrous.

Soc. How then can any one entertain falſe opinions? For it is impoſſible to opine in ways different from theſe; ſince we either know or do not know all things. But in theſe it by no means appears poſſible to opine falſely.

THEÆ. Moſt true.

Soc. Whether, therefore, ought we to conſider the object of our inquiry, not by proceeding according to knowing and not knowing, but according to being and non-being?

THEÆ. How do you ſay?

Soc. It is not a ſimple thing; becauſe he who, with reſpect to any thing, opines things which are not, muſt unavoidably opine falſely, in whatever manner the particulars pertaining to his dianoëtic part may ſubſiſt.

THEÆ. It is proper it ſhould be ſo, Socrates.

Soc. How then ſhall we anſwer, Theætetus, if any one ſhould aſk us (but it is poſſible that what I ſay may take place), What man can opine that which is not, whether reſpecting beings themſelves, or whether conſidered itſelf by itſelf? To this, as it appears, we ſhould reply, that he can then opine about that which is not, when opining he does not opine the truth. Or how ſhall we ſay?

THEÆ. In this manner.

Soc. Does a thing of this kind, therefore, take place elſewhere?

THEÆ. Of what kind?

Soc. That ſome one ſees ſomething, and yet ſees nothing.

THEÆ. But how can he?

Soc. But if he ſees one certain thing, he ſees ſomething which ranks among beings. Or do you think that *the one* does not rank among beings?

THEÆ. I do not.

Soc. He, therefore, who ſees one certain thing ſees a certain being.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

Soc. And, therefore, he who hears a certain thing hears one certain thing, and a certain being.

THEÆ. He does ſo.

Soc. And does not he alſo who touches a certain thing touch one certain thing, and that which has a being, ſince it is one thing?

THEÆ. And this alſo.

Soc. And does not he who opines opine one certain thing?

THEÆ. I grant it.

Soc. He, therefore, who opines that which has no being opines nothing.

THEÆ. So it appears.

Soc. But he who opines nothing does not opine in any reſpect.

THEÆ. It is evident, as it appears.

Soc. It is impoſſible, therefore, to opine that which is not, either about beings, or itſelf by itſelf.

THEÆ. So it appears.

Soc. To opine falſely, therefore, differs from opining things which are not.

THEÆ. It appears that it differs.

Soc.

Soc. For neither is falſe opinion inherent in us in this manner, nor in the manner which we conſidered a little before.

Theæ. It is not.

Soc. Perhaps, therefore, we may denominate this as follows.

Theæ. How?

Soc. We ſay that a certain foreign opinion is a falſe opinion, when ſome one, by an alteration in his dianoëtic energy, ſays that a certain thing is a different thing. For thus he always opines that which has a being, but he opines one thing inſtead of another; and, in conſequence of erring in that which he conſiders, he may be juſtly ſaid to opine falſely.

Theæ. You now appear to me to have ſpoken with the greateſt rectitude. For, when any one opines that which is deformed inſtead of that which is beautiful, or that which is beautiful inſtead of that which is deformed, then he truly opines falſely.

Soc. It is evident, Theætetus, that you deſpiſe, and do not reverence me.

Theæ. In what reſpect?

Soc. I do not think I appear to you to have apprehended that which is truly falſe, when aſked whether the ſwift and the ſlow, the light and the heavy, or any other contraries, do not become contrary to themſelves, according to their own nature, but according to the nature of things which are contrary to them. This, therefore, I diſmiſs, leſt you ſhould be confident in vain. But is it agreeable to you, as you ſay, that to opine falſely is the ſame as to opine foreign to the purpoſe?

Theæ. It is.

Soc. It is poſſible, therefore, according to your opinion, to eſtabliſh by the dianoëtic power one thing as another, and not as that thing which it is [1].

Theæ. It is poſſible.

Soc. When, therefore, the dianoëtic power does this, is it not neceſſary that it ſhould either cogitate about both theſe, or about one of them?

Theæ. It is neceſſary.

Soc. And, therefore, it muſt either cogitate about them both together, or ſeparately.

[1] This is effected when the dianoëtic power converts itſelf to imagination, and in conſequence of this produces falſe reaſoning.

Theæ.

THEÆ. Moſt excellent.

SOC. But do you call dianoëtic energy the ſame as I do?

THEÆ. What do you call it?

SOC. The diſcourſe which the ſoul itſelf evolves in itſelf about the objects of its conſideration. I explain the thing to you like an unſkilful perſon. For the ſoul, when it energizes dianoëtically, appears to me to do nothing elſe than diſcourſe with itſelf[1], by interrogating and anſwering, affirming and denying. But when, having defined, it aſſerts without oppoſition, whether more ſlowly or more rapidly, then I call this opinion[2]. So that I denominate to opine, to ſpeak, and opinion, a diſcourſe not directed to any other, nor accompanied with voice, but directed to itſelf. But what do you call it?

THEÆ. The ſame.

SOC. When any one, therefore, opines that one thing is another, he ſays to himſelf, as it appears, that one thing is another.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Recollect, whether if at any time you ſay to yourſelf, that the beautiful is more than any thing baſe, or that the unjuſt is juſt, or, which is the ſummit of all, whether you ever attempt to perſuade yourſelf, that that which is one thing is more than any thing another thing. Or, on the contrary, have you never dared even in ſleep to ſay to yourſelf, that things even are entirely odd, or any thing elſe of this kind?

THEÆ. Certainly never.

SOC. Do you think, then, that any other perſon, whether he is in a ſane or an inſane condition, will ſeriouſly dare to ſay to himſelf, and this accompanied with perſuaſion, that a horſe is neceſſarily an ox, or two things one thing?

THEÆ. By Jupiter, I do not.

SOC. If, therefore, to opine is for a man to ſpeak to himſelf, no one, while he ſays and opines both theſe, and touches upon both with his ſoul, will ſay and opine that one of thoſe is the other. But we will diſmiſs, if you

[1] As the dianoëtic is accurately conſidered a ſcientific energy, it is very properly defined by Socrates to be a diſcourſe of the ſoul with itſelf. Or, in other words, it is an energy of the rational ſoul, directed to itſelf, and not converted to the phantaſy.

[2] Opinion is the concluſion of the dianoëtic energy. See the Sophiſta.

pleaſe,

pleaſe, this word *the other*. For my meaning is this: that no one will opine that the baſe is the beautiful, or any thing elſe of this kind.

THEÆ. You have my permiſſion, Socrates, to diſmiſs this word; and the caſe appears to me to be as you ſay.

SOC. He, therefore, who opines both theſe cannot opine that one of them is the other.

THEÆ. So it appears.

SOC. And again, he who only opines one of theſe, but by no means the other, can never opine that one of them is the other.

THEÆ. True. For he would be compelled to touch upon that about which he does not opine.

SOC. Neither, therefore, can he who opines both, nor he who only opines one of them, opine foreign to the purpoſe. So that he will ſay nothing, who defines falſe opinion to be heterodoxy. For neither will falſe opinion appear to reſide in us in this manner, nor in that which we have already mentioned.

THEÆ. It does not appear that it will.

SOC. But, Theætetus, if this ſhould not appear to be the caſe, we ſhould be compelled to confeſs many things, and of an abſurd nature.

THEÆ. What are theſe?

SOC. I will not tell you, till I have endeavoured to conſider the affair in every poſſible way. For I ſhould be aſhamed, with reſpect to that of which we are in doubt, if we were compelled to confeſs what I now ſay. But if we ſhall diſcover the object of our ſearch, and become free, then we may ſpeak concerning others, as ſuffering theſe things, while we ſhall be raiſed beyond the reach of ridicule. But if we ſhould be involved in inextricable doubts, and thus become abject, and filled with nauſea, then, I think, we ſhould permit our diſcourſe to trample on us, and uſe us as it pleaſes. Hear, then, whether I have found out any paſſage to the object of our inquiry.

THEÆ. Only ſpeak.

SOC. I ſhall not ſay that we rightly conſented, when we acknowledged that it was impoſſible any one could opine that the things which he knows are things which he does not know, and thus be deceived: but I ſay that this is in a certain reſpect poſſible.

THEÆ. Do you ſay that which I ſuſpected might be the caſe when we made this aſſertion, as that I knowing Socrates, and ſeeing another perſon at a diſtance whom I do not know, might think it was Socrates, whom I do know? For that which you ſay takes place in a thing of this kind.

SOC. Are we not, therefore, driven from the hypotheſis which cauſed us to acknowledge, that, with reſpect to things which we know, we are ignorant of them, at the ſame time that we know them?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

SOC. We muſt not, therefore, eſtabliſh this hypotheſis, but the following: and perhaps ſome one will in a certain reſpect aſſent to us, or perhaps will oppoſe us. But we are now in that ſituation in which it is neceſſary to examine the diſcourſe which perverts all things. Conſider, therefore, whether I ſay any thing to the purpoſe. Is it then poſſible for any one who formerly was ignorant of ſomething, afterwards to learn that thing?

THEÆ. It certainly is poſſible.

SOC. And can he not alſo learn another and another thing?

THEÆ. Why ſhould he not?

SOC. Place for me, for the ſake of an example, one waxen image[1] in our ſouls: in this ſoul a greater image, and in that a leſſer: and in this of purer, but in that of impurer and harder wax: and in ſome again of a moiſter kind, but in others ſufficiently tempered.

THEÆ. I place it.

SOC. We muſt ſay, then, that this is a gift of Mnemoſyne the mother of the Muſes; and that in this, whatever we wiſh to remember of things which we have ſeen, or heard, or underſtood, is impreſſed like images made by a ſeal, by inſinuating itſelf into our ſenſes and conceptions. And further, that we remember and know that which is impreſſed in this waxen image, as long as the impreſſed figure remains; but when it is deſtroyed, or can be no longer impreſſed, we forget and ceaſe to know.

THEÆ. Be it ſo.

[1] What is here ſaid muſt not be underſtood literally; for Plato was by no means of opinion that images are faſhioned by external objects in the ſoul. But nothing more is here meant, than either that the ſoul naturally poſſeſſes theſe images, or that, taking occaſion from external motions, and the paſſions of body, ſhe conceives forms in herſelf by her own native power.

Soc. Conſider, therefore, whether he who knows theſe impreſſions, and attends to what he either ſees or hears, can after this manner opine falſely?

THEÆ. After what manner?

Soc. With reſpect to what he knows, at one time opining that he knows, and at another time that he does not know. For we improperly granted above, that it was impoſſible for this to happen.

THEÆ. But how do you now ſay?

Soc. It is requiſite thus to ſpeak about theſe things, defining them from the beginning: That it is impoſſible that he who knows any thing, and has a monument of it in his ſoul, but does not perceive it, can opine that it is ſomething elſe which he knows, and the image of which he poſſeſſes, but does not perceive. And again, it is impoſſible that any one can opine that what he knows is that which he does not know, and of which he does not poſſeſs the image: or that what he does not know is that which he knows. It is likewiſe impoſſible for any one to opine that what he perceives is ſome other ſenſible object different from what he perceives: or that what he perceives is ſomething which he does not perceive: or that what he does not perceive is ſomething elſe which he does not perceive: or that what he does not perceive is ſomething which he does perceive. Nor, again, can any one opine that what he knows and perceives, and of which he has a ſenſible image, is ſomething elſe which he knows and perceives, and of which he in like manner poſſeſſes a ſenſible image: or that what he knows and perceives, and of which he poſſeſſes an image in a proper manner, is the ſame as that which he ſimply knows: or that what he knows and perceives, and ſimilarly retains, is that which he perceives: or again, that what he neither knows nor perceives is the ſame as that which he ſimply does not know: or that what he neither knows nor perceives is the ſame as that which he does not perceive. For in all theſe it is impoſſible to opine falſely. It remains, therefore, that falſe opinion muſt take place in ſome things of this kind, if it has any ſubſiſtence.

THEÆ. In what things, therefore? that I may ſee whether I can learn better from theſe. For at preſent I do not follow you.

Soc. In thoſe things which any one knowing, opines that they are certain other things which he knows and perceives; or which he does not know,

but perceives; or which both knowing and perceiving, he opines that he knows and perceives.

THEÆ. I now leave you behind, at a greater diſtance than before.

SOC. Hear then again as follows: I knowing Theodorus, and remembering in myſelf what kind of man he is, and in like manner Theætetus, ſometimes I ſee them, and ſometimes I do not: and ſometimes I touch them, and ſometimes not; and hear or perceive them with ſome other ſenſe: but ſometimes I do not apprehend any thing reſpecting you by any ſenſe, yet nevertheleſs I remember you, and know you in myſelf.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Learn this, therefore, the firſt of the things which I wiſh to evince to you, that it is poſſible for a man not to perceive that which he knows, and that it is likewiſe poſſible for him to perceive it.

THEÆ. True.

SOC. Does it not often happen that a man does not perceive that which he does not know, and likewiſe often happen that he perceives it only?

THEÆ. This alſo is true.

SOC. See, then, if you can now follow me better. Socrates knows Theodorus and Theætetus, but ſees neither of them, nor is any other ſenſe preſent with him reſpecting them. Can he ever in this caſe opine in himſelf, that Theætetus is Theodorus? Do I ſay any thing, or nothing?

THEÆ. You ſpeak pertinently; for he cannot thus opine.

SOC. This then was the firſt of thoſe things which I ſaid.

THEÆ. It was.

SOC. But the ſecond was this, that while I know one of you, but do not know the other, and perceive neither of you, I can never opine that he whom I know is the man whom I do not know.

THEÆ. Right.

SOC. But the third was this, that while I neither know nor perceive either of them, I can never opine that he whom I do not know is ſome other perſon whom I do not know: and in a ſimilar manner think that you again hear all that was ſaid above, in which I can never opine falſely reſpecting you and Theodorus, neither while knowing nor while ignorant of both; nor while knowing one, and not knowing other. And the ſame may be ſaid reſpecting the ſenſes, if you apprehend me.

THEÆ. I do apprehend you.

SOC. It remains, therefore, that I muſt then opine falſely, when knowing you and Theodorus, and preſerving in that waxen image, as in a ſeal ring, the impreſſion of both of you for a long time, and not ſufficiently ſeeing both of you, I endeavour, by attributing the proper impreſſion of each to my particular ſight, ſo to harmonize this impreſſion to the veſtige of ſight, that a recognizance may take place: but afterwards failing in the attempt, and changing like thoſe that change their ſhoes, I transfer the viſion of each to a foreign impreſſion, and err by being ſimilarly affected to the paſſions of ſight in mirrors, where things on the right hand flow back to thoſe on the left hand. For then heterodoxy takes place, and I opine falſely.

THEÆ. It appears, Socrates, that the paſſion of opinion is ſuch as in a wonderful manner you have repreſented it to be.

SOC. Still further, when knowing both of you, I beſides this perceive one of you, and not the other, then I have a knowledge of him whom I do not perceive, but not according to ſenſe; which is what I ſaid before, but you did not then underſtand me.

THEÆ. I did not.

SOC. This however I ſaid, that he who knows and perceives one of you, and has a knowledge of you according to ſenſe, will never opine that this object of his knowledge and perception is ſome other perſon whom he knows and perceives, and of whom he has a knowledge according to ſenſe. Was not this what I ſaid?

THEÆ. It was.

SOC. But in a certain reſpect that which I juſt now ſaid is omitted,—I mean, that falſe opinion then takes place, when any one knowing and ſeeing both of you, or poſſeſſing any other ſenſe of both of you, and likewiſe retaining your images in his ſoul, has not a proper perception of either of you, but, like an unſkilful archer, wanders from and miſſes the mark, which is therefore denominated a falſehood.

THEÆ. And very properly ſo.

SOC. When, therefore, ſenſe is preſent to one of the impreſſions, and not to the other, and that which belongs to the abſent ſenſe is adapted to the ſenſe then preſent, in this caſe the dianoëtic part is entirely deceived. And, in one word, it is not poſſible, as it appears, either to be deceived, or to have

a falſe opinion, reſpecting things which a man has neither ever known or perceived, if we now ſay any thing to the purpoſe. But reſpecting things which we know and perceive, in theſe opinion is rolled about and evolved, becoming both true and falſe. And when it collects and marks its proper reſemblances in an oppoſite and ſtraight forward direction, then it is true, but when in a tranſverſe and oblique direction, falſe.

THEÆ. Theſe things, therefore, Socrates, are beautifully ſaid.

SOC. And you will much more ſay ſo, when you hear what follows. For to opine the truth is beautiful, but to lie is baſe.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. They ſay, therefore, that hence the following particulars take place. When that waxen image in the ſoul is profound, abundant, ſmooth, and ſufficiently perfect, then the ſeveral particulars which proceed through the ſenſes, being impreſſed in this heart [1] of the ſoul, (as Homer calls it, obſcurely ſignifying its ſimilitude to wax,) ſo as to become pure ſignatures, and of ſufficient profundity,—in this caſe they become laſting. And, in the firſt place, men with ſuch impreſſions as theſe are docile: in the next place, they are endued with a good memory: and, in the third place, they do not change the impreſſions of the ſenſes, but opine the truth. For, as theſe impreſſions are clear, and ſituated in an ample region, they ſwiftly diſtribute ſenſible particulars to their proper reſemblances, which are called beings; and ſuch men are denominated wiſe. Or does it not appear ſo to you?

THEÆ. It does in a tranſcendent degree.

SOC. When, therefore, any one's heart is hairy (which the perfectly wiſe poet has celebrated), or when it is of a muddy nature, and not of pure wax, or when it is very moiſt, or hard, then it is in a bad condition. For thoſe in whom it is moiſt are indeed docile, but become oblivious; and thoſe in whom it is hard are affected in a contrary manner. But men in whom it is hairy and rough, in conſequence of its poſſeſſing ſomething of a ſtony nature, mingled with earth or clay, theſe contain obſcure reſemblances. The reſemblances too are obſcure in thoſe in whom this heart is hard: for in this caſe it has no profundity. This likewiſe happens to thoſe in whom it is moiſt: for, in conſequence of the impreſſions being confounded, they

[1] For κηρ or κεαρ is the *heart*, and κηρος is *wax*.

ſwiftly become obſcure. But if, beſides all this, they fall on each other, through the narrowneſs of their receptacle, ſince it belongs to a little ſoul, then the reſemblances become ſtill more obſcure. All ſuch as theſe, therefore, opine falſely. For when they ſee, or hear, or think about any thing, as they are unable ſwiftly to attribute things to their reſemblances, they judge erroneouſly; becauſe they ſee, hear, and underſtand for the moſt part perverſely. And ſuch as theſe are called deceivers, and are ſaid to be ignorant of things.

THEÆ. You ſpeak with the greateſt rectitude of all men, Socrates.

SOC. Shall we ſay, then, that falſe opinions reſide in us?

THEÆ. Very much ſo.

SOC. And true opinions likewiſe?

THEÆ. And true opinions.

SOC. I think, therefore, it has been ſufficiently acknowledged by us, that theſe two opinions have a ſubſiſtence more than any thing.

THEÆ. It has in a tranſcendent degree.

SOC. A loquacious man, Theætetus, appears in reality to be a dire and unpleaſant man.

THEÆ. With reference to what do you ſpeak in this manner?

SOC. With reference to my own indocility, and real loquacity, at which I am indignant. For what elſe than a loquacious man can he be called, who through his ſtupidity draws diſcourſe upwards and downwards, not being able to procure perſuaſion, and who with difficulty abandons an aſſertion?

THEÆ. But why are you indignant?

SOC. I am not only indignant, but I am fearful what I ſhould anſwer, if any one ſhould aſk me, O Socrates, have you found that falſe opinion is neither in the mutual energies of the ſenſes, nor in dianoëtic energies, but in the conjunction of ſenſe with the dianoëtic energy? But I think I ſhould ſay, boaſting, as if we had diſcovered ſomething beautiful, that we had found it to be ſo.

THEÆ. What has been juſt now evinced appears to me, Socrates, to be no deſpicable thing.

SOC. Do you, therefore, he will ſay, aſſert that we can never opine, that a man whom we alone dianoëtically conceive, but do not ſee, is a horſe, which,

which we neither at preſent ſee, nor touch, nor perceive by any other ſenſe, but only dianoëtically conceive? I think I ſhould ſay that I do aſſert theſe things.

THEÆ. And very properly.

SOC. Will it not, therefore, follow, he will ſay, according to this reaſon, that no one will ever think eleven, which he only dianoëtically perceives, to be twelve, which he only dianoëtically perceives? What anſwer would you give?

THEÆ. I ſhould anſwer, that ſome one ſeeing or touching eleven things, might opine them to be twelve; but that he would never opine in this manner reſpecting the numbers which he poſſeſſes in his dianoëtic part.

SOC. But what, he will ſay, do you think that any one can ſpeculate about five and ſeven—I do not mean five and ſeven men, or any thing elſe of this kind, but five and ſeven themſelves, which we ſaid were in his ſoul like impreſſions in wax—ſo as never to opine falſely reſpecting them? Or will not ſome men, when they conſider theſe things by themſelves, and inquire about their amount, opine that they are eleven, and others that they are twelve? Or will all men ſay and opine that they are twelve?

THEÆ. By Jupiter they will not; but the greater part will opine that they are eleven. And if any one ſhould aſk them the amount of more numbers, their anſwer would be ſtill more erroneous. For I think that you rather ſpeak about every number.

SOC. You think rightly. Conſider, therefore, whether this ever happens, that any one opines that the twelve which are impreſſed in his ſoul are eleven?

THEÆ. It ſeems this does happen.

SOC. Does not this then revolve to the former aſſertions? For he who ſuffers that which he knows, opines that it is ſome other thing which he alſo knows, which we ſaid was impoſſible: and from this very circumſtance we are compelled to confeſs, that there is no ſuch thing as falſe opinion, leſt the ſame perſon ſhould be forced to know and at the ſame time not to know the ſame things.

THEÆ. Moſt true.

SOC. Hence it appears that falſe opinion muſt be otherwiſe defined than a mutation of the dianoëtic energy with reſpect to ſenſe. For, if this was a

true

true definition, we ſhould never be deceived in dianoëtic conceptions themſelves. But now there is either no ſuch thing as falſe opinion, or, if there is, a man may be ignorant of that which at the ſame time he knows. And which of theſe will you chooſe?

THEÆ. You have propoſed an ambiguous choice, Socrates.

SOC. But it appears that reaſon will not permit both theſe to take place. At the ſame time, however (for all things muſt be attempted), what if we ſhould endeavour to diveſt ourſelves of ſhame?

THEÆ. How?

SOC. By being willing to ſay what it is to have a ſcientific knowledge of a thing.

THEÆ. But why would this be impudent?

SOC. You do not appear to underſtand that the whole of our diſcourſe from the beginning is an inveſtigation of ſcience, as if we did not know what it is.

THEÆ. I underſtand you.

SOC. But does it not appear to be the part of impudent perſons, to ſhow what it is to have a ſcientific knowledge, at the ſame time that they are ignorant what ſcience is? But, Theætetus, it is now ſome time ſince we have not ſpoken with purity. For we have ten thouſand times employed the terms, We know, and We do not know, We have a ſcientific knowledge, and We have not a ſcientific knowledge, as if we mutually underſtood ſomething, in which at the ſame time we are ignorant what ſcience is. But at preſent, if you are willing, we will uſe the terms, to be ignorant, and to underſtand, in ſuch a manner as it is proper to uſe them, ſince we are deſtitute of ſcience.

THEÆ. But how in this caſe, Socrates, ſhall we be able to diſcourſe?

SOC. Not at all while I remain as I am. But I might be able, if I was contentious: and now, if any contentious perſon was preſent, he would ſay that he abſtained from ſuch terms, and would very much deter us from what I ſay. But, as we are bad, man, are you willing I ſhould dare to ſay what it is to know ſcientifically? For it appears to me to be worth while.

THEÆ. Dare then, by Jupiter. For you will greatly deſerve to be pardoned for the attempt.

SOC. Have you heard what at preſent they ſay it is to know ſcientifically?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Perhaps ſo; but at preſent I do not remember.

SOC. They ſay that it is the habit of ſcience.

THEÆ. True.

SOC. We, therefore, ſhall make a trifling alteration, and ſay that it is the poſſeſſion of ſcience.

THEÆ. But in what do you ſay this differs from that?

SOC. Perhaps in nothing. But when you have heard that which appears to me to be the caſe, examine it together with me.

THEÆ. I will, if I can.

SOC. To *poſſeſs*, therefore, does not appear to me to be the ſame as to *have* a thing. Thus, if any one buys a garment, and, having the power of uſing it when he pleaſes, does not wear it, we ſhould not ſay that he *has* the garment, but that he *poſſeſſes* it.

THEÆ. And very properly.

SOC. See then whether it is poſſible to poſſeſs ſcience in this manner, without having it: juſt as if ſome one having caught certain wild doves[1], or other wild birds, and having conſtructed an aviary for them at home, ſhould feed and nouriſh them. For in a certain reſpect we ſhould ſay that he always *has*, becauſe he *poſſeſſes* them. Should we not?

THEÆ. We ſhould.

SOC. But in another reſpect we ſhould ſay that he by no means *has* them, but that he has a power, ſince he has ſhut them up for his own uſe, in an incloſure of his own, of taking and having them when he pleaſes, and of again diſmiſſing them: and that he can do this as often as it is agreeable to him.

THEÆ. Exactly ſo.

SOC. Again, as before we deviſed I know not what waxen figment in the ſoul, ſo now let us place a certain aviary containing all ſorts of birds in the ſoul; ſome of which fly in flocks, apart from others; but others again fly in

[1] It is juſtly obſerved by Proclus, in his admirable Commentary on the firſt book of Euclid's Elements, p. 3, that Socrates here, mingling the jocoſe with the ſerious, aſſimilates the ſciences which are in us to doves. He alſo ſays that they fly away, ſome in flocks, and others ſeparate from the reſt. For the ſciences that are more common contain in themſelves many that are more partial; and thoſe that are diſtributed according to ſpecies, touching on the objects of their knowledge, are ſeparated from, and unconjoined with, each other, in conſequence of originating from different primary principles.

ſmall

ſmall companies; and ſome fly alone, wherever they may happen to find a paſſage.

THEÆ. Let it be ſo: but what follows?

Soc. It is requiſite to ſay, that this receptacle is empty in children: but in the place of birds we muſt underſtand ſciences, and ſay, that he who poſſeſſes ſcience, and confines it in this incloſure, learns or diſcovers that thing of which he poſſeſſes the ſcience; and that this is to have a ſcientific knowledge.

THEÆ. Be it ſo.

Soc. But again, conſider, when any one is willing to inveſtigate ſciences, and receiving to *have* them, and afterwards diſmiſs them, by what names all theſe particulars ought to be expreſſed. Shall we ſay by the ſame names as at firſt, when ſciences were *poſſeſſed*, or by other names? But from what follows you will more clearly underſtand what I ſay. Do you not call arithmetic an art?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. Suppoſe this to be the hunting of the ſciences of all the even and the odd.

THEÆ. I ſuppoſe it.

Soc. But I think by this art the arithmetician has the ſciences of numbers in his power, and delivers them to others.

THEÆ. He does ſo.

Soc. And we ſay that he who delivers theſe ſciences teaches, but that he who receives them learns; and that he who *has* them, in conſequence of poſſeſſing them in that incloſure which we mentioned, knows ſcientifically.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But attend to what follows. Does not he who is a perfect arithmetician know ſcientifically all numbers? For the ſciences of all numbers are in his ſoul.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Does not a man of this kind ſometimes enumerate with himſelf internally, and ſometimes externally, ſuch things as have number?

THEÆ. Certainly.

Soc. But to number is conſidered by us as nothing elſe than the ſpeculation of the quantity of any number.

THEÆ. It is ſo.

Soc. He, therefore, who has a ſcientific knowledge, by thus ſpeculating, appears not to know, though we have confeſſed that he knows every number. Do you hear theſe ambiguities?

Theæ. I do.

Soc. When, therefore, we aſſimilated ſciences to the poſſeſſion and fowling of doves, we ſaid that fowling was twofold; one kind being prior to acquiſition, and ſubſiſting for the ſake of poſſeſſion; but the other being poſterior to acquiſition and poſſeſſion, and ſubſiſting for the ſake of receiving and having in the hands things which were formerly poſſeſſed. So theſe ſciences, which any one had formerly been endued with by learning, and which he had known before, may again be learnt, by reſuming and retaining the ſcience of every particular which he formerly poſſeſſed, but which he has not at hand in his dianoëtic part.

Theæ. True.

Soc. On this account, I juſt now inquired how names reſpecting theſe things were to be uſed, as when an arithmetician numbers, or a grammarian reads. For, in either caſe, he who knows again applies himſelf to know by himſelf what he already knows.

Theæ. But this is abſurd, Socrates.

Soc. Shall we therefore ſay, that the grammarian reads, or the arithmetician numbers, things of which he is ignorant, though we have granted that the one knows all letters, and the other every number?

Theæ. But this alſo is irrational.

Soc. Are you, therefore, willing we ſhould ſay, that we are not at all concerned how any one may employ the names of knowing and learning? But ſince we have determined that it is one thing to *poſſeſs*, and another to *have*, ſcience, we muſt ſay that it is impoſſible for any one not to poſſeſs that which he does poſſeſs. So that it will never happen that any one does not know that which he does know; though about this very thing falſe opinion may be received. For it may happen that we may take the ſcience of one thing for the ſcience of another, when, hunting after ſome one of our inward ſciences, we erroneouſly receive inſtead of it ſome other that flies away. As when any one opines that eleven things are twelve: for then, receiving the ſcience of eleven things inſtead of twelve, he takes out of his aviary a pigeon inſtead

Theæ.

THEÆ. It is reaſonable to ſuppoſe ſo.

SOC. But when he receives that which he endeavours to receive, then he is free from falſehood, and opines things which are. And after this manner falſe and true opinion ſubſiſt: and thus none of the particulars which diſturbed us before will be any longer an impediment to us. Perhaps, therefore, you aſſent to me: or how will you do?

THEÆ. Aſſent to you.

SOC. We are then now freed from the dilemma reſpecting a man knowing and at the ſame time not knowing a thing. For it will no longer happen that we ſhall not poſſeſs that which we do poſſeſs, whether we judge falſely or not. However, a more dire paſſion than this appears to me to preſent itſelf to the view.

THEÆ. What is that?

SOC. If the permutation of ſciences ſhould ever become falſe opinion.

THEÆ. But how?

SOC. In the firſt place, is it not abſurd, that he who has the ſcience of any thing ſhould be ignorant of that thing, not through ignorance, but through the ſcience of the thing? And in the next place, that he ſhould opine this thing to be that, and that thing this? And is it not very irrational to ſuppoſe, that when ſcience is preſent the ſoul ſhould know nothing, but ſhould be ignorant of all things? For, from this aſſertion, nothing hinders but that ignorance when preſent may enable a man to know ſomething, and cauſe blindneſs to ſee, if ſcience ever makes a man to be ignorant of any thing.

THEÆ. Perhaps, Socrates, we have not properly introduced birds, as alone placed ſciences in the ſoul, but we ought at the ſame time to have placed the various kinds of ignorance flying in companies; and a man employed in fowling, at one time receiving ſcience, and at another time ignorance, about the ſame thing: through ignorance opining what is falſe, but through ſcience the truth.

SOC. It is by no means eaſy, Theætetus, not to praiſe you. However, again conſider what you have ſaid. For let it be as you ſay. But he who receives ignorance, you will ſay, opines things falſe. Is it not ſo?

THEÆ. It is.

SOC. But yet he will not think that he opines falſely.

THEÆ. He will not.

Soc. But that he opines truly. And he will be affected with reſpect to thoſe things in which he errs, like one endued with knowledge.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. He will therefore opine that he has by fowling obtained ſcience, and not ignorance.

THEÆ. It is evident.

Soc. Hence, after having made a long circuit, we have again fallen into the firſt doubt. For that reprover whom we mentioned before will laughing ſay to us, O beſt of men, whether can he who knows both ſcience and ignorance opine that what he knows is ſome other thing which he alſo knows? or, knowing neither of theſe, can he opine that a thing which he does not know is ſome other thing which he does not know? or, knowing one of theſe, and not the other, can he opine that what he knows is that which he does not know? or that what he does not know is that which he does know? Or, again, tell me whether there are ſciences of ſciences, and of the various kinds of ignorance, which he who poſſeſſes, and incloſes in other certain ridiculous aviaries, or waxen figments, knows ſo far as he poſſeſſes them, though he has them not at hand in his ſoul? And thus you will be compelled to revolve infinitely about the ſame thing, without making any proficiency. What ſhall we reply to theſe things, Theætetus?

THEÆ. By Jupiter, Socrates, I do not know what ought to be ſaid.

Soc. Does not, therefore, O boy, the diſcourſe of this man very properly reprove us, and evince that we have not done right in inveſtigating falſe opinion prior to ſcience, and leaving ſcience undiſcuſſed? But it is impoſſible to know this till we have ſufficiently determined what ſcience is.

THEÆ. It is neceſſary, Socrates, to ſuſpect at preſent, as you ſay.

Soc. What then can any one again ſay from the beginning reſpecting ſcience? For we are not yet weary of ſpeaking.

THEÆ. Not in the leaſt, if you do not forbid it.

Soc. Tell me, then, in what manner we can ſo ſpeak concerning ſcience as not to contradict ourſelves.

THEÆ. In the ſame manner as we attempted before, Socrates; for I have not any thing elſe to offer.

Soc. In what manner do you mean?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. That true opinion is ſcience. For to opine truly is without error; and every thing that proceeds from it is beautiful and good.

SOC. He who in fording a river, Theætetus, is the leader of others, if interrogated reſpecting the depth of the water, will anſwer that the water will ſhow its own depth. In like manner, if, entering into the preſent ſubject, we inquire, the impediment to our paſſage will, perhaps, preſent to us the object of our ſearch: but, if we remain where we are, nothing will become manifeſt.

THEÆ. You ſpeak well: but let us proceed and conſider.

SOC. Is not this, therefore, a thing of brief conſideration? For the whole of art, and its profeſſors, evince that art is not ſcience.

THEÆ. How ſo? And who are theſe profeſſors?

SOC. Thoſe that excel all others in wiſdom, and who are called orators and lawyers. For theſe perſuade, but do not teach by their art, and cauſe their hearers to opine whatever they pleaſe. Or do you think there are any teachers ſo ſkilful, as to be able in caſes of robbery, and other violences, to evince ſufficiently the truth of the tranſactions by means of a little water?

THEÆ. I by no means think there are: but theſe men perſuade.

SOC. But do you not ſay that to effect perſuaſion is the ſame thing as to produce opinion?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. When, therefore, judges are juſtly perſuaded reſpecting things which he who ſees can alone know, but by no means otherwiſe, is it poſſible that thus judging by report, and receiving true opinion without ſcience, they can judge rightly reſpecting things of which they are perſuaded, if we admit that they judge well?

THEÆ. I entirely think they can.

SOC. But, my friend, if true opinion, judgment, and ſcience are the ſame, that conſummate judge can never opine with rectitude without ſcience: but now each appears to be ſomething different.

THEÆ. I had forgotten, Socrates, what I heard a certain perſon ſay concerning ſcience, but I now remember. But he ſaid that true opinion in conjunction with reaſon is ſcience, but that without reaſon it is void of ſcience; and that things cannot be known ſcientifically of which there is no reaſon, but that things may be thus known which have a reaſon.

SOC.

Soc. How well you ſpeak! But tell me how he divided things which may be ſcientifically known, and which cannot be ſo known, that we may ſee whether you and I ſimilarly underſtand them.

Theæ. I do not know that I can diſcover how he divided theſe; but I can follow another perſon diſcourſing.

Soc. Hear, then, a dream for a dream. For I alſo appear to have heard from certain perſons that the firſt elements [1], as it were, from which we and other things are compoſed cannot be rationally deſcribed. For they ſay that each of theſe can alone be denominated by itſelf, but cannot be called any thing elſe, neither as that which is nor as that which is not; becauſe eſſence, or non-eſſence, would thus be aſſigned to it. But it is requiſite to add nothing, if any one ſpeaks of a thing itſelf alone. For neither the term this, nor that, nor each, nor alone, nor any other ſuch appellations, ſhould be employed, becauſe theſe are applied to things in a circular progreſſion, and are different from the things to which they are added. But it is neceſſary, if poſſible, to ſpeak of the thing itſelf, and, if it has a proper definition, to aſſert ſomething reſpecting it, without the addition of any thing elſe. Now, however, no one of things firſt can be made the ſubject of diſcourſe; for it does not admit of any thing elſe than a denomination. But the things compoſed from theſe, as they are themſelves woven together, ſo from the weaving together of their names diſcourſe is produced. For the connection of names is the eſſence of diſcourſe. Hence, the elements themſelves are ineffable and unknown, but at the ſame time are objects of ſenſe: but ſyllables are known and effable, and may be apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any one receives a true opinion of any thing, without reaſon, then his ſoul perceives the truth reſpecting it, but he does not know the thing; becauſe he who is incapable of giving and receiving a reaſon concerning a thing muſt be deſtitute of ſcience reſpecting it. But when he receives a reaſon, then he may be able to know all theſe, and acquire ſcience in perfection. Have you not, therefore, heard a dream, or is it any thing elſe?

Theæ. It is nothing elſe.

[1] Prodicus the Chian, imitating Leucippus, aſſerted that the elements of things, becauſe they are ſimple, and therefore without definition, are unknown; but that compoſites, ſince they can be defined, may be known.

Soc. Is it, therefore, agreeable to you that we ſhould eſtabliſh ſcience to be true opinion in conjunction with reaſon?

Theæ. Very much ſo.

Soc. Have we, therefore, Theætetus, this very day detected that which formerly many wiſe men inveſtigating grew old before they diſcovered?

Theæ. To me, Socrates, what was juſt now ſaid appears to be well ſaid.

Soc. And it is very fit it ſhould: for what ſcience can there be without reaſon and right opinion? But one of the aſſertions does not pleaſe me.

Theæ. What is that?

Soc. That which appears to be very elegantly ſaid; that the elements of ſpeech are unknown, but the genus of ſyllables known.

Theæ. Is not this right?

Soc. Take notice. For we have as hoſtages of diſcourſe thoſe very paradigms, which he employing ſaid all that I have related.

Theæ. What are theſe paradigms?

Soc. The things pertaining to letters, viz. elements and ſyllables. Or do you think that he who ſaid what we have related ſpoke in this manner looking to any thing elſe than theſe?

Theæ. To nothing elſe than theſe.

Soc. Let us, therefore, receiving theſe, examine them, or rather ourſelves, whether we learn letters in this manner, or not. In the firſt place, then, have ſyllables a definition, but not the elements?

Theæ. Perhaps ſo.

Soc. To me, alſo, it very much appears to be ſo. If, therefore, any one ſhould thus aſk reſpecting the firſt ſyllable of the word Socrates, O Theætetus, viz. what is *So?* what would you anſwer?

Theæ. That it is *S* and *o*.

Soc. You have, therefore, this definition of the ſyllable.

Theæ. I have.

Soc. But come, in a ſimilar manner give me a definition of the letter *S*.

Theæ. But how can any one ſpeak of the elements of an element? For *S*, Socrates, is only a certain ſound of mute letters, the tongue, as it were, hiſſing: but of the letter *B* there is neither voice nor ſound, nor of moſt of the elements. So that it is very well ſaid that they are ineffable, among which

which the well-known ſeven vowels are alone vocal, but have not any reaſon or definition.

Soc. This therefore, my friend, we have rightly aſſerted reſpecting ſcience.

Theæ. So it appears.

Soc. But have we rightly ſhown that a ſyllable is known, but not an element?

Theæ. It is likely.

Soc. But with reſpect to this ſyllable, whether ſhall we ſay that it is both the elements; and, if there are more than two, that it is all thoſe elements? Or ſhall we ſay that it is one certain idea produced from the compoſition of the elements?

Theæ. It appears to me that we ſhould ſay it is all the elements.

Soc. See, then, with reſpect to the two letters *S* and *o*, which form the firſt ſyllable of my name, whether he who knows this ſyllable knows both theſe letters?

Theæ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. He knows, therefore, *S* and *o*.

Theæ. Yes.

Soc. But what, if he knows each, and, knowing neither, knows both?

Theæ. But this would be dire and abſurd, Socrates.

Soc. But if it is neceſſary to know each, if any one knows both, it is neceſſary that he who in any future time knows a ſyllable ſhould previouſly know all the elements: and ſo that beautiful aſſertion eſcaping from us will diſappear.

Theæ. And very ſuddenly too.

Soc. For we did not well ſecure it. For, perhaps, a ſyllable ought to have been adopted, and not the elements; but one certain ſpecies produced from them, and which is different from the elements.

Theæ. Entirely ſo: and perhaps the thing takes place in this manner rather than in that.

Soc. We ſhould conſider, therefore, and not in ſo effeminate a manner betray a great and venerable aſſertion.

Theæ. We ought not, indeed.

Soc. Let a ſyllable then, as we juſt now ſaid, be one idea produced from ſeveral according elements, as well in letters as in all other things.

Theæ. Entirely ſo.

Soc.

Soc. It ought not, therefore, to have any parts.

THEÆ. Why not?

Soc. Becauſe the whole of that which has parts muſt neceſſarily be all the parts. Or do you ſay that a whole which is produced from parts is one certain ſpecies different from all the parts?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. But with reſpect to the all, and the whole, whether do you call each of theſe the ſame, or different?

THEÆ. I have not any thing clear to ſay; yet ſince you order me to anſwer with alacrity, I will venture to ſay that each of theſe is different.

Soc. Your alacrity, Theætetus, is right; but whether your anſwer is ſo, we muſt conſider.

THEÆ. It is neceſſary.

Soc. Does not the whole, therefore, differ from the all, according to your preſent aſſertion?

THEÆ. It does.

Soc. But do all things and the all differ in any reſpect? As when we ſay one, two, three, four, five, ſix: or twice three, or thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one, or five and one;—whether in all theſe do we ſay the ſame thing, or that which is different?

THEÆ. The ſame thing.

Soc. Do we ſay any thing elſe than ſix?

THEÆ. Nothing elſe.

Soc. According to each mode of ſpeaking, therefore, we find that all are ſix.

THEÆ. We do.

Soc. Again, therefore, we do not ſay any one thing when we ſay all things.

THEÆ. It is neceſſary.

Soc. Do we ſay any thing elſe than ſix things?

THEÆ. Nothing elſe.

Soc. In things, therefore, which conſiſt from number, we ſay that the all is the ſame with all things.

THEÆ. So it appears.

Soc. Should we not, therefore, ſay reſpecting them, that the number of an acre is the ſame as an acre?

Theæ. We ſhould.

Soc. And in a ſimilar manner that the number of a ſtadium is a ſtadium?

Theæ. Yes.

Soc. And ſo reſpecting the number of an army, and an army itſelf, and all other ſuch like particulars? For every number, being an all, is each of theſe particulars.

Theæ. It is.

Soc. But is the number of each of theſe any thing elſe than parts?

Theæ. Nothing elſe.

Soc. Such things, therefore, as have parts conſiſt of parts.

Theæ. It appears ſo.

Soc. But it is acknowledged that all the parts are the all, ſince every number is the all.

Theæ. It is ſo.

Soc. The whole, therefore, is not from parts: for it would be the all, in conſequence of being all the parts.

Theæ. It does not appear that it is.

Soc. But does a part belong to any thing elſe than to a whole?

Theæ. It belongs to the all.

Soc. You fight ſtrenuouſly, Theætetus. But is not the all, then this very thing the all, when nothing is wanting to it?

Theæ. It is neceſſary.

Soc. And is not, after the ſame manner, the whole that which it is, when nothing is wanting to it? And is it not true, that that which is in want of any thing, in conſequence of this deficiency, is neither the whole, nor the all?

Theæ. It now appears to me, that the whole and the all in no reſpect differ from each other.

Soc. Do we not ſay that the whole and the all are all the parts of that of which they are the parts?

Theæ. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Again, therefore, that we may reſume what we attempted before,

if

if a ſyllable is not elements, muſt it not neceſſarily follow that it has not elements as parts of itſelf? or that, if it is the ſame with them, it muſt with them be ſimilarly known?

THEÆ. It muſt.

SOC. Leſt, therefore, this ſhould take place, we muſt eſtabliſh the one to be different from the other.

THEÆ. We muſt.

SOC. But if elements are not parts of a ſyllable, can you aſſign any other things which are parts of a ſyllable, and yet are not the elements of it?

THEÆ. I ſhould by no means grant, Socrates, that things which are not the elements can be the parts of a ſyllable. For it is ridiculous, neglecting the elements, to proceed in ſearch of other things.

SOC. According to the preſent reaſoning, therefore, Theætetus, a ſyllable will be in every reſpect one particular impartible idea.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

SOC. Do you remember, therefore, my friend, that we admitted a little before, and thought it was well ſaid, that there could be no reaſon or definition of things firſt, from which other things are compoſed, becauſe each thing conſidered itſelf by itſelf is not a compoſite; and that neither the term 'to be' can with propriety be accommodated to it, nor the term 'this,' becauſe theſe are aſſerted as things different and foreign; and that this very circumſtance cauſes a thing to be ineffable and unknown?

THEÆ. I do remember.

SOC. Is any thing elſe, therefore, than this the cauſe of any thing being uniform and impartible? For I ſee no other cauſe.

THEÆ. It does not appear that there is any other.

SOC. Will not a ſyllable, therefore, be a ſpecies of this kind, ſince it has no parts, and is one idea?

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

SOC. If, therefore, a ſyllable is many elements, and a certain whole, and theſe elements are its parts, ſyllables and elements may be ſimilarly known, and are ſimilarly effable, ſince all the parts appear to be the ſame with the whole.

THEÆ. And very much ſo.

Soc. But if a ſyllable is one impartible thing, a ſyllable and an element are equally ineffable and unknown. For the ſame cauſe renders them ſuch.

Theæ. I cannot ſay otherwiſe.

Soc. We muſt not, therefore, admit the aſſertion, that a ſyllable is a thing known and effable, but an element the contrary.

Theæ. We muſt not, if we are perſuaded by this reaſoning.

Soc. But what again, if any one ſhould aſſert the contrary, would you not rather admit it from thoſe things of which you were conſcious when you learnt your letters?

Theæ. What things are thoſe?

Soc. As that you endeavoured to learn nothing elſe than how to know the elements by your eyes and ears, each itſelf by itſelf, that the poſition of them, when they were pronounced or written, might not diſturb you.

Theæ. You ſpeak moſt true.

Soc. But is the learning to play on the harp in perfection any thing elſe than the ability of knowing what ſound belongs to every chord? For this every one agrees ſhould be called the elements of muſic.

Theæ. It is nothing elſe.

Soc. As, therefore, we are ſkilled in elements and ſyllables, if it was requiſite to conjecture from theſe reſpecting other things, we ſhould ſay that the genus of the elements poſſeſſed a much clearer and more principal knowledge than that of ſyllables, with reſpect to receiving each diſcipline in perfection. And if any one ſhould ſay that a ſyllable is a thing known, but that an element is naturally unknown, we ſhould think that he jeſted either voluntarily or involuntarily.

Theæ. And very much ſo.

Soc. But, as it appears to me, there are yet other demonſtrations of this thing. We muſt not, however, on account of theſe particulars, forget the thing propoſed by us, viz. to inveſtigate the aſſertion, that reaſon united with true opinion becomes moſt perfect ſcience.

Theæ. It is proper, therefore, to conſider this.

Soc. Come then, inform me what is the ſignification of the word *logos*: for it appears to me to ſignify one of three things.

Theæ. What are they?

Soc. The firſt will be to make its own dianoëtic conception apparent, through voice, in conjunction with verbs and nouns; thus impreſſing opinion in the flux through the mouth, as in a mirror, or in water. Or does not logos appear to you to be a thing of this kind?

THEÆ. It does: and we ſay that he who does this ſpeaks.

Soc. Cannot, therefore, every one do this—I mean, point out with more or leſs ſwiftneſs what appears to him reſpecting particulars—unleſs he is either naturally deaf or dumb? And thus it will follow, that whoever opines any thing rightly will appear to opine in conjunction with logos; and true opinion will never ſubſiſt without ſcience.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. We muſt not, therefore, eaſily condemn him who aſſerts ſcience to be that which we juſt now mentioned, as if he ſaid nothing. For perhaps this was not his meaning; but, being aſked what each particular is, he might be able to anſwer the interrogator, through the elements.

THEÆ. How do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. The ſame as Heſiod [1], when he ſpeaks of a chariot as compoſed of a hundred pieces of wood; which I am not able to ſay, nor do I think you are. But we ſhould be contented, if, when aſked what a chariot is, we were able to ſay that it is wheels, an axis, plankings, arches, and a yoke.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But he perhaps would think we are ridiculous, juſt as if we were aſked concerning your name, and ſhould anſwer by a ſyllable; conſidering us indeed in what we ſay as thinking and ſpeaking properly, but that we are grammarians, and that we poſſeſſed and ſpoke grammatically the definition of the name of Theætetus. He would likewiſe ſay, that no one can ſpeak ſcientifically about any thing, till he has brought it to a concluſion through the elements, in conjunction with true opinion, as we obſerved before.

THEÆ. We did ſo.

Soc. After this manner, therefore, he would think we may poſſeſs true opinion reſpecting the chariot; but that he who is able to pervade its eſſence

[1] The future editors of Heſiod may increaſe the fragments of that poet with this part of a verſe,

——— ἑκατον δε τε δουρατ' ἀμαξης.

through

through thoſe hundred pieces of wood, can alſo comprehend its logos or definition, in conjunction with true opinion; and, inſtead of being one that opines, will thus poſſeſs art and ſcience, reſpecting the eſſence of the chariot, determining the whole of it, through its elements.

THEÆ. Does not this appear to you, Socrates, to be well ſaid?

SOC. If it appears ſo to you, my friend, and if you admit that this diſcurſive proceſs through an element reſpecting every thing is logos, or reaſon, and that this is the caſe with the proceſs through ſyllables, or that it is ſomething ſtill greater, void of reaſon. Tell me what you think, that we may conſider it.

THEÆ. But I very much admit this.

SOC. But do you admit it in ſuch a manner as to think that any one has a ſcientific knowledge of any thing, when the ſame thing appears to him at different times to belong to different things; or when he opines different things at different times of the ſame thing?

THEO. Not I, by Jupiter.

SOC. Have you forgotten that both you and others thought in this manner, when you firſt learnt your letters?

THEÆ. Do you mean to ſay, that we thought that at one time one letter, and at another time another, belonged to the ſame ſyllable; and that the ſame letter was at one time to be referred to its proper ſyllable, and at another time to a different ſyllable?

SOC. This is what I mean.

THEÆ. By Jupiter, I do not forget; nor do I think that thoſe who are thus affected poſſeſs a ſcientific knowledge.

SOC. What then, when any one at that time writing the word Theætetus, opines that he ought to write *Th* and *e*, and accordingly writes theſe letters; and again attempting to write Theodorus, opines that he ought to write *Th* and *e*, and writes theſe letters, ſhall we ſay that he knows ſcientifically the firſt ſyllable of your names?

THEÆ. But we juſt now acknowledged, that he who is affected in this manner does not yet know.

SOC. Does any thing, therefore, hinder the ſame perſon from being affected in the ſame manner reſpecting the ſecond, third, and fourth ſyllable?

THEÆ. Nothing hinders.

SOC.

Soc. Will not ſuch a one, therefore, in conſequence of his diſcurſive proceſs through an element, write Theætetus with true opinion when he writes it in its proper order?

THEÆ. It is evident he will.

Soc. Will he not, therefore, be ſtill void of ſcience, but opine rightly, as we ſaid?

THEÆ. Yes.

Soc. And will he not poſſeſs reaſon in conjunction with right opinion? For he wrote making a diſcurſive proceſs through an element, which we acknowledge is logos or reaſon.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. There is, therefore, my friend, ſuch a thing as right opinion in conjunction with reaſon, which it is not yet proper to call ſcience.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

Soc. We are enriched then, as it appears, with a dream, while we opine that we poſſeſs a moſt true definition of ſcience.

THEÆ. Or we ought not yet to blame. For perhaps ſome one may not define *logos* in this manner, but may chooſe the remaining ſpecies of the three, one of which we ſaid would be adopted by him who defined ſcience to be right opinion in conjunction with reaſon.

Soc. You have very properly reminded me: for one ſpecies ſtill remains. For the firſt ſpecies was an image as it were of dianoëtic conception in voice; and the ſecond, that which we juſt now mentioned, a proceſſion to the whole through an element.

THEÆ. But what do you ſay the third is?

Soc. That which the multitude would ſay it is, to be able to aſſign a certain mark by which the object of inquiry differs from all other things.

THEÆ. Can you give me as an inſtance a certain logos of this kind reſpecting any thing?

Soc. If you are willing, I think it will be ſufficient for you to admit reſpecting the ſun, that it is the moſt ſplendid of all the natures that revolve in the heavens round the earth.

THEÆ. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Take then that for the ſake of which this was ſaid. But it is that which we juſt now mentioned: that when you receive the difference of any

thing, by which it differs from other things, you will receive, as ſome ſay, the logos or definition: but as long as you touch upon any thing common, you will have the definition of thoſe things to which this ſomething common belongs.

THEÆ. I underſtand you: and it appears to me very proper to call a thing of this kind logos.

SOC. But he who, in conjunction with right opinion, receives the difference by which any thing whatever is diſtinguiſhed from other things, will be endued with ſcience reſpecting that of which he formerly poſſeſſed opinion.

THEÆ. We ſay it is ſo.

SOC. Now therefore, Theætetus, in conſequence of approaching nearer to what is ſaid, as to a certain adumbration, I find I do not in the leaſt underſtand it; but, while I beheld it at a diſtance, it appeared to me that ſomething was ſpoken to the purpoſe.

THEÆ. But how is this?

SOC. I will tell you, if I can. When I have a right opinion reſpecting you, if I likewiſe receive your definition, then I know you; but if not, then I only opine. Is it not ſo?

THEÆ. It is.

SOC. But logos, or definition, was an interpretaion of your difference.

THEÆ. It was.

SOC. When, therefore, I only opine, I do not perceive by the dianoëtic energy any one of thoſe things by which you differ from others.

THEÆ. You do not, as it appears.

SOC. I, therefore, only dianoëtically perceive ſomething common, which you poſſeſs no leſs than another.

THEÆ. It is neceſſary.

SOC. By Jupiter, then, inform me how, in a thing of this kind, I rather opine you than any other? For, ſuppoſe me thus dianoëtically conſidering: This is Theætetus, who is a man, and has noſtrils, eyes, and a mouth, and in like manner each of the other members. Does this dianoëtic conception cauſe me to perceive Theætetus more than Theodorus? or, as it is ſaid, more than the laſt of the Myſians?

THEÆ. How ſhould it?

SOC. But if I not only dianoëtically conſider that he has noſtrils and eyes, but

but likewiſe that he has a flat noſe and prominent eyes, ſhall I opine you more than myſelf, or any other ſuch perſon?

THEÆ. You will not.

SOC. But I think I ſhall not opine in myſelf, Theætetus, till a certain monument of his flat noſe, exhibiting its difference from other flat noſes which I perceive, is impreſſed in me, and in like manner other particulars from which you are compoſed; which, if I had met with you yeſterday, would remind me, and cauſe me to form a right opinion reſpecting you.

THEÆ. Moſt true.

SOC. Right opinion, therefore, reſpecting every thing will be converſant with difference.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

SOC. What then will be the conſequence if reaſon is aſſumed together with right opinion? For it would be ridiculous if any one ſhould order us to opine in what it is that any thing differs from other things.

THEÆ. How ſo?

SOC. For, reſpecting things of which we have a right opinion, ſo far as they differ from others, he would order us to aſſume a right opinion of them, ſo far as they differ from others. And thus, like the circumvolution of a whip, or a peſtle, or the like, from this mandate nothing would be ſaid. For it might more juſtly be called the mandate of one blind; ſince it would order us to receive things which we poſſeſs, that we might learn things which we opine; and thus would be perfectly ſimilar to the mandate of one deprived of ſight.

THEÆ. Tell me what it is you juſt now aſked.

SOC. If ſome one, O boy, ordering us to receive reaſon, ſhould at the ſame time order us to know, but not opine difference, reaſon would be a pleaſant thing, and the moſt beautiful of all things pertaining to ſcience. For to know is in a certain reſpect to receive ſcience. Is it not?

THEÆ. It is.

SOC. When aſked, therefore, as it appears, what ſcience is, he would anſwer, that it is right opinion with the ſcience of difference. For, according to him, this will be the aſſumption of reaſon.

THEÆ. It appears ſo.

Soc. But it is in every reſpect fooliſh for us, who are inveſtigating ſcience, to ſay that it is right opinion with ſcience, either of difference or of any thing elſe. Neither ſenſe therefore, Theætetus, nor true opinion, nor reaſon in conjunction with true opinion, will be ſcience.

Theæ. It does not appear that they will.

Soc. Are we, therefore, pregnant and parturient, my friend, with any thing further reſpecting ſcience, or have we brought forth every thing?

Theæ. By Jupiter, through you I have already ſaid more than I had in myſelf.

Soc. Does not, therefore, all this ſhow that the obſtetric art has brought for us that which is vain, and which does not deſerve to be nouriſhed?

Theæ. Entirely ſo.

Soc. If, therefore, after this you ſhould endeavour to become pregnant with other things, and your endeavour ſhould be ſucceſsful, you will, through the preſent diſcuſſion, be full of better things. But if you ſhould be empty, you will be leſs troubleſome to your companions, and more moderate and mild; in conſequence of not thinking that you know things which you do not know. For thus much my art is able to accompliſh, but nothing more. Nor do I know any thing of thoſe particulars which are and have been known to great and wonderful men. But this obſtetric art I and my mother are allotted from divinity; ſhe about women, and I about ingenuous and beautiful youths. Now, therefore, I muſt go to the porch of the king, to anſwer to the accuſation of Melitus. But to-morrow, Theodorus, we will again return hither.

THE END OF THE THEÆTETUS.

THE

THE POLITICUS:

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

A KINGDOM.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE POLITICUS.

AS there is one end for which nature, or rather the author of nature, produced the parts of the human body, and another for which he formed the whole man, ſo likewiſe he directed an individual of the human ſpecies to one end, a family to another, and again a city and kingdom to another. And laſtly, that is to be conſidered as the beſt end, for the ſake of which he produced the whole human race. Let no one however think, that though there is a certain end of every partial aſſociation among mankind, yet there is none of the whole; and that though there is order in the parts of human life, yet there is confuſion in the whole; or, in ſhort, that though the parts poſſeſs union from being directed to one end, yet the whole is diſperſed and unconnected: for, if this were admitted, parts would be more honourable than the whole; though the former ſubſiſt for the ſake of the latter, and not the latter for the ſake of the former. Hence it is neceſſary that there ſhould be a certain end of the human race, and that it ſhould conſiſt in thoſe energies through which it may imitate as much as poſſible things ſupernal; by ſcience ſpeculating things natural, human and divine; by prudence properly managing human affairs; and by piety cultivating and venerating divinity. An end, therefore, of this kind requires a twofold life, conſiſting both in action and contemplation, yet ſo conſtituted as that action may ſubſiſt for the ſake of contemplation, as that which is more excellent and divine.

Plato in this dialogue demonſtrates that this end can alone be obtained by the human race, under the government of a king who poſſeſſes conſummate probity and ſcience. Hence employing a moſt accurate diviſion which is

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eſſentially neceſſary to definition and ſcience, and in which Plato and his genuine diſciples excelled in a tranſcendent degree, he Homerically denominates a king the ſhepherd and curator of the human race. This king, too, he compares to a phyſician; ſince ſuch a one, by impoſing laws both on the willing and the unwilling, procures ſalutary remedies for his ſubjects. But he more frequently calls a governor and curator of this kind, a politician than a king, ſignifying by this that he will be ſo humane and mild, that among the citizens he will appear to be a fellow-citizen, and will evince that he is rather ſuperior to them in juſtice, prudence and ſcience, than in any other endowments. He likewiſe aſſerts, that the man who far ſurpaſſes all others in juſtice and prudence is born a king, though he ſhould live the life of a private individual: and it may be collected from his other dialogues as his opinion, that royal authority ſhould be given to the older and more worthy, a ſenate of whom ſhould be the colleagues of the king, forming, as it were, a certain ariſtocracy, or government of the moſt excellent men. As he proves too in this dialogue that a royal ſurpaſſes every other form of government, he likewiſe ſhows that a tyranny is the worſt kind of dominion, ſince it governs neither by law nor intellect, but by unreſtrained impulſe and arbitrary will. As the next in excellence to a royal government, he praiſes an ariſtocracy, but reprobates an oligarchy, or the government of a few: and he conſiders a popular government as deſerving praiſe in the third degree, if it governs according to law. After this he diſcuſſes the duty of a king, and ſhows that it conſiſts in providing ſuch things as are neceſſary for the human race, and eſpecially ſuch as contribute to its felicity, in prudently judging what arts are ſubſervient to this end in peace and war, in public and private conduct; and in exerciſing ſovereign authority in conjunction with the ſenate.

With reſpect to what he ſays of the motion of the ſpheres and the kingdoms of Saturn and Jupiter, the myſtic meaning of this fabulous narration will be unfolded in the notes on this dialogue.

THE

THE POLITICUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, THEODORUS, A GUEST, And SOCRATES Jun.

SOCRATES.

I AM greatly indebted to you, Theodorus, for making me acquainted with Theætetus and this gueſt.

THEO. Perhaps, Socrates, you will be indebted to me the triple of this, after theſe men have made you a politician and a philoſopher.

SOC. Be it ſo. But ſhall we ſay we have heard this of you, who are moſt ſkilful in reaſoning, and in things pertaining to geometry?

THEO. What is that, Socrates?

SOC. That we ſhould conſider each of theſe men as of equal worth, though they are more remote from each other in honour than accords with the analogy of your art.

THEO. By our God Ammon, Socrates, you have properly, juſtly, and promptly reproved me for my error in computation! But I ſhall ſpeak with you about this at ſome other time. But do not you, O gueſt, in any reſpect be weary in gratifying us, but diſcuſs for us, in order, either a politician firſt, or, if it is more agreeable to you, a philoſopher.

GUEST. We ſhall do ſo, Theodorus, as ſoon as we attempt this diſcuſſion, nor ſhall we deſiſt till we arrive at the end of it. But what ought I to do reſpecting Theætetus here?

THEO. About what?

GUEST. Shall we ſuffer him to reſt, and take in his ſtead Socrates here, as our aſſociate in the diſcuſſion? Or how do you adviſe?

THEO. As you ſay, take Socrates in his ſtead: for, both being young men, they will eaſily by reſting be able to endure every kind of labour.

SOC. And indeed, O gueſt, both of them appear to be allied to me in a certain reſpect. For you ſay that one of them (Theætetus) appears to reſemble me in the formation of his face; and the other poſſeſſes a certain alliance, through having the ſame name as myſelf. But it is requiſite that we who are allied ſhould always readily recognize this alliance by diſcourſe. With Theætetus, therefore, I yeſterday joined in diſcourſe, and to-day I have heard him anſwering this gueſt: but neither of them has yet diſcourſed with Socrates here. It is, however, proper that he ſhould be conſidered. Let him then anſwer me ſome other time, but at preſent let him anſwer you.

GUEST. Let it be ſo, Socrates. Do you hear this, Socrates junior?

SOC. JUN. I do.

GUEST. Do you, therefore, aſſent to what he ſays?

SOC. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. It appears, therefore, that you will be no impediment to our diſcuſſion; and perhaps it is requiſite that much leſs ſhould I be an impediment. But after a ſophiſt, it is neceſſary, as it appears to me, that we ſhould inveſtigate a politician. Tell me, therefore, whether this character ſhould be placed among the number of thoſe that poſſeſs a ſcientific knowledge. Or how ſhall we ſay?

SOC. JUN. That it ought.

GUEST. We muſt, therefore, make a diviſion of the ſciences, juſt as we made a diviſion in our inveſtigation of the ſophiſt.

SOC. JUN. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. But yet it appears to me, Socrates, that we ſhould not divide in the ſame manner.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly not.

GUEST. But after another manner.

SOC. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Who then can find the political path? For it is requiſite to find it, and, ſeparating it from other things, to impreſs it with one idea, and, marking the other deflections, with another ſpecies, to make our ſoul conceive that all the ſciences are comprehended in two ſpecies.

SOC. JUN. I think, O gueſt, that this is your buſineſs, and not mine.

GUEST.

GUEST. But indeed, Socrates, it is alſo requiſite that it ſhould be yours when it becomes apparent to us.

SOC. JUN. You ſpeak well.

GUEST. Are not, therefore, the arithmetic, and certain other arts allied to this, diveſted of action, and do they not afford knowledge alone?

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. But thoſe arts which pertain to architecture, and the whole of manual operation, poſſeſs, as it were, ſcience connate with actions, and at the ſame time give completion to bodies produced by them, which before this had not a being.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. After this manner, therefore, divide all ſciences, calling one practic, and the other gnoſtic alone.

SOC. JUN. Let there be, therefore, one whole ſcience, and two ſpecies of it.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, ſhall we conſider and denominate a politician, a king, a deſpot, and the governor of a family, as one and the ſame thing? Or ſhall we ſay there are as many arts pertaining to theſe as there are names? Or rather follow me hither.

SOC. JUN. Whither?

GUEST. To the conſideration of this. If any private perſon is able to adviſe ſufficiently a public phyſician, is it not neceſſary to call him by the name of that art which he who is adviſed profeſſes?

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. And if any private perſon is able to give advice to a king, ſhall we not ſay that ſuch a one poſſeſſes that ſcience which the king himſelf ought to poſſeſs?

SOC. JUN. We ſhall.

GUEST. But is not the ſcience of a true king royal?

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. And may not he who poſſeſſes this ſcience, whether he is a private man, or a ruler, be in every reſpect rightly called, according to this art, royal?

SOC. JUN. He may, juſtly.

GUEST. And are not the governor of a family and a deſpot the ſame?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But what? Is it of any conſequence, with reſpect to empire, whether the city is of a ſmall or of an ample ſize?

Soc. JUN. It is of no conſequence.

GUEST. It is evident, therefore (which is the thing we were juſt now inquiring), that there is one ſcience reſpecting all theſe. But we do not think it is of any conſequence whether any one denominates this ſcience royal, or political, or œconomic.

Soc. JUN. For of what conſequence can it be?

GUEST. This too is evident, that every king is able to do but a little with his hands, and the whole of his body, towards the poſſeſſion of empire, but much by the wiſdom and ſtrength of his ſoul.

Soc. JUN. It is evident.

GUEST. Are you willing, therefore, we ſhould ſay that a king is more allied to the gnoſtic than to the manual, and, in ſhort, to the practic ſcience?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We muſt, therefore, combine into the ſame the political ſcience and a politician, the royal ſcience and a royal man, as all theſe are one thing.

Soc. JUN. It is evident.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, proceed in an orderly manner, and after this divide the gnoſtic ſcience.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Attend, then, and inform me whether we can apprehend any way of eſcape in this.

Soc. JUN. Tell me of what kind.

GUEST. Of this kind. There is a certain logiſtic art.

Soc. JUN. There is.

GUEST. And this I think entirely belongs to the gnoſtic arts.

Soc. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But the logiſtic art knows the difference in numbers. Shall we, therefore, attribute to it any further employment than that of diſtinguiſhing and judging about things known?

Soc. JUN. Why?

GUEST.

GUEST. For no architect works himſelf, but rules over workmen.

SOC. JUN. It is ſo.

GUEST. And he imparts indeed knowledge, but not manual operation.

SOC. JUN. He does.

GUEST. He may juſtly, therefore, be ſaid to participate of the gnoſtic ſcience.

SOC. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But I think this belongs to the office of a judge, not to poſſeſs the end, nor to be liberated, in the ſame manner as the reckoner is liberated, but to order every manual operator that portion of work which is adapted to him, till that which they are commanded to do receives its completion.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. Are not, therefore, all ſuch things as theſe gnoſtic, and likewiſe ſuch as are conſequent to the logiſtic art? And do not theſe two genera differ from each other in judgment and mandate?

SOC. JUN. They appear to do ſo.

GUEST. If, therefore, we ſhould divide the whole of the gnoſtic ſcience into two parts, denominating the one mandatory, and the other judicial, may we not ſay that we have made an elegant diviſion?

SOC. JUN. Yes, according to my opinion.

GUEST. But thoſe that do any thing in common are delighted when they accord with each other.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. As far, therefore, as we accord in this particular we ſhall bid farewell to the opinions of others.

SOC. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Come, then, inform me in which of theſe arts we muſt place a royal character. Muſt we place him in the judicial art, as a certain ſpectator? Or rather, ſhall we place him in the commanding art, acting as a deſpot?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly, rather in this.

GUEST. Let us again conſider whether the commanding art admits of diſtinction. For it appears to me, that as the art of a huckſter differs from his art who ſells his own goods, ſo the royal genus from the genus of public criers.

Soc. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. Huckſters, firſt receiving the ſaleable works of others, afterwards ſell them again themſelves.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. In like manner, the tribe of criers, receiving the mandates of others, again imparts them to others.

Soc. JUN. Moſt true.

GUEST. What then? Shall we mingle the royal into the ſame with the interpretative, commanding, prophetic, and præconic [1] genus, and with many other arts allied to theſe, all which have this in common that they command? Or are you willing that, as we juſt now aſſimilated, we ſhould at preſent aſſimilate a name? ſince this genus of thoſe who command their own concerns is nearly without a name. And thus we ſhall ſo divide theſe as to place the royal genus among the number of thoſe that command their own concerns, neglecting every other particular, which any one may denominate as he pleaſes. For our method was adopted for the ſake of a ruler, and not for the ſake of the contrary.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Since, therefore, this is ſufficiently ſeparated from thoſe, and is brought by diviſion from that which is foreign to that which is domeſtic, it is neceſſary that this again ſhould be divided, if we have yet any compliant ſection in this.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And, indeed, it appears that we have. But follow me in dividing.

Soc. JUN. Whither?

GUEST. Do we not find that all ſuch as rule by command iſſue out their commands for the ſake of the generation of ſomething?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And, indeed, it is not in every reſpect difficult to give a twofold diviſion to all generated natures.

Soc. After what manner?

GUEST. Some among all of them are animated, and others are inanimate.

Soc. JUN. They are ſo.

[1] i. e. Pertaining to criers.

GUEST.

GUEST. If we wiſh to cut the commanding diviſion into theſe parts of the gnoſtic ſcience, we ſhould accordingly cut them.

SOC. JUN. According to what?

GUEST. One part of it ſhould be aſſigned to the genera of inanimate natures, and the other to the genera of ſuch as are animated. And thus the whole will receive a twofold diviſion.

SOC. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. One part, therefore, we muſt omit, and reſume the other; the whole of which we muſt again divide into two parts.

SOC. JUN. But inform me which of theſe is to be reſumed.

GUEST. By all means, that which rules over animals. For it is not the province of the royal ſcience to command things inanimate, like the architectonic ſcience; but, being of a more generous nature, it always poſſeſſes its power in animals, and about things pertaining to them.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. With reſpect to the generation and nurture of animals, attention to the latter is confined to one animal, but the care belonging to the former extends in common to the whole herd.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But we do not find that the attention of the politic ſcience is of a private nature, like that of an ox-driver, or an equerry; but it is rather ſimilar to the attention paid by him who feeds horſes and oxen.

SOC. JUN. This appears to be the caſe.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, with reſpect to the nurture of animals, ſhall we denominate the nurture of a flock the common nurture of many, or a certain common nutrition?

SOC. JUN. Both may be adopted in diſcourſe.

GUEST. You have anſwered well, Socrates. And if you avoid paying ſerious attention to names, you will appear in old age to be more rich in intellectual prudence. Let us, therefore, now do as you adviſe. But do you underſtand how ſome one, by ſhowing that the nurture of a herd is twofold, will render that which is now inveſtigated in things double, to be ſought after in halves?

SOC. JUN. I endeavour to do ſo: and it appears to me that there is one kind of nurture of men, and another of brutes.

GUEST. You have divided in every reſpect promptly and valiantly. We muſt however to the utmoſt of our power be careful that we may not ſuffer this again.

SOC. JUN. What?

GUEST. That we do not take away one ſmall part in oppoſition to many and great parts, nor yet take it away without ſpecies, but always in conjunction with ſpecies. For it is moſt beautiful to ſeparate immediately the object of inquiry from other things, if the ſeparation is rightly made; juſt as you a little before haſtily thought reſpecting diviſion, in conſequence of perceiving the diſcourſe tending to mankind. Though indeed, my friend, it is not ſafe to divide with ſubtilty: but it is more ſafe to proceed dividing through media; for thus we ſhall more readily meet with ideas. But the whole of this confers to the objects of our inveſtigation.

SOC. JUN. How do you mean, O gueſt?

GUEST. I will endeavour to ſpeak yet more clearly, on account of the benevolence of your nature, Socrates. It is impoſſible, therefore, to evince the things now propoſed in ſuch a manner that nothing ſhall be wanting: but yet we muſt endeavour to riſe a little higher in our ſpeculation, for the ſake of perſpicuity.

SOC. JUN. In what reſpect then do you ſay we have not juſt now rightly divided?

GUEST. In this reſpect, that if any one ſhould attempt to give a twofold diviſion to the human genus, he would divide juſt as many of the preſent day divide. For theſe ſeparate the Grecian genus apart from all others, as one thing; and denominate all other kinds of men, which are innumerable, unmixt, and diſcordant with each other, by one appellation, that of Barbarians; and through this one appellation, the genus itſelf appears to them to be one. But this is juſt as if ſome one, thinking that number ſhould be divided into two ſpecies, ſhould cut off ten thouſand from all numbers, as one ſpecies, and, giving one name to all the reſt, ſhould think that this genus will become ſeparate and different from the other through the appellation. He however will divide in a more beautiful manner, and more according to ſpecies, and a two-fold diviſion, who cuts number into the even and odd, and the human ſpecies into male and female; and who then ſeparates the Lydians or Phrygians, or certain other nations, from all others, when he is incapable

of

of finding the genus and at the ſame time part of each of the divided members.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right. But inform me, O gueſt, how any one may more clearly know that genus and part are not the ſame, but different from each other.

GUEST. O Socrates, beſt of men, you enjoin me no trifling thing. And, indeed, we have now wandered further from our propoſed diſcourſe than is fit; and yet you order us to wander ſtill more. Now, therefore, let us again return thither, whence we have digreſſed, as it is fit we ſhould; and hereafter we will at leiſure inveſtigate the queſtion propoſed by you. However, do not by any means think that you have heard this clearly determined from me.

Soc. JUN. What?

GUEST. That ſpecies and part are different from each other.

Soc. JUN. Why ſo?

GUEST. When any thing is a ſpecies of ſomething, it is alſo neceſſary that it ſhould be a part of the thing of which it is ſaid to be the ſpecies: but it is by no means neceſſary that a part ſhould be a ſpecies. Always conſider me, therefore, Socrates, as aſſerting this rather than that.

Soc. JUN. Be it ſo.

GUEST. But inform me after this.

Soc. JUN. What?

GUEST. Reſpecting that whence we have digreſſed hither. For I think that we principally digreſſed in conſequence of your being aſked how the nurture of a herd ſhould be divided, and very readily anſwering that there were two kinds of animals, the one human, and the other comprehending the whole of the brutal ſpecies.

Soc. JUN. True.

GUEST. And you then appeared to me, having taken away a part, to have thought that the remainder ſhould be left as one genus of all brutes, becauſe you could call all of them by the ſame name, viz. brutes.

Soc. JUN. Theſe things were ſo.

GUEST. But this, O moſt valiant of men, is juſt as if ſome other prudent animal, as for inſtance a crane, ſhould after your manner call cranes rational, thus exalting himſelf, and conſider them as forming one genus among other

animals, but, comprehending all the reſt together with men, ſhould perhaps denominate them nothing elſe than brutes. We ſhould endeavour, therefore, to avoid every thing of this kind.

Soc. JUN. How?

GUEST. By not dividing every genus of animals, that we may be leſs expoſed to this miſtake.

Soc. JUN. For there is no occaſion.

GUEST. We, therefore, then erred in this reſpect.

Soc. JUN. In what reſpect?

GUEST. That part of the gnoſtic ſcience which is commanding was determined by us to be of that kind which is employed in the nurture of animals, viz. of gregarious animals. Was it not?

Soc. JUN. It was.

GUEST. The whole animal genus, therefore, was then divided into the tame and wild. For thoſe animals that are naturally capable of being rendered gentle are called tame; but thoſe that are not are denominated wild.

Soc. JUN. Well ſaid.

GUEST. But the ſcience which we are in ſearch of, was and is in tame animals, and is to be inveſtigated among ſuch of theſe as are gregarious. Is it not ſo?

Soc. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. We muſt not, therefore, divide as then, looking to all animals, nor muſt we divide haſtily, in order that we may rapidly comprehend the politic ſcience. For this would cauſe us to ſuffer that which the proverb ſpeaks of.

Soc. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. By dividing too haſtily, we ſhall finiſh more ſlowly.

Soc. JUN. And it would very properly cauſe us to ſuffer, O gueſt.

GUEST. Be it ſo then. But let us again from the beginning endeavour to divide the common nurture of animals. For perhaps the diſcourſe itſelf being brought to a concluſion will more clearly unfold that which you deſire. But tell me this.

Soc. JUN. What?

GUEST. What perhaps you have often heard from certain perſons. For I do not think you have met with thoſe who tame fiſh about the Nile, or the royal

royal lakes. But perhaps you have been a ſpectator of the taming of theſe in fountains.

Soc. JUN. I have been a ſpectator of this, and I have heard of the former from many.

GUEST. You have likewiſe heard and believe that geeſe and cranes are fed by certain perſons, though you have never wandered about the Theſſalian plains.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. I have aſked you all theſe queſtions, becauſe the nurture of herds of animals is partly aquatic and partly terreſtrial.

Soc. JUN. It is ſo.

GUEST. Does it not, therefore, appear to you, as well as to me, that the ſcience reſpecting the common nurture of animals ſhould receive a twofold diviſion, and that one part ſhould be denominated that which nouriſhes in moiſture, and the other that which nouriſhes in dryneſs?

Soc. JUN. It does appear to me.

GUEST. But we do not in the ſame manner inquire to which of theſe arts the royal ſcience belongs. For it is evident to every one.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. For every one can divide the nurture of herds in dryneſs.

Soc. JUN. How?

GUEST. Into the volant and gradient.

Soc. JUN. Moſt true.

GUEST. That the political ſcience, however, is to be inveſtigated among gradient animals, is, as I may ſay, obvious to the moſt ſtupid. Or do you not think it is?

Soc. JUN. I do.

GUEST. But it is requiſite that, dividing the art of feeding animals, like an even number, we ſhould ſhow that it is twofold.

Soc. JUN. This is evident.

GUEST. Moreover, the part to which our diſcourſe impels us appears to extend itſelf in two certain paths; the one being ſhort, in conſequence of ſeparating a ſmall from a large part; but the other long, from preſerving that precept which we mentioned before, that we ought to divide through

media, as this is the moſt ample diviſion. It is permitted us, therefore, to proceed in either of theſe paths, as is moſt agreeable to us.

Soc. JUN. Is it then impoſſible to proceed in both?

GUEST. Not in both at once, O wonderful youth! But it is evident that it is poſſible to proceed in them ſeparately.

Soc. JUN. I will chooſe, therefore, to proceed in each apart from the other.

GUEST. It is eaſy ſo to do, ſince what remains is but ſhort. In the beginning, indeed, and middle of our journey we ſhould have found it difficult to comply with this mandate. But now, ſince it appears to be beſt, let us firſt proceed in the longer road. For, as we have but recently engaged in this affair, we ſhall more eaſily journey through it. But look to the diviſion.

Soc. JUN. Say what it is.

GUEST. The pedeſtrian genus of ſuch tame animals as are gregarious muſt be divided by us according to nature.

Soc. JUN. Why?

GUEST. Becauſe they muſt be divided into ſuch as are without horns, and into ſuch as are horned.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Dividing then the art of feeding pedeſtrian animals, deſcribe the condition of each part. For, if you ſhould be willing to name them, you would be involved in difficulties more than is becoming.

Soc. JUN. How then is it proper to ſpeak of them?

GUEST. Thus. Since the ſcience of feeding animals receives a twofold diviſion, one member of it conſiſts in the horned part of the flock, but the other in that part which is without horns.

Soc. JUN. Let theſe things be ſo ſaid: for they are ſufficiently ſhown to be ſo.

GUEST. Again, therefore, it will appear to us, that a king feeds a certain herd of mutilated hornleſs animals.

Soc. JUN. For how is it poſſible this ſhould not be evident?

GUEST. Breaking this, therefore, in pieces, we will endeavour to exhibit that which is tranſacted by a king.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, are you willing we ſhould divide this herd into what is called the fiſſured and the ſolid hoof? Or ſhall we divide it into common and private generation? For you underſtand me.

Soc. JUN. What kind of generation do you mean?

GUEST. That of horſes and aſſes, which naturally generate from each other.

Soc. JUN. They do.

GUEST. But the remaining ſpecies, belonging to the one herd of tame animals, do not promiſcuouſly mingle with each other, but thoſe only of the ſame kind copulate together.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But whether does the political ſcience appear to take care of the common, or of the private generation of animals?

Soc. JUN. It is evident that it takes care of the unmingled generation of animals.

GUEST. It is evident, then, as it ſeems, that we ſhould give a twofold diviſion to this, as we did to the preceding particulars.

Soc. JUN. It is indeed neceſſary.

GUEST. But we have already nearly ſeparated into minute parts every tame and gregarious animal, except two genera. For it is not fit to rank the genus of dogs among gregarious cattle.

Soc. JUN. It is not. But how ſhall we divide theſe two?

GUEST. After that manner, which it is juſt you and Theætetus ſhould adopt in diſtributing, ſince you have touched on geometry.

Soc. JUN. What manner is that?

GUEST. By the diameter, and again by the diameter of the diameter.

Soc. JUN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Is the condition of the human genus in any other way naturally adapted to progreſſion than as a diameter, in power a biped?

Soc. JUN. In no other way.

GUEST. But again, the condition of the remaining genus is, according to the power of our power, a diameter, ſince it naturally conſiſts of twice two feet.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly. And now I nearly underſtand what you wiſh to evince.

GUEST. But beſides theſe things, do we perceive, Socrates, a circumſtance worthy of laughter, which happened to us in making the former diviſion?

Soc. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. The human genus, mingled and concurring with a genus the moſt generous and tractable of all others.

Soc. JUN. I perceive it, and likewiſe that it is a very abſurd circumſtance.

GUEST. Is it not fit that the ſloweſt things ſhould arrive laſt of all?

Soc. JUN. It is.

GUEST. But we do not perceive this, that a king appears ſtill more ridiculous when running together with the herd, and performing his courſe in conjunction with him who is exerciſed in the beſt manner with reſpect to a tractable life.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. For now, Socrates, that is more apparent which was ſaid by us in our inveſtigation of a ſophiſt.

Soc. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. That, in ſuch a method of diſcourſe as this, he neither pays more attention to what is venerable than what is not, nor does he prefer the ſmall to the great, but always accompliſhes that which is moſt true.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. After this, that you may not accuſe me, as you have inquired what is the ſhorter way to the definition of a king, I will, in the firſt place, conſider this.

Soc. JUN. By all means, do ſo.

GUEST. But I ſay that a gradient animal ought to have been divided by us above into the biped and quadruped genus; and perceiving that man then alone remained in conjunction with the volant genus, the biped herd ſhould again have been divided into the winged and without wings. But this diviſion being made, and being evinced by that art which is the nurſe of men, a political and royal character ſhould be placed over it, like a charioteer, and the reins of the city ſhould be given to him, in conſequence of this ſcience being adapted to him.

Soc.

Soc. JUN. You have anſwered me beautifully, and as if you had been diſcharging a debt; and you have added a digreſſion, by way of intereſt, and as the completion of your diſcourſe.

GUEST. Come, then, let us connect, by recurring from the beginning to the end, the diſcourſe concerning the name of the politic art.

Soc. JUN. By all means.

GUEST. One part, therefore, of the gnoſtic ſcience was aſſerted by us in the beginning to be of a commanding nature; and we ſaid that the part of this ſcience which commands from itſelf was aſſimilated to this. Again, we aſſerted that the nurture of animals was a part of the ſelf-commanding ſcience, and that this was not the ſmalleſt part. Likewiſe, that the nurture of herds was a ſpecies of the nurture of animals; and that the art which is nutritive of animals without horns, eſpecially belongs to the art of feeding pedeſtrian animals. Again, it is neceſſary to connect not leſs than the triple of this part, if any one is deſirous of comprehending it in one name, viz. the ſcience of an unmingled genus of feeding. But a ſection from this, which alone remains, and which feeds men, as ranking among bipeds, is the part which we are now exploring, and which we denominate royal, and at the ſame time political.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Do you therefore think, Socrates, that we have really done well, as you ſay?

Soc. JUN. In what?

GUEST. I mean that the thing propoſed by us has been in every reſpect and ſufficiently diſcuſſed. Or has our inveſtigation been particularly deficient in this, that it has given, indeed, a deſcription of the thing, but ſuch a one as is not perfectly finiſhed?

Soc. JUN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. I will endeavour to explain my meaning more clearly.

Soc. JUN. Do ſo.

GUEST. Since, therefore, it has appeared that there are many paſtoral arts, the politic ſcience is one of theſe, and is the curator of one certain herd.

Soc. JUN. It is.

GUEST. Our diſcourſe defined this to be neither the nurſe of horſes, nor of any other brutes, but to be the common nutritive ſcience of men.

Soc. JUN. It did ſo.

GUEST. But let us contemplate the difference of all ſhepherds and kings.

Soc. JUN. What is the difference?

GUEST. If any one poſſeſſing the name of another art ſhould aſſert and vindicate to himſelf the nutrition in common of the human herd, what ſhould we ſay?

Soc. JUN. How is this?

GUEST. Juſt as if all merchants, huſbandmen, and cooks, and beſides theſe the profeſſors of gymnaſtic, and the genus of phyſicians, ſhould verbally oppoſe the ſhepherds of the human race, whom we have called politicians, and ſhould aſſert that the care of nurturing men belonged to them, and that they were not only ſhepherds of the herds of men, but even of rulers themſelves.

Soc. JUN. And would not their aſſertion be right?

GUEST. Perhaps ſo. And let us alſo conſider this. For we know that no one would contend with a herdſman about things of this kind; ſince he is, doubtleſs, the nurſe, the phyſician, and as it were brideman of a herd, and is alone ſkilled in the obſtetric art reſpecting parturition and offſpring. No one, beſides, is better calculated, by ſuch ſport and muſic as the nature of cattle is capable of receiving, of conſoling, and by alluring arts mitigating, with inſtruments, or the mere mouth, the herd committed to his care. And the ſame may be ſaid of other ſhepherds. Or may it not?

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. How, then, will our diſcourſe reſpecting a king appear to be right and entire, ſince we aſſert that he alone is the ſhepherd and nurſe of the human herd, when at the ſame time ten thouſand others contend for the ſame office?

Soc. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. Did we not, therefore, a little before very properly fear, when we ſuſpected leſt we ſhould only introduce a certain royal figure, and ſhould not perfectly define a political character, unleſs we comprehended thoſe that are connected with this character, and who profeſs themſelves to be equally ſhepherds; and, ſeparating a king from them, alone exhibited him pure?

Soc. JUN. Our fear, indeed, was moſt right.

GUEST. This therefore, Socrates, muſt be done by us, unleſs we intend to diſgrace our diſcourſe at the end.

Soc.

Soc. JUN. But this muſt by no means take place.

GUEST. Again, therefore, we muſt proceed in another way from another beginning.

Soc. JUN. In what way?

GUEST. By nearly inſerting a jeſt. For it is requiſite to employ a copious part of a long fable [1], and to act in the ſame manner with what remains of our

[1] The ſubſtance of this fable is beautifully explained by Proclus, in his fifth book on the Theology of Plato, as follows:

"This univerſe is very properly ſaid to have twofold lives, periods and convolutions; one of theſe being Saturnian, and the other Jovian. According to the former of theſe periods, too, every thing good ſprings ſpontaneouſly, and every animated nature poſſeſſes a blameleſs and unwearied life; but the latter is the ſource of material error, and of an abundantly mutable nature. For, as there is a twofold life in the world, the one unapparent and more intellectual, but the other more natural and apparent, and the one being bounded by providence, but the other proceeding in a diſorderly manner according to fate,—hence this latter, which is multiform, and perfected through nature, is ſuſpended from the Jovian order; but the former, which is more ſimple, is intellectual and unapparent, and is ſuſpended from that of Saturn. This the Elean gueſt clearly indicates, by calling one of the circulations Jovian, and the other Saturnian. Though Jupiter alſo is the cauſe of the unapparent life of the univerſe, is the ſupplier of intellect, and the leader of intellectual perfection, yet he leads upwards all things to the kingdom of Saturn, and, being a leader, together with his father gives ſubſiſtence to the whole mundane intellect. Each of theſe periods, indeed, viz. the apparent and unapparent, participates of both theſe Gods; but the one is more Saturnian, and the other is in ſubjection to the kingdom of Jupiter. That the mighty Saturn, therefore, is allotted the other kingdom of the Gods prior to him, the Elean gueſt clearly evinces in what he ſays prior to the fable, viz. that we have heard from many of the kingdom which Saturn obtained; ſo that, according to this wiſe man alſo, Saturn is one of the royal Gods. Hence, as his father Heaven contains the middle centres of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, he is the leader of the intellectual orders, and ſupplies the whole of intellectual energy, firſt to the Gods; in the ſecond place, to the genera ſuperior to man; and in the laſt place, to partial ſouls ſuch as ours, when they are able to extend themſelves to the Saturnian place of ſurvey. For this univerſe, and all the mundane Gods, perpetually poſſeſs this twofold life, and imitate the Saturnian intellection through unapparent and intellectual energy, but the demiurgic intellect of Jupiter through providential attention to ſecondary concerns; and, in ſhort, through the apparent fabrication of things. But partial ſouls at one time energize intellectually, and conſecrate themſelves to Saturn, and at another time according to the characteriſtic of Jupiter, and with unreſtrained energy provide for ſubordinate natures. When they revolve, however, analogouſly to theſe deities, they intellectually perceive intelligibles, and adorn ſenſibles, and live both theſe lives in the ſame manner as the Gods and the more excellent genera. For their periods are twofold, one intellectual and the other providential. Their paradigms alſo are twofold: of the one the Saturnian

our diſcuſſion, as we did above, viz. always to take away a part from a part, till we arrive at the ſummit of our inquiry. Is it not proper to act in this manner?

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Give me then, after the manner of boys, all your attention to the fable: for you are not very much removed from puerile years.

Soc. JUN. Only relate it.

Saturnian intellect, and of the other the Jovian;—ſince even the mighty Jupiter himſelf has a twofold energy; by intellect, indeed, adhering to intelligibles, but by demiurgic fabrication adorning ſenſibles.

"Since, therefore, the revolutions are twofold, not only in wholes but likewiſe in partial ſouls, in the Saturnian period," ſays the Elean gueſt, the generation of men is not from each other, as in apparent men, nor, as the firſt man with us is alone earth-born, ſo, in partial ſouls, the one firſt ſoul is earth-born; but this is the caſe with all of them. For they are led upwards from laſt and earthly bodies, and they receive an unapparent, deſerting a ſenſible, life. But neither do they verge to old age, and change from younger to older; but on the contrary they become more vigorous, and proceed intellectually in a path contrary to generation, and reſolve as it were that variety of life, which in deſcending they made a compoſite. Hence, likewiſe, all the ſymbols pertaining to youth are preſent with thoſe ſouls when they paſs into ſuch a condition of being; for they lay aſide every thing which adheres to them from generation. And when they are diſtributed about Saturn, and live the life which is there, he ſays fruits are produced in abundance from the trees, and many other things ſpring ſpontaneouſly from the earth. The inhabitants alſo are naked and without beds, and for the moſt part are fed, dwelling in the open air: for they poſſeſs an indiſſoluble temperament of the ſeaſons. The graſs likewiſe ſpringing abundantly from the earth ſupplies them with ſoft couches. Theſe and ſuch like goods, ſouls derive from this mighty deity, according to the Saturnian period. For they are thence filled with vivific good, and gather intellectual fruits from wholes, but do not extend to themſelves, from partial energies, perfection and beatitude. For doxaſtic nutriment poſſeſſes diviſible and material apprehenſions, but that which is intellectual, ſuch as are pure, indiviſible and ſpontaneous; which the ſpontaneous here obſcurely ſignifies. The fruits alſo imparted from the earth ſignify the perfection of the prolific intellect of the Gods, and which illuminates ſouls with a ſufficiency from themſelves. For, through an unenvying abundance of goods, they are alſo able to impart to ſecondary natures felicity in a convenient meaſure. Neither, therefore, are they inveſted with garments, as when they proceed into generation, nor do they abound with additions of life, but are themſelves pure, by themſelves, from all compoſition and variety; and exciting their own intellect, they are extended by their intellectual father to theſe divine benefits. They likewiſe participate of total goods, being guarded by the intellectual Gods; and receiving from them the meaſures of a happy life, they paſs the whole of their exiſtence with facility. And laſtly, eſtabliſhing a ſleepleſs and undefiled life in the generative powers of intelligibles, and being filled with intellectual fruits, and nouriſhed with immaterial and divine forms, they are ſaid to live the life which belongs to the government of Saturn."

GUEST.

GUEST. There were then, and ſtill will be, many memorials of antient affairs; and among others, there is one prodigious relation reſpecting the contention of Atreus and Thyeſtes. For you have heard and remember what is then ſaid to have happened.

SOC. JUN. Perhaps you ſpeak of the prodigy reſpecting the golden ram.

GUEST. By no means: but reſpecting the mutation of the riſing and ſetting of the ſun, and the other ſtars. For whence they now riſe they did then ſet: and their riſing was from a contrary place. Divinity, therefore, then giving a teſtimony to Atreus, changed the heavens into the preſent figure.

SOC. JUN. This alſo is reported.

GUEST. We have likewiſe heard from many reſpecting the kingdom of which Saturn was the founder.

SOC. JUN. We have from very many.

GUEST. And were not thoſe antient men born from the earth, and not generated from each other?

SOC. JUN. This alſo is one of the things which are ſaid to have happened formerly.

GUEST. All theſe things, therefore, proceed from the ſame circumſtance, and ten thouſand others beſides theſe, and which are ſtill more wonderful. But, through length of time, ſome of them have become extinct, and others are related in a diſperſed manner, ſeparate from each other. But that circumſtance which is the cauſe of this taking place has not been mentioned by any one. It muſt, however, now be related: for the relation will contribute to the demonſtration of the nature of a king.

SOC. JUN. You ſpeak moſt beautifully. Speak, therefore, and do not omit any thing.

GUEST. Hear, then. Divinity himſelf ſometimes conducts this univerſe in its progreſſion, and convolves it: but at another time he remits the reins of his government, when the periods of the univerſe have received a convenient meaſure of time. But the world is again ſpontaneouſly led round to things contrary, ſince it is an animal, and is allotted wiſdom from him who cooperated with it from the firſt in harmonizing all its parts with the whole. This progreſſion, however, to things contrary is naturally implanted in it through the following cauſe.

SOC. JUN. Through what cauſe?

GUEST. To ſubſiſt always according to the ſame, and in a ſimilar manner, and to be the ſame, alone belongs to the moſt divine of all things: but the nature of body is not of this order. But that which we call heaven and the world, receives many and bleſſed gifts from its producing cauſe. However, as it participates of body, it cannot be entirely void of mutation: nevertheleſs, as far as it is able, it is moved in the ſame, and according to the ſame, with one lation. Hence it is allotted a circular motion, becauſe there is the ſmalleſt mutation of its motion. But nearly nothing is able to revolve itſelf, except that which is the leader of all things that are moved. And it is not lawful that this ſhould at one time move in one way, and at another time in a different way. From all this, therefore, it muſt be ſaid, that the world neither always revolves itſelf, nor that the whole of it is always convolved by Divinity with twofold and contrary convolutions: nor, again, that two certain Gods convolve it, whoſe deciſions are contrary to each other. But that muſt be aſſerted which we juſt now ſaid, and which alone remains, that at one time it is conducted by another divine cauſe, receiving again an externally acquired life, and a renewed immortality from the demiurgus; but that at another time, when he remits the reins of government, it proceeds by itſelf, and, being thus left for a time, performs many myriads of retrograde revolutions, becauſe it is moſt great, and moſt equally balanced, and accompliſhes its progreſſions with the ſmalleſt foot.

SOC. JUN. All that you have ſaid appears to be very probable.

GUEST. From what has been ſaid, therefore, we may now, by a reaſoning proceſs, apprehend that circumſtance which we ſaid was the cauſe of all wonderful things. For it is this very thing.

SOC. JUN. What?

GUEST. That the circular motion of the univerſe is at one time accompliſhed as at preſent, and at another time in a contrary manner.

SOC. JUN. But how is this the cauſe of all wonderful things?

GUEST. It is requiſite to think that this mutation is the greateſt and moſt perfect of all the celeſtial converſions.

SOC. JUN. It is likely.

GUEST. It is proper, therefore, to think that the greateſt mutations then happen to us who are the inhabitants of the world.

SOC. JUN. And this alſo is likely.

GUEST. But do we not know that the nature of animals ſuſtains with difficulty great, numerous, and all-various mutations?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Hence, the greateſt corruptions of other animals then neceſſarily take place, and very few of the human race remain. And to theſe many other wonderful and novel circumſtances at the ſame time happen; but this is the greateſt, and follows that revolution of the univerſe in which a converſion is effected contrary to the preſent.

SOC. JUN. What circumſtance do you mean?

GUEST. That which takes place the firſt of all, when, in whatever age a mortal animal is conſtituted, he is no longer ſeen advancing to old age, but is again changed to the contrary, and naturally becomes, as it were, younger and more delicate. The white hairs, too, of thoſe more advanced in years then became black [1], and the cheeks of thoſe that had beards became ſmooth; and thus each was reſtored to the paſt flower of his age. The bodies, likewiſe, of ſuch as were in the bloom of youth, becoming ſmoother and ſmaller every day and night, again returned to the nature of a child recently born: and ſuch were aſſimilated to this nature, both in ſoul and body. And at length their bodies, rapidly waſting away, periſhed. But the dead bodies of thoſe who at that time died through violence were in like manner immaniſeſtly, and in a few days, corrupted.

SOC. JUN. But what was then, O gueſt, the generation of animals, and after what manner were they produced from each other?

GUEST. It is evident, Socrates, that at that time there was no generation of one thing from another. But, as it is ſaid that there was once an earth-born race, this race was at that period reſtored back again from the earth. This information, too, was delivered to us by thoſe our firſt progenitors, who lived immediately after the cloſe of the laſt revolution. For they were public witneſſes of the truth of our aſſertions, which at preſent are diſbelieved, though improperly, by the multitude. For I think this particular ought to be attended to, as conſequent to a part of the narration. For, if old men tended to the nature of boys, it follows, that ſuch as were dead, but laid in

[1] Plato, in what he here aſſerts of the Saturnian age, wonderfully accords with Orpheus, who, as we are informed by Proclus in Plat. Theol. lib. v. myſtically ſays, "that the hairs of the face of Saturn are always black, and never become hoary."

the earth, muſt be again reſtored from thence, revive again, and follow that revolution of the univerſe, in which generation is convolved in a contrary order; and that the earth-born race, which according to this reaſon is neceſſarily produced, ſhould thus be denominated and defined, viz. ſuch of them as Divinity has transferred into another deſtiny.

Soc. JUN. This very much follows from what has been ſaid above. But with reſpect to the life which you ſay was under the power of Saturn, did it ſubſiſt in thoſe revolutions, or in theſe? For it is evident that the mutation of the ſtars and the ſun happens in both theſe revolutions.

GUEST. You follow the diſcourſe well. But, in anſwer to your queſtion reſpecting all things being produced ſpontaneouſly for mankind, this by no means is the caſe in the preſent, but happened in the former revolution. For then Divinity was firſt the ruler and curator of the whole circulation; juſt as now the ſeveral parts of the world are locally diſtributed by ruling Gods. Divine dæmons, too, were allotted, after the manner of ſhepherds, animals according to genera and herds; each being ſufficient for all things pertaining to the ſeveral particulars over which he preſided. So that there was nothing ruſtic, no mutual rapine, no war, nor ſedition of any kind; and ten thouſand other things took place, which are the conſequences of ſuch a period. But what is ſaid reſpecting the ſpontaneous life of theſe men is aſſerted becauſe Divinity himſelf fed them, and was their curator; juſt as men who are of a more divine, are the ſhepherds of brutes, who are of a baſer, nature. In conſequence, too, of men being fed by Divinity, there were no polities, nor poſſeſſions of women and children. For all theſe were reſtored to life from the earth, and without having any recollection of former events. But all ſuch things as theſe were abſent. The inhabitants, too, had fruits in abundance from oaks, and many other trees, which did not grow through the aſſiſtance of agriculture, but were ſpontaneouſly given by the earth. And for the moſt part they were naked, ſlept without coverlids, and were fed in the open air. For the temperament of the ſeaſons was innoxious to them. They had ſoft beds, too, from graſs, which germinated in unenvying abundance from the earth. And thus, Socrates, you have heard what was the life of men under the reign of Saturn: but you yourſelf have ſeen what the condition of the preſent life is, which is ſaid to be under Jupiter. But are you able, and likewiſe willing, to judge which of theſe is the more happy?

Soc.

Soc. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. Are you willing, therefore, that I ſhould after a manner judge for you?

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. If, therefore, thoſe that were nurtured by Saturn in ſo much leiſure, and with the power not only of converſing with men, but with brutes, uſed all the above-mentioned particulars for the purpoſe of philoſophy, aſſociating with brutes and with each other, and inquiring of every nature which had a perceptive power of its own, in what reſpect it differed from others as to the common poſſeſſion of prudence; from all this it may be eaſily inferred, that the men of thoſe times were incomparably more happy than thoſe that exiſt at preſent. But if, being abundantly filled with meats and drinks, their diſcourſes with each other, and with brutes, were ſuch as at preſent they are related to have been, from this alſo, in my opinion, their ſuperior felicity may be very eaſily inferred. At the ſame time, however, we ſhall diſmiſs theſe particulars till ſome ſufficient judge of them ſhall ariſe, who will unfold to us whether the men of that period were inclined to ſciences and diſcourſe. But let us now relate on what account we introduced the fable, that we may after this bring to a concluſion what remains. For, after the time of all theſe was conſummated, and it was requiſite that a mutation ſhould take place, and beſides this, the whole terreſtrial genus being conſumed, as all the generations of every ſoul had received their completion, and as many ſeeds having fallen on the earth as were deſtined to each ſoul,—then the governor of the univerſe, laying aſide as it were the handle of his rudder, departed to that place of ſurvey whence he contemplates himſelf. But then fate and connate deſire again convolved the world. All thoſe Gods, therefore, who govern locally, in conjunction with the greateſt dæmon, knowing what had now happened, again deprived the parts of the world of their providential care. But the world becoming inverted, conflicting with itſelf, and being agitated by an impulſe contrary to its beginning and end, and likewiſe making an abundant concuſſion in itſelf, produced again another corruption of all-various animals. After theſe things, however, and the expiration of a ſufficient length of time, the tumult, confuſion, and concuſſions ceaſed, and the world, becoming tranquil and adorned, again proceeded in its uſual courſe, poſſeſſing a providential care and dominion, both over itſelf and

the natures which it contains; remembering, to the utmoſt of its power, the inſtructions of the demiurgus and father[1]. At the beginning, therefore, it accompliſhed this more perfectly, but at the end more remiſsly. But the cauſe of this is the corporeal form of the temperature, and which was nurſed together with an antient nature. For it was a participant of much diſorder before it arrived at the preſent ornament. For, from its compoſing artificer, indeed, it poſſeſſes every good; but, from its former habit, all that atrocity and injuſtice which ſubſiſt within the heavens. And theſe the world both poſſeſſes from that former habit, and inſerts in animated natures. The world, therefore, when nouriſhing the animals which it contains, in conjunction with the governor, brings forth ſmall evils, and mighty goods: but when it is ſeparated from him, during the neareſt time of its departure, it conducts all things beautifully. At a more diſtant period, however, and from oblivion being generated in it, the property of its former diſſonance rules with greater force. And at the laſt period of time it becomes defloreſcent; and producing ſmall goods, but mingling much of the temperament of things contrary to good, it arrives at the danger of both itſelf, and the natures which it contains, being diſſolved. Hence that God who adorned the world, then perceiving the difficulties under which it labours, and anxious leſt, being thus tempeſtuouſly agitated, it ſhould be diſſolved by the tumult, and be plunged into the infinite ſea of diſſimilitude, again reſumes the helm, and adorns and corrects whatever is diſeaſed and diſſolved through the inordinate motion of the former period, and renders the world immortal and unconſcious of age. This, therefore, is the end of the whole narration. But this is ſufficient to ſhow the nature of a king to ſuch as attend to what has been already ſaid. For, the world being again converted to the preſent path of generation, the progreſſion of its age again ſtopped, and it imparted novel things, the very contraries to what it then imparted. For animals proximate to death, on account of their ſmallneſs, are increaſed. But bodies recently born from the earth, hoary, again dying, deſcend into the earth; and all other things are tranſmuted, imitating and following the condition of the univerſe. The imitation, likewiſe, of motion, generation, and nutriment, follows all things from neceſſity. For it is no longer poſſible for an animal

[1] i. e. Jupiter. See the Timæus.

to

to be produced in the earth, through other things mutually compoſing it; but, as the world was deſtined to be the abſolute ruler of its own progreſſion, after the ſame manner its parts alſo were deſtined by a ſimilar guidance to ſpring forth, generate, and nouriſh, as far as they are able. But we have now arrived at that for the ſake of which the whole of our diſcourſe was undertaken. For, with reſpect to other animals, many particulars, and of a prolix nature, might be diſcuſſed; ſuch as, from what things they are ſeverally compoſed, and through what cauſes they were changed: but the particulars reſpecting men are ſhorter, and more to our purpoſe. For, mankind being deſtitute of the guardian care of the dæmon whoſe poſſeſſion we are, and who is the ſhepherd of our race, and as many animals who are naturally cruel became tranſported with rage, hence men, now imbecil, and without a guard, were torn in pieces by ſuch animals. And beſides this, men in thoſe firſt times were unſkilful, and had no knowledge of the arts, becauſe the earth ſpontaneouſly afforded them nutriment: but they did not know how to procure it, becauſe they were not compelled by any previous neceſſity. From all theſe cauſes they were involved in the greateſt difficulties. Hence, thoſe gifts which are ſaid to have been formerly imparted to us by the Gods were imparted with neceſſary inſtruction and erudition: fire, indeed, from Prometheus [1], but the arts from Vulcan and Minerva. Again, ſeeds and plants were imparted by other divinities; and, in ſhort, all ſuch things as are the ſupport of human life. For men, as we have ſaid, were not left deſtitute of the guardian care of the Gods; and it became requiſite that they alſo ſhould pay attention to the concerns of life, in the ſame manner as the whole world; in the imitating and following which, through all the revolutions of time, we live and are born in a different manner at different periods. And let this be the end of the fable. But we ſhall make it uſeful to diſcover how far we have erred in the above definition of a royal and political character.

Soc. jun. In what reſpect, and how far, do you ſay we have erred?

Guest. Partly leſs, and in a more generous manner, and partly in a greater degree, and more abundantly.

Soc. jun. How?

[1] Prometheus is the inſpective guardian of the deſcent of rational ſouls; and the fire which he imparted to mortals is the rational ſoul itſelf, becauſe this like fire naturally tends upwards, or, in other words, aſpires after incorporeal natures.

Guest.

GUEST. Becauſe, while we were aſked reſpecting a king and politician belonging to the preſent circulation and generation, we adduced a ſhepherd of a herd of men belonging to the contrary period; and in conſequence of this ſhepherd being a God, and not a man, we tranſgreſſed abundantly: but again, becauſe we evinced that this ſhepherd was the governor of the whole city, but yet did not ſay after what manner, in this reſpect we aſſerted what is true, but were deficient as to the whole and the perſpicuous; and on this account we erred leſs in this latter caſe than in the former.

SOC. JUN. True.

GUEST. We ought, therefore, as it ſeems, to think that we ſhall then have perfectly deſcribed a political character when we have defined the mode of governing a city.

SOC. JUN. Beautifully ſaid.

GUEST. On this account we related that fable, not only that thoſe might be pointed out who oppoſe the royal character we are now inveſtigating with reſpect to the nurture of a herd, but that we might more clearly perceive him who alone ought to be called a paſtor, ſince after the manner of a ſhepherd and herdſman he takes care of the nurture of the human race.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But I think, Socrates, that this figure of a divine ſhepherd is ſtill greater than that which belongs to a king; and that the politicians of the preſent day are naturally much more ſimilar to ſubjects than governors, and in a manner more allied to theſe participate of diſcipline and nurture.

SOC. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But we muſt not inquire whether they have been more or leſs ſo, and whether they are naturally ſo or not.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly not.

GUEST. Again, therefore, let us thus reſume our inquiry. We ſaid, then, that there was a ſelf-commanding art reſpecting animals, which took care of them, not privately, but in common; and this art we then directly called the herd-nouriſhing art. Do you recollect?

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. In this, therefore, we erred. For we have not by any means comprehended in a definition the political character, nor given it a name; but its name as yet flies from us.

SOC.

Soc. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. To nouriſh the ſeveral herds of animals belongs to all other ſhepherds; but we have not given a fit name to the political character, which requires the application of ſomething common.

Soc. JUN. You ſpeak the truth, if this common ſomething can be obtained.

GUEST. But is it not poſſible to apply healing, as that which is common to all things, without either defining nutriment, or any other thing? and to introduce another certain art, either pertaining to the nurture of herds, or therapeutic, or adapted to take care of ſomething; and thus to comprehend the political character together with others, ſince reaſon ſignifies that this ought to be done?

Soc. JUN. Right. But after this, in what manner muſt the diviſion be made?

GUEST. As before we divided the herd-nouriſhing art into the gradient and winged tribes, and into the horned and without horns, in the ſame manner we ſhould divide the art pertaining to the care of herds, which will thus be ſimilarly comprehended in our diſcourſe, together with the kingdom of Saturn.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo. But go on with your inquiries.

GUEST. If, then, the name of the art pertaining to the care of herds had been thus adopted, no one would have oppoſed us, as if there were no careful attention whatever; juſt as then it was juſtly contended, that there is no art in us which deſerves the appellation of nutritive; and that, if there were any ſuch art, it belongs to many things prior to, and preferable to, any thing pertaining to kings.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But no other art endeavours to accompliſh this more, and in a milder manner, as if it paid a careful attention to the whole of human communion, than the royal art.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But after theſe things, Socrates, do you perceive how very much we have erred about the end?

Soc. JUN. What kind of error have we committed?

GUEST. We have erred in this, that though we have conceived that there

is a certain nutritive art of a biped herd, yet we ought not immediately to have called it royal and politic, as if entirely complete.

Soc. JUN. Why not?

GUEST. In the firſt place, as we have ſaid, the name ought to be accommodated more to attentive care than to nutriment: and in the next place, this attentive care ought to be divided. For it will receive no ſmall ſections.

Soc. JUN. Of what kind?

GUEST. The ſections will be a divine ſhepherd, and a human curator.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. And again, it is neceſſary to give a twofold diſtribution to human care.

Soc. JUN. What are the two parts?

GUEST. The violent and the voluntary.

Soc. JUN. What then?

GUEST. And erring in this, with greater ineptitude than is becoming, we conſidered a king and a tyrant as the ſame, though they are moſt diſſimilar both in themſelves and in their mode of government.

Soc. JUN. True.

GUEST. Now, therefore, again correcting ourſelves (as I have already ſaid), we ſhall divide human care into the violent and the voluntary.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And the violent we ſhall call tyrannic: but the voluntary, and the attention paid to the herds of voluntary biped animals, we ſhall denominate politic. We ſhall therefore evince, that he who poſſeſſes this art and care is truly a king and a politician.

Soc. JUN. And thus the demonſtration, O gueſt, reſpecting political affairs will, as it appears, be perfect.

GUEST. It will be well for us, Socrates, if this is the caſe. But it is requiſite that theſe things ſhould not only be apparent to you, but likewiſe to me, in common with you. But at preſent a king appears to me not to poſſeſs as yet a perfect figure: but juſt as ſtatuaries, who by haſtening their work ſometimes unſeaſonably, and adding more and larger things than are fit, finiſh it more ſlowly; ſo we at preſent have not only rapidly and magnificently evinced that we erred in the former part of our diſcuſſion, in conſequence of thinking that great paradigms ſhould be employed about a king, but

but we reviled the wonderful bulk of the fable, and were compelled to uſe a greater part of it than was proper. On this account, we have made a more prolix demonſtration, and have not entirely finiſhed the fable. But, indeed, our diſcourſe, like an animal, appears to have its exterior delineation ſufficiently perfect, but is not yet perſpicuous, through paint, and the mixture of colours. But it is more becoming to exhibit every animal by words and diſcourſe, to ſuch as are able to follow the diſquiſition, than by painting, and the whole of manual operation; but other things are to be exhibited through the operations of the hand.

Soc. JUN. This, indeed, is rightly ſaid: but ſhow me why you ſay you have not yet ſpoken ſufficiently.

GUEST. It is difficult, O divine youth, to exhibit great things perſpicuouſly, without examples. For each of us appears to know all things as in a dream [1], and again to be ignorant of all things according to a wakeful perception.

Soc. JUN. How do you ſay this?

GUEST. We appear at preſent to have moved very abſurdly the paſſion reſpecting ſcience which is in us.

Soc. JUN. In what reſpect?

GUEST. The example, O bleſſed youth, which I have adduced will again require an example.

Soc. JUN. Why? Tell me, and do not in any reſpect be remiſs on my account.

GUEST. I will, ſince you are prepared to follow me. For we know what boys do as ſoon as they have acquired a knowledge of their letters.

Soc. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. They ſufficiently perceive each of the elements in the ſhorteſt and eaſieſt ſyllables, and are able to ſpeak the truth concerning them.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But, being again dubious about theſe in other ſyllables, they are deceived in opinion and diſcourſe.

[1] The ſoul poſſeſſes a twofold knowledge, one indiſtinct, but the other diſtinct, ſcientific, and without ambiguity. For we eſſentially contain the reaſons of things, and breathe, as it were, the knowledge of them; but we do not always poſſeſs them in energy.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. May they not, therefore, thus be eaſily, and in the moſt beautiful manner, led to things which they do not yet know?

Soc. JUN. How?

GUEST. By leading them firſt to thoſe ſyllables in which they have had right opinions reſpecting theſe very ſame things; but, when we have thus led them, to place before them things which they do not yet know; and, by comparing them together, to ſhow them that there is the ſame ſimilitude and nature in both the complications, till the things conceived by true opinion are preſented to the view compared with all the unknown particulars. But theſe being preſented to the view, and examples of them produced, it will cauſe them to denominate that which is different in all the elements of every ſyllable as different from other things; but that which is the ſame, as always the ſame, according to things the ſame with itſelf.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. This, therefore, we ſufficiently comprehend, viz. that the generation of a paradigm then takes place, when that which is the ſame in another divulſed particular being rightly conceived by opinion, and accommodated to each, produces one true opinion of both.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Shall we therefore wonder, if our ſoul, ſuffering the ſame thing naturally about the elements of all things, at one time is eſtabliſhed in certain particulars by truth itſelf about each individual thing, and at another time fluctuates in other particulars, about all things? And that when, in certain commixtions, it thinks rightly, it ſhould again be ignorant of theſe very ſame things, when it is transferred to long and difficult ſyllables of things?

Soc. JUN. There is nothing wonderful in this.

GUEST. For how, my friend, can any one, beginning from falſe opinion, arrive at any, even the ſmalleſt part of truth, and thus acquire wiſdom?

Soc. JUN. Nearly no one.

GUEST. If, therefore, theſe things naturally ſubſiſt in this manner, you and I ſhall not in any reſpect err, if we firſt of all endeavour to perceive the nature of the whole paradigm in another ſmall and partial paradigm; and after this, betaking ourſelves to the paradigm of a king, which is the greateſt

of

of all paradigms, and deriving it from leſſer things, endeavour again, through a paradigm, to know by art the remedy of political affairs, that we may be partakers of wakeful perceptions inſtead of a dream.

Soc. JUN. Perfectly right.

GUEST. Again, therefore, let us reſume the former part of our diſcourſe, viz. that ſince an innumerable multitude, together with the royal genus, doubt reſpecting the government of a city, it is requiſite to ſeparate all theſe from the royal genus, and to leave it by itſelf. And for this purpoſe we ſaid it was requiſite that we ſhould have a certain paradigm.

Soc. JUN. And very much ſo.

GUEST. But what paradigm can any one adduce which both contains political concerns, and is the ſmalleſt poſſible, ſo that he may ſufficiently find the object of his inveſtigation? Are you willing, by Jupiter, unleſs we have ſomething elſe at hand, that we chooſe the weaving art? Not the whole, indeed, if it is agreeable to you: for, perhaps, the weaving of wool will be ſufficient. For it may happen that this part being choſen may teſtify that which we wiſh to evince.

Soc. JUN. For why ſhould it not?

GUEST. Shall we therefore now, with reſpect to this part of the weaving art, act in the ſame manner as we did above, viz. divide every particular by cutting the parts of parts? and, paſſing over all things in the ſhorteſt manner poſſible, return to that which is uſeful to our preſent purpoſe?

Soc. JUN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. My anſwer to you ſhall be an explanation of the thing.

Soc. JUN. You ſpeak moſt excellently.

GUEST. Of all the things which we fabricate and poſſeſs, ſome are for the ſake of doing ſomething, and others are auxiliaries againſt any inconvenience we may ſuffer. And of auxiliaries, ſome are alexipharmic [1], as well divine as human; but others are ſubſervient to defence. And of things ſubſervient to defence, ſome conſiſt of warlike apparatus, and others are incloſures. And of incloſures, ſome are veils, and others are defences againſt heat and cold. But of defences, ſome are coverings, and others are apparel. And of apparel, one part is an under veil, and another a ſurrounding cover-

[1] i. e. Remedies of evils.

ing.

ing. And of ſurrounding coverings, ſome are ſimple, and others compoſite. But of the compoſite, ſome are perforated, but others are connected together without perforation. And of thoſe that are without perforation, ſome are compoſed from the nerves of things growing out of the earth, but others are hairy. And of the hairy, ſome are conglutinated by water and earth, but others are themſelves connected together with themſelves. To theſe auxiliaries and coverings, which are wrought from the ſame things being bound together, we give the name of garments. But we call that art which is eſpecially converſant with garments, veſtific, from the thing itſelf, in the ſame manner as above we called the art reſpecting a city politic. We likewiſe ſay that the weaving art, ſo far as for the moſt part it weaves garments, differs in nothing but the name from the veſtific art; juſt in the ſame manner as we formerly obſerved that a royal differed only nominally from a political character.

SOC. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. But after this we ſhould thus reaſon: that ſome one may, perhaps, think it has been ſufficiently ſhown that the weaving art is converſant with garments, but may not be able to perceive, that though it is not yet diſtinguiſhed from things which cooperate near together, it is ſeparated from many other things of a kindred nature.

SOC. JUN. Tell me what things of a kindred nature.

GUEST. You do not underſtand what has been ſaid, as it ſeems. It appears, therefore, that we ſhould return from the end to the beginning. For, if you underſtand propinquity, we have now ſeparated this from the weaving art, by diſtributing the compoſition of coverings into things put under, and things ſurrounding us.

SOC. JUN. I underſtand you.

GUEST. We have likewiſe ſeparated every kind of fabrication from thread and broom, and all ſuch plantal productions as we juſt now called nerves. We alſo defined the compreſſive art, and the compoſition which employs perforation and ſewing, which for the moſt part pertains to the currier's art.

SOC. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. We alſo ſeparated the fabrication of ſimple coverings from ſkins, and of ſuch coverings as are employed in building, and in the whole of the tectonic, and in all other arts which are employed in ſtopping the effluxions of

of water. Alſo ſuch arts as procure reſtraints in joining, and violent actions, and which are employed about the conſtruction of doors, and diſtribute the parts of the cementing art. We have likewiſe divided the armour-making art, which is a ſection of the great and all-various power effective of defence. We alſo defined, in the very beginning, the whole art of cooking, which is converſant with alexipharmics; and we left a certain art, which appears to be that we are in purſuit of, viz. which defends againſt cold, produces woollen veſtments, and is called the art of weaving.

Soc. JUN. It ſeems ſo.

GUEST. But we have not yet, O boy, perfectly diſcuſſed this matter. For he who is firſt engaged in the making of garments appears to act in a manner directly contrary to the weaver.

Soc. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. For the work of the weaver is a certain knitting together.

Soc. JUN. It is.

GUEST. But the work of him who firſt engages in the making of garments conſiſts in diſſolving things joined together.

Soc. JUN. What kind of work is this?

GUEST. The work of the art of carding wool. Or ſhall we dare to call the art of carding wool the weaving art, and a wool-carder a weaver?

Soc. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. But if any one ſhould call the art effective of the thread and woof in a loom the weaving art, he would aſſert a paradox, and give it a falſe name.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But whether ſhall we ſay that the whole attention and care of the fuller and the mender contribute nothing to the making of garments? Or ſhall we alſo call theſe weaving arts?

Soc. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. But all theſe contend with the power of the weaving art, reſpecting the care and the making of garments; attributing, indeed, to it the greateſt part, but likewiſe aſſigning to themſelves great portions of the ſame art.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Beſides theſe, it further appears requiſite, that the arts effective of

the inſtruments through which the weaver accompliſhes his work, ſhould be conſidered as concauſes of every work accompliſhed by weaving.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, will our diſcourſe about the weaving art, a part of which we have choſen, be ſufficiently defined, if we aſſert that it is the moſt beautiful and the greateſt of all the arts which are employed about woollen garments? Or ſhall we thus, indeed, ſpeak ſomething of the truth, but yet neither clearly nor perfectly till we have ſeparated all theſe arts from it?

Soc. JUN. This will be the caſe.

GUEST. Muſt we not, therefore, in the next place act in this manner, that our diſcourſe may proceed in an orderly ſeries?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. In the firſt place, therefore, let us conſider two arts which ſubſiſt about all things.

Soc. JUN. What are they?

GUEST. One is the concauſe of generation, and the other is the cauſe itſelf.

Soc. JUN. How?

GUEST. Such arts as do not fabricate the thing itſelf, but prepare inſtruments for the fabricators, without which inſtruments the propoſed work cannot be effected,—theſe are concauſes: but thoſe which fabricate the thing itſelf are cauſes.

Soc. JUN. This diſtinction is reaſonable.

GUEST. In the next place, thoſe arts which produce the diſtaff, and the ſhuttle, and ſuch other inſtruments as contribute to the making of garments,—all theſe I call concauſes: but thoſe which pay attention to and fabricate garments I call cauſes.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. But, of cauſes, it will be proper eſpecially to collect that which pertains to the waſhing of garments, and that which is ſkilled in mending, and all the therapeutic care about theſe, ſince the coſmetic art is abundant, and to denominate the whole the fuller's art.

Soc. JUN. It will ſo.

GUEST. But there is one art comprehending that part which cards wool

and ſpins, and likewiſe every thing pertaining to the making of garments, and which is called by all men the wool-working art.

Soc. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. The art of carding wool, and the half of that art which uſes the ſhuttle, and that art which ſeparates from each other things joined together, —all theſe, in ſhort, form a part of the wool-working art, of which there are two great parts, one collective, and the other ſeparative.

Soc. JUN. There are ſo.

GUEST. The art of carding wool, therefore, and all thoſe other arts which we juſt now mentioned, belong to the ſeparative part. For that art which divides in wool and thread, after one manner with the ſhuttle, and after another with the hands, has all the names which we have juſt now mentioned.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Again, we muſt take a part of the collective part, and of the wool-working art contained in it; but we muſt paſs by all ſuch things of a ſeparating nature as we happen to find there, and biſect the wool-working art, together with the collective and ſeparative ſection.

Soc. JUN. Let us divide them.

GUEST. It will be proper for you, therefore, Socrates, to divide the collective, together with the wool-working part, if we wiſh to apprehend ſufficiently the propoſed weaving art.

Soc. JUN. It will be requiſite.

GUEST. It will indeed: and we ſay, therefore, that one part of it is ſtreptic, or converſant with rolling, and the other ſymplectic, or complicative.

Soc. JUN. Do I then underſtand you? For you appear to me to ſay that the elaboration of the thread is ſtreptic.

GUEST. Not the elaboration of this only, but likewiſe of the woof. Or can we find any generation of it which is not ſtreptic?

Soc. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. Define alſo each of theſe: for perhaps you will find the definition ſeaſonable.

Soc. JUN. In what reſpect?

GUEST. In this. We ſay that the work of the wool-carder, when it is drawn out into length and breadth, is a certain fracture.

Soc. JUN. We do.

GUEST. This, when it is turned by the diſtaff, and becomes a ſolid thread, is called ſtamen: but they ſay that the art which directs this is ſtemonic, or converſant with ſtuff to be woven.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But ſuch things as receive a looſe contortion, and by the implication of the thread with the attraction of the poliſh acquire a meaſured ſoftneſs,—of theſe we call what is ſpun the woof, but the art itſelf which preſides over theſe, woof-ſpinning.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. And now that part of the weaving art which we propoſed is obvious to every one. For, with reſpect to a part of the collective art in the working of wool, when it accompliſhes that which is woven by a fit knitting together of the woof and the thread, then the whole of the thing woven is called a woollen garment, but the art preſiding over this, textorian.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. Be it ſo. But why then did we not immediately anſwer, that the plectic art is that which weaves together the woof and the thread, inſtead of proceeding in a circle, and defining many things in vain?

Soc. JUN. It does not appear to me, O gueſt, that we have ſaid any thing in vain.

GUEST. This is not at all wonderful. But perhaps, O bleſſed youth, it will be ſeen that you will often hereafter fall into this diſeaſe. Nor is it wonderful. But hear a certain diſcourſe, which is proper to be delivered reſpecting all ſuch particulars as theſe.

Soc. JUN. Only relate it.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, in the firſt place, behold the whole of exceſs and deficiency, that we may praiſe and blame according to reaſon whatever is ſaid with more prolixity or brevity than is becoming in diſputations of this kind.

Soc. JUN. It will be proper ſo to do.

GUEST. But I think we ſhall do right by diſcourſing about theſe things.

Soc. JUN. About what things?

GUEST. About prolixity and brevity, and the whole of exceſs and deficiency. For the art of meaſuring is converſant with all theſe.

Soc.

Soc. JUN. It is.

GUEST. We will divide it, therefore, into two parts. For it is requiſite to that after which we are haſtening.

Soc. JUN. Inform me how this diviſion is to be made.

GUEST. Thus. One part according to the communion of magnitude and parvitude with each other; but the other part according to the neceſſary eſſence of generation.

Soc. JUN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Does it not appear to you to be natural, that the greater ought to be called greater than nothing elſe than the leſſer? and again, that the leſſer ſhould not be leſſer than any thing than the greater?

Soc. JUN. To me it does.

GUEST. But what? Muſt we not ſay that what ſurpaſſes the nature of mediocrity, and is ſurpaſſed by it, whether in words or actions, is that by which eſpecially good and bad men differ from each other?

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Theſe twofold eſſences, therefore, and judgments of the great and the ſmall muſt be eſtabliſhed; but not, as we juſt now ſaid, with reference to each other only. But, as we now ſay, they are rather partly to be referred to each other, and partly to mediocrity. Are we however willing to learn on what account this is requiſite?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. If ſome one refers the nature of the greater to nothing elſe than the nature of the leſſer, he will not refer it to mediocrity. Or will he?

Soc. JUN. He will not.

GUEST. May we not, therefore, divide the arts themſelves, and all their works, according to this reaſoning? And ſhall we not entirely take away the political ſcience which we are now inveſtigating, and that which is called the weaving art? For all ſuch things as theſe guard againſt that which is more or leſs than mediocrity, not as if it had no ſubſiſtence, but as a thing of a difficult nature in actions. And after this manner preſerving mediocrity, they effect every thing beautiful and good.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. If, therefore, we take away the politic ſcience, will not our inveſtigation after this of the royal ſcience be dubious?

Soc. JUN. Very much ſo.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, as in our inveſtigation of a ſophiſt, we compelled non-being to be, after diſcourſe about it fled from us, ſo now ſhall we compel the more and the leſs to become meaſured, not only with reference to each other, but likewiſe to the generation of mediocrity? For no one can indubitably become a politician, or knowing in any thing elſe pertaining to actions, unleſs he aſſents to this.

Soc. JUN. We ought, therefore, eſpecially to do this now.

GUEST. This, Socrates, is a ſtill greater work than that; though, as we may remember, that was very prolix. But a thing of this kind may be ſuppoſed reſpecting them, and very juſtly.

Soc. JUN. Of what kind?

GUEST. That there is occaſion for what we are now ſpeaking of, in order to evince what is accurate reſpecting this thing. Further ſtill, with reſpect to the preſent particulars, it appears to me to have been ſhown ſufficiently, that this diſcourſe will afford us magnificent aſſiſtance, as leading us to think that all arts are to be ſimilarly meaſured according to the more and the leſs, not only among themſelves, but likewiſe with reference to the generation of mediocrity. For, this having a ſubſiſtence, they alſo are: and, theſe ſubſiſting, this alſo is. And either of theſe being taken away, neither of them will ſubſiſt.

Soc. JUN. This indeed is right. But what follows?

GUEST. We ſhould evidently divide the art of meaſuring (as we have ſaid) into two parts; placing as one of its parts all thoſe arts which meaſure number, length, breadth, depth, and velocity, with reference to the contrary; but placing as its other part, ſuch arts as regard the moderate and the becoming, the ſeaſonable and the fit, and all ſuch as fly from the extremes to the middle.

Soc. JUN. Each of theſe ſections is great, and they differ much from each other.

GUEST. That, Socrates, which is ſometimes aſſerted by many of thoſe elegant men, who think they aſſert ſomething wiſe, when they ſay that the art of meaſuring is converſant with all generated natures, is now aſſerted by us. For all artificial things after a certain manner participate of meaſure; but, in conſequence of not being accuſtomed to divide according to ſpecies, theſe

theſe men immediately collect into the ſame theſe things which ſo widely differ from each other, and conſider them as ſimilar. And, again, they do the very contrary to this: for things which are different they do not divide according to parts, though it is requiſite that, when any one firſt perceives the communion of many things, he ſhould not deſiſt till he perceives all the differences in it which are placed in ſpecies: and again, when he perceives all-various diſſimilitudes in multitudes, he cannot deſiſt from this difficult perception, till, having incloſed all ſuch things as are allied in one ſimilitude, he comprehends them in the eſſence of a certain genus. And thus much may ſuffice reſpecting theſe particulars, and concerning defect and exceſs. This only muſt be carefully obſerved, that two genera of meaſures about theſe particulars have been invented, and that we ſhould remember what they are.

Soc. JUN. We will remember.

GUEST. But, after this diſcuſſion, let us aſſume another reſpecting the objects of our inveſtigation, and the whole purport of this diſcourſe.

Soc. JUN. What is it?

GUEST. If any one ſhould aſk us reſpecting the cuſtom of thoſe that learn their letters, when they are aſked from what letters a word is compoſed, ſhall we ſay that the inquiry is then made for the ſake of one word only, or that they may become more ſkilful in every thing pertaining to grammar?

Soc. JUN. Evidently that they may become more ſkilful in the whole of grammar.

GUEST. But what again? Is our inquiry reſpecting a politician undertaken by us more for the ſake of the politician, than that we may become more ſkilful in every diſcuſſion?

Soc. JUN. This alſo is evident, that it is undertaken on this latter account.

GUEST. No one indeed endued with intellect would be willing to inveſtigate the art of weaving, for its own ſake alone: but I think moſt men are ignorant, that there are certain ſenſible ſimilitudes of things which are naturally capable of being eaſily learnt, and that there is no difficulty in making theſe manifeſt, when any one wiſhes to point them out to ſome one inquiring a reaſon reſpecting them, not in conjunction with things, but with facility,

facility, without aſſigning a reaſon. But of things the greateſt and the moſt honourable, there is not any image clearly fabricated for men, which being exhibited by him who wiſhes to fill the ſoul of the inquirer, can, by being harmonized to ſome one of the ſenſes, ſufficiently fill the ſoul. Hence it is requiſite to meditate how we may be able to give and receive a reaſon for every thing. For incorporeal natures, as they are the moſt beautiful and the greateſt of all things, can alone be clearly pointed out by reaſon, but by nothing elſe. And all we have ſaid at preſent is aſſerted for the ſake of theſe things. But the conſideration of every particular is more eaſily effected in ſmall things than in ſuch as are great.

Soc. JUN. You ſpeak moſt beautifully.

GUEST. Do we, therefore, remember on what account all theſe things have been ſaid by us?

Soc. JUN. On what account?

GUEST. Principally on account of the difficulty in which we were involved, through the prolix diſcourſe about the weaving art, and the revolution of the univerſe. We likewiſe conſidered the diſcourſe of the ſophiſt about the eſſence of non-being, as full of prolixity. And on all theſe accounts we terrified ourſelves, fearing leſt we ſhould ſpeak ſuperfluouſly in conjunction with prolixity. Conſider, therefore, all theſe things as ſaid by us, in order that we may not ſuffer any thing of this kind again.

Soc. JUN. Be it ſo. Only diſcuſs what remains.

GUEST. I ſay, therefore, it is requiſite that both you and I ſhould be mindful of what we have now ſaid, as often as brevity or prolixity of diſcourſe is blamed, not judging the prolixities by one another, but according to that part of the meaſuring art, which we ſaid above ought to be remembered with a view to the becoming.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But yet all things are not referred to this. For we do not require in order to obtain pleaſure a prolixity which harmonizes with nothing, unleſs as a certain appendix. Nor is it proper to make the eaſy and rapid diſcovery of the object of our inveſtigation our principal intention; but this ought to be conſidered by us as a ſecondary thing. But we ſhould by far moſt eſpecially, and in the firſt place, honour the method which is able to divide according to ſpecies. We ſhould likewiſe by no means be indignant with

with a diſcourſe, however extended, which renders the hearer more inventive; and the ſame muſt be ſaid of a diſcourſe however ſhort. Further ſtill, it becomes him who blames long diſcourſes in diſquiſitions ſuch as theſe, and who does not admit circular periods, not to condemn them altogether rapidly, and immediately, but to ſhow firſt that we ſhall be more fit for diſcuſſion, and more capable of diſcovering things by reaſon, by ſhorter diſcourſes: but we ſhould neither pay any attention to, nor even ſeem to hear any other praiſe or blame. And thus much may ſuffice for theſe things, if it alſo ſeems ſo to you. Let us, therefore, again return to the political character, introducing the before-mentioned paradigm of the weaving art.

Soc. JUN. You ſpeak well: and let us do as you ſay.

GUEST. Is not, therefore, the office of a king to be ſeparated from that of many ſhepherds, or rather from that of all thoſe who have the charge of herds?

Soc. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. But we ſay that the conſideration of cauſes and concauſes reſpecting a city remains, which are firſt to be divided from each other.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. You know, therefore, that it is difficult to biſect theſe. But the cauſe of this will, I think, in the courſe of our inquiry be not leſs apparent.

Soc. JUN. It will be proper, therefore, ſo to do.

GUEST. Let us, then, divide them into parts, like victims, ſince we cannot biſect them: for it is always requiſite to cut into the neareſt number poſſible.

Soc. JUN. How, therefore, ſhall we do at preſent?

GUEST. Juſt as we did above: for we placed all ſuch inſtruments as are ſubſervient to weaving, as concauſes.

Soc. JUN. We did.

GUEST. The ſame thing, therefore, muſt be done by us now, and it is ſtill more neceſſary than it was then. For ſuch things as fabricate in a city either a ſmall or a large inſtrument are all of them to be conſidered as concauſes; ſince without theſe a city could never ſubſiſt, nor yet the politic ſcience. But yet again we do not eſtabliſh any one of theſe as the buſineſs of the royal ſcience.

Soc. JUN. We do not.

GUEST. We likewiſe attempt to accompliſh a difficult thing, in ſeparating this genus from others. For he who ſays that it is an inſtrument of ſome

particular

particular being, appears to ſpeak probably: but at the ſame time we muſt ſay that this is different from the poſſeſſions belonging to a city.

Soc. JUN. In what reſpect?

GUEST. Becauſe it has not this power. For cauſes do not adhere to generation as an inſtrument, but on account of the ſafety of that which is fabricated.

Soc. JUN. What kind of thing do you mean?

GUEST. An all-various ſpecies produced from things dry and moiſt, fiery and without fire, and which we call by one appellation, a veſſel, though it is an abundant ſpecies: but I think this does not at all belong to the ſcience we are inveſtigating.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly not.

GUEST. But the third ſpecies, or that of poſſeſſions, appears to be multiform, conſiſting of the terreſtrial and aqautic, the much-wandering and the nerratic, the honourable and the ignoble; and it has one name, becauſe the whole of it ſubſiſts for the ſake of a certain fitting, as it always becomes a ſeat to ſomething.

Soc. JUN. What kind of thing is it?

GUEST. It is that which is called a vehicle, a thing which is not entirely the work of the politic ſcience, but rather of the tectonic, ceramic[1], and calcotypic[2].

Soc. JUN. I underſtand you.

GUEST. Muſt we then mention a fourth ſpecies of theſe, in which moſt of the things formerly ſpoken of by us are contained? viz. every kind of garment, many arms, walls, all incloſures, conſiſting either of earth or ſtone, and ten thouſand other things. And ſince all theſe are conſtructed for the ſake of defence, the whole may moſt juſtly be called a fortification; and, for the moſt part, may more properly be conſidered as much more the work of the architect and weaver than of the politician.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Are we, therefore, willing to rank in the fifth place the arts of adorning, painting, and muſic, together with ſuch arts as uſe theſe; from which certain imitations are deviſed for the ſake of procuring us pleaſure, and which may be juſtly comprehended in one name?

[1] i. e. Pertaining to the potter's art. [2] i. e. Pertaining to the brazier's art.

Soc. JUN. In what name?

GUEST. They may be denominated ſportive.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. This one name, therefore, accords with all theſe: for no one of them does any thing ſeriouſly, but all their operations are for the ſake of ſport.

Soc. JUN. This alſo I nearly underſtand.

GUEST. But ought we not to place as a ſixth all-various ſpecies, and, which is the offspring of many other arts, that art which prepares bodies for all the above-mentioned particulars?

Soc. JUN. Of what art are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. That art which digs gold and ſilver, and other metals, out of the bowels of the earth; likewiſe that which cuts down trees, that which conſtructs ſomething by ſhaving off the hair, the knitting art, that which cuts off the barks of trees, and the ſkins of animals, and all ſuch arts as are converſant with things of this kind. Alſo, ſuch arts as procure cork, books, and bonds, fabricating compoſite ſpecies from genera which are not compoſite. The whole of this we call the firſt-born poſſeſſion of mankind, ſimple, and by no means the work of the royal ſcience.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. The poſſeſſion of nutriment, and ſuch things as when mingled with the body can, by their parts, adminiſter to its wants, muſt be ranked in the ſeventh place. And the whole of this muſt be denominated by us nutriment, unleſs we have any thing better to adopt inſtead of it. However, we may place the whole of this under agriculture, hunting, gymnaſtic, medicine, and cooking, and attribute it to theſe more properly than to the politic ſcience.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Nearly, therefore, all poſſeſſions, except thoſe of tame animals, may I think be found in theſe ſeven genera. But conſider: for it was moſt juſt that the ſpecies which we called firſt-born ſhould be introduced firſt; and after this, inſtrument, veſſel, vehicle, fortification, that which is ſportive, and cattle. But if any thing of no great conſequence is latent, which may be accommodated to ſome one of theſe, we omit it; ſuch as the idea of coin, of ſeals, and of every thing impreſſed or carved. For theſe things are

not very much allied to the genus; but ſome accord with it, for the purpoſe of ornament, others as ſubſervient to inſtruments, violently, indeed, but at the ſame time they may be drawn to this end. But the nurture of herds which we before diſtributed, ſeems to comprehend the whole poſſeſſion of tame animals, ſlaves being excepted.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. The genus of ſlaves, and of all ſervants, remains, in which I propheſy, that thoſe who contend with a king reſpecting the thing woven will become apparent, in the ſame manner as above, thoſe that knit, and thoſe that comb wool, and ſuch others as were then mentioned by us, contended with the weavers. But all the others who were called by us concauſes, together with the works juſt now mentioned, are ſet aſide, and are ſeparated from royal and political action.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Let us then, approaching nearer, conſider the reſt, that we may more firmly perceive them.

Soc. JUN. It is, therefore, requiſite to do ſo.

GUEST. We ſhall find, then, that the greateſt ſervants, ſo far as we can ſee in this affair, are engaged in a purſuit, and poſſeſs a property the very contrary to what we have expected.

Soc. JUN. What are theſe?

GUEST. Men acquired by purchaſe; whom, beyond all controverſy, we ought to call ſlaves, and of whom we ſhould aſſert, that they by no means vindicate to themſelves the royal art.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But what ſhall we ſay of thoſe free-born men who voluntarily engage in the ſervile employments mentioned by us above, viz. who tranſmit the works of huſbandry, and of the other arts, to each other, and who are engaged in mutual traffic, domeſtic or foreign, whether they change money for other things, or like for like, (whom we denominate money-changers, pilots, and huckſters,) ſhall we ſay that theſe will contend for any part of the politic ſcience?

Soc. JUN. Perhaps merchants will.

GUEST. But yet we never find that thoſe mercenaries who readily offer their ſervices to every one vindicate to themſelves the royal ſcience.

Soc. JUN. For how can they?

GUEST. What then ſhall we ſay of thoſe that act in this ſervile capacity every where?

Soc. JUN. Of whom are you ſpeaking? and of what kind of ſervile offices?

GUEST. I ſpeak of the tribe of criers, and of thoſe who become wiſe reſpecting letters[1], and often act in the capacity of ſervants, together with certain other perſons who are very ſkilful in the labours pertaining to government. What again ſhall we ſay of theſe?

Soc. JUN. That which you juſt now ſaid, that they are ſervants, but no rulers in cities.

GUEST. I do not think, therefore, I was looking at a dream, when I ſaid that many on this account would be ſeen ſtrenuouſly contending for the royal ſcience, though it may appear to be very abſurd to ſeek after theſe in any ſervile portion.

Soc. JUN. Very much ſo, indeed.

GUEST. Let us, beſides, approach ſtill nearer to thoſe whom we have not yet examined. But theſe are ſuch as poſſeſs a certain portion of miniſtrant ſcience about divination. For they are conſidered as interpreting to men things proceeding from the Gods.

Soc. JUN. They are.

GUEST. The genus too of prieſts, as eſtabliſhed by law, knows in what manner we ſhould offer gifts, through ſacrifices, to the Gods, ſo as to render the divinities propitious to us; and likewiſe, after what manner we ſhould requeſt of them, by prayer, the poſſeſſion of good things. But both theſe are parts of the miniſtrant art.

Soc. JUN. So it appears.

GUEST. Now, therefore, we appear to me to touch, as it were, upon a certain veſtige of the object of our ſearch. For the figure of prieſts and prophets is very replete with prudence, and receives a venerable opinion through the magnitude of the undertakings. Hence, among the Egyptians, a king is not allowed to govern without the ſacerdotal ſcience; ſo that, if any one belonging to another genus of men uſurps the kingdom, he is afterwards

[1] Viz. grammarians.

compelled to be initiated in their myſteries, that he may be ſkilled in the ſacerdotal ſcience. Further ſtill, in many places belonging to the Greeks, we ſhall find that the greateſt ſacrifices of this kind are under the direction of the greateſt magiſtrates; and the truth of what I aſſert is particularly evinced among you. For, when a king is elected, they ſay that the moſt venerable of all the antient ſacrifices, and ſuch as are moſt peculiar to the country, are to be conſigned to the care of the new king.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. We ſhould, therefore, conſider theſe kings choſen by lot, together with the prieſts, their ſervants, and a certain other numerous crowd, which juſt now became manifeſt to us, apart from our former aſſertions.

Soc. JUN. Of whom are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. Of certain very wonderful perſons.

Soc. JUN. Why ſo?

GUEST. As I was juſt now ſpeculating, the genus of them appeared to me to be all-various. For many men reſemble lions and centaurs, and other things of this kind; and very many are ſimilar to ſatyrs, and to imbecil and multiform wild beaſts. They likewiſe rapidly change their ideas and their power into each other. And indeed, Socrates, I appear to myſelf to have juſt now perceived theſe men for the firſt time.

Soc. JUN. Speak: for you ſeem to behold ſomething unuſual.

GUEST. I do: for the unuſual or wonderful happens to all men from ignorance. And I myſelf juſt now ſuffered the very ſame thing: for I was ſuddenly involved in doubt on perceiving the choir of civil concerns.

Soc. JUN. What choir?

GUEST. The greateſt enchanter of all ſophiſts, and the moſt ſkilled in this art, who muſt be ſeparated from truly political and royal characters, though this is difficult in the extreme, if we intend to ſee clearly the object of our inveſtigation.

Soc. JUN. We muſt by no means omit to do this.

GUEST. We muſt not, indeed, according to my opinion: but tell me this.

Soc. JUN. What?

GUEST. Is not a monarchy one of our political governments?

Soc. JUN. It is.

GUEST. And after a monarchy I think an oligarchy may be placed.

Soc.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But is not the third ſcheme of a polity the government of the multitude, and which is called a democracy?

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. May not theſe three become after a manner five, ſince they produce two other names from themſelves?

Soc. JUN. What are theſe two?

GUEST. Thoſe who now look to the violent and the voluntary, to poverty and riches, law and the tranſgreſſion of law, which take place in theſe governments, and who give a twofold diviſion to each of the two, and call monarchy by two names, as affording two ſpecies, viz. tyrannic and royal.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But they denominate a city which is governed by a few an ariſtocracy and an oligarchy.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But no one is ever accuſtomed to change the name of a democracy, whether the people govern the rich violently, or with their conſent, and whether they accurately defend the laws or not.

Soc. JUN. True.

GUEST. What then? Shall we think that any one of theſe polities is right, thus bounded by theſe definitions, viz. by one, and a few, and a many, by riches and poverty, by the violent and the voluntary, by written laws, and the privation of laws?

Soc. JUN. What ſhould hinder?

GUEST. Conſider more attentively, following me hither.

Soc. JUN. Whither?

GUEST. Shall we abide by that which was aſſerted by us at firſt, or ſhall we diſſent from it?

Soc. JUN. Of what aſſertion are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. I think we ſaid that a royal government was one of the ſciences.

Soc. JUN. We did.

GUEST. Yet we did not conſider it as any one ſcience indiſcriminately; but we ſelected it from the other ſciences, as ſomething judicial and preſiding.

Soc. JUN. We did.

GUEST. And of the preſiding ſcience, dividing one part, as belonging to in-

animate works, and the other as belonging to animals, we have proceeded thus far, not forgetting that we were ſcientifically employed; but we have not yet been able to determine with ſufficient accuracy what this ſcience is.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. Do we, therefore, underſtand this, that the definition muſt not be made by the few, nor by the many, nor yet by the voluntary or involuntary, nor by poverty or riches, but according to a certain ſcience, if we follow what has been formerly delivered?

Soc. JUN. But, indeed, it is impoſſible that this ſhould not be done.

GUEST. From neceſſity, therefore, we muſt now conſider in which of theſe the ſcience reſpecting the government of men happens to ſubſiſt; this government being nearly the greateſt of all others, and the moſt difficult to obtain. For it is requiſite to inſpect it, that we may perceive what are the things which muſt be taken away from a prudent king, and who thoſe are that pretend to be, and perſuade the multitude that they are, politicians, but who are by no means ſo.

Soc. JUN. Our former reaſoning evinces that it is requiſite to act in this manner.

GUEST. Does it then appear to you that the multitude in a city is able to acquire this ſcience?

Soc. JUN. How can they?

GUEST. In a city, therefore, conſiſting of a thouſand men, is it poſſible that a hundred or five hundred of the inhabitants can ſufficiently acquire this ſcience?

Soc. JUN. If this were the caſe, it would be the moſt eaſy of all arts. For we know that among a thouſand men there cannot be found ſo great a number of thoſe that excel the other Greeks in the game of cheſs, much leſs can there be found as many kings. But, according to our former reaſoning, it is requiſite to call him royal who poſſeſſes the royal ſcience, whether he governs or not.

GUEST. You very properly remind me: but I think it follows from this, that a right government, when it ſubſiſts rightly, ought to be inveſtigated about one perſon, or two, or altogether about a few.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And, as we now think, thoſe that govern according to a certain art

art are to be conſidered as political and regal characters, whether they govern the willing or the refractory, whether according to or without written laws, and whether they are rich or poor. For we call thoſe who heal the maladies of the body, no leſs phyſicians, whether they cure by cutting, or burning, or any other painful application, the voluntary or the refractory; and whether from writings or without writings; and whether they are poor or rich. In all theſe caſes we ſay that they are no leſs phyſicians, ſo long as they proceed according to art, in purging or ſome other way attenuating the body, or in cauſing it to increaſe; and ſo long as, alone regarding the good of the body, they reſtore it from a worſe to a better habit, and preſerve it when thus reſtored. After this manner alone, as I think, we muſt ſay that the definition of the medicinal or any other government is rightly made.

SOC. JUN. And very much ſo.

GUEST. It is neceſſary, therefore, as it ſeems, that that polity alone muſt in the higheſt degree be rightly eſtabliſhed, in which the governors are found to be truly, and not in appearance only, ſcientific; whether they govern according to laws, or without laws; whether they rule over the obedient, or the refractory; and whether they are rich or poor. For no one of theſe is of any conſequence with reſpect to rectitude of government.

SOC. JUN. Beautifully ſaid.

GUEST. Nor yet is it of any conſequence, whether they purge the city with a view to its good, by putting to death or baniſhing certain perſons; or whether they ſend out colonies, like a ſwarm of bees, and thus diminiſh the people; or whether, introducing certain foreigners, they make citizens of them, and thus increaſe the city. For, ſo long as, employing ſcience and juſtice, they cauſe the city, to the utmoſt of their power, to paſs from a worſe to a better condition, and preſerve it in this ſtate,—ſo far, and according to ſuch definitions, we ſay that a polity is alone rightly eſtabliſhed; but that ſuch others, as we have mentioned, are neither genuinely nor truly polities. We muſt likewiſe willingly ſay that ſuch polities as imitate this are conſonant to reaſon, and tend to things more beautiful, but that ſuch as do not, tend to deformity by an imitation of things evil.

SOC. JUN. Other things indeed, O gueſt, appear to have been diſcuſſed ſufficiently: but it is not eaſy to admit your aſſertion, that it is requiſite to govern without laws.

GUEST.

GUEST. You have got before me a little, Socrates, by your queſtion. For I was going to aſk you, whether you admit all theſe things, or whether you find any difficulty in any thing that has been ſaid. It is however evident, that we now wiſh to inquire concerning the rectitude of thoſe that govern without laws.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. After a certain manner it is evident that legiſlation pertains to the royal ſcience: but it is beſt, not for the laws to prevail, but a man who is royal in conjunction with prudence. Do you know why?

SOC. JUN. Inform me.

GUEST. Becauſe law cannot, by comprehending that which is moſt excellent, and at the ſame time moſt accurately juſt, for all men, always enjoin that which is beſt. For the diſſimilitudes of men and actions, and the unceaſing reſtleſſneſs, as I may ſay, of human affairs, do not permit any art whatever to be exhibited reſpecting all things, and through every time. Shall we admit theſe aſſertions?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But we ſee that law nearly endeavours to accompliſh this very thing, like a certain arrogant and ignorant man, who does not ſuffer any thing to be done contrary to his own orders, nor any one to aſk whether it would not be better to make ſome new regulation, contrary to what he has ordained.

SOC. JUN. True. For the law does as you ſay.

GUEST. But it is impoſſible that a thing which is ſimple ſhould prevail in things which are never at any time ſimple.

SOC. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. The cauſe, therefore, muſt be found out why it is neceſſary to eſtabliſh laws, ſince law does not poſſeſs the greateſt rectitude.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Are there not, therefore, among us, as alſo in other cities, certain exerciſes of men collected together, whether belonging to the courſe, or to any thing elſe which is undertaken for the ſake of contention?

SOC. JUN. There are very many ſuch exerciſes.

GUEST. Come then, let us again recall to our memory the mandates of thoſe who preſide over gymnaſtic exerciſes according to art.

Soc.

Soc. JUN. What are their mandates?

GUEST. They do not think that a ſubtle diviſion ſhould be made, according to each individual, ſo as to enjoin that which is adapted to the body of each; but that attention ſhould be paid to what is more common, and which is advantageous for the moſt part, and to a many.

Soc. JUN. Excellent.

GUEST. Hence at preſent aſſigning equal labours to collected bodies of men, they at the ſame time impel them to begin the conteſt together, and to reſt from the race, from wreſtling, and from all the labours of the body, at one and the ſame time.

Soc. JUN. They do ſo.

GUEST. We, therefore, think that the legiſlator who preſides over the herds of men, and enjoins them what is juſt reſpecting their compacts with each other, cannot, while he gives laws to them collectively, accurately aſſign what is fit to each individual.

Soc. JUN. This is likely to be the caſe.

GUEST. But I think that in a leſs ſubtle way he will eſtabliſh laws for the multitude, and for the moſt part, both written and unwritten, and ſuch as are agreeable to the manners of the country.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. Right indeed. For how, Socrates, can any one attend ſufficiently to individuals through the whole of life, and accurately enjoin what is adapted to each? For, though he who poſſeſſes the royal ſcience could, I think, do this, he would ſcarcely preſcribe for himſelf thoſe impediments which are called laws.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo, O gueſt, from what has been now ſaid.

GUEST. Rather, O moſt excellent youth, from what will be ſaid.

Soc. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. This. For we thus ſay to ourſelves: If a phyſician, or maſter of gymnaſtic, intending to travel, and to be abſent from thoſe under his care for a long time, ſhould think that thoſe who are exerciſed, or thoſe who are ſick, would not remember his precepts, he will wiſh to write commentaries for them. Or how ſhall we ſay?

Soc. JUN. That he will wiſh to do ſo.

GUEST. But what? If the phyſician ſhould return ſooner than he thought,

will he venture to order them certain other things beſides thoſe contained in his writings, if any thing better ſhould occur for the ſick, through winds, or any thing elſe, which is wont to take place through Jupiter, contrary to expectation? Will he think that he ought ſtrenuouſly to perſevere in his former injunctions, neither himſelf ordering any thing elſe, nor the ſick man daring to do any thing different from his written preſcriptions; theſe being medicinal and ſalubrious, but things of a different nature, noxious, and contrary to art? Or rather, every thing of this kind happening about all things according to ſcience and true art, will not his edicts become the moſt ridiculous of all others?

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But ſhall not he who writes things juſt and unjuſt, beautiful and baſe, good and evil, and who eſtabliſhes unwritten laws for the herds of mankind, who live in cities according to written laws,—ſhall not he, I ſay, who has written laws according to art, or any other who reſembles him, be permitted on his return to enjoin things different from theſe? Or, rather, would not this interdiction appear in reality to be no leſs ridiculous than the former?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Do you know, therefore, what the multitude ſay reſpecting a thing of this kind?

Soc. JUN. I do not at preſent remember.

GUEST. But it is very ſpecious. For they ſay, if any one has found out laws better than thoſe that are already eſtabliſhed, and can perſuade his citizens that they are better, he ſhould eſtabliſh them; otherwiſe not.

Soc. JUN. Do they not, therefore, ſay rightly?

GUEST. Perhaps ſo. But if ſome one ſhould introduce that which is beſt, not by perſuaſion, but by force, what name muſt be given to this violence? Or, rather, firſt anſwer me reſpecting the former particulars.

Soc. JUN. Of what particulars are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. If any one who is properly ſkilled in the medical art ſhould not perſuade but compel a boy, or a man, or a woman, to do that which is better, but at the ſame time contrary to written preſcriptions, what will be the name of this violence? Ought it not to be called rather any thing than a tranſgreſſion of art, or a noxious error? And ſhould we not ſay that

every thing will happen to the compelled perſon, rather than any thing noxious and contrary to art from the compelling phyſicians?

Soc. JUN. You ſpeak moſt true.

GUEST. But what is that error to be called which is contrary to the political art? Muſt it not be denominated baſe, evil, and unjuſt?

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But come, will not he be the moſt ridiculous of all men, who ſhould blame the violence of thoſe that force men to act more juſtly, better, and more beautifully than before, contrary to written precepts, and the laws of their country? And ought not every thing rather to be aſſerted of thoſe that are thus compelled, than that they ſuffer things baſe, unjuſt, and evil?

Soc. JUN. Your aſſertion is moſt true.

GUEST. But if he who compels is rich, will his compulſions be juſt,—but, if he is poor, unjuſt? Or ſhall we not rather ſay, that he who effects what is advantageous, whether he perſuades or does not perſuade, whether he is rich or poor, and whether he acts according or contrary to written injunctions, will act conformably to the moſt true definition of the right government of a city? For a wiſe and good man will always govern in this manner, always attending to the advantage of his ſubjects, in the ſame manner as a pilot is watchful for the ſafety of the ſhip and the ſailors. And as the pilot preſerves the ſailors, not by written mandates but by exhibiting to them laws according to art, after the ſame manner an upright polity will be produced by thoſe who are thus able to govern, by exhibiting a ſtrength of art better than the laws. And, in ſhort, prudent governors never err in any part of their conduct, as long as they obſerve this one thing, viz. by always diſtributing that which is moſt juſt to the citizens, in conjunction with intellect and art, to preſerve them, and, from being woſſe, render them better to the utmoſt of their power.

Soc. JUN. Theſe aſſertions cannot be contradicted.

GUEST. Nor yet thoſe.

Soc. JUN. What aſſertions do you mean?

GUEST. That no multitude whatever can receive that ſcience, by which a city is governed according to intellect, but that an upright polity muſt be inveſtigated about a ſmall number, and a few, and one perſon; and that other polities are to be conſidered as imitations, as we obſerved a little before,

ſome reſembling this in a more beautiful, and others in a more deformed manner.

Soc. JUN. How do you ſay this? For I do not underſtand what you juſt now ſaid reſpecting imitations.

GUEST. He would not act badly, who, after introducing a diſcourſe of this kind, ſhould deſiſt before he had ſhown the error which is at preſent committed.

Soc. JUN. What error do you mean?

GUEST. It is requiſite to inveſtigate a thing of that kind, which is not altogether uſual, nor yet eaſy to perceive; but at the ſame time we muſt endeavour to apprehend it. For, ſince an upright polity is that alone of which we have ſpoken, do you not know that other polities ought to be preſerved, while they uſe the inſtitutions of this, and do that which we juſt now praiſed, though it is not moſt right?

Soc. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. That no citizen ſhall dare to act in any reſpect contrary to the laws, and that he who dares to do ſo ſhall be puniſhed with death, and ſhall ſuffer all extreme puniſhments. This is moſt right and beautiful in the ſecond place; for that which was juſt now mentioned muſt be ranked in the firſt place. But we ſhould unfold the manner in which that which we call ſecondary ſubſiſts. Or ſhould we not?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But let us again return to images, to which it is always neceſſary to aſſimilate royal governors.

Soc. JUN. What kind of images?

GUEST. The generous pilot, and, as Homer ſays, the phyſician, who is of equal worth with many others. Let us conſider the affair by deviſing a certain figure in theſe things.

Soc. JUN. Of what kind?

GUEST. Such a one, as if we all conceived that we ſuffered the moſt dire things from theſe perſons. For ſuch of us as they wiſh to ſave, they do ſave; and ſuch as they wiſh to injure, they injure by cutting and burning; at the ſame time ordering money to be given them as a reward for this, not ſpending any thing themſelves on the ſick, but they and their familiars making uſe of others. And laſtly, receiving money either from the kindred or

from certain enemies of the ſick man, they cauſe him to die. Pilots too effect ten thouſand other things of this kind. For they deſignedly leave men by themſelves in certain receſſes, and, committing an error in navigation, hurl them into the ſea, and injure them in other reſpects. In conſequence of conſidering theſe things, let us ſuppoſe that we conſult how we may deprive theſe arts of their independent authority, ſo that they may no longer poſſeſs abſolute power, either over ſlaves or the free-born. Hence, we aſſemble together for this purpoſe, and convene either all the people, or the rich only. In this aſſembly, obſcure individuals and mechanics give their opinion reſpecting the ſhip and diſeaſes; viz. after what manner medicines, and medical inſtruments, ſhould be employed about the diſeaſed; and likewiſe ſhips and nautical inſtruments in navigation, in the dangers to which ſhips are ſubject, through the winds, the ſea, and pirates, and when there is occaſion to fight with long ſhips againſt others of the like kind. Let us likewiſe ſuppoſe that the opinions, either of certain phyſicians and pilots, or of other private perſons, given in this aſſembly, are inſcribed in triangular tables and pillars, and that certain unwritten cuſtoms of the country are eſtabliſhed, according to which in all future times navigation is to be conducted, and remedies for the ſick adminiſtered.

Soc. JUN. You have ſpoken of very abſurd things.

GUEST. Let us likewiſe ſuppoſe that yearly governors of the multitude are eſtabliſhed, whether choſen by lot from the rich, or from all the people; and let them govern both ſhips and the diſeaſed, according to thoſe written inſtitutions.

Soc. JUN. Theſe things appear ſtill more difficult.

GUEST. Let us likewiſe ſee what is conſequent to theſe things. For when the year of each governor is expired, it will be neceſſary that courts of juſtice ſhould be eſtabliſhed, which are compoſed either of choſen rich men, or from all the people, for the purpoſe of calling the governors to account, and reproving them when requiſite. Let every one likewiſe who is willing be permitted to accuſe the governors, as neither governing the ſhips, during the year, according to the written injunctions, nor according to the antient manners of their anceſtors. And let the ſame things be permitted to take place reſpecting thoſe that cure the diſeaſed. But let thoſe

that

that are convicted be puniſhed in whatever manner the judges ſhall think fit.

Soc. JUN. He, therefore, who voluntarily governs theſe men will moſt juſtly ſuffer from them, and receive whatever puniſhment they pleaſe.

GUEST. Further ſtill, it will be requiſite that a law ſhould be eſtabliſhed for all theſe, that if any one introduces a mode of piloting different from the written inſtitutions, or ſhall be found inveſtigating the ſalubrious, and the truth of the medicinal art, contrary to the writings, about winds, heat and cold, or deviſing any thing whatever, about affairs of this kind;—in the firſt place, he ſhall neither be called a pilot nor a phyſician, but a certain boaſtful and garrulous ſophiſt; and, in the next place, he ſhall be brought before a court of juſtice, by any perſon who is willing, as one who corrupts other young men, and perſuades them that every one ſhould be permitted to pilot ſhips, and cure the diſeaſed, not according to the laws, but according to his own will. And if any one ſhall be found perſuading either young or old men, contrary to the laws, and the written mandates, he ſhall be puniſhed in the extreme. For nothing ought to be wiſer than the laws. Beſides, no one ſhould be ignorant of the medicinal and the ſalubrious, nor of nautical affairs. For every one who is willing is permitted to learn the written mandates, and the cuſtoms of his country. If theſe particulars, Socrates, ſhould take place about theſe ſciences, viz. about military concerns, the whole of hunting, and painting, imitation, and architecture, the formation of inſtruments of every kind, agriculture, botany; or, again, about the care pertaining to horſes, and herds of cattle of every kind, prophecy, the whole of ſervile offices, the game of cheſs, the whole of arithmetic in its ſimple ſtate, whether it is converſant with planes or depths, or ſwiftneſs and ſlowneſs;—if theſe particulars, I ſay, ſhould take place about theſe ſciences, ſo as to cauſe them to be effected according to the written mandates, and not according to art, what ſhall we ſay?

Soc. JUN. It is evident that all arts muſt be entirely ſubverted, without ever being reſtored, in conſequence of the law which forbids inveſtigation. So that life, which is at preſent difficult, would then be perfectly intolerable.

GUEST. But what will you ſay to this? If we ſhould compel each of the above-mentioned particulars to take place according to written injunctions, and

and ſhould appoint as the guardian of theſe writings a man either choſen by ſuffrage, or chance, but who paying no attention to them, either for the ſake of a certain gain, or private pleaſure, ſhould endeavour, though ignorant of every thing, to act contrary to theſe mandates; would not this be a greater evil than the former?

Soc. JUN. It moſt truly would.

GUEST. For he who ſhould dare to act contrary to thoſe laws which have been eſtabliſhed from long experience by thoſe who, conſulting how to gratify the people, have perſuaded them to adopt them, will commit an error of a very extended nature, and ſubvert every action in a much greater degree than written mandates are capable of effecting.

Soc. JUN. How is it poſſible he ſhould not?

GUEST. Hence, as it is ſaid, there is a ſecond navigation for thoſe that eſtabliſh laws and written mandates reſpecting any thing whatever, viz. that neither one perſon, nor the multitude, ſhould ever be ſuffered to do any thing at any time contrary to them.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. Will not theſe writings, therefore, be certain imitations of truth, compoſed by intelligent men, in the greateſt perfection of which they are capable?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But, if we remember, we have ſaid, that a man truly knowing in political concerns will do many things from art, without paying any attention to written mandates, when any thing occurs to him better than what he has left behind him in writing.

Soc. JUN. We did ſay ſo.

GUEST. And if any thing better than what is eſtabliſhed by law ſhould occur either to an individual, or to the people at large, will they not in this caſe, to the utmoſt of their power, act in the ſame manner as the true politician?

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. If, therefore, they ſhould act in this manner, without poſſeſſing ſcience, they would attempt to imitate that which is true, but the whole of their imitation would be vicious; but if their conduct is the effect of art, this is no longer an imitation, but is a thing itſelf moſt true.

Soc. JUN. It is ſo in every reſpect.

GUEST.

GUEST. It was likewiſe acknowledged by us above, that the multitude is incapable of receiving any art whatever.

SOC. JUN. It was.

GUEST. If, therefore, there is a certain royal art, the multitude of the rich, and the whole of the people, can never receive this politic ſcience.

SOC. JUN. For how can they?

GUEST. It is requiſite then (as it ſeems) that ſuch-like polities, if they intend to imitate as much as poſſible that true polity which is governed according to art by one man, muſt never do any thing contrary to their written laws, and the cuſtoms of their country.

SOC. JUN. You ſpeak moſt beautifully.

GUEST. When, therefore, the rich imitate this polity, we then denominate ſuch a polity an ariſtocracy: but when they pay no attention to the laws, an oligarchy.

SOC. JUN. So it appears.

GUEST. And again, when one man governs according to the laws, imitating him who is endued with ſcience, then we call ſuch a one a king, not diſtinguiſhing by name him who governs with ſcience from the monarch who governs with opinion according to the laws.

SOC. JUN. We appear to do ſo.

GUEST. If, therefore, one man governs, who truly poſſeſſes a ſcientific knowledge of government, he is entirely called by this name a king, and by no other: for this alone, of the five names of the polities juſt now mentioned, belongs to him.

SOC. JUN. So it appears.

GUEST. But when one man governs neither according to the laws, nor according to the cuſtoms of the country, but at the ſame time pretends that he poſſeſſes a ſcientific knowledge, and that it is beſt to act in this manner, contrary to the written mandates, though a certain intemperate deſire and ignorance are the leaders of this imitation, muſt not a man of this kind be called a tyrant?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Thus, then, we ſay, a tyrant, a king, an oligarchy, an ariſtocracy, and a democracy, will be produced; mankind indignantly bearing the authority of a monarch, and not believing that any man will ever be found worthy

worthy of ſuch a government, ſo as to be both willing and able to govern with virtue and ſcience, and properly diſtribute to all men things juſt and holy. They are likewiſe fearful, that one man endued with abſolute power will injure, oppreſs, and ſlay whomſoever he pleaſes: though, if ſuch a character ſhould ariſe, as we have mentioned, he would be beloved, and his adminiſtration, on account of its accurate rectitude, would alone render a polity happy.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But now, ſince no ſuch king is to be found in cities, who, as if produced in a ſwarm of bees, excels from the very beginning both in body and ſoul, it is requiſite, as it ſeems, that men aſſembling together ſhould compoſe written inſtitutions, treading in the footſteps of the moſt true polity.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. And ſhall we wonder, Socrates, that in ſuch-like polities thoſe evils ſhould take place which we behold at preſent, and which will ſubſiſt in future, when they reſt on the foundation of written mandates and long eſtabliſhed cuſtoms, and not on the firm baſis of ſcience? Or ought we not rather to admire how ſtrong a thing a city naturally is? For, though cities have ſubſiſted for an immenſe length of time in this condition, yet ſome of them have continued ſtable, and have not been ſubverted; at the ſame time many of them, like veſſels merged in the ſea, have periſhed, do periſh, and will periſh, through the depravity of the pilots and ſailors, who are involved in the *greateſt* ignorance reſpecting the greateſt concerns; for though they know nothing about political affairs, yet they think their knowledge of the political ſcience is the moſt clear of all ſcientific knowledge.

Soc. JUN. Moſt true.

GUEST. As, therefore, all theſe erroneous polities are full of difficulties, we ſhould conſider in which it is the leaſt difficult and burthenſome to live; for, though this is ſuperfluous with reſpect to our preſent inquiry, yet, perhaps, univerſally we all of us do all things for the ſake of this.

Soc. JUN. It is impoſſible it ſhould not be requiſite to conſider this.

GUEST. Of three things, therefore, they ſay that one is remarkably difficult, and at the ſame time eaſy.

Soc. JUN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. No otherwiſe than as I ſaid before, that there are three polities, a monarchy, the government of a few, and the government of a many, which three polities were at firſt mentioned by us in a confuſed manner.

SOC. JUN. There were.

GUEST. Biſecting, therefore, each of theſe, we ſhall produce ſix, ſeparating from theſe the upright polity, as a ſeventh.

SOC. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. We muſt diſtribute monarchy into the royal and the tyrannic; but the polity which is not compoſed from a multitude, into an ariſtocracy and oligarchy, which form an illuſtrious diviſion. Again, we formerly conſidered the polity which is compoſed from a multitude as ſimple, and called it a democracy, but we muſt now eſtabliſh this as twofold.

SOC. JUN. How ſo? And after what manner do we make this diviſion?

GUEST. Not at all different from the others, though the name of this is now twofold. But to govern according to the laws, and to tranſgreſs the laws, is common both to this and the other polities.

SOC. JUN. It is ſo.

GUEST. Then, indeed, when we were inveſtigating an upright polity, this ſection was of no uſe, as we have ſhown above: but ſince we have ſeparated it from the others, and have conſidered the others as neceſſary, in theſe we divide each according to the legal, and the tranſgreſſion of law.

SOC. JUN. It appears ſo from what has now been ſaid.

GUEST. A monarchy, therefore, when conjoined with good written inſtitutions, which we call laws, is the beſt of all the ſix polities; but when ſubſiſting without law is grievous, and moſt burthenſome to live under.

SOC. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. But the polity which is compoſed of not many, ought to be conſidered by us as a medium, in the ſame manner as a few is a medium between one and many. But again, we ſhould conſider the polity which is compoſed of many as in all things imbecil, and as incapable, when compared with the others, of accompliſhing either any great good or great evil; in conſequence of authority in this polity being divided according to ſmall parts among many. Hence, this is the worſt of all theſe legal polities, but the beſt of all ſuch as are illegal. And where all are intemperate, it is beſt to live in a democracy; but where all are temperate, this polity is the worſt

to

to live in. The firſt and beſt condition of life is in the firſt polity, the ſeventh being excepted. For this muſt be ſeparated from all the other polities, in the ſame manner as divinity from men.

Soc. JUN. Theſe things appear thus to ſubſiſt and happen; and that muſt be done which you mention.

GUEST. Ought not, therefore, the governors of all theſe polities (the governor of the ſcientific polity being excepted) to be withdrawn, as not being truly political but ſeditious characters; and as preſiding over the greateſt images, and being ſuch themſelves? And as they are the greateſt imitators and enchanters, are they not the greateſt ſophiſts of ſophiſts?

Soc. JUN. This appellation ſeems to pertain, with the greateſt rectitude, to thoſe that are called politicians.

GUEST. Be it ſo. This, indeed, is as a drama for us; juſt as we lately ſaid that we ſaw a certain Centauric and Satyric Bacchic choir, which was to be ſeparated from the politic art, and now this has ſcarcely been ſeparated by us.

Soc. JUN. So it appears.

GUEST. But another thing ſtill more difficult than this remains, which is more allied to the royal genus, and which at the ſame time it is more difficult to underſtand. And we appear to me to be affected in a manner ſimilar to thoſe that purify gold.

Soc. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. Thoſe workmen firſt of all ſeparate earth, ſtones, and many other things; but, after this, ſuch things as are allied to gold remain, which are honourable, and alone to be ſeparated by fire,—I mean braſs and ſilver, and ſometimes diamonds. Theſe being with difficulty ſeparated by fuſion, ſcarcely ſuffer us to ſee that which is called perfectly pure gold.

Soc. JUN. So it is ſaid reſpecting theſe things.

GUEST. After the ſame manner, we alſo appear now to have ſeparated from the politic ſcience things different, and ſuch as are foreign and not friendly, and to have left ſuch as are honourable and allied to it. But among the number of theſe, the military and judicial arts, and that rhetoric which communicates with the royal ſcience, perſuading men to act juſtly, and which, together with that ſcience, governs the affairs of cities, may be ranked. Theſe if ſome one ſhould after a certain manner ſeparate with facility, he will ſhow naked and alone by himſelf that character which we are inveſtigating.

Soc. JUN. It is evident that we ſhould endeavour to do this.

GUEST. For the ſake of an experiment, therefore, it will be evident: but we ſhould endeavour to render it apparent through muſic. Inform me, therefore.

Soc. JUN. What?

GUEST. Have we any diſcipline of muſic, and univerſally of the ſciences, concerning manual operations?

Soc. JUN. We have.

GUEST. But what? Shall we ſay that any one among theſe is a certain ſcience which teaches us what we ought to learn reſpecting theſe things, and what we ought not? Or how ſhall we ſay?

Soc. JUN. We muſt ſay that there is.

GUEST. Shall we not, therefore, confeſs that this is different from the others?

Soc. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. But whether muſt we ſay that no one of them rules over the other? or that the others rule over this? or that this, as a guardian, ought to rule over all the others?

Soc. JUN. That this ſcience ought to rule over the others, which teaches us, whether it is requiſite to learn any one of them, or not.

GUEST. You aſſert, therefore, that it ought to rule over both the teacher and the learner.

Soc. JUN. Very much ſo.

GUEST. And do you likewiſe aſſert, that the ſcience which judges whether it is requiſite to perſuade or not, ſhould rule over him who is able to perſuade?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. To what ſcience, therefore, ſhall we attribute that which perſuades the multitude and the crowd, through mythology, but not through doctrine?

Soc. JUN. I think it is evident that this is to be attributed to the rhetoric ſcience.

GUEST. But again, to what ſcience ſhall we attribute the power of judging, whether we ſhould act towards certain perſons through perſuaſion, or through a certain violence; or, univerſally, whether we ought ever to employ either perſuaſion or violence?

Soc.

Soc. JUN. To that which rules over the arts of perſuaſion and diſcourſe.

GUEST. But this, as I think, will not be any other than the power of the politician.

Soc. JUN. You ſpeak moſt beautifully.

GUEST. Thus, therefore, the rhetoric appears to have been very rapidly ſeparated from the politic ſcience, as being another ſpecies, but ſubſervient to this ſcience.

Soc. JUN. Certainly.

GUEST. But again, what muſt we conceive reſpecting this power?

Soc. JUN. What power?

GUEST. That by which we war upon thoſe againſt whom we have declared war. Whether ſhall we ſay that this is endued with, or deprived of, art?

Soc. JUN. How can we conceive that power to be deprived of art which the commanding art and all warlike actions employ?

GUEST. But ſhall we conſider that power which is able to conſult ſcientifically, whether it is proper to engage in war, or make peace, as different from this, or the ſame with it?

Soc. JUN. From what has been before eſtabliſhed, it neceſſarily follows that it muſt be different.

GUEST. Muſt not, therefore, the military ſcience have dominion over the warrior, if we in a ſimilar manner follow what has been before advanced?

Soc. JUN. It muſt.

GUEST. What ſcience then ſhall we endeavour to evince as the deſpot of the whole of the military art, which is thus ſkilful and mighty, except the truly royal ſcience?

Soc. JUN. No other whatever.

GUEST. We muſt not, therefore, conſider the ſcience of military commanders as the ſame with the political, to which it is ſubſervient.

Soc. JUN. It is not proper we ſhould.

GUEST. But come, let us contemplate the power of judges who judge rightly.

Soc. JUN. By all means.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, capable of doing more than merely judging what is juſt or unjuſt, reſpecting ſuch compacts as are legal, and which have

been eſtabliſhed by royal authority; employing for this purpoſe its own proper virtue, ſo as never to wiſh to diſſolve mutual accuſations, either through the influence of certain gifts, or fear, or pity, or hatred, or love, contrary to the order of the legiſlator?

Soc. JUN. It will never wiſh to act in this manner; but that which you have mentioned is nearly the employment of this power.

GUEST. We find, therefore, that the ſtrength of judges is not royal, but is the guardian of the laws, and ſubſervient to the royal ſcience.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. This alſo muſt be obſerved, that no one of the abovementioned ſciences will appear to be the politic ſcience to him who perceives all of them. For the province of the truly royal ſcience is not to act itſelf, but to rule over thoſe that are able to act, ſince it knows the dominion and impulſe of thoſe that are the greateſt in the city, reſpecting what is opportune and the contrary: but it is the province of the other ſciences to do as they are ordered.

Soc. Right.

GUEST. Hence, ſince the ſciences which we have juſt now diſcuſſed neither rule over each other nor themſelves, but each is converſant with a certain proper employment of its own, they are juſtly denominated according to the peculiarity of their actions.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. But rightly comprehending by a common appellation the power of that ſcience which rules over all theſe, and takes care of the laws, and of every thing in the city, we may moſt juſtly, as it ſeems, call it the politic ſcience.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Shall we not, therefore, diſcuſs this ſcience at preſent, according to the paradigm of the weaving art, ſince all the genera pertaining to a city have become manifeſt to us?

Soc. JUN. And very much ſo.

GUEST. We muſt therefore, as it ſeems, relate what the royal connection is, after what manner it weaves together, and what kind of web it produces for us.

Soc. JUN. It is evident.

GUEST.

GUEST. It is, indeed, a thing difficult to be evinced; but, as it appears, it is neceſſary it ſhould be unfolded.

SOC. JUN. It muſt, by all means.

GUEST. For, that a part of virtue differs from the ſpecies of virtue, may be eaſily proved from the opinion of the multitude, in oppoſition to the contentious.

SOC. JUN. I do not underſtand you.

GUEST. But again, thus conſider. For I think that you conſider fortitude as one part of virtue.

SOC. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And likewiſe, that temperance is different from fortitude, but that the former is a part of the ſame thing as the latter.

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. We muſt dare to unfold a certain wonderful diſcourſe reſpecting theſe things.

SOC. JUN. Of what kind?

GUEST. That after a certain manner they are in many things very adverſe and contrary to each other.

SOC. JUN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. My aſſertion is by no means uſual. For all the parts of virtue are ſaid to be friendly to each other.

SOC. JUN. It is ſo ſaid.

GUEST. Let us conſider, therefore, with the greateſt attention, whether this is ſo ſimple, or differs more than any thing from theſe, in things of a kindred nature.

SOC. JUN. Inform me how we are to conſider.

GUEST. In all ſuch things as we call beautiful it is proper to inveſtigate, and refer them to two ſpecies contrary to each other.

SOC. JUN. You ſpeak moſt clearly.

GUEST. Have you ever then either praiſed yourſelf, or heard ſome other perſon praiſing ſharpneſs and ſwiftneſs, either in bodies or ſouls, or the motion of voice, or in ſuch imitations of theſe as muſical and graphical imitations exhibit?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly I have.

GUEST.

GUEST. Do you likewiſe remember after what manner praiſe is beſtowed in each of theſe?

SOC. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. Shall we, therefore, be able to point out to you my conceptions of this in words?

SOC. JUN. What ſhould hinder?

GUEST. You ſeem to think a thing of this kind eaſy. Let us conſider it, therefore, in ſubcontrary genera. For often, and in many actions, when we admire the ſwiftneſs, vehemence, and acuteneſs of thought, body, or voice, we praiſe them, and at the ſame time employ one of the appellations of fortitude.

SOC. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. In the firſt place, we ſay it is acute and ſtrenuous, ſwift and virile, and in a ſimilar manner vehement: and, univerſally, we praiſe all theſe natures, by applying this name to them in common.

SOC. JUN. We do.

GUEST. But what? Do we not often praiſe in many actions the ſpecies of quiet generation?

SOC. JUN. And very much ſo.

GUEST. Do we not, therefore, in praiſing theſe, aſſert things contrary to what we did in praiſing thoſe?

SOC. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. We ſay that each of theſe is quiet and temperate, and we admire theſe when they take place about cogitation; but about actions, we admire the ſlow and the ſoft, about voice, the ſmooth and the grave, all rhythmical motion, and the whole of the muſe which employs ſlowneſs opportunely; and to all theſe we give the appellation of the moderate, and not of fortitude.

SOC. JUN. Moſt true.

GUEST. But when both theſe take place unſeaſonably, we then blame each of them, and call them by contrary names.

SOC. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. When they appear to be unſeaſonably acute, ſwift, and hard, we then call them inſolent and inſane; but when they are unſeaſonably grave, ſlow,

ſlow, and ſoft, we call them timid and ſlothful. And we nearly find that theſe, and the nature of fortitude and temperance, are for the moſt part contrary to each other, as being hoſtile and ſeditious forms, and which are never mingled together in actions about things of this kind. We ſhall likewiſe find by inveſtigation, that thoſe who poſſeſs theſe in their ſouls, are diſcordant with each other.

Soc. JUN. Where do you ſay?

GUEST. In all thoſe particulars which we have juſt now mentioned, and, it is probable, in many others. For, I think, praiſing ſome things as their own property, on account of their alliance to both, but blaming others as things foreign, they become very adverſe to each other in many things.

Soc. JUN. They appear to do ſo.

GUEST. This difference, therefore, is the ſport of theſe ſpecies. But a diſeaſe the moſt baneful of all others happens to cities about things of the greateſt conſequence.

Soc. JUN. About what things?

GUEST. About the whole apparatus of living, as it is likely it ſhould. For thoſe who are remarkably modeſt are always prepared to live a quiet life, attending privately to their own concerns, and being after a certain manner diſpoſed to aſſociate peaceably both with their fellow citizens and foreigners. Through this love, however, which is more unſeaſonable than is fit, when they do that which they wiſh to accompliſh, they become ſecretly enervated, and render young men ſimilarly affected. Hence, they are always ſubject to injuries; and in a ſhort time themſelves, their children, and the whole city, often by ſlow degrees, from being free become ſlaves.

Soc. JUN. You ſpeak of a ſevere and dire paſſion.

GUEST. But thoſe that verge more to fortitude, do they not incite the cities to which they belong to war, through a more vehement deſire of a life of this kind than is becoming, and thus rendering many nations and potentates hoſtile to their country, either entirely ſubvert it, or bring it in ſubjection to the enemy?

Soc. JUN. They do.

GUEST. How is it poſſible, therefore, we ſhould not ſay, that in theſe things both genera are in the greateſt degree adverſe to each other?

Soc. JUN. It is impoſſible we ſhould ſay otherwiſe.

GUEST. Have we not, therefore, found that which we were conſidering in the beginning, that certain parts of virtue, which are not ſmall naturally, differ from each other, and that they likewiſe cauſe thoſe that poſſeſs them to do the ſame?

Soc. JUN. It appears we have.

GUEST. Let us again too conſider this.

Soc. JUN. What?

GUEST. Whether there is any thing belonging to ſynthetic ſciences which has any one of its works, though it ſhould be the vileſt, compoſed from things evil and at the ſame time uſeful? Or ſhall we ſay, that every ſcience always rejects things evil to the utmoſt of its power, and receives ſuch as are apt and uſeful? and that from theſe, which are both ſimilar and diſſimilar, collected into one, it fabricates one certain power and idea?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. The truly political ſcience, therefore, according to nature, will never be willing that a city ſhould be compoſed from good and bad men; but it is very evident that it will firſt of all examine every thing by diſcipline, and, after the examination, will commit this employment to ſuch as are able to inſtruct others, and at the ſame time be ſubſervient to others, itſelf commanding and preſiding: juſt in the ſame manner as the weaving art preſides over the wool-combers, and others that prepare the materials for weaving, and gives ſuch orders to the preparatory workmen as it thinks will beſt contribute to the work it has in view.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. The royal ſcience appears to me to do the very ſame, permitting thoſe that inſtruct and educate others according to law, alone to exerciſe and teach that which being effected according to its temperature will produce worthy manners. But it puniſhes with death, exile, and the greateſt diſgrace, thoſe that are unable to participate of fortitude, temperance, and ſuch other things as tend to virtue, but through a depraved nature are violently impelled to impiety, inſolence and injuſtice.

Soc. JUN. This is ſaid to be the caſe.

GUEST. But thoſe that are rolled like cylinders in ignorance and an abject ſpirit, it ſubjugates to ſervile employments.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. It preſerves and defends, therefore, ſuch as are naturally qualified for acquiring the generous and the noble, when properly diſciplined, and who through art can be mingled with each other. And ſuch among theſe as verge more to fortitude, it conſiders as reſembling ſtrong thread in the loom on account of their ſolid manners; but ſuch as verge more to modeſty, as ſimilar to fat and ſoft matter; and, that we may uſe an image from the weaving art, as reſembling ſaffron-coloured thread. And ſuch as tend contrary to theſe, it endeavours to bind together and connect after the following manner.

Soc. JUN. After what manner?

GUEST. In the firſt place, according to the allied, it harmonizes together the eternal part of their ſoul with a divine bond. But after that which is divine it harmonizes together their vivific part with human bonds.

Soc. JUN. How again is this?

GUEST. When true opinion becomes ſtably inherent in the ſoul reſpecting things beautiful, juſt and good, and the contraries to theſe, we ſay that the divine in the dæmoniacal genus is produced.

Soc. JUN. It is proper it ſhould.

GUEST. Do we, therefore, know that a politician and a good legiſlator ought alone to be able, with the Muſe of the royal ſcience, to effect this in thoſe that are properly diſciplined, and whom we have juſt now mentioned?

Soc. JUN. It is fit this ſhould be the caſe.

GUEST. But he, Socrates, who cannot accompliſh a thing of this kind, muſt by no means be called by the names which we are now inveſtigating.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. What then? Muſt not a brave ſoul, when it receives truth of this kind, become mild, and thus be willing in the higheſt degree to partake of things juſt? But when it does not receive it, muſt it not be conſidered as verging more to a certain ſavage nature?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But what? Will not a ſoul of a modeſt nature, when receiving theſe opinions, become truly temperate and moderate in a polity? But when

it does not partake of the things we are ſpeaking of, will it not be moſt diſgracefully branded with ſtupidity?

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Muſt we not ſay, that this connection and binding together of the evil with each other, and of the good with the evil, can never become ſtable, and that no ſcience will ever ſeriouſly attempt to accompliſh this with ſuch as theſe?

Soc. JUN. For how can it?

GUEST. But in thoſe alone who are endued with worthy manners from the firſt, and who are educated according to nature, this bond is naturally implanted through the laws. In theſe, too, this art is a remedy; and, as we ſaid before, the natural virtue of the parts is the more divine bond of things diſſimilar, and tending to contraries.

Soc. JUN. Moſt true.

GUEST. Since this divine bond exiſts, there is ſcarcely any difficulty in either underſtanding the other bonds which are human, or in bringing them to perfection when underſtood.

Soc. JUN. How ſo? And what are theſe bonds?

GUEST. The communions of alliances and children, and thoſe reſpecting private locations and marriages. For many reſpecting theſe things are not properly bound together for the purpoſe of begetting children.

Soc. JUN. Why?

GUEST. Is it worth while to relate how anxiouſly they purſue riches and power in theſe things?

Soc. JUN. It is not.

GUEST. But it will be more juſt to ſpeak of thoſe who make the human race the object of their care, and to conſider if they do any thing improperly.

Soc. JUN. It will.

GUEST. They do not indeed at all act from right reaſon, but purſue preſent pleaſure; and in conſequence of being delighted with thoſe ſimilar to themſelves, and of not loving thoſe that are diſſimilar, they attribute the greateſt part to moleſtation.

Soc. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. Thoſe that are modeſt ſeek after their own manners, and as much

much as poſſible marry thoſe that are endued with them, and likewiſe marry their own offspring to ſuch as reſemble themſelves. The genus about fortitude acts in the ſame manner, purſuing its own nature; when at the ſame time it is requiſite that both genera ſhould act in a manner entirely contrary.

Soc. JUN. How, and on what account?

GUEST. Becauſe this is the natural condition of fortitude, that when it has been unmingled for many generations with a temperate nature, it is florid with ſtrength in the beginning, but in the end becomes entirely efflo-reſcent with inſanity.

Soc. JUN. It is likely.

GUEST. Again, a ſoul very full of ſhame, and void of audacious fortitude, when it has ſubſiſted in this manner for many generations, naturally becomes unſeaſonably ſluggiſh, and at laſt perfectly mutilated.

Soc. JUN. And this alſo is likely to happen.

GUEST. We have ſaid that there is no difficulty in binding men with theſe bonds, if both genera have one opinion reſpecting things beautiful and good. For this is the one and entire work of royal weaving, viz. never to ſuffer temperate manners to ſubſiſt apart from ſuch as are valiant, but, weaving together both theſe, from according opinions, honor, diſhonor, and glory, to collect from theſe a web ſmooth, and, as it is ſaid, well woven, and always to commit in common the authority of governors in cities to theſe.

Soc. JUN. How?

GUEST. Where it happens that one governor is ſufficient, a preſident ſhould be choſen who poſſeſſes both theſe; but where more than one is neceſſary, parts of theſe muſt be mingled together. For the manners of temperate governors are very cautious, juſt, and ſalutary; but they require acrimony, and a certain acute and practical temerity.

Soc. JUN. Theſe things alſo appear ſo to me.

GUEST. Again, fortitude with reſpect to juſtice and caution is more indigent than thoſe other virtues; but it excels them in actions. But it is impoſſible that all things pertaining to cities, both of a private and public nature, ſhould ſubſiſt beautifully, unleſs both theſe are preſent.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We muſt ſay then that this end of the web of politic action is then.

then rightly woven, when the royal art, connecting the manners of brave and temperate men by concord and friendſhip, collects together their life in cōmmon, producing the moſt magnificent and excellent of all webs;—and beſides this, when, embracing in common all others in the city, both ſlaves and free-born, it holds them together by this texture, and governs and preſides over the city in ſuch a manner that nothing may in any reſpect be wanting which is requiſite to its felicity.

Soc. JUN. You have finiſhed, O gueſt, your deſcription of the royal and political character moſt beautifully.

THE END OF THE POLITICUS.

THE MINOS:

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

LAW.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE MINOS.

LAW, conſidered according to its firſt ſubſiſtence in Deity, is juſtly defined by Plato to be *a diſtribution of intellect* (*νου διανομη*). As it originates, therefore, from deity, and is thence participated by the human ſoul, it does not depend for its being among men on arbitrary will and mutual compact, but is truly an evolution of one of thoſe eternal ideas or forms which the ſoul eſſentially contains. He, therefore, who diligently attends to what is ſaid by Plato in this dialogue, in his Laws, and Republic, concerning law, will find that it is a true mode of governing, which directs the governed to the beſt end through proper media, eſtabliſhing puniſhments for ſuch as tranſgreſs, and rewards for thoſe that are obedient to this mode. Hence the inſtitutions of princes, when they are not true, and do not proceed to the beſt end in a right path, are by no means laws, but decrees and edicts: for a work is frequently denominated legitimate from law, juſt from being legitimate, and good, right and true from being juſt; and therefore law is neceſſarily good and true. It alſo follows that law properly ſo called is eternal and perfectly immutable: for that which is changed by times, places and opinions, is not a law, but an inſtitute.

According to Plato, too, it appears that there are four ſpecies of laws. The firſt of theſe are Saturnian, or, in other words, ſubſiſt in that deity, who according to antient theologiſts is the ſummit of the intellectual order. Theſe laws are mentioned by Plato in the Gorgias, where Socrates ſays, "This was the law in the times of Saturn, and now alſo ſubſiſts in the Gods." The ſecond are Jovian, and are indicated in the Laws, where the Athenian gueſt

ſays "that Juſtice follows Jupiter, being the avenger of thoſe who deſert the divine law." The third are fatal, as we learn from the Timæus, where it is ſaid that the Demiurgus "diſcloſed to ſouls the laws of Fate." And the fourth are human. Since law, therefore, has a divine origin, all the illuſtrious framers of laws with the greateſt propriety referred the invention of them to Deity. Hence Zoroaſter, when he delivered laws to the Bactrians and Perſians, aſcribed the invention of them to Oromaſis; Hermes Triſmegiſtus the Egyptian legiſlator referred the invention of his laws to Mercury; Minos the Cretan lawgiver to Jupiter; Charondas the Carthaginian to Saturn; Lycurgus the Lacedæmonian to Apollo; Draco and Solon the Athenian legiſlators to Minerva; Pompilius the Roman lawgiver to Ægeria; Zamolxis the Scythian to Veſta; and Plato, when he gave laws to the Magneſians and Sicilians, to Jupiter and Apollo.

THE

THE MINOS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND MINOS.

SOCRATES.

WHAT is law with us?

MIN. About what kind of law do you interrogate?

SOC. What is that by which law differs from law, according to this very thing, the being law? For conſider what I aſk you. For I aſk as if I ſhould inquire what gold is; and if you in a ſimilar manner ſhould aſk me, about what kind of gold I inquire, I ſhould think you would not rightly interrogate. For neither does gold differ in any thing from gold, ſo far as it is gold, nor a ſtone from a ſtone, ſo far as it is a ſtone. And in like manner, neither does law differ in any thing from law; but all laws are the ſame. For each of them is ſimilarly law; nor is one more, but the other leſs ſo. I aſk you, therefore, the whole of this very thing, what law is; and if you have an anſwer at hand give it me.

MIN. What elſe, Socrates, will law be than things eſtabliſhed by law?

SOC. Does ſpeech alſo appear to you to be things which are ſpoken? or ſight things which are ſeen? or hearing things which are heard? Or is ſpeech one thing, and are things ſpoken another? Is ſight one thing, and are things ſeen another? Is hearing one thing, and are things heard another? And, is law one thing, and are things eſtabliſhed by law another? Is this the caſe, or how does it appear to you?

MIN. This now appears to me to be the caſe.

SOC. Law, therefore, is not things eſtabliſhed by law.

Min. It does not appear to me that it is.

Soc. What law, therefore, may be, let us thus conſider. If ſome one ſhould aſk us reſpecting thoſe things of which we have juſt now ſpoken, ſince you ſay that things viſible are ſeen by the ſight, what the ſight is by which they are ſeen? we ſhould anſwer him, that it is a ſenſe which through the eyes manifeſts colours to us. And if he ſhould again aſk us what the hearing is by which things are heard? we ſhould reply, that it is a ſenſe which through the ears manifeſts to us ſounds. In like manner, if he ſhould aſk us, ſince legal inſtitutions are legally eſtabliſhed by law, what is law by which they are thus eſtabliſhed? whether is it a certain ſenſe, or manifeſtation? in the ſame manner as things which are learnt, are learnt by ſcience rendering them manifeſt. Or is it a certain invention? juſt as things which are diſcovered are invented: as, for inſtance, things ſalubrious and noxious are diſcovered by medicine; but the conceptions of the Gods, as prophets ſay, by divination. For the divining art is with us an invention of ſuch like things: Or is it not?

Min. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Which of theſe, therefore, may we eſpecially preſume law to be? Shall we ſay it is theſe dogmas and decrees?

Min. It appears ſo to me. For what elſe can any one ſay law is? So that it appears the whole of this which you aſk, viz. law, is the dogma of the city.

Soc. You call, as it ſeems, law, political opinion.

Min. I do.

Soc. And perhaps you ſpeak well; but perhaps we ſhall know better in the following manner. Do you ſay that ſome men are wiſe?

Min. I do.

Soc. Are not the wiſe, therefore, wiſe by wiſdom?

Min. Yes.

Soc. But what? are the juſt, juſt by juſtice?

Min. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Are the legitimate, therefore, alſo legitimate by law?

Min. Yes.

Soc. And the illegitimate, illegitimate by a privation of law?

Min. Yes.

Soc.

Soc. And are the legitimate juſt?

Min. Yes.

Soc. But the illegitimate unjuſt?

Min. Unjuſt.

Soc. Are not juſtice and law, therefore, things moſt beautiful?

Min. They are.

Soc. And are not injuſtice and illegality moſt baſe?

Min. Yes.

Soc. And does not one of theſe preſerve cities and every thing elſe, but the other deſtroy and ſubvert them?

Min. Yes.

Soc. It is neceſſary, therefore, dianoëtically to conſider law as ſomething beautiful, and to inveſtigate it as good.

Min. How ſhould we not?

Soc. Have we not, therefore, ſaid that law is the dogma of the city?

Min. We have ſaid ſo.

Soc. What then? Are not ſome dogmas good, and others bad?

Min. They are.

Soc. Law however is not bad.

Min. It is not.

Soc. It is not, therefore, right ſimply to determine that law is the dogma of the city.

Min. It does not appear to me that it is.

Soc. The aſſertion, therefore, does not accord with the truth, that law is a baſe dogma.

Min. It does not.

Soc. Law however appears alſo to me to be a certain opinion. And ſince it is not a baſe opinion, is not this, therefore, evident, that it is a good opinion, if law is opinion?

Min. Yes.

Soc. But is not a certain good, a true, opinion?

Min. Yes.

Soc. Is, therefore, true opinion the diſcovery of being?

Min. It is.

Soc.

Soc. Law, therefore, is the diſcovery of being.

Min. But, Socrates, if law is the diſcovery of being, how is it that we do not always uſe the ſame laws about the ſame things, ſince beings are diſcovered by us?

Soc. Nevertheleſs law wiſhes to be the diſcovery of being; but men, as it ſeems, not always uſing the ſame laws, are not always able to diſcover that which law wiſhes, viz. being. But come, let us ſee if it will hence become evident to us, whether we always uſe the ſame laws, or different laws at different times; and if all of us uſe the ſame laws, or different perſons different laws.

Min. But this, Socrates, is not difficult to know, that neither do the ſame perſons always uſe the ſame laws, nor different perſons always different laws. Thus, for example, it is not a law with us to ſacrifice men, but this is conſidered as unholy; but the Carthaginians ſacrifice men, this being holy and legal with them; ſo that ſome of them ſacrifice their ſons to Saturn, as perhaps you have heard. And not only do Barbarian men uſe laws different from ours, but alſo thoſe in Lycia. And as to the progeny of Athamas [1], what ſacrifices do they perform, though they are Greeks? You alſo know and have heard what laws we formerly uſed concerning the dead, cutting the throats of the victims before the dead body was carried out, and calling thoſe that carry the ſacrifices to the dead. And thoſe ſtill prior to theſe buried the dead at home; but we do none of theſe. Ten thouſand inſtances likewiſe of this might be adduced. For the field of demonſtration is very wide, that neither we always think invariably the ſame with ourſelves, nor men with each other.

Soc. It is by no means wonderful, O beſt of men, if you ſpeak rightly, and this ſhould be concealed from me. But till you by yourſelf declare what appears to you, in a long diſcourſe, and I again do the ſame, we ſhall never, as I think, agree. If however a common ſubject of ſpeculation is propoſed, we ſhall perhaps accord. If, therefore, you are willing, interrogating me, conſider together with me in common. Or, if it is more agreeable to you, inſtead of interrogating, anſwer.

Min. But I wiſh, Socrates, to reply to any queſtion you may propoſe.

[1] Athamas was the ſon of Æolus, and king of Thebes in Bœotia.

Soc. Come then. Whether do you think that juſt things are unjuſt, and unjuſt things juſt? Or that juſt things are juſt, and unjuſt things unjuſt?

Min. I indeed think that juſt things are juſt, and unjuſt things unjuſt.

Soc. Is this opinion, therefore, entertained among all men, as well as here?

Min. Yes.

Soc. Among the Perſians alſo?

Min. And among the Perſians too.

Soc. But is this opinion always entertained?

Min. Always.

Soc. Whether are things which attract more, thought by us to be heavier, but things which attract leſs, lighter? or the contrary?

Min. Not the contrary: but things which attract more are heavier, and things which attract leſs are lighter.

Soc. Is this the caſe, therefore, in Carthage and in Lycia?

Min. Yes.

Soc. Things beautiful, as it ſeems, are every where thought to be beautiful; and things baſe to be baſe: but things baſe are not thought to be beautiful, nor things beautiful baſe.

Min. It is ſo.

Soc. As we may ſay, therefore, in all things, beings are thought to be, and not non-beings, both with us and with all others.

Min. It appears ſo to me.

Soc. He, therefore, who wanders from being wanders from that which is legitimate.

Min. Thus, Socrates, as you ſay, theſe things always appear legitimate both to us and to others. But when I conſider that we never ceaſe tranſpoſing laws upwards and downwards, I cannot be perſuaded by what you ſay.

Soc. Perhaps you do not perceive that theſe things thus tranſpoſed continue to be the ſame. But thus conſider them together with me. Did you ever meet with any book concerning the health of the ſick?

Min. I have.

Soc. Do you know, therefore, to what art this book belongs?

Min. I know that it belongs to the art of medicine.

Soc.

Soc. Do you, therefore, call thoſe who are ſcientifically ſkilled about theſe things, phyſicians?

Min. I call them ſo.

Soc. Whether, therefore, do thoſe that have a ſcientific knowledge think the ſame things about the ſame, or do ſome of theſe think differently from others about the ſame things?

Min. They appear to me to think the ſame things.

Soc. Whether, therefore, do the Greeks alone accord with the Greeks about things of which they have a ſcientific knowledge, or do the Barbarians alſo both accord with each other about ſuch things, and with the Greeks?

Min. There is an abundant neceſſity that both Greeks and Barbarians who poſſeſs a ſcientific knowledge ſhould accord in opinion with each other.

Soc. You anſwer well. Do they not, therefore, always accord?

Min. Yes, always.

Soc. Do not phyſicians alſo write thoſe things about health which they think to be true?

Min. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Things medicinal, therefore, and medicinal laws, theſe are the writings of phyſicians.

Min. Things medicinal, certainly.

Soc. Whether, therefore, are geometrical writings alſo geometrical laws?

Min. Yes.

Soc. Of whom, therefore, are the writings and legitimate inſtitutions concerning gardening?

Min. Of gardeners.

Soc. Thoſe laws, therefore, pertain to gardening.

Min. They do.

Soc. Are they not, therefore, the laws of thoſe who know how to manage gardens?

Min. How ſhould they not?

Soc. But gardeners poſſeſs this knowledge.

Min. Yes.

Soc. But of whom are the writings and legitimate inſtitutions concerning food?

Min. Of cooks.

Soc. Thoſe, therefore, are cooking laws.

Min. Cooking.

Soc. And of thoſe, as it ſeems, who know how to manage the preparation of food.

Min. Yes.

Soc. But cooks, as they ſay, poſſeſs this knowledge.

Min. They do poſſeſs it.

Soc. Be it ſo. But of whom are the writings and legal inſtitutions concerning the government of a city? Are they not of thoſe who ſcientifically know how to govern cities?

Min. It appears ſo to me.

Soc. But do any others than politicians and kings poſſeſs this knowledge?

Min. They alone poſſeſs it.

Soc. Theſe writings, therefore, are political, which men call the writings of kings and good men.

Min. You ſpeak the truth.

Soc. Thoſe, therefore, who poſſeſs a ſcientific knowledge do not at different times write differently about the ſame things.

Min. Certainly not.

Soc. If, therefore, we ſee certain perſons doing this, whether ſhall we ſay that thoſe who act in this manner are ſcientific or unſcientific?

Min. Unſcientific.

Soc. Shall we, therefore, ſay that what is right in every particular is legitimate, whether it be medicinal, or pertain to cooking, or to gardening?

Min. Yes.

Soc. But with reſpect to what is not right, this we no longer aſſert to be legitimate.

Min. No longer.

Soc. It, therefore, becomes illegitimate.

Min. Neceſſarily ſo.

Soc. Hence, in writings concerning things juſt and unjuſt, and, in ſhort, concerning the orderly diſtribution of a city, and the manner in which it ought to be governed, that which is right is a royal law; but that which is not right does not appear to be a royal law, becauſe ſcience is wanting: for it is illegal.

MIN. It is.

SOC. We have rightly, therefore, acknowledged that law is the invention of being.

MIN. So it appears.

SOC. Further ſtill, this alſo we ſhould conſider in it: who is it that ſcientifically knows how to ſow ſeeds in the earth?

MIN. The huſbandman.

SOC. Does he then ſow fit ſeeds in each ſoil?

MIN. Yes.

SOC. The huſbandman, therefore, is a good diſtributor of theſe things, and his laws and diſtributions in theſe particulars are right.

MIN. Yes.

SOC. But who is a good diſpenſator of pulſations for melodies, and diſtributes ſuch things as are fit? And whoſe laws alſo, if he has any, are right?

MIN. The laws of the piper, and thoſe of the harper.

SOC. He, therefore, who is moſt legitimate in theſe things is in the moſt eminent degree a piper.

MIN. Yes.

SOC. But who in the beſt manner diſtributes nutriment to the bodies of men? Does not he do this who diſtributes that which is fit?

MIN. Yes.

SOC. The diſtributions, therefore, and the laws of this man are the beſt; and he who is moſt legitimate about theſe things is the moſt excellent diſtributor.

MIN. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Who is he?

MIN. The inſtructor of children.

SOC. Does he know how to feed the flock of the human body in the beſt manner?

MIN. Yes.

SOC. But who is he that feeds in the beſt manner a flock of ſheep? What is his name?

MIN. A ſhepherd.

SOC. The laws, therefore, of the ſhepherd are the beſt for the ſheep.

MIN. They are.

SOC.

Soc. And thoſe of the herdſman for oxen.

Min. Yes.

Soc. But whoſe laws are the beſt for the ſouls of men? Are they not thoſe of a king?

Min. They are.

Soc. You ſpeak well. Can you, therefore, tell me who among the antients was a good legiſlator in the laws pertaining to pipes? Perhaps you do not recollect. Are you, therefore, willing that I ſhould remind you?

Min. Perfectly ſo.

Soc. Marſyas, then, and his beloved Olympus the Phrygian were of this deſcription.

Min. True.

Soc. The harmony produced by the pipes of theſe men is moſt divine, and alone excites and unfolds thoſe that ſtand in need of the Gods [1]. It likewiſe alone remains to the preſent time as being divine.

Min. Theſe things are ſo.

Soc. But who among the antient kings is ſaid to have been a good legiſlator, and whoſe legal inſtitutions even now remain as being divine?

Min. I do not recollect.

Soc. Do you not know who they were that uſed the moſt antient laws of the Greeks?

Min. Do you ſpeak of the Lacedæmonians, and Lycurgus the legiſlator?

Soc. Theſe inſtitutions, however, have not perhaps been eſtabliſhed three hundred years, or very little more than this. But do you know whence the beſt of their laws were derived?

Min. They ſay, from Crete.

Soc. Do they, therefore, of all the Greeks uſe the moſt antient laws?

Min. Yes.

Soc. Do you know then who among theſe were good kings? I mean Minos and Rhadamanthus, the ſons of Jupiter and Europa, by whom theſe laws were framed.

Min. They ſay, Socrates, that Rhadamanthus was a juſt man, but that Minos was ruſtic, moroſe and unjuſt.

[1] See the ſpeech of Alcibiades in The Banquet.

Soc. You relate, O beſt of men, an Attic and tragical fable.

Min. Are not theſe things reported of Minos?

Soc. They are not by Homer and Heſiod, whoſe authority is greater than that of all the tragic poets from whom you aſſert theſe things.

Min. But what do they ſay about Minos?

Soc. I will tell you, leſt you as well as the many ſhould be guilty of impiety. For there is not any thing which is more impious than this; *nor is there any thing of which we ought to be more afraid, than of offending againſt* THE GODS *either in word or in deed*[1]. And next to this we ſhould be fearful of offending againſt divine men. We ſhould however be very cautious, when we praiſe or blame any man, that we do not ſpeak erroneouſly; and for the ſake of this it is neceſſary that we ſhould learn to know good and bad men. For divinity is indignant when any one blames a man ſimilar to himſelf, or praiſes one diſſimilar to him: but the former of theſe is the good man. Nor ought you to think that ſtones, pieces of wood, birds and ſerpents are ſacred, but that men are not ſo: for a good man is the moſt ſacred, and a depraved man the moſt defiled, of all things. Now, therefore, ſince Homer and Heſiod paſs an encomium on Minos, on this account I thus ſpeak, *leſt you, being a man ſprung from a man, ſhould ſin in what you ſay againſt a hero the ſon of Jupiter.* For Homer[2], ſpeaking of Crete, that there are many men and ninety cities in it, ſays that among theſe is Gnoſſus, a great city in which Minos reigned, who for nine years converſed with the mighty Jupiter. This then is Homer's encomium of Minos, which though ſhort is ſuch as he does not give to any one of his heroes. For that Jupiter is a ſophiſt[3], and that the art itſelf is all-beautiful, he evinces as well in many other places as here. For he ſays that Minos converſed nine years with Jupiter, and went to be inſtructed by him, as if Jupiter were a ſophiſt. That Homer, therefore, does not beſtow this honour of being inſtructed by Jupiter on any other hero than Minos alone, muſt be conſidered as a wonderful praiſe. Ulyſſes alſo, in ſpeaking of the dead[4], repreſents Minos judging

[1] This among many other paſſages muſt convince the moſt careleſs reader, that Plato was a firm believer in the religion of his country.

[2] Odyſſ. lib. xix. ver. 172, &c.

[3] That is, one endued with wiſdom; for this is the original meaning of the word.

[4] Odyſſ. lib. xi.

with

with a golden ſceptre in his hand; but neither here nor in any other place does he ſpeak of Rhadamanthus as judging, or as converſing with Jupiter. On this account I ſay that Minos is extolled by Homer beyond all other heroes. For that being the ſon of Jupiter, he was only inſtructed by Jupiter, contains no tranſcendency of praiſe. For the verſe which ſays that Minos reigned nine years, and converſed with the mighty Jupiter, ſignifies that he was the aſſociate of Jupiter; ſince ομφοι are diſcourſes, and ομφιστης is an aſſociate in diſcourſe. Hence, for nine years Minos went to the cavern of Jupiter, learning ſome things, and teaching others, which during theſe nine years he had received from Jupiter. There are however ſome who conceive ομφιστης to ſignify the aſſociate of Jupiter in drinking and ſport. But that thoſe who thus conceive ſay nothing to the purpoſe, may be inferred from this, that, as both the Greeks and Barbarians are numerous, there are none among theſe who abſtain from banquets, and that ſport to which wine belongs, except the Cretans and the Lacedæmonians, who were inſtructed by the Cretans. In Crete, too, this is one of the other laws which Minos eſtabliſhed, that men ſhould not drink with each other to intoxication. And this indeed is evident, that he made thoſe things to be laws for his citizens which he thought to be beautiful. For Minos did not, like a baſe man, think one thing, and do another different from what he thought; but his aſſociation with Jupiter was as I have ſaid through diſcourſe, in order to be inſtructed in virtue. Hence he eſtabliſhed theſe laws for his citizens through which Crete is perpetually happy, and alſo Lacedæmon, from the time in which it began to uſe theſe laws, in conſequence of their being divine. But Rhadamanthus was indeed a good man; for he was inſtructed by Minos. He did not however learn the whole of the royal art, but that part of it which is of the miniſtrant kind, and which poſſeſſes authority in courts of judicature; and hence he is ſaid to have been a good judge. For Minos employed him as a guardian of the laws in the city; but he uſed Talus [r] for this purpoſe through the reſt of Crete. For Talus thrice every year went through the villages in order to preſerve the laws in them, and carried with him the laws written in tables of braſs; whence alſo he was called brazen. Heſiod alſo aſſerts things ſimilar to theſe of Minos. For,

[r] A ſon of Cres, the founder of the Cretan nation.

having mentioned his name, he says[a] that he was the most royal of mortal kings, and that he reigned over many neighbouring men, having the sceptre of Jupiter, with which also he governed cities. And he calls the sceptre of Jupiter nothing else than the discipline of Jupiter, by which he governed Crete.

Min. On what account then, Socrates, came the report to be spread that Minos was an unlearned and morose man?

Soc. On that account through which you, O best of men, if you are prudent, and every other man who intends to be celebrated, will be cautious never to offend a poet. For poets are able to effect much with respect to opinion, both in praising men and blaming them. In this particular, therefore, Minos erred when he warred on this city, in which there is much other wisdom, together with tragic and other poets of every description. But the tragedy here is antient, not originating, as is generally thought, from Thespis, nor from Phrynicus; but, if you consider, you will find that it is a very antient invention of this city. Tragedy indeed is of all poetry the most pleasing to the vulgar, and the most alluring; to which applying ourselves we have taken vengeance on Minos, for which he has compelled us to pay those tributes. In offending us, therefore, Minos erred; whence, in reply to your question, he became infamous. For that he was a good man, a friend to law, and a good shepherd of the people, as I have before observed, this is the greatest token, that his laws are immutable, in consequence of having well discovered the truth concerning the government of a city.

Min. You appear to me, Socrates, to have discovered a probable reason.

Soc. If, therefore, I speak the truth, do not the Cretans, the citizens of Minos and Rhadamanthus, appear to you to have used the most antient laws?

Min. They do.

Soc. These, therefore, were the best legislators of the antients, and were also shepherds of men; just as Homer likewise says, that a good general is the shepherd of the people.

Min. Entirely so.

Soc. Come then, by Jupiter, who presides over friendship, if any one who

[a] What Plato here cites from Hesiod is not to be found in any of the writings of that poet now extant.

is a good legiſlator and ſhepherd of the body ſhould aſk us what thoſe things are which when diſtributed to the body will make it better, we ſhould well and briefly anſwer, that they are nutriment and labour, the former of which by increaſing, and the latter by exerciſing, give ſtability to the body.

MIN. Right.

SOC. If, therefore, after this, that good legiſlator and ſhepherd ſhould alſo aſk us what thoſe things are which being diſtributed to the ſoul make it better, what ſhall we anſwer, that we may not be aſhamed of ourſelves and of our age?

MIN. I am no longer able to anſwer this queſtion.

SOC. It is however diſgraceful to the ſoul of each of us, if we ſhould appear to be ignorant of things pertaining to our ſouls, in which good and evil are contained, but to be knowing in particulars pertaining to the body, and together things.

THE END OF THE MINOS.

THE APOLOGY

OF

SOCRATES.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

THE elevation and greatneſs of mind for which Socrates was ſo juſtly celebrated by antiquity, are perhaps no where ſo conſpicuouſly diſplayed as in this his Apology. In a ſituation in which death itſelf was preſented to his view, he neither deviates from the moſt rigid veracity, nor has recourſe to any of thoſe abject arts, by which in ſimilar circumſtances pity is generally ſolicited and puniſhment ſometimes averted. His whole diſcourſe, indeed, is full of ſimplicity and noble grandeur, and is the energetic language of conſcious innocence and offended worth.

The cauſes that occaſioned this Apology were as follow:—Ariſtophanes, at the inſtigation of Melitus, undertook, in his comedy of The Clouds, to ridicule the venerable character of Socrates, on the ſtage; and the way being once open to calumny and defamation, the fickle and licentious populace paid no reverence to the philoſopher, whom they had before regarded as a being of a ſuperior order. When this had ſucceeded, Melitus ſtood forth to criminate him, together with Anytus and Lycon; and the philoſopher was ſummoned before the tribunal of the Five Hundred. He was accuſed of making innovations in the religion of his country, and corrupting the youth. But as both theſe accuſations muſt have been obviouſly falſe to an unprejudiced tribunal, the accuſers relied for the ſucceſs of their cauſe on perjured witneſſes, and the envy of the judges, whoſe ignorance would readily yield to miſrepreſentation, and be influenced and guided by falſe eloquence and fraudulent arts. That the perſonal enemies indeed of Socrates, vile cha-

racters, to whom his wiſdom and his virtue were equally offenſive, ſhould have accuſed him of making innovations in the religion of Greece, is by no means ſurpriſing; but that very many of modern times ſhould have believed that this accuſation was founded in truth, and that he endeavoured to ſubvert the doctrine of polytheiſm, is a circumſtance which by the truly learned reader muſt be ranked among the greateſt eccentricities of modern wit. For to ſuch a one it will moſt clearly appear from this very Apology, that Socrates was accuſed of impiety for aſſerting that he was connected in a very tranſcendant degree with a preſiding dæmon, to whoſe direction he confidently ſubmitted the conduct of his life. For the accuſation of Melitus, that he introduced other novel dæmoniacal natures, can admit of no other conſtruction. Beſides, in the courſe of this Apology he aſſerts, in the moſt unequivocal and ſolemn manner, his belief in polytheiſm; and this is indubitably confirmed in many places by Plato, the moſt genuine of his diſciples, and the moſt faithful recorder of his doctrines. The teſtimony of Xenophon too on this point is no leſs weighty than deciſive. "I have often wondered," ſays that hiſtorian and philoſopher [1], "by what arguments the Athenians who condemned Socrates perſuaded the city that he was worthy of death. For, in the firſt place, how could they prove that he did not believe in the Gods in which the city believed? ſince it was evident that he often ſacrificed at home, and often on the common altars of the city. It was alſo not unapparent that he employed divination. For a report was circulated, that ſignals were given to Socrates, according to his own aſſertion, by a dæmoniacal power; whence they eſpecially appear to me to have accuſed him of introducing new dæmoniacal natures. He however introduced nothing new, nor any thing different from the opinion of thoſe who, believing in divination, make uſe of auguries and oracles, ſymbols and ſacrifices. For theſe do not apprehend that either birds, or things which occur, know what is advan-

[1] Πολλακις εθαυμασα, τισι ποτε λογοις Αθηναιους επεισαν οι γραψαμενοι Σωκρατην, ως αξιος ειη θανατου τη πολει.—Πρωτον μεν ουν ως ουκ ενομιζεν ους η πολις νομιζει θεους, ποιω ποτ' εχρησαντο τεκμηριω; θυων τε γαρ φανερος ην πολλακις μεν οικοι, πολλακις δε επι των κοινων της πολεως βωμων· και μαντικη χρωμενος, ουκ αφανης ην· διετετρυλητο γαρ, ως φαιη Σωκρατης το δαιμονιον εαυτω σημαινειν, οθεν δη και μαλιστα μοι δοκουσιν αυτον αιτιασασθαι, καινα δαιμονια εισφερειν. ὁ δ' ουδεν καινομενον εισεφερε των αλλων, οσοι μαντικην νομιζοντες, οιωνοις τε χρωνται, και φημαις, και συμβολοις, και θυσιαις. ουτοι τε γαρ υπολαμβανουσιν, ου τους ορνιθας, ουδε τους απαντωντας ειδεναι τα συμφεροντα τοις μαντευομενοις, αλλα τους θεους δια τουτων αυτα σημαινειν· κακεινος ουτως ενομιζεν. P. 441.

tageous

tageous to the diviners; but they are of opinion that the Gods thus ſignify to them what is beneficial; and he alſo thought the ſame. Again, in another place, he obſerves as follows: "Socrates [1] thought that the Gods take care of men not in ſuch a way as the multitude conceive. For they think that the Gods know ſome things, but do not know others. But Socrates thought that the Gods know all things, as well things ſaid and done, as thoſe deliberated in ſilence. That they are alſo everywhere preſent, and ſignify to men concerning all human affairs. I wonder, therefore, how the Athenians could ever be perſuaded that Socrates was not of a ſound mind reſpecting the Gods, as he never ſaid or did any thing impious concerning them. But all his ſayings and all his actions pertaining to the Gods were ſuch as any one by ſaying and doing would be thought to be moſt pious." And laſtly, in another place he obſerves, "That it was evident that Socrates worſhipped the Gods the moſt of all men [2]."

After ſuch unequivocal teſtimony, no other reaſon can be aſſigned for that ſtrange poſition of the moderns, that Socrates ridiculed the religion of his country, than a profound ignorance of one of the moſt important tenets of the heathen religion, and which may alſo be conſidered as ranking among the firſt of the moſt magnificent, ſcientific, and divine conceptions of the human mind. The tenet I allude to is this, that the eſſential, which is the moſt perfect energy of deity, is deific; and that his firſt and immediate progeny muſt as neceſſarily be Gods, that is, beings tranſcendantly ſimilar to himſelf, and poſſeſſing thoſe characteriſtics *ſecondarily* which he poſſeſſes *primarily*, as heat is the immediate offſpring of fire, and coldneſs of ſnow. From being unacquainted with this mighty truth, which is coeval with the univerſe itſelf, modern theologiſts and ſophiſts have dared to defame the religion of Greece, and, by offering violence to the ſacred pages of antiquity,

[1] Και γαρ επιμελεισθαι θεους ενομιζεν ανθρωπων, ουχ ὁν τροπον οἱ πολλοι νομιζουσιν. ὁυτοι μεν γαρ οιωνται τους θεους τα μεν ειδεναι, τα δ' ουκ ειδεναι· Σωκρατης δε παντα μεν ηγειτο θεους ειδεναι, τα τε λεγομενα και πραττομενα, και τα σιγη βουλευομενα· πανταχου δε παρειναι και σημαινειν τοις ανθρωποις περι των ανθρωπειων παντων. Θαυμαζω ουν, ὁπως ποτε επεισθησαν Αθηναιοι, Σωκρατην περι τους θεους μη σωφρονειν, τον ασεβες μεν ουδεποτε περι τους θεους ουτ' ειποντα ουτε πραξαντα· τοιαυτα δε και λεγοντα και πραττοντα περι θεων, οια τις αν και λεγων και πραττων ειη τε και νομιζοιτο ευσεβεστατος. P. 443.

[2] Φανερος ην θεραπευων τους θεους, μαλιστα των αλλων ανθρωπων. P. 450.

have

have made the great Socrates himſelf become the patron of their own ſhallow and diſtorted conceptions. But to return to the Apology.

Lyſias, one of the moſt celebrated orators of the age, compoſed an oration, in a laboured and pathetic ſtyle, which he offered to Socrates to be pronounced as his defence in the preſence of his judges. Socrates however refuſed it, obſerving, that a philoſopher ought to be conſpicuous for magnanimity and firmneſs of ſoul. Hence, in his Apology, he paid no attention to the ſplendor of diction, but truſted wholly to the intrinſic dignity of his ſentiments. He contented himſelf with ſpeaking to his judges as he uſed to do in common diſcourſe, and with propoſing queſtions to his accuſers. Hence his defence was entirely the ſpontaneous effuſions of his genius; ſimple and plain, yet nervous and dignified.

Several perſons who aſſiſted in the court upon this occaſion, beſides Plato, drew up the Apology of Socrates. Amongſthe reſt Xenophon compiled one from the relation of Hermogenes the ſon of Hipponicus, for he himſelf was not then at Athens. None of them are extant, however, but thoſe of Plato and Xenophon. And of theſe, the firſt is in every reſpect worthy the greateſt diſciple of Socrates; but the other preſents us with an imperfect copy, becauſe compoſed by a diſciple that was abſent. This imperfect copy, however, ſufficiently proves that the ſubſtance of this Apology is accurate, how much ſoever it may have been amended by paſſing through ſuch a hand as that of Plato.

THE

THE APOLOGY

OF

SOCRATES.

I KNOW not, O Athenians, how you may be affected by my accuſers: I indeed have through them almoſt forgotten myſelf, ſo perſuaſively have they ſpoken; though, as I may ſay, they have not aſſerted any thing which is true. But among the multitude of their falſe aſſertions I am moſt ſurpriſed at this, in which they ſay that you ought to beware of being deceived by me, as if I were an eloquent ſpeaker. For that they ſhould not be aſhamed of aſſerting that which will be immediately confuted by me in reality, ſince in the preſent inſtance I ſhall appear to you to be by no means eloquent,—this ſeems to me to be the conſummation of impudence; unleſs they call him eloquent who ſpeaks the truth. For, if they aſſert this, I ſhall indeed acknowledge myſelf to be a rhetorician, though not according to their conceptions. They have not then, as I ſaid, aſſerted any thing which is true; but from me you will hear all the truth. Not, by Jupiter, O Athenians, that you will hear from me a diſcourſe ſplendidly decorated with nouns and verbs, and adorned in other reſpects, like the harangues of theſe men; but you will hear me ſpeaking in ſuch language as may caſually preſent itſelf. For I am confident that what I ſay will be juſt, nor let any one of you expect it will be otherwiſe: for it does not become one of my age to come before you like a lad with a ſtudied diſcourſe. And, indeed, I very much requeſt and beſeech you, O Athenians, that if you ſhould hear me apologizing in the ſame terms and modes of expreſſion which I am accuſtomed to uſe in the Forum, on the Exchange and public Banks, and in

other places, where many of you have heard me,—that you will neither wonder nor be diſturbed on this account; for the caſe is as follows:—I now for the firſt time come before this tribunal, though I am more than ſeventy years old; and conſequently I am a ſtranger to the mode of ſpeaking which is here adopted. As, therefore, if I were in reality a foreigner, you would pardon me for uſing the language and the manner in which I had been educated, ſo now I requeſt you, and this juſtly, as it appears to me, to ſuffer the mode of my diction, whether it be better or worſe, and to attend to this, whether I ſpeak what is juſt or not: for this is the virtue of a judge, as that of an orator is to ſpeak the truth.

In the firſt place, therefore, O Athenians, it is juſt that I ſhould anſwer the firſt falſe accuſations of me, and my firſt accuſers, and afterwards the latter accuſations, and the latter accuſers. For many have been accuſers of me to you for many years, and who have aſſerted nothing true, of whom I am more afraid than of Anytus and his accomplices, though theſe indeed are powerful in perſuading; but thoſe are ſtill more ſo, who having been converſant with many of you from infancy, have perſuaded you, and accuſed me falſely. For they have ſaid, that there is one Socrates, a wiſe man, ſtudious of things on high, and exploring every thing under the earth, and who alſo can make the worſe to be the better argument. Theſe men, O Athenians, who ſpread this report are my dire accuſers. For thoſe who hear it think that ſuch as inveſtigate theſe things do not believe that there are Gods. In the next place, theſe accuſers are numerous, and have accuſed me for a long time. They alſo ſaid theſe things to you in that age in which you would moſt readily believe them, ſome of you being boys and lads; and they accuſed me quietly, no one ſpeaking in my defence. But that which is moſt irrational of all is this, that neither is it poſſible to know and tell their names, except ſome one of them ſhould be a comic [1] poet. Such however as have perſuaded you by employing envy and calumny, together with thoſe who being perſuaded themſelves have perſuaded others,—with reſpect to all theſe, the method to be adopted is moſt dubious. For it is not poſſible to call them to account here before you, nor to confute any one of them; but it is neceſſary, as if fighting with ſhadows, to make my defence and refutation without any to anſwer me. Conſider, therefore, as I have

[1] Meaning Ariſtophanes.

ſaid,

ſaid that my accuſers are twofold, ſome having accuſed me lately, and others formerly; and think that it is neceſſary I ſhould anſwer the latter of theſe firſt; for you alſo have heard theſe my accuſers, and much more than you have thoſe by whom I have been recently accuſed. Be it ſo. I muſt defend myſelf then, O Athenians, and endeavour in this ſo ſhort a ſpace of time to remove from you the calumny which you have ſo long entertained. I wiſh, therefore, that this my defence may effect ſomething better both for you and me, and that it may contribute to ſome more important end. I think however that it will be attended with difficulty, and I am not entirely ignorant what the difficulty is. At the ſame time let this terminate as Divinity pleaſes. It is my buſineſs to obey the law, and to make my apology.

Let us repeat, therefore, from the beginning what the accuſation was, the ſource of that calumny in which Melitus confiding brought this charge againſt me. Be it ſo. What then do my accuſers ſay? For their accuſation muſt be formally recited as if given upon oath. It is this: SOCRATES ACTS WICKEDLY, AND WITH CRIMINAL CURIOSITY INVESTIGATES THINGS UNDER THE EARTH, AND IN THE HEAVENS. HE ALSO MAKES THE WORSE TO BE THE BETTER ARGUMENT; AND HE TEACHES THESE THINGS TO OTHERS. Such is the accuſation: for things of this kind you alſo have yourſelves ſeen in the comedy of Ariſtophanes [1]: for there one Socrates is carried about, who affirms that he walks upon the air, and idly aſſerts many other trifles of this nature; of which things however I neither know much nor little. Nor do I ſay this as deſpiſing ſuch a ſcience, if there be any one wiſe about things of this kind, leſt Melitus ſhould charge me with this as a new crime, but becauſe, O Athenians, I have no ſuch knowledge. I adduce many of you as witneſſes of this, and I call upon ſuch of you as have at any time heard me diſcourſing, and there are many ſuch among you, to teach and declare to each other, if you have ever heard me ſpeak much or little about things of this kind. And from this you may know that other things alſo, which the multitude aſſert of me, are all of them of a ſimilar nature: for no one of them is true. For neither if you have heard any one aſſert that I attempt to teach men, and that I make money by ſo doing,—

[1] See The Clouds of that poet, ver. 112 et ſeq. et ver. 188.

neither is this true. This indeed appears to me to be a beautiful thing, if some one is able to instruct men, like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the Cean, and Hippias the Elean. For each of these, in the several cities which he visits, has the power of persuading the young men, who are permitted to apply themselves to such of their own countrymen as they please without any charge, to adhere to them only, and to give them money and thanks besides for their instruction. There is also another wise man, a Parian, who I hear has arrived hither. For it happened that I once met with a man who spends more money on the sophists than all others,—I mean Callias the son of Hipponicus. I therefore asked him, for he has two sons, O Callias, said I, if your two sons were two colts or calves, should we not have some one to take care of them, who would be paid for so doing, and who would make them beautiful, and the possessors of such good qualities as belong to their nature? But now, since your sons are men, what master do you intend to have for them? Who is there that is scientifically knowing in human and political virtue of this kind? For I think that you have considered this, since you have sons. Is there such a one, said I, or not? There certainly is, he replied. Who is he? said I. And whence is he? And for how much money does he teach? It is Evenus the Parian, said he, Socrates, and he teaches for five minæ (15l.). And I indeed have considered Evenus as blessed, if he in reality possesses this art, and so elegantly teaches. I, therefore, should also glory and think highly of myself, if I had a scientific knowledge of these things; but this, O Athenians, is certainly not the case.

Perhaps, however, some one may reply: But, Socrates, what have you done then? Whence have these calumnies against you arisen? For unless you had more curiously employed yourself than others, and had done something different from the multitude, so great a rumour would never have been raised against you. Tell us, therefore, what it is, that we may not pass an unadvised sentence against you. He who says these things appears to me to speak justly, and I will endeavour to show you what that is which has occasioned me this appellation and calumny. Hear, therefore; and though perhaps I shall appear to some of you to jest, yet be well assured that I shall tell you all the truth. For I, O Athenians, have acquired this name through nothing else than a certain wisdom. But of what kind is this wisdom? Perhaps it is human wisdom. For this in reality I appear to possess. Those indeed

indeed whom I juſt now mentioned poſſeſſed perhaps more than human wiſdom, which I know not how to denominate: for I have no knowledge of it. And whoever ſays that I have, ſpeaks falſely, and aſſerts this to calumniate me. But, O Athenians, be not diſturbed if I appear to ſpeak ſomewhat magnificently of myſelf. For this which I ſay is not my own aſſertion, but I ſhall refer it to one who is conſidered by you as worthy of belief. For I ſhall adduce to you the Delphic Deity himſelf as a teſtimony of my wiſdom, if I have any, and of the quality it poſſeſſes. You certainly then know Chærepho: he was my aſſociate from a youth, was familiar with moſt of you, and accompanied you in and returned with you from your exile. You know, therefore, what kind of a man Chærepho was, and how eager in all his undertakings. He then, coming to Delphi, had the boldneſs to conſult the oracle about this particular. Be not, as I ſaid, O Athenians, diſturbed: for he aſked if there was any one more wiſe than I am. The Pythian prieſteſs, therefore, anſwered that there was not any one more wiſe. His brother can teſtify to you the truth of theſe things; for Chærepho himſelf is dead.

Conſider then on what account I aſſert theſe things: for I am going to inform you whence this calumny againſt me aroſe. When, therefore, I had heard this anſwer of the oracle, I thus conſidered with myſelf, What does the God ſay? and what does he obſcurely ſignify? For I am not conſcious to myſelf that I am wiſe, either in a great or in a ſmall degree. What then does he mean in ſaying that I am moſt wiſe? For he does not lie, ſince this is not lawful to him. And for a long time, indeed, I was dubious what he could mean. Afterwards with conſiderable difficulty I betook myſelf to the following mode of inveſtigating his meaning. I went to one of thoſe who appear to be wiſe men, that here if any where I might confute the prediction, and evince to the oracle that this man was more wiſe than I. Surveying, therefore, this man, (for there is no occaſion to mention his name, but he was a politician;) while I beheld him and diſcourſed with him, it ſo happened, O Athenians, that this man appeared to me to be wiſe in the opinion of many other men, and eſpecially in his own, but that he was not ſo. And afterwards I endeavoured to ſhow him that he fancied himſelf to be wiſe, but was not. Hence I became odious to him, and alſo to many others that were preſent. Departing,

therefore, I reasoned with myself that I was wiser than this man. For it appears that neither of us knows any thing beautiful or good: but ne indeed not knowing, thinks that he knows something; but I, as I do not know any thing, neither do I think that I know. Hence in this trifling particular I appear to be wiser than him, because I do not think that I know things which I do not know. After this I went to another of those who appeared to be wiser than him; and of him also I formed the same opinion. Hence also I became odious to him and many others.

Afterwards however I went to others, suspecting and grieving and fearing that I should make enemies. At the same time however it appeared to me to be necessary to pay the greatest attention to the oracle of the God, and that, considering what could be its meaning, I should go to all that appeared to possess any knowledge. And by the dog [1], O Athenians, (for it is necessary to tell you the truth,) that which happened to me was as follows. Those that were most celebrated for their wisdom appeared to me to be most remote from it; but others who were considered as far inferior to them possessed more of intellect. But it is necessary to relate to you my wandering, and the labours as it were which I endured, that the oracle might become to me unconfuted. For after the politicians I went to the poets both tragic and dithyrambic, and also others, expecting that I should here immediately find myself to be less wise than these. Taking up, therefore, some of their poems which appeared to me to be the most elaborately written, I asked them what was their meaning, that at the same time I might learn something from them. I am ashamed indeed, O Athenians, to tell you the truth; but at the same time it must be told. For, as I may say, all that were present would have spoken better about the things which they had composed. I discovered this, therefore, in a short time concerning the poets, that they did not effect by wisdom that which they did, but by a certain genius and from enthusiastic energy, like prophets and those that utter oracles. For these also say many and beautiful things, but they understand nothing of what they say. Poets, therefore, appeared to me to be affected in a similar manner. And at the same time I perceived

[1] Ῥαδιμανθεὶς τοὺς τοῦτο, ὁ κατὰ κύνα, ἢ χῆνα, ἢ πλάτανον, ἢ κρόν, ἢ τοὺς ἄλλον τοιοῦτο. Schol. Graec. in Plat. p. 5. i. e. "This is the oath of Rhodiomanthus, who swore by the dog, or the goose, or the plane tree, or the ram, or something else of this kind."

that

that they conſidered themſelves, on account of their poetry, to be the wiſeſt of men in other things, in which they were not ſo. I departed, therefore, alſo from them, thinking that I ſurpaſſed them by the very ſame thing in which I ſurpaſſed the politicians.

In the laſt place, therefore, I went to the artificers. For I was conſcious to myſelf that I knew nothing, as I may ſay, but that theſe men poſſeſſed knowledge, becauſe I had found them acquainted with many and beautiful things. And in this indeed I was not deceived; for they knew things which I did not, and in this they were wiſer than I. But, O Athenians, good artificers alſo appeared to me to have the ſame fault as the poets. For each, in conſequence of performing well in his art, thought that he was alſo moſt wiſe in other things, and thoſe the greateſt. And this their error obſcured that very wiſdom which they did poſſeſs. I therefore aſked myſelf in behalf of the oracle, whether I would chooſe to be as I am, poſſeſſing no part either of their wiſdom or ignorance, or to have both which they poſſeſs. I anſwered, therefore, for myſelf and for the oracle, that it was advantageous for me to be as I am.

From this my inveſtigation, O Athenians, many enmities were excited againſt me, and ſuch as were moſt grievous and weighty, ſo that many calumnies were produced from them; and hence I obtained the appellation of *the wiſe man.* For thoſe that hear me think that I am wiſe in theſe things, the ignorance of which I confute in others. It appears however, O Athenians, that Divinity is wiſe in reality, and that in this oracle he ſays this, that human wiſdom [1] is but of little, or indeed of no worth; and it ſeems that he uſed my name, making me an example, as if he had ſaid, He, O men, is the wiſeſt among you, who, like Socrates, *knows* that he is in reality of no worth with reſpect to wiſdom. Theſe things, therefore, going about, I even now inquire and explore in obedience to the God, both among citizens and ſtrangers, if any one of them appears to me to be wiſe; and when I find he is not, giving aſſiſtance to the God, I demonſtrate that he is not wiſe. And in conſequence of this employment I have no leiſure

[1] This is the key to the profound meaning of Socrates when he ſaid that he *knew* that he knew nothing. For, as I have elſewhere obſerved, he only intended by this to ſignify the nothingneſs of human when compared with divine knowledge.

worth

worth mentioning either for public or private tranſactions; but I am in great poverty through my religious cultivation of the God.

Beſides, the youth that ſpontaneouſly follow me, who eſpecially abound in leiſure, as being the ſons of the moſt wealthy, rejoice on hearing men confuted by me; and often imitating me, they afterwards endeavour to make trial of others. In which attempt I think they find a numerous multitude of men who fancy that they know ſomething, but who know little or nothing. Hence, therefore, thoſe who are tried by them are angry with me, and not with them, and ſay that there is one Socrates a moſt wicked perſon, and who corrupts the youth. And when ſome one aſks them what he does, and what he teaches, they have nothing to ſay, but are ignorant. That they may not however appear to be dubious, they aſſert things which may be readily adduced againſt all that philoſophize, as, that he explores things on high and under the earth, that he does not think there are Gods, and that he makes the worſe to be the better reaſon. For I think they are not willing to ſpeak the truth, that they clearly pretend to be knowing, but know nothing. Hence, as it appears to me, being ambitious and vehement and numerous, and ſpeaking in an elegant and perſuaſive manner about me, they fill your ears, both before and now calumniating in the extreme. Among theſe, Melitus, Anytus, and Lycon, have attacked me; Melitus indeed being my enemy on account of the poets; but Anytus on account of the artificers and politicians; and Lycon on account of the orators. So that, as I ſaid in the beginning, I ſhould wonder if I could remove ſuch an abundant calumny from your minds in ſo ſhort a time. Theſe things, O Athenians, are true; and I thus ſpeak, neither concealing nor ſubtracting any thing from you, either great or ſmall; though I nearly know that I ſhall make enemies by what I have ſaid. This however is an argument that I ſpeak the truth, that this is the calumny which is raiſed againſt me, and that the cauſes of it are theſe. And whether now or hereafter you inveſtigate theſe things, you will find them to be as I have ſaid. Concerning the particulars, therefore, which my firſt accuſers urged againſt me, let this be a ſufficient apology to you.

In the next place, I ſhall endeavour to reply to Melitus, that good man and lover of his country, as he ſays, and alſo to my latter accuſers. For again, as being different from the former accuſers, let us take the oath

of theſe men for calumny. The accuſation then is as follows: Socrates, it ſays, acts unjuſtly, corrupting the youth; and not believing in thoſe Gods in which the city believes, he introduces other novel dæmoniacal natures. Such then is the accuſation; of which let us examine every part. It ſays, therefore, that I act unjuſtly by corrupting the youth. But I, O Athenians, ſay that Melitus acts unjuſtly, becauſe he intentionally trifles, raſhly bringing men into danger, and pretending to be ſtudious and ſolicitous about things which were never the objects of his care. But that this is the caſe I will endeavour to ſhow you.

Tell me then, O Melitus, whether you conſider it as a thing of the greateſt conſequence, for the youth to become the beſt of men?—I do.—Come, then, do you therefore tell them what will make them better? For it is evident that you know, ſince it is the object of your care. For, having found me to be a corrupter of youth, as you ſay, you have brought me hither, and are my accuſer; but come, inform me who it is that makes them better, and ſignify it to this aſſembly. Do you ſee, O Melitus, that you are ſilent, and have not any thing to ſay? Though, does it not appear to you to be ſhameful, and a ſufficient argument of what I ſay, that this is not the object of your attention? But tell me, O good man, who it is that makes them better.—The laws.—I do not, however, aſk this, O beſt of men, but what man it is that firſt knows this very thing, the laws.—Theſe men, Socrates, are the judges.—How do you ſay, Melitus? Do they know how to inſtruct the youth, and to make them better?—Eſpecially ſo.—But whether do all of them know how? or do ſome of them know, and others not?—All of them.—You ſpeak well, by Juno, and adduce a great abundance of thoſe that benefit. But what? Can theſe auditors alſo make the youth better, or not?—Theſe alſo.—And what of the ſenators?—The ſenators alſo can effect this.—But, O Melitus, do ſome of thoſe that harangue the people in an aſſembly corrupt the more juvenile; or do all theſe make them better?—All theſe.—All the Athenians therefore, as it ſeems, make them to be worthy and good, except me, but I alone corrupt them. Do you ſay ſo?—Theſe very things I ſtrenuouſly aſſert.—You charge me with a very great infelicity. But anſwer me: Does this alſo appear to you to be the caſe reſpecting horſes, viz. that all men can make them better, but that there is only one perſon

that

that corrupts them? or does the perfect contrary of this take place, ſo that it is one perſon who can make them better, or, at leaſt, that thoſe poſſeſſed of equeſtrian ſkill are very few; but the multitude, if they meddle with and make uſe of horſes, corrupt them? Is not this the caſe, O Melitus, both with reſpect to horſes and all other animals? It certainly is ſo, whether you and Anytus ſay ſo, or not. For a great felicity would take place concerning youth if only one perſon corrupted, and the reſt benefited them. However, you have ſufficiently ſhown, O Melitus, that you never beſtowed any care upon youth; and you clearly evince your negligence, and that you pay no attention to the particulars for which you accuſe me.

Further ſtill, tell me, by Jupiter, O Melitus, whether it is better to dwell in good or in bad polities? Anſwer, my friend: for I aſk you nothing difficult. Do not the depraved always procure ſome evil to thoſe that continually reſide near them; and do not the good procure ſome good?—Entirely ſo.—Is there then any one who wiſhes to be injured by his aſſociates, rather than to be benefited? Anſwer, O good man: for the law orders you to anſwer. Is there any one who wiſhes to be injured?—There is not.—Come then, whether do you bring me hither, as one that corrupts the youth, and makes them depraved willingly, or as one who does this unwillingly?—I ſay that you do it willingly.—But what, O Melitus, is it poſſible that you, who are ſo much younger than I am, ſhould well know that the depraved always procure ſome evil to thoſe that are moſt near to them, and the good ſome good; but that I ſhould have arrived at ſuch ignorance as not to know that, if I make any one of my aſſociates depraved, I ſhall be in danger of receiving ſome evil from him; and that I, therefore, do this ſo great an evil willingly, as you ſay? I cannot be perſuaded by you, O Melitus, as to theſe things, nor do I think that any other man would: but either I do not corrupt the youth, or I corrupt them unwillingly. So that you ſpeak falſely in both aſſertions. But if I unwillingly corrupt them, the law does not order me to be brought hither for ſuch-like involuntary offences, but that I ſhould be taken and privately taught and admoniſhed. For it is evident that, if I am taught better, I ſhall ceaſe doing that which I unwillingly do. But you, indeed, have avoided me, and have not been willing to aſſociate with and inſtruct me; but you have brought me hither, where the law orders thoſe who require

require puniſhment, and not diſcipline, to be brought. Wherefore, O Athenians, this now is manifeſt which I have ſaid, that Melitus never paid the ſmalleſt attention to this affair.

At the ſame time, however, tell us, O Melitus, how you ſay I corrupt the youth. Or is it not evident, from your written accuſation, that I teach them not to believe in the Gods in which the city believes, but in other new divine powers? Do you not ſay that, teaching theſe things, I corrupt the youth?—Perfectly ſo: I ſtrenuouſly aſſert theſe things.—By thoſe very Gods, therefore, Melitus, of whom we are now ſpeaking, ſpeak in a ſtill clearer manner both to me and to theſe men. For I cannot learn whether you ſay that I teach them to think that there are not certain Gods, (though I myſelf believe that there are Gods, for I am by no means an atheiſt, nor in this reſpect do I act unjuſtly,) not, indeed, ſuch as the city believes in, but others, and that this it is for which you accuſe me, that I introduce other Gods; or whether you altogether ſay that I do not believe there are Gods, and that I teach this doctrine alſo to others.—I ſay this, that you do not believe that there are Gods.—O wonderful Melitus, why do you thus ſpeak? Do I then think, unlike the reſt of mankind, that the ſun and moon are not Gods?—He does not, by Jupiter, O judges: for he ſays that the ſun is a ſtone, and that the moon is earth.—O friend Melitus, you think that you accuſe Anaxagoras; and you ſo deſpiſe theſe judges, and think them to be ſo illiterate, as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian are full of theſe aſſertions. Beſides, would the youth learn thoſe things from me, which they might buy for a drachma at moſt in the orcheſtra, and thus might deride Socrates if he pretended they were his own, ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY ARE LIKEWISE SO ABSURD[1]? But, by Jupiter, do I then appear to you to think that there is no God?—None whatever, by Jupiter.—What you ſay, O Melitus, is incredible, and, as it appears to me, is ſo even to yourſelf. Indeed, O Athenians, this man appears to me to be perfectly inſolent and intemperate in his ſpeech, and to have in reality written this accuſation, impelled by a certain inſolence, wantonneſs, and youthfulneſs. For he ſeems, as it were, to have compoſed an ænigma in order to try me, and to have ſaid

[1] This aſſertion, among many others, affords an inconteſtable proof that Socrates believed in the religion of his country: for he here clearly ſays, that the doctrine of Anaxagoras, which made the ſun and moon to be no Gods, is *abſurd*.

to himſelf, Will the wiſe Socrates know that I am jeſting, and ſpeaking contrary to myſelf? Or ſhall I deceive him, together with the other hearers? For he appears to me to contradict himſelf in his accuſation, as if he had ſaid, Socrates is impious in not believing that there are Gods, but believing that there are Gods. And this, indeed, muſt be the aſſertion of one in jeſt.

But let us jointly conſider, O Athenians, how he appears to me to have aſſerted theſe things. And do you, O Melitus, anſwer us, and, as I requeſted you at firſt, be mindful not to diſturb me if I diſcourſe after my uſual manner. Is there then any man, O Melitus, who thinks that there are human affairs, but does not think that there are men? Pray anſwer me, and do not make ſo much noiſe. And is there any one who does not think that there are horſes, but yet thinks that there are equeſtrian affairs? or who does not think that there are pipers, but yet that there are things pertaining to pipers? There is not, O beſt of men. For I will ſpeak for you, ſince you are not willing to anſwer yourſelf. But anſwer alſo to this: Is there any one who thinks that there are dæmoniacal affairs, but yet does not think that there are dæmons?—There is not.—How averſe you are to ſpeak! ſo that you ſcarcely anſwer, compelled by theſe things. Do you not, therefore, ſay that I believe in and teach things dæmoniacal, whether they are new or old? But indeed you acknowledge that I believe in things dæmoniacal, and to this you have ſworn in your accuſation. If then I believe in dæmoniacal affairs, there is an abundant neceſſity that I ſhould alſo believe in the exiſtence of dæmons. Is it not ſo?—It is.—For I ſuppoſe you to aſſent, ſince you do not anſwer. But with reſpect to dæmons [1], do we not think either that they are Gods, or the ſons of Gods? Will you acknowledge this or not?—Entirely ſo.—If, therefore, I believe that there are dæmons as you ſay, if dæmons are certain Gods, will it not be as I ſay, that you ſpeak ænigmatically and in jeſt, ſince you aſſert that I do not think there are Gods, and yet again think that there are, ſince I believe in dæmons? But if dæmons are certain ſpurious ſons of the Gods, either from Nymphs, or from certain others, of whom they are ſaid to be the offſpring, what man can believe that there are ſons of the Gods, and yet that there are no Gods? For this would be juſt as abſurd, as if ſome one ſhould think that there are colts and mules, but

[1] For a copious account of dæmons, ſee the Notes on The Banquet.

ſhould

ſhould not think that there are horſes and aſſes. However, O Melitus, it cannot be otherwiſe but that you have written this accuſation, either to try me, or becauſe there was not any crime of which you could truly accuſe me. For it is impoſſible that you ſhould perſuade any man who has the ſmalleſt degree of intellect, that one and the ſame perſon can believe that there are dæmoniacal and divine affairs, and yet that there are neither dæmons, nor Gods, nor heroes. That I am not, therefore, impious, O Athenians, according to the accuſation of Melitus, does not appear to me to require a long apology; but what I have ſaid is ſufficient.

As to what I before obſerved, that there is a great enmity towards me among the vulgar, you may be well aſſured that it is true. And this it is which will condemn me, if I ſhould happen to be condemned, viz. the hatred and envy of the multitude, and not Melitus, nor Anytus; which indeed has alſo happened to many others, and thoſe good men, and will I think again happen in futurity. For there is no reaſon to expect that it will terminate in me. Perhaps, however, ſome one will ſay, Are you not aſhamed, Socrates, to have applied yourſelf to a ſtudy, through which you are now in danger of being put to death? To this perſon I ſhall juſtly reply, That you do not ſpeak well, O man, if you think that life or death ought to be regarded by the man who is capable of being uſeful though but in a ſmall degree; and that he ought not to conſider this alone when he acts, whether he acts juſtly, or unjuſtly, and like a good or a bad man. For thoſe demigods that died at Troy would, according to your reaſoning, be vile characters, as well others as the ſon of Thetis, who ſo much deſpiſed the danger of death when compared with diſgraceful conduct, that when his mother, who was a goddeſs, on his deſiring to kill Hector, thus I think addreſſed [1] him—My ſon, if you revenge the ſlaughter of your friend Patroclus, and kill Hector, you will yourſelf die, for ſaid ſhe, death awaits you as ſoon as Hector expires:—Notwithſtanding this, he conſidered the danger of death as a trifle, and much more dreaded living baſely, and not revenging his friends. For he ſays, May I immediately die, when I have inflicted juſt puniſhment on him who has acted unjuſtly, and not ſtay here an object of ridicule, by the crooked ſhips, and a burden to the ground? Do you think that he was

[1] Iliad. lib. xviii. ver. 94, &c.

ſolicitous

ſolicitous about death and danger? For this, O Athenians, is in reality the caſe: wherever any one ranks himſelf, thinking it to be the beſt for him, or wherever he is ranked by the ruler, there as it appears to me he ought to abide, and encounter danger, neither paying attention to death nor to any thing elſe before that which is baſe.

I therefore, O Athenians, ſhould have acted in a dire manner, if, when thoſe rulers which you had placed over me had aſſigned me a rank at Potidea, at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I ſhould then have remained where they ſtationed me, like any other perſon, and ſhould have encountered the danger of death; but that, when Divinity has ordered, as I think and apprehend, that I ought to live philoſophiſing, and exploring myſelf and others, I ſhould here through fear of death or any other thing deſert my rank. For this would be dire: and then in reality any one might juſtly bring me to a court of judicature, and accuſe me of not believing in the Gods, in conſequence of not obeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking myſelf to be wiſe when I am not. For to dread death, O Athenians, is nothing elſe than to appear to be wiſe, without being ſo: ſince it is for a man to appear to know that which he does not know. For no one knows but that death may be to man the greateſt of goods; but they dread it, as if they well knew that it is the greateſt of evils. And how is it poſſible that this ſhould not be a moſt diſgraceful ignorance, I mean for a man to ſuſpect that he has a knowledge of that of which he is ignorant? But I, O Athenians, differ perhaps in this from the multitude of men; and if I ſhould ſay that I am wiſer than ſome one in any thing, it would be in this, that not having a ſufficient knowledge of the things in Hades, I alſo think that I have not this knowledge. But I know that to act unjuſtly, and to be diſobedient to one more excellent, whether God or man, is evil and baſe. I ſhall never, therefore, fear and avoid things which for aught I know may be good, before thoſe evils which I know to be evils. So that neither if you ſhould now diſmiſs me, (being unperſuaded by Anytus, who ſaid that either I ought not to have been brought hither at firſt, or that, when brought hither, it was impoſſible not to put me to death, telling you that if I eſcaped, all your ſons ſtudying what Socrates had taught them would be corrupted,) if beſides theſe things you ſhould ſay to me, O Socrates, we now indeed ſhall not be perſuaded by Anytus, but we ſhall diſmiſs you, though on this condition,

condition, that afterwards you no longer buſy yourſelf with this inveſtigation, nor philoſophiſe, and if hereafter you are detected in ſo doing, you ſhall die,—if, as I ſaid, you ſhould diſmiſs me on theſe terms, I ſhould thus addreſs you: O Athenians, I honour and love you: but I obey Divinity rather than you; and as long as I breathe and am able, I ſhall not ceaſe to philoſophiſe, and to exhort and indicate to any one of you I may happen to meet, ſuch things as the following, after my uſual manner. O beſt of men, ſince you are an Athenian, of a city the greateſt and the moſt celebrated for wiſdom and ſtrength, are you not aſhamed of being attentive to the means of acquiring riches, glory and honour, in great abundance, but to beſtow no care nor any conſideration upon prudence [3] and truth, nor how your ſoul may ſubſiſt in the moſt excellent condition? And if any one of you ſhould contend with me, and ſay that theſe things are the objects of his care, I ſhould not immediately diſmiſs him, nor depart, but I ſhould interrogate, explore, and reaſon with him. And if he ſhould not appear to me to poſſeſs virtue, and yet pretend to the poſſeſſion of it, I ſhould reprove him as one who but little eſteems things of the greateſt worth, but conſiders things of a vile and abject nature as of great importance. In this manner I ſhould act by any one I might happen to meet, whether younger or older, a ſtranger or a citizen; but rather to citizens, becauſe ye are more allied to me. For be well aſſured that Divinity commands me thus to act. And I think that a greater good never happened to you in the city, than this my obedience to the will of Divinity. For I go about doing nothing elſe than perſuading both the younger and older among you, neither to pay attention to the body, nor to riches, nor any thing elſe prior to the ſoul; nor to be ſo much concerned for any thing, as how the ſoul may ſubſiſt in the moſt excellent condition. I alſo ſay that virtue is not produced from riches, but riches from virtue, as likewiſe all other human goods, both privately and publicly. If, therefore, aſſerting theſe things, I corrupt the youth, theſe things will be noxious; but if any one ſays that I aſſert other things than theſe, he ſays nothing. In addition to this I ſhall ſay, O Athenians, that whether you are perſuaded by Anytus or not, and whether you diſmiſs me or not, I ſhall not act otherwiſe, even though I ſhould die often.

[3] Meaning *intellectual prudence*, which is the contemplation of the forms contained in intellect.

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Be not diſturbed, O Athenians, but patiently hear what I ſhall requeſt of you; for I think it will be advantageous for you to hear. For I am about to mention certain other things to you, at which perhaps you will be clamorous; though let this on no account take place. Be well aſſured then, if you put me to death, being ſuch a man as I ſay I am, you will not injure me more than yourſelves. For neither Melitus nor Anytus injures me; for neither can they. Indeed, I think it is not lawful for a better to be injured by a worſe man. He may indeed perhaps condemn me to death, or exile, or diſgrace; and he or ſome other may conſider theſe as mighty evils. I however do not think ſo; but, in my opinion, it is much more an evil to act as he now acts, who endeavours to put a man to death unjuſtly. Now, therefore, O Athenians, it is far from my intention to defend myſelf, (as ſome one may think,) but I thus ſpeak for your ſake, leſt in condemning me you ſhould ſin againſt the gift of Divinity. For, if you ſhould put me to death, you will not eaſily find ſuch another (though the compariſon is ridiculous) whom Divinity has united to this city as to a great and generous horſe, but ſluggiſh through his magnitude, and requiring to be excited by a certain fly. In like manner Divinity appears to have united ſuch a one as I am to the city, that I might not ceaſe exciting, perſuading and reproving each of you, and every where ſitting among you through the whole day. Such another man, therefore, will not eaſily ariſe among you. And if you will be perſuaded by me, you will ſpare me. Perhaps, however, you, being indignant, like thoſe who are awakened from ſleep, will repulſe me, and, being perſuaded by Anytus, will inconſiderately put me to death. Should this be the caſe, you will paſs the reſt of your time in ſleep, unleſs Divinity ſhould ſend ſome other perſon to take care of you. But that I am ſuch a one as I have ſaid, one imparted to this city by Divinity, you may underſtand from hence. For my conduct does not appear to be human, in neglecting every thing pertaining to myſelf and my private affairs for ſo many years, and always attending to your concerns, addreſſing each of you ſeparately, like a father, or an elder brother, and perſuading you to the ſtudy of virtue. And if indeed I had obtained any emolument from this conduct, and receiving a recompenſe had exhorted you to theſe things, there might be ſome reaſon for aſſerting that I acted like other men; but now behold, even my accuſers themſelves, who have ſo ſhameleſsly calumniated me in every thing

elſe, have not been ſo impudent as to charge me with this, or to bring witneſſes to prove that I ever either demanded or ſolicited a reward. And that I ſpeak the truth, my poverty I think affords a ſufficient teſtimony.

Perhaps, therefore, it may appear abſurd, that, going about and involving myſelf in a multiplicity of affairs, I ſhould privately adviſe theſe things, but that I ſhould never dare to come to your convention, and conſult for the city. The cauſe of this is that which you have often heard me every where aſſerting, viz. becauſe a certain divine and dæmoniacal [1] voice is preſent with me, which alſo Melitus in his accuſation derided. This voice attended me from a child; and, when it is preſent, always *diſſuades* me from what I intended to do, but never *incites* me. This it is which oppoſed my engaging in political affairs; and to me its oppoſition appears to be all-beautiful. For be well aſſured, O Athenians, if I had formerly attempted to tranſact political affairs, I ſhould have periſhed long before this, and ſhould neither have benefited you in any reſpect, nor myſelf. And be not indignant with me for ſpeaking the truth. For it is not poſſible that any man can be ſafe, who ſincerely oppoſes either you, or any other multitude, and who prevents many unjuſt and illegal actions from taking place in the city; but it is neceſſary that he who in reality contends for the juſt, if he wiſhes even but for a little time to be ſafe, ſhould live privately, and not engage in public affairs.

I will preſent you with mighty proofs of theſe things, not words, which you honour, but deeds. Hear then the circumſtances which have happened to me, that you may know that I ſhall not yield to any one contrary to what is becoming, through dread of death; though at the ſame time by not yielding I ſhall periſh. For I, O Athenians, never bore the office of magiſtrate [2] in the city, but I have been a ſenator: and it happened that our Antiochean tribe governed, when you thought proper to condemn the ten generals collectively, for not taking up the bodies of thoſe that periſhed in the naval battle [3]; and in ſo doing acted illegally, as afterwards appeared to

[1] See the note at the beginning of the Firſt Alcibiades for a full account of the dæmon of Socrates.

[2] The people of Athens were divided into tribes, and fifty men were choſen by turns out of each, who governed thirty-five days, and were called Prytani or Senators.

[3] This battle was fought by Callicratidas, the Lacedæmonian general, againſt the ten Athenian generals, who obtained the victory.

all

all of you. At that time I alone of the Prytaneans oppoſed you, that you might not act contrary to the laws, and my ſuffrage was contrary to yours. When the orators alſo were ready to point me out and condemn me, and you likewiſe were exhorting and vociferating to the ſame end, I thought that I ought rather to encounter danger with law and juſtice, than adhere to you, not eſtabliſhing what is juſt, through fear of bonds or death. And theſe things indeed happened while the city was yet a democracy; but when it became an oligarchy, the Thirty ſent for me and four others to the Tholus [1], and ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, in order to be put to death [2]; for by theſe orders they meant to involve many others in guilt. Then indeed I, not in words but in deeds, ſhowed them, if the aſſertion is not too ruſtic, that I made no account of death; but that all my attention was directed to this, that I might do nothing unjuſt or unholy. For that dominion of the Thirty, though ſo ſtrong, did not terrify me into the perpetration of any unjuſt action. But when we departed from the Tholus, the four indeed went to Salamis, and brought with them Leon; but I returned home. And perhaps for this I ſhould have been put to death, if that government had not been rapidly diſſolved. Theſe things many of you can teſtify.

Do you think, therefore, that I could have lived for ſo many years, if I had engaged in public affairs, and had acted in a manner becoming a good man, giving aſſiſtance to juſtice, and doing this in the moſt eminent degree? Far otherwiſe, O Athenians: for neither could any other man. But I, through the whole of my life, if I do any thing publicly, ſhall appear to be ſuch a man; and being the ſame privately, I ſhall never grant any thing to any one contrary to juſtice, neither to any other, nor to any one of theſe whom my calumniators ſay are my diſciples. I however was never the preceptor of any one; but I never repulſed either the young or the old that were deſirous of hearing me ſpeak after my uſual manner. Nor do I diſcourſe when I receive money, but refrain from ſpeaking when I do not receive any; but I ſimilarly offer myſelf to be interrogated by the rich and the poor: and if any one is willing to anſwer, he hears what I have to ſay. Of

[1] The Tholus was a kind of clerks office, where the Prytani dined, and the clerks ſat.

[2] This happened in the ſecond year of the 39th Olympiad.

theſe

theſe too, whether any one becomes good or not, I cannot juſtly be ſaid to be the cauſe, becauſe I never either promiſed or taught them any diſcipline. But if any one ſays that he has ever learnt or heard any thing from me privately which all others have not, be well aſſured that he does not ſpeak the truth.

Why therefore ſome have delighted to aſſociate with me for a long time ye have heard, O Athenians. I have told you all the truth, that men are delighted on hearing thoſe interrogated who think themſelves to be wiſe, but who are not: for this is not unpleaſant. But, as I ſay, I am ordered to do this by Divinity, by oracles, by dreams, and by every mode by which any other divine deſtiny ever commanded any thing to be done by man. Theſe things, O Athenians, are true, and might eaſily be confuted if they were not. For if, with reſpect to the youth, I corrupt ſome, and have corrupted others, it is fit, if any of them have become old, that, knowing I gave them bad advice when they were young, they ſhould now riſe up, accuſe and take vengeance on me; but if they themſelves are unwilling to do this, that their fathers, or brothers, or others of their kindred, ſhould now call to mind and avenge the evil which their relatives ſuffered from me. But in ſhort many of them are here preſent, whom I ſee:—In the firſt place, Crito, who is of the ſame age and city that I am, and who is the father of this Critobulus: in the next place, Lyſanias the Sphecian, the father of this Æſchines; and further ſtill, Antipho the Cephiſian, the father of Epigenes. There are alſo others whoſe brothers are in this aſſembly, viz. Nicoſtratus the ſon of Zotidas, and the brother of Theodotus. And Theodotus indeed is dead, and ſo has no occaſion for his brother's aſſiſtance. Paralus alſo is here, the ſon of Demodochus, of whom Theages was the brother; likewiſe Adimantus the ſon of Ariſto, the brother of whom is this Plato; and Æantidorus, of whom Apollodorus is the brother. I could alſo mention many others, ſome one of whom Melitus, eſpecially in his oration, ought to have adduced as a witneſs. If however he then forgot to do ſo, let him now produce him, for he has my conſent; and if he has any thing of this kind to diſcloſe, let him declare it. However, you will find the very contrary of this to be the caſe, and that all theſe are ready to aſſiſt me who have corrupted and injured their kindred, as Melitus and Anytus ſay. It might indeed perhaps be reaſonable to ſuppoſe that thoſe whom I have corrupted would aſſiſt me; but what

other reaſon can the relatives of theſe have, who are not corrupted, and who are now advanced in age, for giving me aſſiſtance, except that which is right and juſt? For they know that Melitus lies, and that I ſpeak the truth. Be it ſo then, O Athenians: and theſe indeed, and perhaps other ſuch-like particulars, are what I have to urge in my defence.

Perhaps, however, ſome one among you will be indignant on recollecting that he, when engaged in a much leſs conteſt than this, ſuppliantly implored the judges with many tears; that he alſo brought his children hither, that by theſe he might eſpecially excite compaſſion, together with many others of his relatives and friends: but I do none of theſe things, though, as it may appear, I am brought to extreme danger. Perhaps, therefore, ſome one thus thinking may become more hoſtile towards me, and, being enraged with theſe very particulars, may give his vote with anger. If then any one of you is thus affected, I do not think it by any means right; but if he ſhould be, I ſhall appear to myſelf to ſpeak equitably to ſuch a one by ſaying that I alſo, O beſt of men, have certain relatives. For, as Homer ſays, I am not ſprung from an oak, nor from a rock, but from men. So that I alſo, O Athenians, have relations, and three ſons; one now a lad; but the other two, boys: I have not however brought any one of them hither, that I might ſupplicate you on that account to acquit me. Why is it then that I do none of theſe things? It is not, O Athenians, becauſe I am contumacious, nor is it in contempt of you. And as to my fearing or not fearing death, that is another queſtion. But it does not appear to me to be conſiſtent either with my own glory or yours, or that of the whole city, that I ſhould do any thing of this kind at my age, and with the reputation I have acquired, whether true or falſe. For it is admitted that Socrates ſurpaſſes in ſomething the multitude of mankind. If, therefore, thoſe among you who appear to excell either in wiſdom, in fortitude, or any other virtue, ſhould act in ſuch a manner as I have ſeen ſome when they have been judged, it would be ſhameful: for theſe, appearing indeed to be ſomething, have conducted themſelves in a wonderful manner, thinking they ſhould ſuffer ſomething dreadful by dying, as if they would be immortal if you did not put them to death. Theſe men, as it appears to me, would ſo diſgrace the city, that any ſtranger might apprehend that ſuch of the Athenians as excell in virtue, and who are promoted to the magiſtracy and other honours in

preference to the reſt, do not in any reſpect ſurpaſs women. For theſe things, O Athenians, ought not to be done by us who have gained ſome degree of reputation, nor ſhould you ſuffer us to do them, if we were willing; but you ſhould ſhow that you will much ſooner condemn him who introduces theſe lamentable dramas, and who thus makes the city ridiculous, than him who quietly expects your deciſion.

But excluſive of glory, O Athenians, neither does it appear to me to be juſt for a judge to be entreated, or to acquit any one in conſequence of being ſupplicated; but in my opinion he ought to teach and perſuade. For a judge does not ſit for the purpoſe of ſhowing favour, but that he may judge what is juſt: and he takes an oath that he will not ſhow favour to any, but that he will judge according to the laws. Hence it is neither fit that we ſhould accuſtom you, nor that you ſhould be accuſtomed to ſwear: for in ſo doing neither of us will act piouſly. Do not, therefore, think, O Athenians, that I ought to act in ſuch a manner towards you as I ſhould neither conceive to be beautiful, nor juſt, nor holy; and eſpecially, by Jupiter, ſince I am accuſed of impiety by this Melitus. For it clearly follows, that if I ſhould perſuade you, and, though you have taken an oath, force you to be favourable, I might then indeed teach that you do not think there are Gods; and in reality, while making my defence, I ſhould accuſe myſelf as not believing in the Gods. This however is far from being the caſe: *for I believe that there are* GODS *more than any one of my accuſers*; and I refer it to you and to Divinity to judge concerning me ſuch things as will be beſt both for me and you[1].

That I ſhould not, therefore, O Athenians, be indignant with you becauſe you have condemned me, there are many reaſons, and among others this, that it has not happened to me contrary to my expectation; but I much rather wonder that there ſhould have been ſo great a number of votes on both ſides. For I did not think that I ſhould have wanted ſuch a few additional votes for my acquittal. But now, as it ſeems, if there had been only three more votes, I ſhould have eſcaped condemnation. Indeed, as it

[1] After Socrates had thus ſpoken, votes were taken by the judges, and he was condemned by a majority of three voices. His ſpeech after his condemnation commences in the paragraph immediately following.

appears to me, I now have eſcaped Melitus; and I have not only eſcaped him, but it is perfectly evident that unleſs Anytus and Lyco had riſen to accuſe me, he had loſt his thouſand [1] drachmas, ſince he had not the fifth part of the votes on his ſide.

Melitus then thinks that I deſerve death. Be it ſo. But what puniſhment [2], O Athenians, ſhall I aſſign to myſelf? Is it not evident that it will be ſuch a one as I deſerve? What then do I deſerve to ſuffer or to pay, for not having during my life concealed what I have learned, but neglected all that the multitude eſteem, riches, domeſtic concerns, military command, authority in public aſſemblies, and other magiſtracies? for having avoided the conſpiracies and ſeditions which have happened in the city, thinking that I was in reality a more worthy character than to depend on theſe things for my ſafety? I have not, therefore, applied myſelf to thoſe purſuits, by which I could neither benefit you nor myſelf; but my whole endeavour has been to benefit every individual in the greateſt degree; ſtriving to perſuade each of you, that he ſhould pay no attention to any of his concerns, prior to that care of himſelf by which he may become a moſt worthy and wiſe man; that he ſhould not attend to the affairs of the city prior to the city itſelf; and that attention ſhould be paid to other things in a ſimilar manner. What then, being ſuch a man, do I deſerve to ſuffer? A certain good, O Athenians, if in reality you honour me according to my deſert; and this ſuch a good as it is proper for me to receive. What then is the good which is adapted to a poor man who is a benefactor, and who requires leiſure that he may exhort you to virtue? There is not any thing more adapted, O Athenians, than that ſuch a man ſhould be ſupported at the public expenſe in the Prytaneum; and this much more than if ſome

[1] An accuſer was obliged to have one half of the votes, and a fifth part more, or elſe he was fined in a thouſand drachmas, i. e. nearly 26l. 3s. 4d.

[2] When the criminal was found guilty, and the accuſer demanded a ſentence of death, the law allowed the priſoner to condemn himſelf to one of theſe three puniſhments, viz. perpetual impriſonment, a fine, or baniſhment. This privilege was firſt enacted on the behalf of the judges, that they might not heſitate to paſs ſentence on thoſe who, by condemning themſelves, owned their guilt. Socrates, therefore, in obedience to the laws, and in order to proclaim his innocence, inſtead of a puniſhment demanded a reward worthy of himſelf.

one of you had been victorious in the Olympic games with horſes, or in the two or four-yoked car. For ſuch a one makes you *appear* to be happy, but I cauſe you *to be* ſo: and he is not in want of ſupport, but I am. If, therefore, it is neceſſary that I ſhould be honoured according to what is juſtly my deſert, I ſhould be honoured with this ſupport in the Prytaneum.

Perhaps, therefore, in ſaying theſe things, I ſhall appear to you to ſpeak in the ſame manner as when I reprobated lamentations and ſupplications. A thing of this kind, however, O Athenians, is not the caſe, but rather the following. I am determined not to injure any man willingly; though I ſhall not perſuade you of this, becauſe the time in which we can diſcourſe with each other is but ſhort. For if there was the ſame law with you as with others, that in caſes of death the judicial proceſs ſhould not continue for one day only but for many, I think I ſhould be able to perſuade you. But now it is not eaſy in a ſhort time to diſſolve great calumnies. Being however determined to injure no one, I ſhall be very far from injuring myſelf, and of pronouncing againſt myſelf that I am worthy of evil and puniſhment. What then? Fearing leſt I ſhould ſuffer that which Melitus thinks I deſerve, which I ſay I know not whether it is good or evil, that I may avoid this, ſhall I chooſe that which I well know to be evil, and think that I deſerve this? Whether then ſhall I chooſe bonds? But why is it neceſſary that I ſhould live in priſon, in perpetual ſubjection to the eleven magiſtrates? Shall I pay a fine then, and remain in bonds till it is diſcharged? But this is what I juſt now ſaid: for I have not money to pay it. Shall I then chooſe exile? For perhaps I ſhall be thought worthy of this. I ſhould however, O Athenians, be a great lover of life, if I were ſo abſurd as not to be able to infer that if you, being my fellow citizens, could not endure my habits and diſcourſes, which have become to you ſo burthenſome and odious, that you now ſeek to be liberated from them, it is not likely that others would eaſily bear them. It is far otherwiſe, O Athenians. My life would be beautiful indeed were I at this advanced age to live in exile, changing and being driven from one city to another. For I well know that, wherever I may go, the youth will hear me when I diſcourſe, in the ſame manner as they do here. And if I ſhould repell them, they alſo would expell me, perſuading the more elderly to this effect. But if I ſhould not repell them, the fathers

and

and kindred of theſe would baniſh me on account of theſe very young men themſelves.

Perhaps however ſome one will ſay, Can you not, Socrates, live in exile ſilently and quietly? But it is the moſt difficult of all things to perſuade ſome among you, that this cannot take place. For if I ſay that in ſo doing I ſhould diſobey Divinity, and that on this account it is impoſſible for me to live a life of leiſure and quiet, you would not believe me, in conſequence of ſuppoſing that I ſpoke ironically. And if, again, I ſhould ſay that this is the greateſt good to man, to diſcourſe every day concerning virtue, and other things which you have heard me diſcuſſing, exploring both myſelf and others; and if I ſhould alſo aſſert that an uninveſtigating life is to be rejected by man, much leſs, were I thus to ſpeak, would you believe me. Theſe things however, O Athenians, are as I ſay; but it is not eaſy to perſuade you that they are ſo. And at the ſame time I am not accuſtomed to think myſelf deſerving of any ill. Indeed, if I were rich, I would amerce myſelf in ſuch a ſum as I might be able to pay; but now I am not in a condition to do this, unleſs you would allow the fine to be proportioned to what I am able to pay. For thus perhaps I might be able to pay a mina of ſilver (3l.). But Plato here, O Athenians, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, exhort me to pay thirty minæ, (90l.) for which they will be anſwerable. I amerce myſelf, therefore, in thirty minæ; and theſe will be my ſecurities for the payment [1].

Now, O Athenians, your impatience and precipitancy will draw upon you a great reproach, and give occaſion to thoſe who are ſo diſpoſed, to revile the city for having put that wiſe man Socrates to death. For thoſe who are willing to reproach you will call me a wiſe man, though I am not. If, therefore, you had waited but for a ſhort time, this very thing, my death, would have happened to you ſpontaneouſly. For behold my age, that it is far advanced in life, and is near to death. But I do not ſay this to all of you, but to thoſe only who have condemned me to die. This alſo I ſay to them:

[1] Socrates having amerced himſelf in obedience to the laws, the judges took the affair into conſideration, and, without any regard to the fine, condemned him to die. After the ſentence was pronounced, Socrates addreſſed them as in the next paragraph.

Perhaps

Perhaps you think, O Athenians, that I was condemned through the want of ſuch language, by which I might have perſuaded you, if I had thought it requiſite, to ſay and do any thing, ſo that I might eſcape puniſhment. Far otherwiſe: for I am condemned through want indeed, yet not of words, but of audacity and impudence, and becauſe I was unwilling to ſay ſuch things to you as you would have been much gratified in hearing, I at the ſame time weeping and lamenting, and doing and ſaying many other things unworthy of me, as I ſay, but ſuch as you are accuſtomed to hear and ſee in others. But neither then did I think it was neceſſary, for the ſake of avoiding danger, to do any thing illiberal, nor do I now repent that I have thus defended myſelf; but I ſhould much rather chooſe to die, after having made this apology, than to live after that manner. For neither in a judicial proceſs, nor in battle, is it proper that I or any other ſhould deviſe how he may by any means avoid death; ſince in battle it is frequently evident that a man might eaſily avoid death by throwing away his arms, and ſuppliantly converting himſelf to his purſuers. There are alſo many other devices in other dangers, by which he who dares to do and ſay any thing may eſcape death. To fly from death however, O Athenians, is not difficult, but it is much more difficult to fly from depravity; for it runs ſwifter than death. And now I indeed, as being ſlow and old, am caught by the ſlower; but my accuſers, as being ſkilful and ſwift, are caught by the ſwifter of theſe two, improbity. Now too, I indeed depart, condemned by you to death; but they being condemned by truth, depart to depravity and injuſtice. And I acquieſce in this decition, and they alſo. Perhaps, therefore, it is neceſſary that theſe things ſhould ſubſiſt in this manner, and I think they ſubſiſt properly.

In the next place, I deſire to predict to you who have condemned me, what will be your fate. For I am now in that ſituation in which men eſpecially propheſy [1], viz. when they are about to die. For I ſay, that you, my murderers, will immediately after my death be puniſhed [2], by dying in a

[1] That men are often prophetic at the point of death is an opinion which may be traced as far as to the time of Homer, and is doubtleſs of infinite antiquity.

[2] This prediction was fulfilled almoſt immediately after the death of Socrates. The Athenians repented of their cruelty; and his accuſers were univerſally deſpiſed and ſhunned. One of them, Melitus, was torn in pieces; another, Anytus, was expelled the Heraclea, to which he fled for ſhelter; and others deſtroyed themſelves. And, in addition to this, a raging plague ſoon after deſolated Athens.

manner,

manner, by Jupiter, much more ſevere than I ſhall. For now you have done this, thinking you ſhould be liberated from the neceſſity of giving an account of your life. The very contrary however, as I ſay, will happen to you: for many will be your accuſers, whom I have reſtrained, though you did not perceive it. Theſe too will be more troubleſome, becauſe they are younger, and will be more indignant againſt you. For, if you think that by putting men to death you will reſtrain others from upbraiding you that you do not live well, you are much miſtaken; ſince this mode of liberation is neither ſufficiently efficacious nor becoming. But this is the moſt beautiful and the moſt eaſy mode, not to diſturb others, but to act in ſuch a manner that you may be moſt excellent characters. And thus much I propheſy to thoſe of you who condemned me.

But to you who have acquitted me by your deciſion, I would willingly ſpeak concerning this affair during the time that the magiſtrates are at leiſure, and before I am brought to the place where it is neceſſary I ſhould die. Attend to me, therefore, O Athenians, during that time. For nothing hinders our converſing with each other, as long as we are permitted ſo to do; ſince I wiſh to demonſtrate to you, as friends, the meaning of that which has juſt now happened to me. To me then, O my judges, (and in calling you judges I rightly denominate you,) a certain wonderful circumſtance has happened. For the prophetic voice of the dæmon, which oppoſed me in the moſt trifling affairs, if I was about to act in any thing improperly, prior to this, I was continually accuſtomed to hear; but now, though theſe things have happened to me which you ſee, and which ſome one would think to be the extremity of evils, yet neither when I departed from home in the morning was the ſignal of the God adverſe to me, nor when I aſcended hither to the place of judgment, nor when I was about to ſpeak,—though at other times it frequently reſtrained me in the midſt of ſpeaking. But now, in this affair, it has never been adverſe to me, either in word or deed. I will now, therefore, tell you what I apprehend to be the cauſe of this. For this thing which has happened appears to me to be good; nor do thoſe of us apprehend rightly who think death to be an evil; of which this appears to me to be a great argument, that the accuſtomed ſignal would have oppoſed me, unleſs I had been about to do ſomething good.

After this manner too we may conceive that there is abundant hope that death

death is good. For to die is one of two things. For it is either to be as it were nothing [1], and to be deprived of all ſenſation; or, as it is ſaid, it is a certain mutation and migration of the ſoul from this to another place. And whether no ſenſation remains, but death is like ſleep when unattended with any dreams, in this caſe death will be a gain. For, if any one compares ſuch a night as this, in which he ſo profoundly ſleeps as not even to ſee a dream, with the other nights and days of his life, and ſhould declare how many he had paſſed better and more pleaſantly than this night, I think that not only a private man, but even the great king himſelf, would find ſo ſmall a number that they might be eaſily counted. If, therefore, death is a thing of this kind, I ſay it is a gain: for thus the whole of future time appears to be nothing more than one night. But if again death is a migration from hence to another place, and the aſſertion is true that all the dead are there, what greater good, O my judges, can there be than this? For if ſome one arriving at Hades, being liberated from theſe who pretend to be judges, ſhould find thoſe who are true judges, and who are ſaid to judge there, viz. Minos and Rhadamanthus, Æacus and Triptolemus, and ſuch others of the demigods as lived juſtly, would this be a vile journey? At what rate would you not purchaſe a conference with Orpheus and Muſæus, with Heſiod and Homer? I indeed ſhould be willing to die often, if theſe things are true. For to me the aſſociation will be admirable, when I ſhall meet with Palamedes, and Ajax the ſon of Telamon, and any other of the antients who died through an unjuſt deciſion. The comparing my caſe with theirs will, I think, be no unpleaſing employment to me. But the greateſt pleaſure will conſiſt in paſſing my time there, as I have done here, in interrogating and exploring who among them is wiſe, and who fancies himſelf to be but is not ſo. What, O my judges, would not any one give for a conference with him who led that mighty army againſt Troy, or with Ulyſſes, or Siſyphus, or ten thouſand others, both men and women, that might be mentioned? For to converſe and aſſociate with theſe would be an ineſtimable felicity. For I ſhould not be capitally condemned on this account by thoſe that dwell there; ſince they are in other reſpects more happy than thoſe that

[1] The reader muſt not imagine by this that Socrates calls in queſtion the immortality of the ſoul; for this, as he will ſee, he demonſtrates in the Phædo.

live here, and are for the reſt of time immortal, if the aſſertions reſpecting theſe things are true.

You, therefore, O my judges, ought to entertain good hopes with reſpect to death, and to be firmly perſuaded of this one thing, that to a good man nothing is evil, neither while living nor when dead, and that his concerns are never neglected by the Gods. Nor is my preſent condition the effect of chance; but this is evident to me, that now to die, and be liberated from the affairs of life, is better for me. On this account the accuſtomed ſignal did not in this affair oppoſe me. Nor am I very indignant with thoſe that accuſed and condemned me, though their intention in ſo doing was to injure me; and for this they deſerve to be blamed. Thus much however I requeſt of them: That you will puniſh my ſons when they grow up, if they cauſe you the ſame moleſtation that I have; and if they ſhall appear to you to pay more attention to riches or any thing elſe than to virtue, and ſhall think themſelves to be ſomething when they are nothing, that you will reprobate them as I do you, as neglecting the care of things to which they ought to attend, and conceiving themſelves to be of ſome conſequence when they are of no worth. If ye do theſe things, your conduct both towards me and my ſons will be juſt. But it is now time to depart hence,—for me indeed to die, but for you to live. Which of us however will arrive at a better[1] thing, is perfectly immaniſeſt except to Divinity.

[1] It is always good for a good man to die with reſpect to himſelf; but it is often better for the community that he ſhould live. It is likewiſe frequently better for a bad man to live than to die, in order that his latent vices may be called forth into energy; and beſides this, he is frequently an inſtrument in the hand of Divinity of good to others. Socrates, therefore, with no leſs accuracy than profundity ſays, that Divinity only knows whether it is better for him to die, than for his accuſers to live; for this could only be aſcertained by a very extenſive knowledge of futurity; and conſequently could only be manifeſt to Divinity.

THE END OF THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

THE

THE CRITO

OR

CONCERNING TRUE AND JUST OPINION.

THE CRITO[1].

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND CRITO.

SCENE.—The Priſon of SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

WHY came you at this early hour, Crito? Or is it not yet morning?

CRI. It is.

SOC. But what time of the morning is it?

CRI. It is now the break of day.

SOC. I wonder how the keeper of the priſon came to admit you.

CRI. He is accuſtomed to me, Socrates, in conſequence of my frequently coming hither; and he is alſo in a certain reſpect under obligations to me.

SOC. Did you come juſt now, or ſome time ago?

CRI. It is a conſiderable time ſince I came.

SOC. But why did you not immediately call me, and not ſit down in ſilence?

CRI. Not ſo, by Jupiter, Socrates; nor ſhould I myſelf be willing to be for ſo long a time awake and in ſorrow. But I have for ſome time admired you, on perceiving how ſweetly you ſlept. And I deſignedly did not call you, that you might continue in that pleaſant condition. Indeed I have often

[1] The Crito is diſpoſed after a manner ſo regular and plain, that it requires no Introduction. I ſhall therefore only obſerve, that it admirably teaches us to deſpiſe the opinions of the vulgar, to endure calamities patiently, and to conſider the good of the whole as incomparably more important than that of a part.

and

and formerly through the whole of your life conſidered you as happy on account of your manners, but far more ſo in the preſent calamity, becauſe you bear it ſo eaſily and mildly.

Soc. But it would be abſurd, Crito, if a man of my age were to be indignant when it is neceſſary for him to die.

Cri. And yet others, Socrates, equally old, when they have been involved in ſuch-like calamities, have notwithſtanding their age been indignant with their preſent fortune.

Soc. It is ſo. But why did you come to me ſo early?

Cri. I come, Socrates, bearing a meſſage not unpleaſant to you, as it appears to me, but bitter and weighty to me and to all your aſſociates; and which I indeed ſhall bear moſt heavily.

Soc. What is it? Is the ſhip [1] come from Delos, on the arrival of which it is neceſſary I ſhould die?

Cri. Not yet; but it appears to me, from what certain perſons coming from Sunium have announced, and who left it there, that it will arrive to-day. From theſe meſſengers, therefore, it is evident that it will be here to-day; and conſequently it will be neceſſary for you, Socrates, to die to-morrow.

Soc. But with good fortune, Crito: and if it pleaſe the Gods, be it ſo. Yet I do not think that it will arrive here to-day.

Cri. Whence do you infer this?

Soc. I will tell you. For on the day after, or on the very day in which the ſhip arrives, it is neceſſary that I ſhould die.

Cri. Thoſe that have power over theſe things ſay ſo.

Soc. I do not, therefore, think it will come this, but the next day. But I infer this from a certain dream which I ſaw this night a little before you came; and you appear very opportunely not to have diſturbed me.

Cri. But what was this dream?

Soc. A certain woman, beautiful, of a pleaſing aſpect and in white raiment, ſeemed to approach, and calling me to ſay, The third day hence, O Socrates, you will arrive at the fertile Phthia [2].

Cri.

[1] See The Phædo, near the beginning.

[2] What this woman ſaid to Socrates in a dream is taken from the ninth book of the Iliad, and belongs to the ſpeech of Achilles on the embaſſy to him from Agamemnon. The original is

Cri. What a ſtrange dream, Socrates!

Soc. Manifeſt however, as it appears to me, O Crito.

Cri. Very much ſo, as it ſeems. But, O bleſſed Socrates, be now perſuaded by me, and ſave yourſelf. For, if you die, not one calamity only will befall me; but, excluſively of being deprived of you, an aſſociate ſo neceſſary as I never have found any other to be, thoſe who do not well know me and you, will think that I might have ſaved you if I had been willing to ſpend my money, but that I neglected to do ſo. Though what can be more baſe than ſuch an opinion, by which I ſhould appear to value riches more than my friends? For the multitude will not be perſuaded that you were unwilling to depart hence, though we endeavoured to effect your eſcape.

Soc. But why, O bleſſed Crito, ſhould we ſo much reſpect the opinion of the multitude? For the moſt worthy men, whoſe opinion ought rather to be regarded, will think theſe things to have been ſo tranſacted as they were.

Cri. Nevertheleſs you ſee, Socrates, that it is neceſſary to pay attention to the opinion of the multitude. For the preſent circumſtances now evince that the multitude can effect not the ſmalleſt of evils, but nearly the greateſt, if any one is calumniated by them.

Soc. I wiſh, O Crito, the multitude could effect the greateſt evils, that they might alſo accompliſh the greateſt good: for then it would be well. But now they can do neither of theſe. For they can neither make a man wiſe, nor deſtitute of wiſdom; but they do whatever caſually takes place.

Cri. Let theſe things be ſo. But anſwer me, Socrates, whether your concern for me and the reſt of your aſſociates prevents you from eſcaping hence, leſt we ſhould be moleſted by calumniators, as having fraudulently taken you from hence, and be forced either to loſe all our property, or a great ſum of money, or to ſuffer ſomething elſe beſides this? For, if you fear any ſuch thing, bid farewell to it. For we ſhall be juſt in ſaving you from this danger, and, if it were requiſite, from one even greater than this. But be perſuaded by me, and do not act otherwiſe.

Soc. I pay attention to theſe things, Crito, and alſo to many others.

ἡματι κεν τριτατῳ Φθιην ερίβωλον ικοιμην. As Socrates applied what is here ſaid in the dream to a returning to his true country, the intelligible world, he confirms the explanation of the Trojan war which we have given from Proclus in the Notes on the Phædrus.

Cri.

Cri. Do not, therefore, dread theſe things. For thoſe who have agreed to ave you, and to take you from hence, demand no great ſum for this purpoſe. And, in the next place, do you not ſee how poor your calumniators are, and that on this account your liberty may be purchaſed at a ſmall expenſe? My property too, which I think is ſufficient, is at your ſervice. And if, out of regard to me, you do not think fit to accept my offer, theſe gueſts here are readily diſpoſed to pay what may be neceſſary. One alſo among them, Simmias the Theban, has brought with him a ſum of money ſufficient for this purpoſe. Cebes, too, and very many others are ready to do the ſame: ſo that, as I ſaid, neither fearing theſe things, ſhould you heſitate to ſave yourſelf, nor ſhould you be troubled on leaving the city (as in court you ſaid you ſhould) from not knowing how to conduct yourſelf. For in many other places, wherever you may go, you will be beloved. And if you are diſpoſed to go to Theſſaly, you will there find my gueſts, who will pay you every attention, and will render your abode there ſo ſecure, that no one in Theſſaly will moleſt you. Beſides this, Socrates, neither do you appear to me to attempt a juſt thing, in betraying when you might ſave yourſelf; and in endeavouring to promote the earneſt wiſhes of your enemies, who ſtrive to deſtroy you. To this I may alſo add, that you appear to me to betray your own children, whom it is incumbent on you to maintain and educate; and, as far as pertains to you, leave them to the guidance of chance; though it is likely that ſuch things will happen to them as orphans are wont to experience. However, either it is not proper to beget children, or it is requiſite to labour in rearing and inſtructing them when begotten. But you appear to me to have choſen the moſt indolent mode of conduct; though it is proper that you ſhould chooſe ſuch things as a good and brave man would adopt, eſpecially as you profeſs to have made virtue the object of your attention through the whole of life. I am, therefore, aſhamed both for you, and thoſe familiars who are our aſſociates as well as yours, leſt the whole affair concerning you ſhould appear to have been accompliſhed through a certain cowardice on our part. And in the firſt place, your ſtanding a trial which might have been prevented; in the next place, your defence; and, in the laſt place, the extremity to which you are now brought, will be placed to the account of our viciouſneſs and cowardice, and will be conſidered as ſo many ridiculous circumſtances which

might have been avoided; if we had exerted ourſelves even in a trifling degree. See, therefore, O Socrates, whether theſe things, beſides being evil, will not alſo be diſgraceful both to you and us. Adviſe then with yourſelf quickly, though indeed there is no time for conſultation; for on the following night all this muſt be done. But, if we delay, it will be impoſſible to effect your eſcape. By all means, therefore, be perſuaded by me, Socrates, and do not in any reſpect otherwiſe.

Soc. My dear Crito, your alacrity is very commendable, if it is attended with a certain rectitude; but if not, by how much the greater it is, by ſo much is it the more blameable. It is neceſſary, therefore, to conſider whether theſe things ought to be done or not. For I am a man of that kind, not only now but always, who acts in obedience to that reaſon which appears to me on mature deliberation to be the beſt. And the reaſons which I have formerly adopted, I am not able now to reject in my preſent fortune, but they nearly appear to me to be ſimilar: and I venerate and honour the ſame principles as formerly; ſo that, unleſs we have any thing better to adduce at preſent than theſe, be well aſſured that I ſhall not comply with your requeſt, not though the power of the multitude ſhould endeavour to terrify us like children, by threatening more bonds and deaths, and ablations of property.

Cri. How, therefore, may we conſider theſe things in the beſt manner?

Soc. If, in the firſt place, we reſume that which you ſaid concerning opinions, conſidering whether it was well ſaid by us or not, that to ſome opinions we ought to pay attention, and to others not; or rather indeed, before it was neceſſary that I ſhould die, it was well ſaid, but now it becomes evident that it was aſſerted for the ſake of diſcuſſion, though in reality it was merely a jeſt and a trifle. I deſire, however, O Crito, to conſider, in common with you, whether that aſſertion appears to me in my preſent condition to be different, or the ſame, and whether we ſhall bid farewell to or be perſuaded by it. But thus I think it is every where ſaid by thoſe who appear to ſay any thing pertinently, that, as I juſt now aſſerted of the opinions which men opine, ſome ought to be very much attended to, and others not. By the Gods, Crito, does not this appear to you to be well ſaid? For you, ſo far as relates to human power, are out of danger of dying to-morrow, and ſuch a calamity as the preſent will not ſeduce you into

a falſe deciſion. Conſider then: does it not appear to you to have been aſſerted with ſufficient rectitude, that it is not fit to reverence all the opinions of men, but that ſome ſhould be honoured and others not? Nor yet the opinions of all men, but thoſe of ſome and not thoſe of others? What do you ſay? Are not theſe things well ſaid?

Cri. Well.

Soc. Are not worthy opinions, therefore, to be honoured, but baſe opinions not?

Cri. They are.

Soc. And are not worthy opinions thoſe of wiſe men; but baſe opinions thoſe of the unwiſe?

Cri. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Come then, let us again conſider how things of this kind were aſſerted. Whether does he who is converſant in gymnaſtic exerciſes pay attention to the praiſe and blame and opinion of every man, or of that one man alone who is a phyſician, or the preceptor of boys in their bodily exerciſes?

Cri. Of that one alone.

Soc. Is it not, therefore, proper that he ſhould fear the blame and embrace the praiſe of that one, but not the praiſe and blame of the multitude?

Cri. Evidently.

Soc. In this manner, therefore, he ought to act and exerciſe himſelf, and alſo to eat and drink, which appears fit to the one who preſides and knows, rather than in that which may appear to be proper to all others.

Cri. Certainly.

Soc. Be it ſo. But if he is diſobedient to that one, and diſregards his opinion and his praiſe, but honours the opinion and praiſe of the multitude, who know nothing, will he not ſuffer ſome evil?

Cri. How is it poſſible he ſhould not?

Soc. But what is this evil, whither does it tend, and to which of the things pertaining to him who is diſobedient?

Cri. Evidently to his body, for this it corrupts.

Soc. You ſpeak well. We muſt form the ſame concluſion, therefore, Crito, in other things, that we may not run through all of them. With reſpect,

reſpect, therefore, to things juſt and unjuſt, baſe and beautiful, good and evil, and which are now the ſubjects of our conſultation, whether ought we to follow the opinion of the multitude, and to dread it, or that of one man if there is any one knowing in theſe things, whom we ought to reverence and fear rather than all others; to whom if we are not obedient, we ſhall corrupt and injure that which becomes better by the juſt, but is deſtroyed by the unjuſt? Or is this nothing?

CRI. I think, Socrates, we ought to follow the opinion of that one.

SOC. Come then, if not being perſuaded by the opinion of thoſe that are judges, we deſtroy that which becomes better by the ſalubrious, but is corrupted by the inſalubrious, can we live after this deſtruction? But is not this very thing of which we are ſpeaking the body?

CRI. Yes.

SOC. Can we, therefore, live after the body is depraved and corrupted?

CRI. By no means.

SOC. But can we live when that is corrupted which is injured by the unjuſt, but benefited by the juſt? Or ſhall we think that to be viler than the body, whatever it may be, pertaining to us, about which juſtice and injuſtice ſubſiſt?

CRI. By no means.

SOC. It is, therefore, more honourable.

CRI. By far.

SOC. We ſhould not, therefore, O beſt of men, be ſo very much concerned about what the multitude ſay of us, but what that one man who knows what is juſt and unjuſt, and what truth itſelf is, aſſerts reſpecting us. So that you did not act rightly at firſt, in introducing the opinion of the multitude concerning things juſt, beautiful and good, and the contraries of theſe, as that to which we ought to pay attention. Though ſome one may ſay that the multitude are able to deſtroy us.

CRI. Some one, Socrates, may indeed ſay ſo.

SOC. True. But, O wonderful man, the aſſertion which we have diſcuſſed appears to me to be diſſimilar and prior to this: and again conſider whether this is ſtill granted by us, that we are not to admit the merely living, but living well, to be a thing of the greateſt conſequence.

CRI. It is granted.

Soc. And is this alſo granted, or not, that it is the ſame thing to live well, beautifully, and juſtly?

Cri. It is.

Soc. From what has been aſſented to, therefore, this muſt be conſidered, whether it is juſt for me to endeavour to depart hence, the Athenians not diſmiſſing me, or whether it is not juſt. And if it ſhould appear to be juſt indeed, we ſhould endeavour to accompliſh it; but if not, we muſt bid farewell to the attempt. For as to the conſiderations which you adduce concerning money, opinion, and the education of children, ſee, Crito, whether theſe are not in reality the reflections of the vulgar, who raſhly put men to death, and if it were in their power would recall them to life, and this without being at all guided by intellect. But by us, ſince reaſon requires it, nothing elſe is to be conſidered than as we juſt now ſaid, whether we ſhall act juſtly in giving money and thanks to thoſe who may lead me hence; or whether in reality, both we that are led from hence and thoſe that lead us, ſhall not in all theſe things act unjuſtly. And if it ſhould appear that we in ſo doing ſhall act unjuſtly, we muſt by no means pay attention to theſe things, rather than to the conſideration whether we ſhall do any thing unjuſtly, not even if it ſhould be neceſſary for us to die, ſtaying here and being quiet, or to ſuffer any thing elſe whatever.

Cri. You appear to me, Socrates, to ſpeak well; but ſee what is to be done.

Soc. Let us conſider, O good man, in common; and if you can in any reſpect contradict what I ſay, contradict me, and I will aſſent to you; but if you cannot, ceaſe, O bleſſed man, to repeat often to me the ſame thing, that I ought to depart hence, though the Athenians are unwilling. For I ſhall think it a great thing if you can perſuade me thus to act, but not if you attempt this contrary to my will. See then, whether the beginning of this conſideration ſatisfies you, and endeavour to anſwer the interrogation in ſuch a way as you eſpecially think it is proper.

Cri. I will endeavour.

Soc. Shall we ſay then, that we ſhould by no means willingly act unjuſtly? Or may we in a certain reſpect act unjuſtly, and in a certain reſpect not? Or is to act unjuſtly by no means neither good nor beautiful, as we have often confeſſed before, and as we juſt now ſaid? Or are all thoſe things which we formerly

formerly aſſented to diſſipated in theſe few days; and has it for ſome time been concealed from us, that though we are ſo old, yet in ſeriouſly diſcourſing with each other, we have in no reſpect differed from children? Or does it not thus ſubſiſt more than any thing, as we then ſaid, whether the multitude admit it or not? And whether it be neceſſary that we ſhould ſuffer things ſtill more grievous, or ſuch as are milder than theſe, at the ſame time ſhall we ſay or not that to act unjuſtly is evil and baſe to him who thus acts?

Cri. We ſhall ſay ſo.

Soc. By no means, therefore, ought we to act unjuſtly.

Cri. We ought not.

Soc. Neither, therefore, ought he who is injured to return the injury, as the multitude think, ſince it is by no means proper to act unjuſtly.

Cri. So it appears.

Soc. But what then? Is it proper to do evil to any one, O Crito, or not?

Cri. It is not proper, Socrates.

Soc. But what? Is it juſt to repay evil with evil, as the multitude ſay, or is it not juſt?

Cri. By no means.

Soc. For he who does evil to men, differs in no reſpect from him who acts unjuſtly.

Cri. Your aſſertion is true.

Soc. Neither, therefore, is it proper to return an injury, nor to do evil to any man, however you may be injured by him. But ſee, Crito, while you acknowledge theſe things, that you do not aſſent to them contrary to your opinion. For I know that theſe things appear to and are opined by very few. But thoſe to whom theſe things appear, and thoſe to whom they do not, diſagree with each other in their deciſions; and it is neceſſary that theſe ſhould deſpiſe each other, while they look to each other's deliberations. Do you therefore conſider, and very diligently, whether it thus appears to you in common with me, and whether deliberating we ſhould begin from hence, that it is never right either to do an injury, or to return an injury, or when ſuffering evil to revenge it by doing evil in return; or, whether you will depart and not agree with us in this principle. For it thus appears to me both formerly and now; but if it in any reſpect appears otherwiſe

to you, ſpeak and inform me. And if you acquieſce in what has been ſaid above, hear what follows.

Cri. But I do acquieſce and accord with you. Speak, therefore.

Soc. I will ſay then that which is conſequent to this, or rather I will aſk you, whether when a man has promiſed to do things that are juſt, he ought to do them, or to break his promiſe.

Cri. He ought to do them.

Soc. From theſe things then thus conſider. If we ſhould depart hence without the conſent of the city, ſhall we do evil to certain perſons, and thoſe ſuch as we ought not in the ſmalleſt degree to injure, or ſhall we not? And ſhall we acquieſce in thoſe things which we aſſented to as being juſt, or ſhall we not?

Cri. I cannot reply to your queſtion, Socrates: for I do not underſtand it.

Soc. But thus conſider. If to us, intending to eſcape from hence, or in whatever manner it may be requiſite to denominate it, the Laws and the Republic ſhould preſent themſelves in a body, and thus addreſs us,—Tell us, O Scrates, what is it you intend to do? Do you conceive that by this thing which you attempt, you will deſtroy any thing elſe than, as far as you are able, us the Laws, and the whole city? Or does it appear to you to be poſſible for that city to ſubſiſt and not be ſubverted, in which Juſtice is not only without ſtrength, but is likewiſe diveſted of its authority and corrupted by private perſons?—What ſhould we ſay, Crito, to theſe things, and to others of a ſimilar kind? For much might be ſaid, and particularly by rhetoricians, on the ſubverſion of that law which provides that ſentences once paſſed ſhall not be infringed. Shall we ſay to them that the city has not paſſed an equitable ſentence upon us? Shall we ſay this, or ſomething elſe?

Cri. This, by Jupiter, Socrates.

Soc. Will not the Laws then thus addreſs us? O Socrates, has it not been admitted by us and you, that you ſhould acquieſce in the ſentence which the city has paſſed? If, therefore, we ſhould wonder at the Laws thus ſpeaking, perhaps they would ſay, Be not ſurpriſed, O Socrates, at what we have aſſerted, but anſwer, ſince you are accuſtomed both to interrogate and reply. For what is the charge againſt us and the city, for which you

endeavour

endeavour to deſtroy us? Did we not firſt beget you? And was it not through us that your father married your mother, and planted you? Tell us, therefore, whether you blame theſe laws of ours concerning marriage as improper? I ſhould ſay I do not blame them. But do you blame thoſe laws concerning the nurture and education of children in which you were yourſelf inſtructed? Or did not the laws framed for this purpoſe order in a becoming manner when they commanded your father to inſtruct you in muſic and gymnaſtic? I ſhould ſay they ordered well. Since then we begot and nouriſhed and educated you, can you deny that both you and your progenitors are our offspring and ſervants? And if this be the caſe, do you think that there is an equality [1] of juſtice between us and you, and that it is juſt for you to attempt to do thoſe things to us which we endeavour to do to you? Or will you admit that there is no equality of juſtice between you and your father, or maſter, if you happen to have either of them, ſo that you are not to return to theſe any evil you may ſuffer from them, nor, when they reproach you, contradict them, nor, when they ſtrike you, ſtrike them again, nor do many other things of a ſimilar nature; but that againſt your country and the Laws it is lawful for you to act in this manner, ſo that if we endeavour to deſtroy you, thinking it to be juſt, you alſo ſhould endeavour, as far as you are able, to deſtroy in return, us the Laws and your country, and ſhould ſay that in ſo doing you act juſtly,—you who in reality make virtue the object of your care? Or, are you ſo wiſe as to be ignorant that your country is more honourable, venerable and holy, than your mother and father, and all the reſt of your progenitors, and ranks higher both among the Gods and among men endued with intellect? That it is alſo more neceſſary for a man to venerate, obey and aſſent to his country, when conducting itſelf with ſeverity, than to his father? Likewiſe that he ſhould be perſuaded by it, and do what it orders? That he ſhould quietly ſuffer, if it orders him to ſuffer? And that, if it commands him to be beaten, or confined in bonds, or ſends him to battle to be wounded or ſlain, he ſhould do theſe things, and that it is juſt to comply? And that he ſhould neither decline nor recede from nor deſert his rank; but in war, in a court

[1] Wholes in the order of nature are more excellent than parts; and in conſequence of this, as being more honourable, there is no reciprocity of obligation between the two.

of

of juſtice, and every where, the commands of the city and his country ſhould be obeyed; or he ſhould perſuade his country to that which is naturally juſt; but that it is not holy to offer violence either to a mother or a father, and much leſs to one's country?—What ſhall we ſay to theſe things, Crito? Shall we acknowledge that the Laws ſpeak the truth or not?

Cri. To me it appears that they do.

Soc. Conſider, therefore, O Socrates, perhaps the Laws will ſay, whether our aſſertion is true, that your preſent attempt againſt us is unjuſt. For we are the authors of your birth, we nouriſhed, we educated you, imparting both to you and all the other citizens all the good in our power, at the ſame time proclaiming, that every Athenian who is willing has the liberty of departing wherever he pleaſes, with all his property, if after having explored and ſeen the affairs of the city, and us the Laws, we ſhould not be conſtituted according to his wiſhes. Nor does any one of us the Laws impede or forbid any one of you from migrating into ſome colony, or any other place, with all his property, if we and the city do not pleaſe him. But, on the other hand, if any one of you continues to live here after he has ſeen the manner in which we adminiſter juſtice, and govern the city in other parculars, we now ſay, that he in reality acknowledges to us, that he will do ſuch things as we may command. We alſo ſay, that he who is not obedient is triply unjuſt, becauſe he is diſobedient to his begetters, and to thoſe by whom he was educated; and becauſe, having promiſed to be perſuaded by us, he is neither perſuaded, nor does he perſuade us, if we do any thing improperly; though at the ſame time we only propoſe, and do not fiercely command him to do what we order, but leave to his choice one of two things, either to perſuade us, or to obey our mandates; and yet he does neither of theſe.

And we ſay that you alſo, O Socrates, will be obnoxious to theſe crimes if you execute what you intend to do; nor will you be the leaſt, but the moſt obnoxious of all the Athenians. If, therefore, I ſhould aſk them the reaſon of this, they would perhaps juſtly reproach me by ſaying, that I promiſed to ſubmit to all theſe conditions beyond the reſt of the Athenians. For they would ſay, This, O Socrates, is a great argument with us, that both we and the city were pleaſing to you; that you eſpecially of all the Athenians would never have dwelt in it, if it had not been particularly agreeable to you. For you never left the city for any of the public ſpectacles except once, when you went

went to the Iſthmian games, nor did you ever go elſewhere, except in your military expeditions. You never went any other journey like other men; nor had you ever any deſire of ſeeing any other city, or becoming acquainted with any other laws; but we and our city were ſufficient for you, ſo exceedingly were you attached to us, and ſo much did you conſent to be governed by our mandates. Beſides, you have procreated children in this city, in conſequence of being pleaſed with it. Further ſtill, in this very judicial proceſs, you might have been condemned to exile, if you had been willing, and might then have executed with the conſent of the city what you now attempt without it. Then however you carried yourſelf loftily, as one who would not be indignant, if it were requiſite that you ſhould die; but you preferred, as you ſaid, death to exile. But now you are neither aſhamed of thoſe aſſertions, nor do you revere us the Laws, ſince you endeavour to deſtroy us. You alſo do that which the moſt vile ſlave would do, by endeavouring to make your eſcape contrary to the compacts and agreements according to which you conſented to become a member of this community. In the firſt place, therefore, anſwer us this very thing, whether we ſpeak the truth in aſſerting, that you conſented to be governed by us in reality, and not merely in words? Do we in aſſerting this ſpeak the truth? What ſhall we ſay to theſe things, Crito? Can we ſay any thing elſe than that we aſſent to them?

Cri. It is neceſſary ſo to do, Socrates.

Soc. Do you not then, they will ſay, violate theſe compacts and agreements between us; which you conſented to neither from neceſſity nor through deception, nor in conſequence of being compelled to deliberate in a ſhort time; but during the ſpace of ſeventy years, in which you might have departed if you had been diſſatisfied with us, and the compacts had appeared to you to be unjuſt? You however neither preferred Lacedæmon nor Crete, which you are perpetually ſaying are governed by good laws, nor any other city of the Greeks or Barbarians; but you have been leſs out of Athens than the lame and the blind, and other mutilated perſons. So much did the city and we the Laws pleaſe you beyond the reſt of the Athenians. For who can be pleaſed with a city without the laws? But now you do not abide by the compacts. You will however abide by them if you are perſuaded by us, Socrates, and do not become ridiculous by eſcaping from the city.

For conſider what advantage can be derived either to yourſelf or your friends by violating thoſe compacts. For in conſequence of your eſcaping from hence, it is nearly evident that your friends will be expoſed to the danger either of baniſhment, or of the loſs of their property. And as for yourſelf, if you retire to any neighbouring city, whether Thebes or Megara (for both are governed by good laws), you will be conſidered, Socrates, as an enemy to their polity. And ſuch as have any regard for their country will look upon you as a corrupter of the laws. You will alſo confirm them in their good opinion of your judges, who will appear to have very properly condemned you. For he who is a corrupter of the laws will very much appear to be a corrupter of youth and of ſtupid men. Will you then avoid theſe well-governed cities, and men of the moſt elegant manners? Suppoſing you ſhould, will it, therefore, be worth while for you to live? Or, ſhould you go to theſe cities, will you not bluſh, Socrates, to diſcourſe about the ſame things as you did here, viz. that virtue and juſtice, legal inſtitutes, and the laws, ſhould be objects of the greateſt attention to men? And do you not think that this conduct of Socrates would be very indecorous? You muſt neceſſarily think ſo. But perhaps, avoiding theſe cities, you will go to Theſſaly, to the gueſts of Crito. For there there is the greateſt diſorder and intemperance. And perhaps they will willingly hear you relating how ridiculouſly you eſcaped from priſon, inveſting yourſelf with a certain apparatus, ſuch as a ſkin, or ſomething elſe which thoſe that make their eſcape are accuſtomed to provide, and thus altering your uſual appearance.

Do you think no one will ſay, that you, though an old man, and likely to live but a very little longer, have dared to deſire life with ſuch ſordid avidity, and to tranſgreſs the greateſt laws? Perhaps this will be the caſe, though you ſhould not have offended any one. But if you ſhould, you will hear, Socrates, many things unworthy of you. You will however live obnoxious, and in ſubjection to all men. But what will you do in Theſſaly beſides feaſting? having come to Theſſaly as to a ſupper. And where ſhall we find thoſe diſcourſes concerning juſtice, and the other virtues?—But do you wiſh to live for the ſake of your children, that you may nurture and inſtruct them? What then? Bringing them to Theſſaly, will you there educate them, making them to be ſtranger gueſts, that they may alſo derive this advantage from you? Or, if you ſhould not do this, but ſhould leave them here, will they be better nurtured and

educated in your abſence? for your friends will take care of them. Do you ſuppoſe then that your children will be taken care of by your friends if you go to Theſſaly, and that they will be neglected by them if you depart to Hades? If indeed any advantage is to be derived from thoſe that call themſelves your friends, it is proper to think that they will not.

But, O Socrates, being perſuaded by us your nurſes, neither pay more attention to your children, nor to life, nor to any thing elſe than to juſtice, that, when you arrive at Hades, you may be able to defend all theſe particulars to the rulers there. For if, tranſgreſſing the laws, you ſhould thus act, it will neither be better, nor more juſt, nor more holy to yourſelf, nor to any one of your friends; nor will it be more advantageous to you when you arrive at Hades. But you will depart, if you do depart, not injured by us the Laws, but by men. If however you ſhould ſo diſgracefully eſcape, returning injury for injury, and evil for evil, tranigreſſing your agreements and compacts with us, and injuring thoſe whom you ought not to injure in the ſmalleſt degree, viz. yourſelf, your friends, your country, and us;—in this caſe, we ſhall be indignant with you as long as you live; and in another life, our brothers the Laws who reſide in Hades will not benevolently receive you; knowing that you attempted, as far as you was able, to deſtroy us. Let not Crito, therefore, rather than us, perſuade you to do what he ſays.

Be well aſſured, my dear friend Crito, that I ſeem to hear theſe things, juſt as thoſe who are agitated with Corybantic fury appear to hear the melody of pipes. And the ſound of theſe words, like the humming of bees, in my ears, renders me incapable of hearing any thing elſe. You ſee then what appears to me at preſent; and if you ſhould ſay any thing contrary to theſe things, you will ſpeak in vain. At the ſame time, if you think that any thing more ſhould be done, tell me.

CRI. But, Socrates, I have nothing further to ſay.

SOC. Deſiſt, therefore, Crito, and let us adopt this conduct, ſince Divinity perſuades us thus to act.

THE END OF THE CRITO.

THE PHÆDO:

A

DIALOGUE

ON

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE PHÆDO.

THE following dialogue is no leſs remarkable for the maſterly manner of its compoſition, than for the different effects which the peruſal of it is related to have formerly produced. For the arguments which it contains for the immortality of the ſoul, are ſaid to have incited Cleombrotus to ſuicide, and to have diſſuaded Olympiodorus, an eminent Platonic philoſopher, from its perpetration. Indeed, it is by no means wonderful that a perſon like Cleombrotus, ignorant (as his conduct evinces) that the death ſo much inculcated in this dialogue is a philoſophic, and not a natural death, ſhould be led to an action which is in moſt caſes highly criminal. This ignorance however is not peculiar to Cleombrotus, ſince I am afraid there are ſcarcely any of the preſent day who know that it is one thing for the ſoul to be ſeparated from the body, and another for the body to be ſeparated from the ſoul, and that the former is by no means a neceſſary conſequence of the latter.

This philoſophic death, or ſeparation of the ſoul from the body, which forms one of the moſt leading particulars of the dialogue, is no other than the exerciſe of the cathartic virtues, of which the reader will find a copious explanation in the following notes. That theſe virtues are not figments of the latter Platoniſts, as ſome ignorant verbaliſts have raſhly aſſerted, is not only evident from the firſt part of this dialogue, but from the Golden Pythagorean verſes, which are certainly of greater antiquity than even the writings of Plato: for the following is one of the precepts in theſe verſes—

Αλλ' ειργου βρωτων, ὡν ειπομεν, εν τε καθαρμοις,
Εν τε γυσει ψυχῆς κρινων·

i. e. "Abſtain

i. e. "Abſtain from the foods of which we have ſpoken in the PURIFICATIONS and SOLUTION of the ſoul." And the employment of cathartic virtue entirely conſiſts in *purifying* the ſoul and liberating it from all attachment to the body, as far as the condition of its union with it will permit.

Of the arguments adduced by Socrates in this dialogue, ſome, as will be ſhown in the notes, only demonſtrate that the ſoul ſubſiſted prior to, and will ſurvive the diſſolution of, the body, but do not prove that it has a *perpetual* exiſtence; but others demonſtrate, and with an invincible force, that the ſoul is *truly immortal*. Should it ſeem ſtrange, and to thoſe who are not deeply ſkilled in the philoſophy of Plato it doubtleſs will, that Socrates in no part of this dialogue introduces that argument for the immortality of the ſoul which he adopts in the Phædrus, an argument drawn from the rational ſoul being the origin of motion, and which may be ſaid to poſſeſs adamantine ſtrength,—it is neceſſary to obſerve, in anſwer to this doubt, that, in the Phædrus, Socrates demonſtrates the immortality of every rational ſoul, viz. the human, dæmoniacal and divine; but in the Phædo he alone demonſtrates the immortality of the human ſoul.

But though ſome of the arguments in this dialogue are perfectly demonſtrative, yet certain modern writers, from not underſtanding, have not only attempted to invalidate them, but have been induced to imagine that Socrates himſelf, convinced of their inſufficiency, inſinuates in the courſe of the dialogue the neceſſity of a divine revelation in order to obtain a full conviction of this moſt important truth. As this is an opinion no leſs dangerous than erroneous, I ſhall preſent the reader with the paſſage that gave occaſion to it, and then unfold to him from antient ſources its genuine explanation.

About the middle of this dialogue, then, Simmias obſerves as follows:—"As to myſelf, Socrates, I am perhaps of the ſame opinion about theſe particulars as yourſelf; that to know them clearly in the preſent life is either impoſſible, or a thing very difficult to obtain. But not to argue about what has been ſaid in every poſſible way, and to deſiſt before, by an arduous inveſtigation on all ſides, wearineſs is produced, can only take place among indolent and effeminate men. For it is neceſſary in things of this kind either to learn or to diſcover the manner of their ſubſiſtence; or, if both theſe are impoſſible, then by receiving the beſt of human reaſons, and that which is

the moſt difficult of confutation, to venture upon this as on a raft, and ſail in it through the ocean of life, unleſs ſome one ſhould be able to be carried more ſafely and with leſs danger by means of a firmer vehicle, or a certain *divine reaſon.*" Here, in the firſt place, it muſt be obſerved, that it is Simmias who thus ſpeaks, an imperfect diſciple of his great maſter, as is evident from many parts of this dialogue, and not Socrates himſelf. And, in the next place, though it ſhould be urged that Socrates himſelf is here ſaid by Simmias to have admitted that "to know theſe particulars [1] clearly in the preſent life is either impoſſible or a thing very difficult to obtain," it muſt be obſerved, that Socrates thus ſpeaks from a deep conviction that this ſublime truth, the immortality of the ſoul, could not be fully comprehended by his auditors, who were very far from being maſters in philoſophy, and that this muſt be the caſe with the multitude in general. Hence, he ſays, it is either impoſſible or very difficult to obtain this knowledge.—To the *multitude* it is impoſſible, and to the *few* very difficult, becauſe it requires many preparatory diſciplines, and a genius naturally adapted to ſublime ſpeculations.

In the third place, by *a firmer vehicle, or a certain divine reaſon,* Socrates does not allude to a divine tradition, ſince this affords no higher evidence than that of opinion. It is well obſerved, therefore, by Olympiodorus, in his MS. Scholia on this dialogue, that by this θειος λογος, or *divine reaſon,* we muſt underſtand *ſelf-beholding intellect,* which, agreeably to Plato's deſcription of it in the Phædrus, aſſociates with Deity itſelf. Τις ὁ ασφαλεστερος, και ακινδυνοτερος, και βεβαιοτερος, και θειος λογος; ου δηπου ὡς φασιν ὁ θεοθεν εκδοθεις, δοξαστικος γαρ ὁ γε τοιουτος· αλλ' εστιν ὁ ειρημενος αυτοπτικος νους, ὁ θεῳ τῳ οντι συνων, ὡς εν Φαιδρῳ. In order however to underſtand what Olympiodorus means by *ſelf-beholding intellect,* it is neceſſary to obſerve, that there are four modes of knowledge which we are able to acquire in the preſent life. The firſt of theſe reſults from opinion, by which we learn *that* a thing is, without knowing *the why:* and this conſtitutes that part of knowledge which was called by Ariſtotle and Plato παιδεια, or erudition; and which conſiſts in moral inſtructions, for the purpoſe of purifying ourſelves from immoderate paſſions. But the ſecond is produced by the ſciences; in which, from eſtabliſhing certain principles as hypotheſes, we educe neceſſary concluſions, and arrive

[1] Viz. the particulars pertaining to the paſt and future exiſtence of the ſoul.

at the knowledge of *the why* (as in the mathematical ſciences); but at the ſame time we are ignorant with reſpect to the principles of theſe concluſions, becauſe they are merely hypothetical. The third ſpecies of knowledge is that which reſults from Plato's dialectic; in which, by a progreſſion through all ideas, we arrive at the firſt principle of things, and at that which is no longer hypothetical; and this by dividing ſome things and analyſing others, by producing many things from one thing, and one thing from many. But the fourth ſpecies is ſtill more ſimple than this; becauſe it no longer uſes analyſations or compoſitions, definitions or demonſtrations, but by a ſimple and ſelf-viſive energy of intellect ſpeculates things themſelves, and by intuition and contact becomes one with the object of its perception; and this energy is the *divine reaſon* which Plato ſpeaks of in the preſent paſſage, and which far tranſcends the evidence of the moſt divine revelation; ſince this laſt is at beſt but founded in opinion, while the former ſurpaſſes even the indubitable certainty of ſcience.

In ſhort, that Socrates, and conſequently Plato, firmly believed in this moſt important truth, is evident from the Phædrus and the tenth book of the Republic; and in the ſeventh Epiſtle of Plato there is the following remarkable paſſage:—πειθεσθαι δε ουτως αει χρη τοις παλαιοις τε και ἱεροις λογοις ἡ δη μηνυουσιν ἡμιν αθανατον ψυχην ειναι, δικαστας τε ισχειν, και τινειν τας μεγιστας τιμωριας, ὁταν τις απαλλαχθη του σωματος. i. e. "It is proper indeed always to believe in *antient and ſacred diſcourſes*, which announce to us that the ſoul is immortal, and that it has judges of its conduct, and ſuffers the greateſt puniſhments when it is liberated from the body." From which paſſage we alſo learn, that the immortality of the ſoul is a doctrine of the higheſt antiquity, and that it was delivered in the ſacred writings of the heathens.

I ſhall only obſerve further, that the character of Socrates, as exhibited in this dialogue, in the Crito, and in the Apology, is ſo tranſcendently great, and diſplays ſuch a perfection of juſtice, fortitude and piety, that it may be conſidered as a moſt ſplendid inſtance of the moral and intellectual excellence which human nature is capable of attaining, and an example of conſummate wiſdom and virtue, which will be imitated by the few in all future ages.

THE PHÆDO.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

ECHECRATES AND PHÆDO.

ECHECRATES.

WERE you preſent, Phædo, with Socrates that day when he drank the poiſon in priſon? or did you hear an account of it from any other?

PHÆD. I myſelf, Echecrates, was preſent.

ECHEC. What then was his diſcourſe previous to his death? and how did he die? for I ſhould be very glad to hear the account: for ſcarcely does any one of the Phliaſian [1] citizens now viſit Athens; and it is ſome time ſince any ſtranger has arrived from thence who might afford us ſome clear information about theſe particulars. All indeed that we heard was, that he died through drinking the poiſon; but he who acquainted us with this had nothing further to ſay about other particulars of his death.

PHÆD. What! did you not hear the manner in which he was tried?

ECHEC. Yes: a certain perſon related this to us; and we wondered, as his ſentence was paſſed ſo long ago, that he ſhould not die till a conſiderable time after. What then, Phædo, was the reaſon of this?

PHÆD. A certain fortune happened to him, Echecrates: for, the day before his trial, the ſtern of that ſhip was crowned which the Athenians ſend every year to Delos.

ECHEC. But what is the meaning of this?

[1] Phlius was a city of Peloponneſus ſituated not far from the Iſthmus. Vid. Strab. lib. viii. Pauſan. in Corinth. et Steph. de Urb. et Pop.

PHÆD. This is the ſhip, as the Athenians ſay, in which Theſeus formerly carried the twice ſeven young children to Crete, and preſerved both them and himſelf. The Athenians, therefore, as it is reported, then vowed to Apollo, that if the children were preſerved, they would lead every year a ſacred ſpectacle to Delos; which, from that time, they regularly ſend every year to the God. As ſoon, therefore, as the preparations for the ſacred ſpectacle commence, the law orders that the city ſhall be purified, and that no one ſhall be put to death by a public decree till the ſhip has arrived at Delos, and again returned to Athens. But this ſometimes takes a long time in accompliſhing, when the winds impede their paſſage; but the feſtival itſelf commences when the prieſt of Apollo has crowned the ſtern of the ſhip. Now this, as I told you, took place on the day preceding the trial; and on this account that length of time happened to Socrates in priſon between his ſentence and his death.

ECHEC. And what, Phædo, were the circumſtances reſpecting his death? what were his ſayings and actions? and who of his familiars were preſent with him? or would not the magiſtrates ſuffer that any ſhould be admitted to him, ſo that he died deprived of the preſence of his friends?

PHÆD. By no means; but ſome, and indeed many, were preſent with him.

ECHEC. Endeavour to relate all theſe particulars to us in the cleareſt manner, unleſs you have ſome buſineſs which may prevent you.

PHÆD. But I am at leiſure, and will endeavour to gratify your requeſt: for indeed to call to mind Socrates, whether I myſelf ſpeak or hear others, is to me always the moſt pleaſant of all things.

ECHEC. Truly, Phædo, others who hear you will be affected in the ſame manner: but endeavour, as much as you are able, to narrate every circumſtance in the moſt accurate manner.

PHÆD. And indeed I myſelf, who was preſent, was wonderfully affected; for I was not influenced with pity, like one preſent at the death of a familiar: for this man, O Echecrates, appeared to me to be bleſſed, when I conſidered his manner and diſcourſes, and his intrepid and generous death. Hence it appeared to me, that he did not deſcend to Hades without a divine deſtiny, but that there alſo he would be in a happy condition, if this can ever be aſſerted of any one. On this account I was entirely uninfluenced with

with pity, though apparently I ought not to have been, on ſo mournful an occaſion; nor yet again was I influenced by pleaſure through philoſophical converſe, as I uſed to be; for our diſcourſes were of this kind. But, to ſpeak ingenuouſly, a certain wonderful paſſion, and an unuſual mixture of pleaſure and grief, were preſent with me, produced by conſidering that he muſt in a very ſhort time die. And, indeed, all of us who were preſent were nearly affected in the ſame manner, at one time laughing, and at another weeping: but this was eminently the caſe with one of us, Apollodorus; for you know the man, and his manner of behaviour.

ECHEC. How is it poſſible that I ſhould not?

PHÆD. He, therefore, was remarkably affected in this manner; and I myſelf, and others, experienced great trouble and confuſion.

ECHEC. Who then, Phædo, happened to be preſent?

PHÆD. Of the natives, Apollodorus, Critobulus, and his father Crito, were preſent; likewiſe Hermogenes, Epigenes, Æſchines, and Antiſthenes [1]. And beſides theſe, Cteſippus [2] the Pœanian, Menexenus, and ſome other Athenians were preſent: but Plato I think was ſick.

ECHEC. Were there no ſtrangers?

PHÆD. Yes: Simmias the Theban, Cebes [3], and Phædondes; and among the Megarenſians, Euclid and Terpſion.

ECHEC. But what! were not Ariſtippus [4] and Cleombrotus there?

PHÆD. By no means: for they were ſaid to be at Ægina.

ECHEC. Was any other perſon preſent?

PHÆD. I think thoſe I have mentioned were nearly all.

ECHEC. Will you now then relate what were his diſcourſes?

[1] This Antiſthenes, as principally imitating Socrates in his endurance and contempt of pleaſure, was the author of the Cynic ſect, and the preceptor of Diogenes.

[2] See the Euthydemus, in which the diſpoſition of Cteſippus is deſcribed.

[3] This Cebes is the author of the allegorical table now extant.

[4] A philoſopher of Cyrene, and founder of the Cyrenaic ſect. What is here ſaid concerning the abſence of Ariſtippus and Cleombrotus is well explained by Demetrius in his book περὶ Ερμηνειας. "Plato, he obſerves, ſays this in order to reprove Ariſtippus and Cleombrotus, who were feaſting in Ægina at the time that Socrates was in priſon, and did not fail to ſee their friend and maſter, though they were then at the entrance of the Athenian harbour. Plato however does not clearly relate theſe particulars, becauſe his narration would have been an open defamation."

PHÆD.

PHÆD. I will endeavour to relate the whole to you from the beginning. For we were always accuſtomed to viſit Socrates, myſelf and others meeting in the morning at the place where he was tried, for it was very near to the priſon. Here we waited every day till the priſon was opened, diſcourſing among ourſelves, for it was not opened very early in the morning; but, as ſoon as we could be admitted, we went to Socrates, and generally ſpent the whole day with him. And then, indeed, we met together ſooner than uſual; for the day before, when we left the priſon, we heard that the ſhip from Delos was returned. We determined, therefore, among ourſelves, to come very early in the morning to the uſual place; and we met together accordingly: but when we arrived, the goaler, who uſed to attend upon us, told us to wait, and not enter till he called us. For, ſays he, the eleven magiſtrates are now freeing Socrates from his bonds, and announcing to him that he muſt die to-day. But not long after this he returned, and ordered us to enter. When we entered, we found Socrates juſt freed from his fetters, but Xantippe (you know her) holding one of his children, and ſitting by him. As ſoon, therefore, as Xantippe ſaw us, ſhe began to lament in a moſt violent manner, and ſaid ſuch things as are uſual with women in affliction; and among the reſt, Socrates (ſays ſhe), this is the laſt time your friends will ſpeak to you, or you to them. But Socrates looking upon Crito, Crito (ſays he), let ſome one take her home. Upon which ſome of Crito's domeſtics led her away, beating herſelf, and weeping bitterly. But Socrates, ſitting upright on the bed, drew up his leg, and, ſtroking it with his hand, ſaid at the ſame time, What a wonderful thing is this, my friends, which men call *the pleaſant and agreeable!* and how admirably is it affected by nature towards that which appears to be its contrary, *the painful!* for they are unwilling to be preſent with us both together; and yet, if any perſon purſues and receives the one, he is almoſt always under a neceſſity of receiving the other, as if both of them depended from one ſummit. And it ſeems to me (ſays he), that if Æſop had perceived this he would have compoſed a fable from it, and would have informed us, that Divinity, being willing to reconcile contending natures, but not being able to accompliſh this deſign, conjoined their ſummits in a nature one and the ſame; and that hence it comes to paſs, that whoever partakes of the one is ſoon after connected

nected with the other. And this, as it appears, is the caſe with myſelf at preſent; for the pain which was before in my leg, through the bond, is now ſucceeded by a pleaſant ſenſation.

But here Cebes replying, ſaid, By Jupiter, Socrates, you have very opportunely cauſed me to recollect: for certain perſons have aſked me concerning thoſe poems which you compoſed, viz. the Fables of Æſop which you verſified, and your exordium to Apollo, and other pieces of compoſition; and, among the reſt, Evenus lately inquired with what deſign you did this after coming here, when before you have never attempted any thing of the kind. If, therefore, you have any deſire that I may have an anſwer ready for Evenus, when he again interrogates me on this occaſion (and I am certain that he will do ſo), tell me what I muſt ſay to him. You may truly inform him (ſays he), Cebes, that I did not compoſe theſe verſes with any deſign of rivalling him, or his poems (for I knew that this would be no eaſy matter); but that I might try to explore the meaning of certain dreams, and that I might make a proper expiation, if this ſhould happen to be the muſic which they have often ordered me to exerciſe. For in the paſt part of my life the ſame dream has often occurred to me, exhibiting at different times a different appearance, yet always adviſing me the ſame thing; for it ſaid, Socrates, make and exerciſe muſic. And indeed, in the former part of my life, I conſidered that this dream perſuaded and exhorted me reſpecting what I ſhould do, in the ſame manner as thoſe in the races are exhorted; for, by perſuading me to exerciſe muſic, it ſignified that I ſhould labour in philoſophy, which is the greateſt muſic. But now ſince my ſentence has taken place, and the feſtival of the God has retarded my death, it appeared to me to be neceſſary, that, if the muſic which the dream has ſo often exhorted me to undertake ſhould happen to be of the popular ſort, I ſhould by no means reſiſt its perſuaſions, but comply with the exhortation: for I conſidered that it would be more ſafe for me not to depart from hence before I had made an expiation by compoſing verſes, and obeying the dream. Thus, in the firſt place, I compoſed ſome verſes in honour of the God to whom the preſent feſtival belongs; but after the God, conſidering it neceſſary that he who deſigns to be a poet ſhould make fables and not diſcourſes, and knowing that I myſelf was not a mythologiſt, on theſe accounts I verſified the fables of

Æſop,

Æſop, which were at hand, and were known to me; and began with thoſe firſt, that firſt preſented themſelves to my view.

Give this anſwer, Cebes, to Evenus: at the ſame time bid him farewell for me; and tell him, if he is wiſe he will follow me. But I ſhall depart, as it ſeems, to-day; for ſuch are the orders of the Athenians.—Upon this Simmias replied, What is this, Socrates, which you command me to tell Evenus? for I often meet with him; and from what I know of him, I am certain that he will never willingly comply with your requeſt.—What then (ſays Socrates), is not Evenus a philoſopher?—To me he appears to be ſo (ſays Simmias).—Both Evenus, therefore, will be willing to follow me, and every one who is worthy to partake of philoſophy; not perhaps indeed by violently [1] depriving himſelf of life, for this they ſay is unlawful. And at the

[1] Socrates ſays, that perhaps the philoſopher will not deſtroy himſelf, for this is not lawful. This the text ſhows through two arguments, the one mythical and Orphic, but the other dialectic and philoſophic. But before we conſider the text, ſays Olympiodorus, let us ſhow by appropriate arguments that ſuicide is not lawful. Divinity poſſeſſes twofold powers, anagogic and providential; and the powers which are providential of things ſecondary are not impeded by the anagogic, and which are converted to them, but he energizes at once according to both. In like manner, nothing hinders but that a philoſopher, ſince he is an imitator of Divinity, (for philoſophy is an aſſimilation to Deity,) may at once energize cathartically, and with a providential care of ſecondary natures: for there is nothing great in living cathartically when ſeparated from the body after death; but, while detained in the body, it is generous to be intent on purification. The ſecond argument is this: As a divine nature is always preſent to all things, and ſome things participate of it more or leſs, through their proper aptitude or inaptitude; ſo alſo it is neceſſary that the ſoul ſhould be preſent to the body, and ſhould not ſeparate itſelf from it. But the body participates or does not participate of it, through its proper aptitude or inaptitude. Thus, in the Theætetus, the Coryphæan philoſopher is repreſented as not knowing where the Forum is ſituated, but as being even ignorant that he is ignorant of ſenſible particulars; and this while he is in the body. The third argument is as follows: It is neceſſary that a voluntary bond ſhould be voluntarily diſſolved; but that an involuntary bond ſhould be diſſolved with an involuntary ſolution, and not in a promiſcuous manner. Hence a phyſical life, being involuntary, muſt be diſſolved with an involuntary ſolution, i. e. by a phyſical death; but the impaſſioned life in us, which ſubſiſts according to preelection or free will, muſt be diſſolved with a voluntary ſolution, i. e. with purification, or the exerciſe of the cathartic virtues.

With reſpect to the text, it ſhows through two arguments, as we have obſerved, that ſuicide is not lawful; and of theſe the mythical argument, according to Olympiodorus, is as follows:—According to Orpheus, there are four governments: the firſt that of Heaven, which Saturn received, cutting

the ſame time, as he thus ſpoke, he withdrew his leg from the bed, and placed it on the ground; and afterwards continued to diſcourſe with us, in a ſitting poſture,

cutting off the genitals of his father. After Saturn, Jupiter reigned, who hurled his father into Tartarus. And after Jupiter Bacchus reigned, who they ſay was lacerated by the Titans, through the ſtratagems of Juno. It is alſo ſaid that the Titans taſted his fleſh, and that Jupiter being enraged hurled his thunder at them; and that from the aſhes of their burnt bodies men were generated [1]. Suicide, therefore, is not proper, not, as the text ſeems to ſay, becauſe we are in a certain bond the body, (for this is evident, and he would not have called this arcane,) but ſuicide is not lawful, becauſe our body is Dionyſiacal: for we are a part of Bacchus, if we are compoſed from the aſhes of the Titans who taſted his fleſh. Socrates, therefore, fearful of diſcloſing this arcane narration, becauſe it pertained to the myſteries, adds nothing more than that we are in the body, as in a priſon ſecured by a guard; but the interpreters, when the myſteries were declining, and almoſt extinct, owing to the eſtabliſhment of a new religion, openly diſcloſed the fable.

But the allegory of this fable, ſays Olympiodorus, is of that kind as when Empedocles aſſerts that the intelligible and ſenſible worlds were generated according to parts; not that they were produced at different times, for they always are, but becauſe our ſoul at one time lives according to the intelligible, and then the intelligible world is ſaid to be generated, and at another time according to the ſenſible world, and then the ſenſible world is ſaid to be generated. So likewiſe with Orpheus, thoſe four governments do not ſubſiſt at one time, and at another not, for they always are; but they obſcurely ſignify the gradations of the virtues according to which our ſoul contains the ſymbols of all the virtues, the theoretic and cathartic, the politic and ethic. For it either energizes according to the theoretic virtues, the paradigm of which is the government of Heaven, and on this account Heaven receives its denomination *παρα του τα ανω οραν, from beholding the things above*; or it lives cathartically, the paradigm of which is the kingdom of Saturn, and on this account Saturn is denominated as *a pure intellect, through beholding himſelf*, διον ὁ κρονους τις ὡν δια το ἑαυτον ορᾳν; and hence he is ſaid to devour his own offspring, as converting himſelf to himſelf: or it energizes according to the political virtues, the ſymbol of which is the government of Jupiter; and hence Jupiter is the demiurgus, as energizing about ſecondary natures: or it lives according to the ethical and phyſical virtues, the ſymbol of which is the kingdom of Bacchus; and hence it is lacerated, becauſe the virtues do not alternately follow each other.

But Bacchus being lacerated by the Titans ſignifies his proceſſion to the laſt of things; for of theſe the Titans are the artificers, and Bacchus is the monad of the Titans. This was effected by the ſtratagems of Juno, becauſe this goddeſs is the inſpective guardian of motion and progreſſion; and hence, in the Iliad, ſhe continually excites Jupiter to a providential attention to ſecondary

[1] Παρα τῳ Ορφει τεσσαρες βασιλειαι παραδιδονται. πρωτη μεν ἡ του Ουρανου, ην ὁ Κρονος διεδεξατο εκτεμων τα αιδοια του πατερος. μετα δε τον Κρονον ὁ Ζευς ἐβασιλευσε καταταρταρωτας τον πατερα. επειτα τον Δια διεδεξατο ὁ Διονυσος, ὀν φασι κατ' επιβουλην της Ἡρας τους περι αυτον Τιτανας σπαραττειν, και των σαρκων αυτου απογευεσθαι· και τουτους οργισθεις ὁ Ζευς εκεραυνωσε, και εκ της αιθαλης των κτιμων των αναδοθεντων εξ αυτων ὑλης γενομενης γενεσθαι τους ανθρωπους.

poſture, the remaining part of the time. Cebes [1], therefore, inquired of him, How is this to be underſtood, Socrates, that it is not lawful to commit ſuicide,

[1] Socrates and Cebes are here ſpeaking about two different kinds of death; the latter about a phyſical, and the former about a pre-elective or free-will death.

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natures. Bacchus alſo, ſays Olympiodorus, preſides over generation, becauſe he preſides over life and death. Over life, becauſe over generation; but over death, becauſe wine produces an enthuſiaſtic energy, and at the time of death we become more enthuſiaſtic, as Proclus teſtifies together with Homer; for he became prophetic when he was dying. Tragedy and comedy alſo are referred to Bacchus; comedy from its being the ſport of life, and tragedy through the calamities and the death in it. Comic, therefore, do not properly accuſe tragic writers as not being Dionyſiacal, when they aſſert that theſe things do not pertain to Bacchus. But Jupiter hurled his thunder at the Titans, the thunder manifeſting converſion: for fire moves upwards. Jupiter, therefore, converts them to himſelf. And this is the mythical argument.

But the dialectic and philoſophic argument is as follows:—The Gods take care of us, and we are their poſſeſſions: it is not proper, therefore, to free ourſelves from life, but we ought to convert ourſelves to them. For if one of theſe two things took place, either that we are the poſſeſſions of the Gods, but they take no care of us; or, on the contrary, that we are not the poſſeſſions of the Gods, it might be rational to liberate ourſelves from the body: but now, as neither of theſe takes place, it is not proper to diſſolve our bonds.

On the contrary, however, it may be ſaid that ſuicide according to Plato is neceſſary. And, in the firſt place, he here ſays that a philoſopher will not *perhaps* commit ſuicide, unleſs Divinity ſends ſome great neceſſity, ſuch as the preſent: for the word *perhaps* affords a ſuſpicion that ſuicide may *ſometimes* be neceſſary. In the ſecond place, Plato admits that ſuicide may be proper to the worthy man, to him of a middle character, and to the multitude and depraved: to the worthy man, as in this place; to the middle character, as in the Republic, where he ſays that ſuicide is neceſſary to him who is afflicted with a long and incurable diſeaſe, as ſuch a one is uſeleſs to the city, becauſe Plato's intention was that his citizens ſhould be uſeful to the city, and not to themſelves; and to the vulgar character, as in the Laws, when he ſays that ſuicide is neceſſary to him who is poſſeſſed with certain incurable paſſions, ſuch as being in love with his mother, ſacrilege, or any thing elſe of this kind.

Again it may be ſaid, from the authority of Plotinus, that ſuicide is ſometimes neceſſary, and alſo from the authority of the Stoics, who ſaid that there were five ways in which ſuicide was rational. For they aſſimilated, ſays Olympiodorus, life to a banquet, and aſſerted that it is neceſſary to diſſolve life through ſuch-like cauſes as occaſion the diſſolution of a banquet. A banquet, therefore, is diſſolved either through a great neceſſity unexpectedly intervening, as through the preſence of a friend ſuddenly coming; or it is diſſolved through intoxication taking place; and through what is placed on the table being morbid. Further ſtill, it is diſſolved after another manner through a want of things neceſſary to the entertainment; and alſo through obſcene and baſe language. In like manner life may be diſſolved in five ways. And, in the firſt

place,

ſuicide, and yet that a philoſopher ſhould be willing to follow one who is about to die?—What (ſays he), Cebes, have not you and Simmias heard your familiar Philolaus [1] diſcourſe concerning things of this kind?—We have

place, as at a banquet, it may be diſſolved through ſome great neceſſity, as when a man ſacrifices himſelf for the good of his country. In the ſecond place, as a banquet is diſſolved through intoxication, ſo likewiſe it is neceſſary to diſſolve life through a delirium following the body: for a delirium is a phyſical intoxication. In the third place, as a banquet is diſſolved through what is placed on the table being morbid, thus too it is neceſſary that life ſhould be diſſolved when the body labours under incurable diſeaſes, and is no longer capable of being miniſtrant to the ſoul. In the fourth place, as a banquet it diſſolved through a want of things neceſſary to the entertainment, ſo ſuicide is proper when the neceſſaries of life are wanting. For they are not to be received from depraved characters; ſince gifts from the defiled are ſmall, and it is not proper for a man to pollute himſelf with theſe. And, in the fifth place, as a banquet is diſſolved through obſcene language, ſo likewiſe it is neceſſary to diſſolve life when compelled by a tyrant to ſpeak things arcane, or belonging to the myſteries, which a certain female Pythagorean is ſaid to have done. For, being compelled to tell why ſhe did not eat beans, ſhe ſaid, I may eat them if I tell. And afterwards being compelled to eat them, ſhe ſaid, I may tell if I eat them; and at length bit off her tongue, as the organ of ſpeech and taſte.

What then ſhall we ſay? for the diſcourſe is brought to a contradiction. And how can it be admitted that ſuicide is unlawful? Or, may we not ſay that a liberation from life is not neceſſary ſo far as pertains to the body; but that it is rational when it contributes a greater good to the ſoul? Thus, for inſtance, ſuicide is lawful when the ſoul is injured by the body. As, therefore, it is unholy not to give aſſiſtance to a friend when he is ſcourged, but, if he is ſcourged by his father, it is not becoming to aſſiſt him; ſo here ſuicide is unlawful when committed for the ſake of the body, but rational when committed for the ſake of the ſoul; ſince this is ſometimes advantageous to it.

I only add, that according to Macrobius it is ſaid, in the arcane diſcourſes concerning the return of the ſoul, "that the wicked in this life reſemble thoſe who fall upon ſmooth ground, and who cannot riſe again without difficulty; but that ſouls departing from the preſent life with the defilements of guilt are to be compared to thoſe who fall from a lofty and precipitous place, from whence they are never able to riſe again." "Nam in arcanis de animæ reditu diſputationibus fertur, in hac vita delinquentes ſimiles eſſe ſuper æquale ſolum cadentibus, quibus denuo ſine difficultate præſto ſit ſurgere: animas vero ex hac vita cum delictorum ſordibus recedentes, æquandas his, qui in abruptum ex alto præcipitique delapſi ſunt, unde facultas nunquam ſit reſurgendi. Somn. Scip. cap. xiii. Suicide, therefore, is in general unlawful, becauſe it is not proper to depart from life in an unpurified ſtate.

[1] Philolaus, ſays Olympiodorus, was a Pythagorean, and it was uſual with the Pythagoreans to ſpeak through ænigmas. Hence ſilence was one of the peculiarities of this ſect; through ſilence indicating the arcane nature of Divinity, which it is neceſſary a philoſopher ſhould imitate. But Philolaus ſaid in ænigmas that ſuicide is not proper: for he ſays, we ought not to turn

have not, Socrates, heard any thing clearly on this ſubject.—But I (ſays Socrates) ſpeak in conſequence of having heard; and what I have heard I will not enviouſly conceal from you. And perhaps it is becoming in the moſt eminent degree, that he who is about to depart thither ſhould conſider and mythologize about this departure: I mean, what kind of a thing we ſhould think it to be. For what elſe can ſuch a one be more properly employed about, till the ſetting [1] of the ſun?

On what account then, Socrates, ſays Cebes, do they ſay that it is unlawful for a man to kill himſelf? for I myſelf have ſome time ſince heard from Philolaus, when he reſided with us, and from ſome others, that it was not proper to commit ſuch an action; but I never heard any thing clear upon the ſubject from any one.—Prepare yourſelf, then (ſays Socrates), for perhaps you may be ſatisfied in this particular: and perhaps it may appear to you wonderful, if this alone of everything elſe is ſomething ſimple, and by no means happens to a man like other events, but ſtill remains the ſame, even with reſpect to thoſe to whom it is better to die than to live; though,

back when going to a temple, nor cut wood in the way. By the latter of theſe he manifeſts that we ſhould not divide and cut life; for life is a way: and by the former he indicates the meditation of death. For the life of a future ſtate is ſacred; ſince our father and country are there. He ſays, therefore, that he who lives cathartically ſhould not turn back, i. e. ſhould not cut off the cathartic life. But Cebes met with Philolaus in Bœotia; for he aſſociated with him in Thebes. Olympiodorus alſo, after obſerving that it was the cuſtom of the Pythagoreans to live as in a common life, making all their poſſeſſions common, adds as follows:—"If, therefore, any one among them was found to be unadapted to philoſophy, they led him out together with his property, made a cenotaph or empty tomb, and lamented as if it were for one who was going a journey. But a certain perſon named Cylo coming among them, and experiencing this treatment, ſet fire to the ſchool, and all the diſciples were burnt except two, Philolaus and Hipparchus. Philolaus, therefore, came to Thebes in order to perform funeral ſacrifices to his deceaſed preceptor. He alſo performed them to Lyſias, who was there buried, and in whoſe name Plato has written a dialogue, which is inſcribed, Lyſias, or Concerning Friendſhip." Ει τις ουν ασκητικως ευρεθη προς φιλοσοφιαν, εξηγον αυτον μετα της ουσιας, και κενοταφιον εποιουν, και ωσπερ περι αποδημουντος απωδυροντο. Κυλων δε τις εισελθων και πεπονθως τουτο ὑφηψε πυρ τω διδασκαλειω, και παντες εκαυθησαν πλην δυο Φιλολαου και Ἱππαρχου. ηλθεν ουν ὁ Φιλολαος εις Θηβας αφειλαν χαρις τω οικειω διδασκαλω τεθνηκοτι, και εκει τεθαμμενω ποιησασθαι τα Λυσιδι, ου και κατα ομωνυμιαν γεγραπται τω Πλατωνι διαλογος, Λυσις ἡ Περι φιλιας.

[1] It was a law, ſays Olympiodorus, with the Athenians, to put no one to death in the day, juſt as it was an injunction with the Pythagoreans, not to ſleep in mid-day, when the ſun exhibits his moſt ſtrenuous energy.

perhaps,

perhaps, it may ſeem wonderful to you, that it ſhould be better for thoſe men to die, in whom it would be unholy to benefit themſelves by ſuicide, and who ought to expect ſome other, as a benefactor on this occaſion.—Then Cebes, gently laughing, Jupiter knows that (ſays he, ſpeaking in his own tongue).—For this indeed (ſays Socrates) appears to be irrational; and yet, perhaps, it is not ſo, but has a certain reaſon on its ſide. For the diſcourſe which is delivered about theſe particulars, in the arcana of the myſteries, *that we are placed as in a certain priſon ſecured by a guard, and that it is not proper for any one to free himſelf from this confinement, and make his eſcape*, appears to me to be an aſſertion of great moment, and not eaſy to be underſtood. But this appears to me, O Cebes, to be well ſaid, that the Gods take care of us, and that we who are men are one of the poſſeſſions belonging to the Gods. Or does not this appear to you to be the caſe?—It does to me (ſays Cebes).—Would not you, therefore, if any one of your ſervants [1] ſhould deſtroy himſelf, when at the ſame time you did not ſignify that you was willing he ſhould die, would you not be angry with him? and if you had any puniſhment, would you not chaſtiſe him?—Entirely ſo (ſays he).—*Perhaps*, therefore, it is not irrational to aſſert, that a man ought not to kill himſelf before Divinity lays him under a certain neceſſity [2] of doing ſo, ſuch as I am ſubject to at preſent.

This, indeed (ſays Cebes), appears to be reaſonable. But that which you ſaid juſt now, Socrates, that philoſophers would very readily be willing to die, appears to be abſurd, if what we have aſſerted is agreeable to reaſon,

[1] How from human affairs, ſays Olympiodorus, do we conjecture that things pertaining to the Gods ſubſiſt in a ſimilar manner? For they are not like us, paſſive. May we not ſay that he aſſimilates them analogouſly, but politically and œconomically? For it is evident that the paradigms of every mundane providential care are previouſly comprehended in the Gods. But reconciliation and vengeance muſt be conceived to take place in a very different manner in the Gods. For the former is the riſing of their proper light when the darkneſs of guilt is diſperſed; and the latter is a ſecondary puniſhing providence, about the apoſtatizing ſoul.

[2] Neceſſity is four-fold: for one kind is internal, and the other external; and each of theſe is twofold, viz. good and evil. But the paradigms of that which is inwardly good are the will of Divinity, and that of the juſt man; and of that which is inwardly evil, the pre-election of the depraved man. But of that neceſſity which is externally good, the paradigm is the will of Fate imparting precedaneous goods; and of that which is externally evil, the beſtowing of things violent, contrary to nature, and corruptive.

that Divinity [1] takes care of us, and that we are one of his poſſeſſions; for it is irrational to ſuppoſe that the moſt prudent men ſhould not be grieved, when departing from that ſervitude in which they are taken care of by the Gods, who are the beſt of govenors. For ſuch a one will by no means think that he ſhall be better taken care of when he becomes free: but ſome one who is deprived of intellect may perhaps think that he ſhould fly from his maſter, and will not conſider that he ought not to fly from a good maſter, but that he ſhould by all means abide in his ſervice. Hence he will depart from him in a moſt irrational manner: but he who is endowed with intellect will deſire to live perpetually with one who is better than himſelf. And thus, Socrates, it is reaſonable that the contrary of what you juſt now ſaid ſhould take place: for it is proper that the prudent, when about to die, ſhould be ſorrowful, but that the fooliſh ſhould rejoice.—Socrates, therefore, upon hearing this, ſeemed to me to be pleaſed with the reaſoning of Cebes; and loking upon us, Cebes (ſays he) never ſuffers any thing to paſs without inveſtigation, and is by no means willing to admit immediately the truth of an aſſertion.—But indeed (ſays Simmias), Cebes, O Socrates, appears to me to ſay ſomething now to the purpoſe. For with what deſign can men, truly wiſe, fly from maſters who are better than themſelves, and, without any

[1] Every thing naturally provides for things ſubordinate; but the Gods exert a providential energy prior to all things, and according to hyparxis. For each is *a goodneſs*, becauſe the higheſt God is *the good*, and providence is the energy of goodneſs, and imparts eſſential good. Divinity too may be ſaid to take care of man, becauſe from being worſe he makes him better; but man cultivates Divinity becauſe he is made better by him. Obſerve too, that as, in the univerſe, intellect ſubſiſting after the Gods is firſt converted to them, ſo likewiſe in us *intellect* is extended to Divinity, but *ignorance* turns from a divine nature. By intellect, however, here, we muſt underſtand, not that alone which is gnoſtic, but alſo that which is orectic or appetitive, both in the univerſe and in us: for intellect poſſeſſes both deſire and knowledge, becauſe it is the firſt animal. This being admitted, we ſhall no longer be diſturbed by the doubt, whether orectic is better than gnoſtic perfection; or, in other words, whether virtue is better than ſcience: for the one is not perfect without the other.

Should it be inquired how the Gods are our maſters, ſince a *maſter*, ſo far as a maſter, does not conſider the good of his ſervant, but his own good; for in this he differs from a *governor*; and ſhould it alſo be ſaid, What good can the Gods derive from man? we reply with Olympiodorus, that the Gods make all things precedaneouſly on account of themſelves; and that they are excellent in proportion as they are exempt from other things. But they *govern* according to a certain coordination with us; and by how much the more we ſubject ourſelves to, by ſo much the more do we participate of them, as wholly giving ourſelves up to them, and neglecting that which is properly our own.

reluctance,

reluctance, free themſelves from their ſervitude? And Cebes appears to me to direct his diſcourſe to you, becauſe you ſo eaſily endure to leave us, and thoſe beneficent rulers the Gods, as you yourſelf confeſs.—You ſpeak juſtly (ſays Socrates); for I think you mean that I ought to make my defence, as if I was upon my trial.—By all means, ſays Simmias.

Be it ſo then (ſays Socrates): and I ſhall endeavour that this my apology may appear more reaſonable to you than it did to my judges. For, with reſpect to myſelf (ſays he), O Simmias and Cebes, unleſs I thought that I ſhould depart, in the firſt place, to other [1] Gods who are wiſe and good, and, in the next place, to men who have migrated from the preſent life, and are better than any among us, it would be unjuſt not to be troubled at death: but now believe for certain, that I hope to dwell with good men; though this, indeed, I will not confidently aſſert: but that I ſhall go to Gods who are perfectly good rulers, you may conſider as an aſſertion which, if any thing of the kind is ſo, will be ſtrenuouſly affirmed by me. So that, on this account, I ſhall not be afflicted at dying, but ſhall entertain a good hope that ſomething remains for the dead; and, as it was formerly ſaid, that it will be much better hereafter for the good than the evil.—What then, Socrates (ſays Simmias), would you have departed with ſuch a conception in your intellect, without communicating it to us? Or will you not render us alſo partakers of it? For it appears to me, that this will be a common good; and at the ſame time it will be an apology for you, if you can perſuade us to believe what you ſay.—I will endeavour to do ſo (ſays he). But let us firſt conſider what that is which it appears to me Crito ſome time ſince was deſirous of ſaying. What elſe (ſays Crito) ſhould it be, Socrates, except what he who is to give you the poiſon has long ago told me, that you ought to ſpeak as little as poſſible? For he ſays that thoſe who diſpute become too much heated, and that nothing of this kind ought to be introduced with the poiſon, ſince thoſe who do not obſerve this caution are ſometimes obliged to drink the poiſon twice or thrice.—Let him (ſays Socrates) only take care of his proper employment, as one who muſt adminiſter the poiſon twice; and even, if occaſion requires, thrice. I was almoſt certain

[1] By *other Gods*, Socrates means ſuch as are ſupermundane, or of an order ſuperior to the ruling divinities of the world. In ſhort, thoſe Gods are here ſignified that are unconnected with body.

(ſays Crito) that this would be your anſwer; but he enjoined me to do this, as I ſaid, ſome time ſince. Permit him to do ſo (ſays Socrates); but I am deſirous of rendering to you, as my judges, the reaſon, as it appears to me, why a man who has truly paſſed his life in the exerciſe of philoſophy ſhould with great propriety be confident when about to die, and ſhould poſſeſs good hopes of obtaining the greateſt advantages after death; and in what manner this takes place I will endeavour, Simmias and Cebes, to explain:

Thoſe who are converſant with philoſophy in a proper manner, ſeem to have concealed from others that the whole of their ſtudy is nothing elſe than how to die and be dead [1]. If this then is true, it would certainly be abſurd, that thoſe who have made this alone their ſtudy through the whole of life, ſhould when it arrives be afflicted at a circumſtance upon which they have before beſtowed all their attention and labour. But here Simmias laughing, By Jupiter (ſays he), Socrates, you cauſe me to laugh, though I am very far from deſiring to do ſo at preſent: for I think that the multitude, if they heard this, would conſider it as well ſaid reſpecting philoſophers; and that men of the preſent day would perfectly agree with you, that philoſophers ſhould in reality deſire death, and that they are by no means ignorant that men of this deſcription deſerve to ſuffer death. And indeed, Simmias, they would ſpeak the truth, except in aſſerting that they are not ignorant of it: for both the manner in which true philoſophers deſire to die, and how they are worthy of death, is concealed from them. But let us bid farewell to ſuch as theſe (ſays he), and diſcourſe among ourſelves: and to begin, Do you think that death is any thing? Simmias replied, Entirely ſo. Is it any thing elſe than a liberation of ſoul from body? and is not this to die [2], for the body to be liberated from the ſoul, and to ſubſiſt apart by itſelf? and likewiſe for the ſoul to be liberated from the body, and to be eſſentially

[1] It is well obſerved by Olympiodorus, that *to die* (ἀποθνήσκειν) differs from *to be dead* (τεθνάναι). For the cathartic philoſopher *dies* in conſequence of meditating death; but the theoretic philoſopher is *dead*, in conſequence of being ſeparated from the paſſions.

[2] Plato beautifully defines death to be a ſeparation of the body from the ſoul, and of the ſoul from the body. For, with reſpect to ſouls that are enamoured with body, the body is indeed ſeparated from the ſoul, but not the ſoul from the body, becauſe it is yet conjoined with it through habitude or alliance, from which thoſe ſhadowy phantaſms are produced that wander about ſepulchres.

ſeparate?

ſeparate? Is death any thing elſe but this?—It is no other (ſays Simmias).—Conſider then, excellent man, whether the ſame things appear to you as to me; for from hence I think we ſhall underſtand better the ſubjects of our inveſtigation. Does it appear to you that the philoſopher is a man who is anxiouſly concerned about things which are called pleaſures, ſuch as meats and drinks?—In the ſmalleſt degree, Socrates (ſays Simmias).—But what, is he ſedulouſly employed in venereal concerns?—By no means.—Or does ſuch a man appear to you to eſteem other particulars which regard the obſervance of the body, ſuch as the acquiſition of excellent garments and ſandals, and other ornaments of the body? whether does he appear to you to eſteem or deſpiſe ſuch particulars, employing them only ſo far as an abundant neceſſity requires?—A true philoſopher (ſays Simmias) appears to me to be one who will deſpiſe every thing of this kind.—Does it, therefore, appear to you (ſays Socrates), that the whole employment of ſuch a one will not conſiſt in things which regard the body, but in ſeparating himſelf from the body as much as poſſible, and in converting himſelf to his ſoul?—It does appear ſo to me.—Is it not, therefore, firſt of all evident, in things of this kind, that a philoſopher, in a manner far ſurpaſſing other men, ſeparates his ſoul in the higheſt degree from communion with the body?—It appears ſo.—And to *the many*, O Simmias, it appears that he who accounts nothing of this kind pleaſant, and who does not partake of them, is not worthy to live; but that he nearly approaches to death who is not concerned about the pleaſures which ſubſiſt through the body.—You entirely ſpeak the truth.

But what with reſpect to the acquiſition[1] of wiſdom? Is the body an impediment

[1] Socrates having ſhown from *life* that the philoſopher is willing to die, now proves this from *knowledge* as follows:—The philoſopher deſpiſes the ſenſes: he who does this deſpiſes alſo the body, in which the ſenſes reſide: he who deſpiſes the body is averſe to it: he who is averſe to it ſeparates himſelf from the body: and he who ſeparates himſelf from the body is willing to die; for death is nothing elſe than a ſeparation of the ſoul from the body.

But it is here neceſſary to obſerve, that there are three energies of the ſoul: for it either converts itſelf to things ſubordinate, and acquires a knowledge of ſenſibles; or it converts itſelf to itſelf, and ſees all things in itſelf, becauſe it is an omniform image containing the reaſons of all things; or it extends itſelf to the intelligible, and beholds ideas. As there are, therefore, three energies of the ſoul, we muſt not ſuppoſe that the politic, cathartic and theoretic characters differ from each other in this, that the political character knows ſenſibles; the cathartic, the reaſons in the ſoul;

impediment or not, if any one aſſociates it in the inveſtigation of wiſdom? What I mean is this: Have ſight and hearing in men any truth[1]? or is the caſe ſuch as the poets perpetually ſing, that

"We nothing accurate or ſee or hear?"

Though if theſe corporeal ſenſes are neither accurate nor clear, by no means can the reſt be ſo: for all the others are in a certain reſpect more depraved than theſe. Or does it not appear ſo to you?—Entirely ſo, ſays he.—When then does the ſoul touch upon the truth? for, when it endeavours to conſider any thing in conjunction with the body, it is evidently then deceived by the body.—You ſpeak the truth.—Muſt not, therefore, ſomething of reality become manifeſt to the ſoul, in the energy of reaſoning, if this is ever the caſe?—It muſt.—But the ſoul then reaſons in the moſt beautiful manner, when it is diſturbed by nothing belonging to the body, neither by hearing, nor ſight, nor pain, nor any pleaſure, but ſubſiſts in the moſt eminent degree, itſelf by itſelf, bidding farewell to the body, and, as much as poſſible neither communicating nor being in contact with it, extends itſelf towards real being.—Theſe things are ſo.—Does not the ſoul of a philoſopher, therefore, in theſe employments, deſpiſe the body in the moſt eminent

ſoul; and the theoretic, ideas—ſince no one is in reality a philoſopher who has not a knowledge of all things: but they differ in this, that the political philoſopher is converſant with pleaſures and pains; for he attends to the body as an inſtrument, and his end is not a privation, but a moderation of the paſſions. But the cathartic and theoretic philoſophers attend to the body as a neighbouring trifle, that it may not become an impediment to their energies; and the end with them is a liberation from the paſſions.

[1] Plato ſays that there is no truth in the ſenſes, becauſe they do not properly know: for paſſion is mingled with their knowledge, in conſequence of being obtained through media. For intellect is ſaid to know accurately, becauſe that which underſtands is the ſame with the intelligible, or the object of intellection. Beſides, ſenſe cannot ſuſtain the accuracy of ſenſibles. Thus, for inſtance, the eye cannot bear to look at that which is white in the extreme. For ſenſible objects, when they are tranſcendent, deſtroy the ſenſes. Senſe, however, may be ſaid to be always true and accurate when it is compared with aſſimilative knowledge, ſuch as that of images in mirrors. When, therefore, ſenſe is ſaid, as it is by Ariſtotle, to be the principle of ſcience, it muſt not be conſidered as the producing principle, but as agitating the ſoul to a recollection of univerſals, and as performing the office of a meſſenger and herald, by exciting our ſoul to the evolution of the ſciences. The poets who aſſert that the ſenſes know nothing accurately are Parmenides, Empedocles, and Epicharmus.

degree,

energy by itself sincere, at the same time endeavours to hunt [1] after every thing which has true being subsisting by itself separate and pure; and who in the most eminent degree is liberated from the eyes and ears, and in short from the whole body, as disturbing the soul, and not suffering it to acquire truth and wisdom by its conjunction? Will not such a man, Simmias, procure for himself real being, if this can ever be asserted of any one?—You speak the truth, Socrates (says Simmias), in a transcendent [2] manner.

Is it not necessary, therefore (says Socrates), from hence, that an opinion of this kind should be present with genuine philosophers in such a manner, that they will speak among themselves as follows: In the consideration of things, this opinion, like a certain path, leads us in conjunction with reason from the vulgar track, that, as long as we are connected with a body, and our soul is contaminated with such an evil, we can never sufficiently obtain the object of our desire; and this object we have asserted to be truth? For the body [3] subjects us to innumerable occupations through necessary aliment,

[1] The verb *hunting*, says Olympiodorus, is adapted to intelligibles, because these are known by an unapparent power of the soul, in the same manner as hunters study to be invisible to the objects of their pursuit. Ὅσον τὸ δύνασθαι τὰς τοιαύτας, δεῖ μᾶλλον λαμβάνειν τὸν ἄδηλον τρόπον ἐπιτηδεύοντας, καθάπερ καὶ οἱ θηρεύοντες μᾶλλον ἐπιτηδεύουσι τὸ λανθάνειν.

[2] The word in the original is ὑπερφυῶς, which is literally *supernaturally*. And, as Olympiodorus says, it is very properly used here, because the discourse is about intelligibles.

[3] The *vital irrational* part of our nature is an impediment to the *rational* soul. For this is twofold: for it is either beheld about the body alone, as fears, desires and loves, or about things external, as wars, and the accumulation of wealth. The *gnostic irrational* part also becomes an impediment, as for instance, the phantasy, which is always a hindrance to our intellectual conceptions. For there are two passions which it is difficult to wipe away, in knowledge the phantasy, and self-love; since these are the things with which the soul becomes first involved, and which lie, in the last place, lays aside. For the first vital vehicle of the soul is ambition, and the first gnostic is the phantasy. Hence, says Olympiodorus, Ulysses required the assistance of the mercurial wand, and right reason, in order to fly from Calypso, or the phantasy which like a cloud becomes an impediment to reason, the sun of the soul. For the phantasy is a veil, and hinders from our eyes it long wished. On this account, Ulysses left Circe, that is, Sense, as being the daughter of the Sun. The phantasy, therefore, is an impediment to our intellectual conceptions; and hence (Olympiodorus adds), when we are agitated by the inspiring influence of Divinity, if the phantasy intervenes, the enthusiastic energy ceases: for enthusiasm and the phantasy are contrary to each other. Should it be asked, whether the soul is able to energize without the phantasy? we reply, that in perceptions of universals it is able. It has perception, therefore, independent of the phantasy; at the same time, however, the phantasy attends it in its energies, just as a flame purifies him who falls on the fire.

and

the water which they have drawn. But when this water, departing from thence, is impelled hither, it again fills the rivers on the earth; and these, when filled, flow through channels and through the earth; and when they have severally passed through the avenues, which are open to each, they produce seas, lakes, rivers, and fountains. Flowing back again from hence under the earth, and some of them streaming round longer and more numerous places, but others round such as are shorter and less numerous, they again hurl themselves into Tartarus; and some indeed much more profoundly, but others less so, than they were drawn: but the influxions of all of them are deeper than the places from which they flow upwards. And the effluxions of some are in a direction contrary to their influxions, but in others both take place according to the same part. There are some again which entirely flow round in a circle, folding themselves like snakes, once or often about the earth; and being bent downwards as much as possible, they are again hurled forth on each side till they arrive at the middle, but never beyond this. For each part of the earth becomes steep to both these streams.

The other rivers, indeed, are many, great, and various: but among this abundance there are certain streams, four [1] in number, of which the greatest, and which circularly flows round the earth the outermost of all, is called the Ocean. But that which flows opposite, and in a contrary direction to this, is Acheron; which, flowing through other solitary places, and under the earth, devolves its waters into the Acherusian marsh, into which many souls

[1] The four rivers which are here mentioned are, says Olympiodorus, according to the Interpreter (i. e. Ammonius Hermeas), the four elements in Tartarus. Of these Ocean is water; Cocytus, or rather Styx, is earth; Pyriphlegethon is fire; and Acheron is air. But Styx is opposed to Pyriphlegethon, as heat to cold; and Acheron to Ocean, as air to water. Hence also Orpheus [a] calls the Acherusian lake aërial. However, says Olympiodorus, the position of the rivers does not correspond to this interpretation. For Ocean is first, and in the higher place. Under this is Acheron. Under this again, Pyriphlegethon; and in the last place, Cocytus. Besides, all of them are called rivers, though the elements are different. It is better therefore, says he, to consider the allotments, and the places themselves of souls, as receiving a fourfold division, according to depth. And prior to the places, we should consider the divine idioms, viz. the definitive, according to Ocean; the cathartic, according to Acheron; that which punishes through heat, according to Pyriphlegethon; and that which punishes through cold, according to Cocytus.

[a] Δεῖ καὶ Ὀρφέως τὴν Ἀχερουσίαν ἐκεῖνο αἰρίαν καλεῖ.

of

time baſe; and that, if any thing happens to be unpleaſant and uſeful, this it may ſay and ſing, whether it gratifies the ſpectators or not? According to which of theſe modes does the poeſy of tragedy appear to you to conſiſt?

CAL. It is evident, Socrates, that it is more impelled to pleaſure, and the gratification of the ſpectators.

SOC. Did we not, therefore, Callicles, juſt now ſay that a thing of this kind is flattery?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Come then, if any one ſhould take from all poeſy, melody, rhythm, and meaſure, would any thing elſe than diſcourſes remain?

CAL. Neceſſarily nothing elſe.

SOC. Are not, therefore, theſe diſcourſes delivered to a great multitude of people?

CAL. I ſay ſo.

SOC. Poeſy, therefore, is a certain popular ſpeech. Or do not poets appear to you to employ rhetoric in the theatres?

CAL. To me they do.

SOC. Now, therefore, we have found a certain rhetoric among a people conſiſting of boys, and at the ſame time women and men, ſlaves and the free-born; and which we do not altogether approve. For we ſaid that it was adulation.

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Be it ſo. But what ſhall we ſay that rhetoric is, which ſubſiſts among the Athenian people, and the people conſiſting of free-born men in other cities? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to ſpeak with a view to that which is beſt, directing their attention to this, that the citizens through their diſcourſes may become the beſt of men? Or are they alſo impelled to the gratification of the citizens? and, neglecting public for the ſake of private advantage, do they converſe with the people as with boys, alone endeavouring to gratify them, without being in the leaſt concerned whether through this they become better or worſe?

CAL. This which you aſk is not a ſimple thing. For ſome rhetoricians are ſolicitous in what they ſay for the good of the citizens: but others are ſuch as you repreſent them.

SOC. It is ſufficient. For, if this alſo is twofold, one part of it will be adulation,

do not know any good politician in this city: but you acknowledge that you know of none at present, but that formerly there were some; and the names of these you have mentioned: but these have appeared to be equal to the politicians of the present day. So that, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use rhetoric truly (for otherwise they would not have fallen into disgrace), nor yet did they employ adulation.

Cal. But indeed, Socrates, it is far from being the case, that any one of the present day will ever accomplish such undertakings as were accomplished by any one of those I mentioned.

Soc. Neither, O divine man, do I blame these men, so far as they were servants of the city; but they appear to me to have been more skilful ministers than those of the present day, and more adapted to procure for the city such things as it desired. But in persuading, and at the same time compelling, the citizens to repress their desires, and not indulge them, by means of which they would become better men, in this those former politicians in no respect differed from such as exist at present; for this, indeed, is alone the work of a good citizen. But, with respect to procuring ships, walls, and docks, and many other things of this kind, I also agree with you, that those were more skilful than these. I, therefore, and you, act ridiculously in this disputation. For during the whole time of our conversation we have not ceased to revolve about the same thing, and to be mutually ignorant of what we said. I think, therefore, that you have often acknowledged and known, that there is this twofold employment, both respecting the body and soul: and that the one is ministrant, by which we are enabled, if hungry, to procure food for our bodies, and, if thirsty, drink; if cold, garments, coverlids, shoes, and other things which the body requires. And I will designedly speak to you through the same images, that you may more easily understand. If any one then supplies these things, being either a victualler, or a merchant, or an artificer of some one of them, viz. a baker, or a cook, a weaver, shoemaker, or mason, it is by no means wonderful that, being a person of this kind, he should appear, both to himself and others, to be a curator of the body; I mean, to all those who are ignorant that, besides all these, there is a certain gymnastic and medicinal art, to which the care of the body in reality pertains; to which it belongs to rule over all these arts, and to use their respective works; in consequence of knowing what is good and bad in solid or

liquid

but purify ourſelves from its defiling connection, till Divinity itſelf diſſolves our bonds. And thus being pure, and liberated from the madneſs of body, it is proper to believe that we ſhall then aſſociate with others who are ſimilarly pure, and ſhall through ourſelves know every thing genuine and ſincere: and this perhaps is the truth itſelf; for it is by no means lawful that the pure ſhould be touched by that which is impure. And ſuch, O Simmias, in my opinion, ought to be the diſcourſe and ſentiments of all ſuch as are lovers of learning in a proper manner. Or does it not ſeem ſo to you?—It does, Socrates, more ſo than any thing.

If all this then (ſays Socrates) is true, my friend, much hope remains for him who arrives at that place to which I am now departing, that he ſhall there, if ever any where, ſufficiently obtain that for the ſake of which we take ſo much pains in the preſent life: ſo that the journey which is now aſſigned me will be accompanied with good hope; as will likewiſe be the caſe with any other man who thinks that he ought to prepare his dianoëtic part in ſuch a manner that it may become as it were pure.—Entirely ſo (ſays Simmias).—But does not purification conſiſt in this, as we formerly aſſerted in our diſcourſe: I mean, in ſeparating the ſoul from the body in the moſt eminent degree, and in accuſtoming it to call together and collect itſelf eſſentially on all ſides from the body, and to dwell as much as poſſible, both now and hereafter, alone by itſelf, becoming by this mean liberated, from the body as from detaining bonds?—Entirely ſo (ſays he).—Is not death called a ſolution and ſeparation of the ſoul from body?—Perfectly ſo (ſays he).—But thoſe alone who philoſophize rightly [1], as we have ſaid, always and

he nouriſhed and to ſleep; phyſical but not neceſſary, as venereal enjoyments; and thoſe which are neither phyſical nor neceſſary, as the decoration of the body, and ſuch things as pertain to variety of clothing: for that theſe laſt are neither phyſical nor neceſſary is evident from their not being uſed by other animals. As there are, therefore, theſe three energies, the philoſopher, ſays Olympiodorus, neither uſes thoſe which are phyſical and not neceſſary, nor thoſe which are neither phyſical nor neceſſary. For emiſſions in ſleep are ſufficient to him for the diſcharge of the ſeed; and he pays no attention to external decoration. He likewiſe uſes thoſe which are phyſical and neceſſary, no further than neceſſity requires. This being the caſe, the philoſopher is willing to die, and inceſſantly meditates death.

[1] Theſe only, ſays Olympiodorus, who philoſophize rightly, i. e. with an underſtanding energy, *ſpecially and always providentially* attend to a ſolution from the body; poſſeſſing the *providential* energy

justice, fortitude, and prudence itself, are each of them a certain purification. And those who instituted the mysteries for us appear to have been by no means

so, from possessing the ethical virtues, we know the fate of the universe, because fate is conversant with irrational lives. For the rational soul is not under fate; and the ethical virtues are irrational. According to the political virtues we know mundane affairs, and according to the cathartic supermundane; but as possessing the theoretic we know intellectual, and from the paradigmatic intelligible natures. Temperance also pertains to the ethical virtues; justice to the political, on account of compacts; fortitude to the cathartic, through not verging to matter; and prudence to the theoretic. Observe too, that Plato calls the physical virtues servile, because they may subsist in servile souls; but he calls the ethical σωφροφιαι, because their possessors only know *that* the energies of such virtues are right, but do not know *why* they are so. It is well observed too here, by Olympiodorus, that Plato calls the cathartic and theoretic virtues, those which are in reality true virtues. He also separates them in another way, viz. that the politic are not telestic, i. e. do not pertain to mystic ceremonies, but that the cathartic and theoretic are telestic. Hence, says Olympiodorus, the cathartic are denominated from the purification which is used in the mysteries; but the theoretic from perceiving things divine, ἀπὸ τοῦ τὰ θεῖα ὁρᾶν. On this account he accords with the Orphic verses, that

> The soul that uninitiated dies,
> Plung'd in the blackest mire in Hades lies.

For initiation is the Bacchic mysteries of the virtues (τελετὴ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἀρετῶν βακχεία). Olympiodorus also further observes, that by the thyrsus-bearers, Plato means those that energize according to the political virtues, but by the Bacchuses those that exercise the cathartic virtues. For we are bound in matter as Titans, through the great partibility of our nature; but we rise from the dark mire as Bacchuses. Hence we become more prophetic at the time of death: and Bacchus is the inspective guardian of death, because he is likewise of every thing pertaining to the Bacchic sacred rites.

It is here too necessary to observe, that all the virtues exhibit their proper characters, these being every where common, but subsisting appropriately in each. For the characteristic property of fortitude is the not declining to things subordinate; of temperance, a conversion from an inferior nature; of justice, a proper energy, and adapted to being; and of prudence, the election and selection of things good and evil. Observe too, with Olympiodorus, that all the virtues are in the Gods: for many Gods, says he, are adorned with their appellations; and all goodness originates from the Gods. Likewise prior to things which sometimes participate the virtues, as is our case, it is necessary there should be natures which always participate them. In what order, therefore, do the virtues first appear? Shall we say in the psychical? For virtue is the perfection of the soul; and election and pre-election are the energies and projections of the soul. Hence the Chaldæan oracles conjoin fontal virtue with fontal soul, or, in other words, with soul subsisting according to cause. But may it not also be said, that the virtues naturally wish to give an orderly arrangement to disorder? If this be admitted, they will originate from the demiurgic order.

whoever arrived there, purified and initiated, ſhould dwell with the Gods. For, as it is ſaid by thoſe who write about the myſteries,

> " The thyrſus-bearers[1] numerous are ſeen,
> " But few the Bacchides have always been."

Theſe few are, in my opinion, no other than thoſe who philoſophize rightly; and that I may be ranked in the number of theſe, I ſhall leave nothing unattempted, but exert myſelf in all poſſible ways. But whether or not my exertions will be properly directed, and whether I ſhall accompliſh any thing when I arrive thither, I ſhall clearly know, very ſhortly, if Divinity pleaſes, as it appears to me. And this (ſays he), Simmias and Cebes, is my apology[2], why upon leaving you, and the rulers of the preſent life, I ought not to be afflicted and indignant, ſince I am perſuaded that I ſhall there meet with maſters and companions not leſs good than ſuch as are here. This indeed is incredible to many; but if my apology ſhall have more influence with you than with the judges of the Athenians, it will have a good effect.

[1] The thyrſus, ſays Olympiodorus, is a ſymbol of material and paſſible fabrication, on account of its diviſible continuity, whence alſo it is a Titanic plant. For it is extended before Bacchus inſtead of his paternal ſceptre, and through this they call him into a partial nature. Beſides, ſays he, the Titans are thyrſus-bearers; and Prometheus concealed fire in a reed, whether by this we are to underſtand that he draws down celeſtial light into generation, or inſpels ſoul into body, or calls forth divine illumination, the whole of which is ungenerated, into generation. Hence Socrates Orphically calls the multitude thyrſus-bearers, as living Titanically. Olympiodorus further adds, that he who lives Bacchically, now reſts from his labours, is liberated from his bonds, and diſmiſſes his guard, or rather his confined life; and ſuch a one is a cathartic philoſopher. Some too, ſays he, prefer *philoſophy*, as Porphyry and Plotinus, and many other philoſophers; but others prefer the *hieratic* diſcipline, or the diſcipline pertaining to ſacred ceremonies, as Jamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus, and all the *hieratic* philoſophers. Plato, however, knowing that much may be ſaid on both ſides, collects the arguments into one, by calling the philoſopher a Bacchus.

[2] The apology of Socrates is twofold, one to the Athenian judges, and the other to the moſt genuine of his aſſociates. The one contending for the ſafety of the animal, i. e. of the compoſite of ſoul and body, but the other for the ſeparate and proper life of the ſoul. The one alſo being a mixture of ſcience and opinion, but the other of intellect and ſcience. The one proceeding from the political life, but the other from the cathartic life. And the one evincing that the death which is apparent and known to all men is good; but the other, that this muſt be aſſerted of the true death, and which is only known to philoſophers.

When

thoſe who are accuſtomed to ſpeak about it imagine, as I am perſuaded from a certain perſon's account.—How is this, Socrates (ſays Simmias)? For I myſelf alſo have heard many things about the earth; and yet perhaps not theſe particulars which have obtained your belief. I ſhould therefore be glad to hear you relate them.—Indeed, Simmias (ſays he), the art of Glaucus does not appear to me to be neceſſary, in order to relate theſe particulars; but to evince their truth, ſeems to me to be an undertaking beyond what the art of Glaucus can accompliſh. Beſides, I myſelf perhaps am not able to accompliſh this; and even though I ſhould know how, the time which is allotted me to live, Simmias, ſeems by no means ſufficient for the length of ſuch a diſcourſe. However, nothing hinders me from informing you what I am perſuaded is the truth, reſpecting the form of the earth, and the places which it contains.—And this information (ſays Simmias) will be ſufficient.—I am perſuaded, therefore (ſays he), in the firſt place, that if the earth is in the middle of the heavens, and is of a ſpherical figure, it has no occaſion of air, nor of any other ſuch-like neceſſity, to prevent it from falling: but that the perfect ſimilitude of the heavens to themſelves, and the equilibrity of the earth, are ſufficient cauſes of its ſupport. For that which is equally inclined, when placed in the middle of a ſimilar nature, cannot tend more or leſs to one part than another; but, ſubſiſting on all ſides ſimilarly affected, it will remain free from all inclination. This is the firſt thing of which I am perſuaded.—And very properly ſo (ſays Cebes).—But yet further (ſays he), that the earth is prodigiouſly[1] great; that we who

conſequently this muſt alſo be true of the earth. It is likewiſe evident that the earth is in the middle. For, if the univerſe is ſpherical, it ſubſiſts about the centre: the parts of the univerſe, therefore, which rank as wholes will alſo ſubſiſt about centres, and conſequently this will be the caſe with the earth. Let it, however, be admitted, that it ſubſiſts about a centre, but whence is it evident that it ſubſiſts about the centre of the univerſe? We reply, that if it is the moſt groſs of all the bodies, it will be the laſt of them; for the moſt attenuated of bodies, as being able to pervade through each other, poſſeſs the higher place, conſequently to the order of attenuation; and the earth the lower.

[1] That the earth is very great, ſays Olympiodorus, is evident from the Atlantic iſland ſurpaſſing in magnitude both Aſia and Libya. It is alſo evident from the perfection of the places which we inhabit, ſince ſuch places cannot rank as firſt. It is likewiſe evident from the ſummits of things boundary wiſhing to be aſſimilated to the extremities of things prior to them; ſo that the ſummit of earth muſt be attenuated and paſſive, ſimilar to the moſt precious ſtones and metals.

is neceſſary that we muſt have learned the things which we now call to mind in ſome former period of time. But this is impoſſible, unleſs our ſoul ſub-

the reader. Unleſs the ſoul then had a being prior to her connexion with the preſent body, ſhe never would be led to ſearch after knowledge. For if the objects of her inveſtigation were things which ſhe had never before been acquainted with, how could ſhe ever be certain that ſhe detected them? Indeed it would be as impoſſible on this hypotheſis for the ſoul to know any thing about them, even when ſhe perceived them, as it would be to tell the meaning of the words of an unknown language on hearing them pronounced. The Peripateties, in order to ſubvert this conſequence, have recourſe to an intellect in capacity, which is the paſſive recipient of all forms. The doubt however ſtill remains. For how does this intellect underſtand? For it muſt either underſtand the things which it already knows, or things which it does not know. But the Stoics aſſert, that natural conceptions are the cauſes of our inveſtigating and diſcovering truth. If, therefore, theſe conceptions are in capacity, we aſk the ſame queſtion as before; but if they are in energy, why do we inveſtigate things which we know? Laſtly, the Epicureans affirm that anticipations are the cauſes of our inveſtigations. If then they ſay that theſe anticipations ſubſiſt diſtinctly, inveſtigation muſt be vain; but if indiſtinctly, why do we ſeek after any thing beſides theſe anticipations? Or, in other words, why do we ſeek after diſtinct knowledge, of which we have no anticipation?

Again, there are numberleſs inſtances of perſons that are terrified at certain animals, ſuch as cats, lizards, and tortoiſes, without knowing the cauſe of their terror. Thus the nephews of Berius, ſays Olympiodorus, that were accuſtomed to hunt bears and lions, could not endure the ſight of a cock. The ſame author adds, that a certain apothecary could look undiſturbed at aſps and ſnakes, but was ſo exceedingly frightened at a waſp, that he would run from it crying aloud, and ſtupeſied with terror. Thus too, ſays he, Themiſon the phyſician could apply himſelf to the cure of every diſeaſe except the hydrophobia; but if any perſon only mentioned this diſeaſe, he would be immediately agitated, and ſuffer in a manner ſimilar to thoſe afflicted with this malady. Now it is impoſſible to aſſign any other ſatisfactory cauſe of all this, than a reminiſcence of having ſuffered through theſe animals in a prior ſtate of exiſtence.

Further ſtill, infants are not ſeen to laugh for nearly three weeks after their birth, but paſs the greateſt part of this time in ſleep; however, in their ſleep they are often ſeen both to laugh and cry. But how is it poſſible that this can any otherwiſe happen than through the ſoul being agitated by the whirling motions of the animal nature, and moved in conformity to the paſſions which it had experienced in another life? Beſides, our looking into ourſelves, when we are endeavouring to diſcover any truth, evinces that we inwardly contain truth, though concealed in the darkneſs of obſcurity. The delight too which attends our diſcovery of truth, ſufficiently proves that this diſcovery is nothing more than a recognition of ſomething moſt eminently allied to our nature, and which had been, as it were, loſt in the middle ſpace of time, between our former knowledge of the truth and the recovery of that knowledge. For the perception of a thing perfectly unknown and unconnected with our nature, would produce terror inſtead of delight; and things are pleaſing only in proportion as they poſſeſs ſomething known and domeſtic to the nature by which they are known.

ſiſted

becility having never aſcended to the top of the ſea, nor emerged from its deeps into this region, has never perceived how much purer and more beautiful it is than the place which he inhabits, nor has received this information from any other who has beheld this place of our abode. In the very ſame manner are we affected: for, dwelling in a certain hollow of the earth, we think that we reſide on its ſurface; and we call the air heaven, as if the ſtars paſſed through this, as through the heavens themſelves. And this likewiſe, in the ſame manner as in the above inſtance, happens to us through our imbecility and ſloth, which render us incapable of aſcending to the ſummit of the air. For, otherwiſe, if any one could arrive at its ſummit, or, becoming winged, could fly thither, he would be ſeen emerging from hence; and juſt as fiſhes, emerging hither from the ſea, perceive what our region contains, in the ſame manner would he behold the ſeveral particulars belonging to the ſummit of the earth. And beſides this, if his nature was ſufficient for ſuch an elevated ſurvey, he would know that the heavens which he there beheld were the true heavens, and that he perceived the true light and the true earth. For this earth which we inhabit, the ſtones which it contains, and the whole region of our abode, are all corrupted and gnawed, juſt as things in the ſea are corroded by the ſalt: for nothing worthy of eſtimation grows in the ſea, nor does it contain any thing perfect; but caverns and ſand, and immenſe quantities of mud and filth, are found in it wherever there is earth. Nor are its contents to be by any means compared with the beauty of the various particulars in our place of abode. But thoſe upper regions of the earth will appear to be yet far more excellent than theſe which we inhabit. For, if it is proper to tell you a beautiful fable, it is well worth hearing, Simmias, what kind of places thoſe are on the upper earth, ſituated under the heavens.

It is reported then, my friend (ſays he), in the firſt place, that this earth, if any one ſurveys it from on high, appears like globes covered with twelve ſkins, various[1], and diſtinguiſhed with colours; a pattern of which are the colours

[1] The earth is diſtinguiſhed with colours, ſays Olympiodorus, according to the *phyſical* variety of colours; according to the deluſions of celeſtial illuminations from Mars and the Sun; and according to inviſible fires, which proceed as far as to viſible beauty. With reſpect to the elements likewiſe on the ſummit of the earth, water there is as vapour, and as moiſt air; but air is ether,

others dwell about the air, as we do about the sea; and others reside in islands which the air flows round, and which are situated not far from the continent. And in one word, what water and the sea are to us, with respect to utility, that air is to them: but what air is to us, that æther is to the inhabitants of this pure earth. But the seasons there are endued with such an excellent temperament, that the inhabitants are never molested with disease, and live for a much longer time than those who dwell in our regions; and they surpass us in sight, hearing, and prudence, and every thing of this kind, as much as air excels water in purity—and æther, air. And besides this, they have groves and temples of the Gods, in which the Gods dwell in reality; and likewise oracles and divinations, and sensible perceptions of the Gods, and such-like associations with them. The sun too, and moon, and stars, are seen by them such as they really are; and in every other respect their felicity is of a correspondent nature.

And in this manner indeed the whole earth naturally subsists, and the parts which are situated about it. But it contains about the whole of its ambit many places in its concavities; some of which are more profound and extended than the region which we inhabit: but others are more profound, indeed, but yet have a less chasm than the places of our abode; and there are certain parts which are less profound [1], but broader than ours. But all these are in many places perforated into one another under the earth, according to narrower and broader avenues, and have passages of communication through which a great quantity of water flows into the different hollows of the earth, as into bowls; and besides this, there are immense bulks of ever-flowing rivers under the earth, and of hot and cold waters; likewise a great quantity of fire, mighty rivers of fire, and many of moist mire, some of which are purer, and others more muddy; as in Sicily there are rivers of mud, which flow before a stream of fire, which is itself a flaming torrent.

alone, what ought we to think of the inhabitants which are there? Και τι θαυμαστον, ἐπι και οἱ Αθηναι φθε πως ἐχοιεν δια τον τον αἱρον συμμετριον. και ο ἐνταυθα ἐστερει Αριστοτελης ανθρωπον ουσης και μειρ τῳ ἐκινειδι τρεφεσιν αἱρι, τι χρη περι τον ἐκει ουσθαι.

[1] Plato, says Olympiodorus, directs his attention to the four quarters of the globe: for since there are two which we inhabit, viz. Europe and Asia, there must also be two others according to the antipodes. Καταστεχαζεται δε τον τετραρον τοπαρον, ουσθα δια καθ' ἑαυτ ειρος ἡ Ευρωπη και ἡ Ασιας ἀστε δεν αλλαι κατα τους αντιπεδας.

And

the water which they have drawn. But when this water, departing from thence, is impelled hither, it again fills the rivers on the earth; and these, when filled, flow through channels and through the earth; and when they have severally passed through the avenues, which are open to each, they produce seas, lakes, rivers, and fountains. Flowing back again from hence under the earth, and some of them streaming round longer and more numerous places, but others round such as are shorter and less numerous, they again hurl themselves into Tartarus; and some indeed much more profoundly, but others less so, than they were drawn: but the influxions of all of them are deeper than the places from which they flow upwards. And the effluxions of some are in a direction contrary to their influxions, but in others both take place according to the same part. There are some again which entirely flow round in a circle, folding themselves like snakes, once or often about the earth; and being bent downwards as much as possible, they are again hurled forth on each side till they arrive at the middle, but never beyond this. For each part of the earth becomes steep to both these streams.

The other rivers, indeed, are many, great, and various: but among this abundance there are certain streams, four [1] in number, of which the greatest, and which circularly flows round the earth the outermost of all, is called the Ocean. But that which flows opposite, and in a contrary direction to this, is Acheron; which, flowing through other solitary places, and under the earth, devolves its waters into the Acherusian marsh, into which many souls

[1] The four rivers which are here mentioned are, says Olympiodorus, according to the Interpreter (i. e. Ammonius Hermeas), the four elements in Tartarus. Of these Ocean is water; Cocytus, or rather Styx, is earth; Pyriphlegethon is fire; and Acheron is air. But Styx is opposed to Pyriphlegethon, as heat to cold; and Acheron to Ocean, as air to water. Hence also Orpheus [a] calls the Acherusian lake aërial. However, says Olympiodorus, the position of the rivers does not correspond to this interpretation. For Ocean is first, and in the higher place. Under this is Acheron. Under this again, Pyriphlegethon; and in the last place, Cocytus. Besides, all of them are called rivers, though the elements are different. It is better therefore, says he, to consider the allotments, and the places themselves of souls, as receiving a fourfold division, according to depth. And prior to the places, we should consider the divine idioms, viz. the definitive, according to Ocean; the cathartic, according to Acheron; that which punishes through heat, according to Pyriphlegethon; and that which punishes through cold, according to Cocytus.

[a] Δεῖ καὶ Ὀρφέως τὴν Ἀχερουσίαν ἐκεῖνο αἰρίαν καλεῖ.

of

time baſe; and that, if any thing happens to be unpleaſant and uſeful, this it may ſay and ſing, whether it gratifies the ſpectators or not? According to which of theſe modes does the poeſy of tragedy appear to you to conſiſt?

CAL. It is evident, Socrates, that it is more impelled to pleaſure, and the gratification of the ſpectators.

SOC. Did we not, therefore, Callicles, juſt now ſay that a thing of this kind is flattery?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Come then, if any one ſhould take from all poeſy, melody, rhythm, and meaſure, would any thing elſe than diſcourſes remain?

CAL. Neceſſarily nothing elſe.

SOC. Are not, therefore, theſe diſcourſes delivered to a great multitude of people?

CAL. I ſay ſo.

SOC. Poeſy, therefore, is a certain popular ſpeech. Or do not poets appear to you to employ rhetoric in the theatres?

CAL. To me they do.

SOC. Now, therefore, we have found a certain rhetoric among a people conſiſting of boys, and at the ſame time women and men, ſlaves and the free-born; and which we do not altogether approve. For we ſaid that it was adulation.

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Be it ſo. But what ſhall we ſay that rhetoric is, which ſubſiſts among the Athenian people, and the people conſiſting of free-born men in other cities? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to ſpeak with a view to that which is beſt, directing their attention to this, that the citizens through their diſcourſes may become the beſt of men? Or are they alſo impelled to the gratification of the citizens? and, neglecting public for the ſake of private advantage, do they converſe with the people as with boys, alone endeavouring to gratify them, without being in the leaſt concerned whether through this they become better or worſe?

CAL. This which you aſk is not a ſimple thing. For ſome rhetoricians are ſolicitous in what they ſay for the good of the citizens: but others are ſuch as you repreſent them.

SOC. It is ſufficient. For, if this alſo is twofold, one part of it will be adulation,

do not know any good politician in this city: but you acknowledge that you know of none at present, but that formerly there were some; and the names of these you have mentioned: but these have appeared to be equal to the politicians of the present day. So that, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use rhetoric truly (for otherwise they would not have fallen into disgrace), nor yet did they employ adulation.

Cal. But indeed, Socrates, it is far from being the case, that any one of the present day will ever accomplish such undertakings as were accomplished by any one of those I mentioned.

Soc. Neither, O divine man, do I blame these men, so far as they were servants of the city; but they appear to me to have been more skilful ministers than those of the present day, and more adapted to procure for the city such things as it desired. But in persuading, and at the same time compelling, the citizens to repress their desires, and not indulge them, by means of which they would become better men, in this those former politicians in no respect differed from such as exist at present; for this, indeed, is alone the work of a good citizen. But, with respect to procuring ships, walls, and docks, and many other things of this kind, I also agree with you, that those were more skilful than these. I, therefore, and you, act ridiculously in this disputation. For during the whole time of our conversation we have not ceased to revolve about the same thing, and to be mutually ignorant of what we said. I think, therefore, that you have often acknowledged and known, that there is this twofold employment, both respecting the body and soul: and that the one is ministrant, by which we are enabled, if hungry, to procure food for our bodies, and, if thirsty, drink; if cold, garments, coverlids, shoes, and other things which the body requires. And I will designedly speak to you through the same images, that you may more easily understand. If any one then supplies these things, being either a victualler, or a merchant, or an artificer of some one of them, viz. a baker, or a cook, a weaver, shoemaker, or mason, it is by no means wonderful that, being a person of this kind, he should appear, both to himself and others, to be a curator of the body; I mean, to all those who are ignorant that, besides all these, there is a certain gymnastic and medicinal art, to which the care of the body in reality pertains; to which it belongs to rule over all these arts, and to use their respective works; in consequence of knowing what is good and bad in solid or

liquid

energy by itself sincere, at the same time endeavours to hunt [1] after every thing which has true being subsisting by itself separate and pure; and who in the most eminent degree is liberated from the eyes and ears, and in short from the whole body, as disturbing the soul, and not suffering it to acquire truth and wisdom by its conjunction? Will not such a man, Simmias, procure for himself real being, if this can ever be asserted of any one?—You speak the truth, Socrates (says Simmias), in a transcendent [2] manner.

Is it not necessary, therefore (says Socrates), from hence, that an opinion of this kind should be present with genuine philosophers in such a manner, that they will speak among themselves as follows: In the consideration of things, this opinion, like a certain path, leads us in conjunction with reason from the vulgar track, that, as long as we are connected with a body, and our soul is contaminated with such an evil, we can never sufficiently obtain the object of our desire; and this object we have asserted to be truth? For the body [3] subjects us to innumerable occupations through necessary aliment,

[1] The verb *hunting*, says Olympiodorus, is adapted to intelligibles, because these are known by an unapparent power of the soul, in the same manner as hunters study to be invisible to the objects of their pursuit. Ὅσον τὸ δύνασθαι τὰς τοιαύτας, δεῖ μᾶλλον λαμβάνειν τὸν ἄδηλον τρόπον ἐπιτηδεύοντας, καθάπερ καὶ οἱ θηρεύοντες μᾶλλον ἐπιτηδεύουσι τὸ λανθάνειν.

[2] The word in the original is ὑπερφυῶς, which is literally *supernaturally*. And, as Olympiodorus says, it is very properly used here, because the discourse is about intelligibles.

[3] The *vital irrational* part of our nature is an impediment to the *rational* soul. For this is twofold: for it is either beheld about the body alone, as fears, desires and loves, or about things external, as wars, and the accumulation of wealth. The *gnostic irrational* part also becomes an impediment, as for instance, the phantasy, which is always a hindrance to our intellectual conceptions. For there are two passions which it is difficult to wipe away, in knowledge the phantasy, and self-love; since these are the things with which the soul becomes first involved, and which lie, in the last place, lays aside. For the first vital vehicle of the soul is ambition, and the first gnostic is the phantasy. Hence, says Olympiodorus, Ulysses required the assistance of the mercurial wand, and right reason, in order to fly from Calypso, or the phantasy which like a cloud becomes an impediment to reason, the sun of the soul. For the phantasy is a veil, and hinders from our eyes it long wished. On this account, Ulysses left Circe, that is, Sense, as being the daughter of the Sun. The phantasy, therefore, is an impediment to our intellectual conceptions; and hence (Olympiodorus adds), when we are agitated by the inspiring influence of Divinity, if the phantasy intervenes, the enthusiastic energy ceases: for enthusiasm and the phantasy are contrary to each other. Should it be asked, whether the soul is able to energize without the phantasy? we reply, that in perceptions of universals it is able. It has perception, therefore, independent of the phantasy; at the same time, however, the phantasy attends it in its energies, just as a flame purifies him who falls on the fire.

and

but purify ourſelves from its defiling connection, till Divinity itſelf diſſolves our bonds. And thus being pure, and liberated from the madneſs of body, it is proper to believe that we ſhall then aſſociate with others who are ſimilarly pure, and ſhall through ourſelves know every thing genuine and ſincere: and this perhaps is the truth itſelf; for it is by no means lawful that the pure ſhould be touched by that which is impure. And ſuch, O Simmias, in my opinion, ought to be the diſcourſe and ſentiments of all ſuch as are lovers of learning in a proper manner. Or does it not ſeem ſo to you?—It does, Socrates, more ſo than any thing.

If all this then (ſays Socrates) is true, my friend, much hope remains for him who arrives at that place to which I am now departing, that he ſhall there, if ever any where, ſufficiently obtain that for the ſake of which we take ſo much pains in the preſent life: ſo that the journey which is now aſſigned me will be accompanied with good hope; as will likewiſe be the caſe with any other man who thinks that he ought to prepare his dianoëtic part in ſuch a manner that it may become as it were pure.—Entirely ſo (ſays Simmias).—But does not purification conſiſt in this, as we formerly aſſerted in our diſcourſe: I mean, in ſeparating the ſoul from the body in the moſt eminent degree, and in accuſtoming it to call together and collect itſelf eſſentially on all ſides from the body, and to dwell as much as poſſible, both now and hereafter, alone by itſelf, becoming by this mean liberated, from the body as from detaining bonds?—Entirely ſo (ſays he).—Is not death called a ſolution and ſeparation of the ſoul from body?—Perfectly ſo (ſays he).—But thoſe alone who philoſophize rightly [1], as we have ſaid, always and

he nouriſhed and to ſleep; phyſical but not neceſſary, as venereal enjoyments; and thoſe which are neither phyſical nor neceſſary, as the decoration of the body, and ſuch things as pertain to variety of clothing: for that theſe laſt are neither phyſical nor neceſſary is evident from their not being uſed by other animals. As there are, therefore, theſe three energies, the philoſopher, ſays Olympiodorus, neither uſes thoſe which are phyſical and not neceſſary, nor thoſe which are neither phyſical nor neceſſary. For emiſſions in ſleep are ſufficient to him for the diſcharge of the ſeed; and he pays no attention to external decoration. He likewiſe uſes thoſe which are phyſical and neceſſary, no further than neceſſity requires. This being the caſe, the philoſopher is willing to die, and inceſſantly meditates death.

[1] Theſe only, ſays Olympiodorus, who philoſophize rightly, i. e. with an underſtanding energy, *ſpecially and always providentially* attend to a ſolution from the body; poſſeſſing the *providential* energy

justice, fortitude, and prudence itself, are each of them a certain purification. And those who instituted the mysteries for us appear to have been by no means

so, from possessing the ethical virtues, we know the fate of the universe, because fate is conversant with irrational lives. For the rational soul is not under fate; and the ethical virtues are irrational. According to the political virtues we know mundane affairs, and according to the cathartic supermundane; but as possessing the theoretic we know intellectual, and from the paradigmatic intelligible natures. Temperance also pertains to the ethical virtues; justice to the political, on account of compacts; fortitude to the cathartic, through not verging to matter; and prudence to the theoretic. Observe too, that Plato calls the physical virtues servile, because they may subsist in servile souls; but he calls the ethical σωφροφιαι, because their possessors only know *that* the energies of such virtues are right, but do not know *why* they are so. It is well observed too here, by Olympiodorus, that Plato calls the cathartic and theoretic virtues, those which are in reality true virtues. He also separates them in another way, viz. that the politic are not telestic, i. e. do not pertain to mystic ceremonies, but that the cathartic and theoretic are telestic. Hence, says Olympiodorus, the cathartic are denominated from the purification which is used in the mysteries; but the theoretic from perceiving things divine, ἀπὸ τοῦ τὰ θεῖα ὁρᾶν. On this account he accords with the Orphic verses, that

> The soul that uninitiated dies,
> Plung'd in the blackest mire in Hades lies.

For initiation is the Bacchic mysteries of the virtues (τελετὴ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἀρετῶν βακχεία). Olympiodorus also further observes, that by the thyrsus-bearers, Plato means those that energize according to the political virtues, but by the Bacchuses those that exercise the cathartic virtues. For we are bound in matter as Titans, through the great partibility of our nature; but we rise from the dark mire as Bacchuses. Hence we become more prophetic at the time of death: and Bacchus is the inspective guardian of death, because he is likewise of every thing pertaining to the Bacchic sacred rites.

It is here too necessary to observe, that all the virtues exhibit their proper characters, these being every where common, but subsisting appropriately in each. For the characteristic property of fortitude is the not declining to things subordinate; of temperance, a conversion from an inferior nature; of justice, a proper energy, and adapted to being; and of prudence, the election and selection of things good and evil. Observe too, with Olympiodorus, that all the virtues are in the Gods: for many Gods, says he, are adorned with their appellations; and all goodness originates from the Gods. Likewise prior to things which sometimes participate the virtues, as is our case, it is necessary there should be natures which always participate them. In what order, therefore, do the virtues first appear? Shall we say in the psychical? For virtue is the perfection of the soul; and election and pre-election are the energies and projections of the soul. Hence the Chaldæan oracles conjoin fontal virtue with fontal soul, or, in other words, with soul subsisting according to cause. But may it not also be said, that the virtues naturally wish to give an orderly arrangement to disorder? If this be admitted, they will originate from the demiurgic order.

whoever arrived there, purified and initiated, ſhould dwell with the Gods. For, as it is ſaid by thoſe who write about the myſteries,

> " The thyrſus-bearers[1] numerous are ſeen,
> " But few the Bacchides have always been."

Theſe few are, in my opinion, no other than thoſe who philoſophize rightly; and that I may be ranked in the number of theſe, I ſhall leave nothing unattempted, but exert myſelf in all poſſible ways. But whether or not my exertions will be properly directed, and whether I ſhall accompliſh any thing when I arrive thither, I ſhall clearly know, very ſhortly, if Divinity pleaſes, as it appears to me. And this (ſays he), Simmias and Cebes, is my apology[2], why upon leaving you, and the rulers of the preſent life, I ought not to be afflicted and indignant, ſince I am perſuaded that I ſhall there meet with maſters and companions not leſs good than ſuch as are here. This indeed is incredible to many; but if my apology ſhall have more influence with you than with the judges of the Athenians, it will have a good effect.

[1] The thyrſus, ſays Olympiodorus, is a ſymbol of material and paſſible fabrication, on account of its diviſible continuity, whence alſo it is a Titanic plant. For it is extended before Bacchus inſtead of his paternal ſceptre, and through this they call him into a partial nature. Beſides, ſays he, the Titans are thyrſus-bearers; and Prometheus concealed fire in a reed, whether by this we are to underſtand that he draws down celeſtial light into generation, or inſpels ſoul into body, or calls forth divine illumination, the whole of which is ungenerated, into generation. Hence Socrates Orphically calls the multitude thyrſus-bearers, as living Titanically. Olympiodorus further adds, that he who lives Bacchically, now reſts from his labours, is liberated from his bonds, and diſmiſſes his guard, or rather his confined life; and ſuch a one is a cathartic philoſopher. Some too, ſays he, prefer *philoſophy*, as Porphyry and Plotinus, and many other philoſophers; but others prefer the *hieratic* diſcipline, or the diſcipline pertaining to ſacred ceremonies, as Jamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus, and all the *hieratic* philoſophers. Plato, however, knowing that much may be ſaid on both ſides, collects the arguments into one, by calling the philoſopher a Bacchus.

[2] The apology of Socrates is twofold, one to the Athenian judges, and the other to the moſt genuine of his aſſociates. The one contending for the ſafety of the animal, i. e. of the compoſite of ſoul and body, but the other for the ſeparate and proper life of the ſoul. The one alſo being a mixture of ſcience and opinion, but the other of intellect and ſcience. The one proceeding from the political life, but the other from the cathartic life. And the one evincing that the death which is apparent and known to all men is good; but the other, that this muſt be aſſerted of the true death, and which is only known to philoſophers.

When

thoſe who are accuſtomed to ſpeak about it imagine, as I am perſuaded from a certain perſon's account.—How is this, Socrates (ſays Simmias)? For I myſelf alſo have heard many things about the earth; and yet perhaps not theſe particulars which have obtained your belief. I ſhould therefore be glad to hear you relate them.—Indeed, Simmias (ſays he), the art of Glaucus does not appear to me to be neceſſary, in order to relate theſe particulars; but to evince their truth, ſeems to me to be an undertaking beyond what the art of Glaucus can accompliſh. Beſides, I myſelf perhaps am not able to accompliſh this; and even though I ſhould know how, the time which is allotted me to live, Simmias, ſeems by no means ſufficient for the length of ſuch a diſcourſe. However, nothing hinders me from informing you what I am perſuaded is the truth, reſpecting the form of the earth, and the places which it contains.—And this information (ſays Simmias) will be ſufficient.—I am perſuaded, therefore (ſays he), in the firſt place, that if the earth is in the middle of the heavens, and is of a ſpherical figure, it has no occaſion of air, nor of any other ſuch-like neceſſity, to prevent it from falling: but that the perfect ſimilitude of the heavens to themſelves, and the equilibrity of the earth, are ſufficient cauſes of its ſupport. For that which is equally inclined, when placed in the middle of a ſimilar nature, cannot tend more or leſs to one part than another; but, ſubſiſting on all ſides ſimilarly affected, it will remain free from all inclination. This is the firſt thing of which I am perſuaded.—And very properly ſo (ſays Cebes).—But yet further (ſays he), that the earth is prodigiouſly[1] great; that we who

conſequently this muſt alſo be true of the earth. It is likewiſe evident that the earth is in the middle. For, if the univerſe is ſpherical, it ſubſiſts about the centre: the parts of the univerſe, therefore, which rank as wholes will alſo ſubſiſt about centres, and conſequently this will be the caſe with the earth. Let it, however, be admitted, that it ſubſiſts about a centre, but whence is it evident that it ſubſiſts about the centre of the univerſe? We reply, that if it is the moſt groſs of all the bodies, it will be the laſt of them; for the moſt attenuated of bodies, as being able to pervade through each other, poſſeſs the higher place, conſequently to the order of attenuation; and the earth the lower.

[1] That the earth is very great, ſays Olympiodorus, is evident from the Atlantic iſland ſurpaſſing in magnitude both Aſia and Libya. It is alſo evident from the perfection of the places which we inhabit, ſince ſuch places cannot rank as firſt. It is likewiſe evident from the ſummits of things boundary wiſhing to be aſſimilated to the extremities of things prior to them; ſo that the ſummit of earth muſt be attenuated and paſſive, ſimilar to the moſt precious ſtones and metals.

is neceſſary that we muſt have learned the things which we now call to mind in ſome former period of time. But this is impoſſible, unleſs our ſoul ſub-

the reader. Unleſs the ſoul then had a being prior to her connexion with the preſent body, ſhe never would be led to ſearch after knowledge. For if the objects of her inveſtigation were things which ſhe had never before been acquainted with, how could ſhe ever be certain that ſhe detected them? Indeed it would be as impoſſible on this hypotheſis for the ſoul to know any thing about them, even when ſhe perceived them, as it would be to tell the meaning of the words of an unknown language on hearing them pronounced. The Peripateties, in order to ſubvert this conſequence, have recourſe to an intellect in capacity, which is the paſſive recipient of all forms. The doubt however ſtill remains. For how does this intellect underſtand? For it muſt either underſtand the things which it already knows, or things which it does not know. But the Stoics aſſert, that natural conceptions are the cauſes of our inveſtigating and diſcovering truth. If, therefore, theſe conceptions are in capacity, we aſk the ſame queſtion as before; but if they are in energy, why do we inveſtigate things which we know? Laſtly, the Epicureans affirm that anticipations are the cauſes of our inveſtigations. If then they ſay that theſe anticipations ſubſiſt diſtinctly, inveſtigation muſt be vain; but if indiſtinctly, why do we ſeek after any thing beſides theſe anticipations? Or, in other words, why do we ſeek after diſtinct knowledge, of which we have no anticipation?

Again, there are numberleſs inſtances of perſons that are terrified at certain animals, ſuch as cats, lizards, and tortoiſes, without knowing the cauſe of their terror. Thus the nephews of Berius, ſays Olympiodorus, that were accuſtomed to hunt bears and lions, could not endure the ſight of a cock. The ſame author adds, that a certain apothecary could look undiſturbed at aſps and ſnakes, but was ſo exceedingly frightened at a waſp, that he would run from it crying aloud, and ſtupeſied with terror. Thus too, ſays he, Themiſon the phyſician could apply himſelf to the cure of every diſeaſe except the hydrophobia; but if any perſon only mentioned this diſeaſe, he would be immediately agitated, and ſuffer in a manner ſimilar to thoſe afflicted with this malady. Now it is impoſſible to aſſign any other ſatisfactory cauſe of all this, than a reminiſcence of having ſuffered through theſe animals in a prior ſtate of exiſtence.

Further ſtill, infants are not ſeen to laugh for nearly three weeks after their birth, but paſs the greateſt part of this time in ſleep; however, in their ſleep they are often ſeen both to laugh and cry. But how is it poſſible that this can any otherwiſe happen than through the ſoul being agitated by the whirling motions of the animal nature, and moved in conformity to the paſſions which it had experienced in another life? Beſides, our looking into ourſelves, when we are endeavouring to diſcover any truth, evinces that we inwardly contain truth, though concealed in the darkneſs of obſcurity. The delight too which attends our diſcovery of truth, ſufficiently proves that this diſcovery is nothing more than a recognition of ſomething moſt eminently allied to our nature, and which had been, as it were, loſt in the middle ſpace of time, between our former knowledge of the truth and the recovery of that knowledge. For the perception of a thing perfectly unknown and unconnected with our nature, would produce terror inſtead of delight; and things are pleaſing only in proportion as they poſſeſs ſomething known and domeſtic to the nature by which they are known.

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becility having never aſcended to the top of the ſea, nor emerged from its deeps into this region, has never perceived how much purer and more beautiful it is than the place which he inhabits, nor has received this information from any other who has beheld this place of our abode. In the very ſame manner are we affected: for, dwelling in a certain hollow of the earth, we think that we reſide on its ſurface; and we call the air heaven, as if the ſtars paſſed through this, as through the heavens themſelves. And this likewiſe, in the ſame manner as in the above inſtance, happens to us through our imbecility and ſloth, which render us incapable of aſcending to the ſummit of the air. For, otherwiſe, if any one could arrive at its ſummit, or, becoming winged, could fly thither, he would be ſeen emerging from hence; and juſt as fiſhes, emerging hither from the ſea, perceive what our region contains, in the ſame manner would he behold the ſeveral particulars belonging to the ſummit of the earth. And beſides this, if his nature was ſufficient for ſuch an elevated ſurvey, he would know that the heavens which he there beheld were the true heavens, and that he perceived the true light and the true earth. For this earth which we inhabit, the ſtones which it contains, and the whole region of our abode, are all corrupted and gnawed, juſt as things in the ſea are corroded by the ſalt: for nothing worthy of eſtimation grows in the ſea, nor does it contain any thing perfect; but caverns and ſand, and immenſe quantities of mud and filth, are found in it wherever there is earth. Nor are its contents to be by any means compared with the beauty of the various particulars in our place of abode. But thoſe upper regions of the earth will appear to be yet far more excellent than theſe which we inhabit. For, if it is proper to tell you a beautiful fable, it is well worth hearing, Simmias, what kind of places thoſe are on the upper earth, ſituated under the heavens.

It is reported then, my friend (ſays he), in the firſt place, that this earth, if any one ſurveys it from on high, appears like globes covered with twelve ſkins, various[1], and diſtinguiſhed with colours; a pattern of which are the colours

[1] The earth is diſtinguiſhed with colours, ſays Olympiodorus, according to the *phyſical* variety of colours; according to the deluſions of celeſtial illuminations from Mars and the Sun; and according to inviſible fires, which proceed as far as to viſible beauty. With reſpect to the elements likewiſe on the ſummit of the earth, water there is as vapour, and as moiſt air; but air is ether,

others dwell about the air, as we do about the sea; and others reside in islands which the air flows round, and which are situated not far from the continent. And in one word, what water and the sea are to us, with respect to utility, that air is to them: but what air is to us, that æther is to the inhabitants of this pure earth. But the seasons there are endued with such an excellent temperament, that the inhabitants are never molested with disease, and live for a much longer time than those who dwell in our regions; and they surpass us in sight, hearing, and prudence, and every thing of this kind, as much as air excels water in purity—and æther, air. And besides this, they have groves and temples of the Gods, in which the Gods dwell in reality; and likewise oracles and divinations, and sensible perceptions of the Gods, and such-like associations with them. The sun too, and moon, and stars, are seen by them such as they really are; and in every other respect their felicity is of a correspondent nature.

And in this manner indeed the whole earth naturally subsists, and the parts which are situated about it. But it contains about the whole of its ambit many places in its concavities; some of which are more profound and extended than the region which we inhabit: but others are more profound, indeed, but yet have a less chasm than the places of our abode; and there are certain parts which are less profound [1], but broader than ours. But all these are in many places perforated into one another under the earth, according to narrower and broader avenues, and have passages of communication through which a great quantity of water flows into the different hollows of the earth, as into bowls; and besides this, there are immense bulks of ever-flowing rivers under the earth, and of hot and cold waters; likewise a great quantity of fire, mighty rivers of fire, and many of moist mire, some of which are purer, and others more muddy; as in Sicily there are rivers of mud, which flow before a stream of fire, which is itself a flaming torrent.

alone, what ought we to think of the inhabitants which are there? Και τι θαυμαστον, ἐπι και οἱ Αθηναι φθε πως ἐχοιεν δια τον τον αἱρον συμμετριον. και ο ἐνταυθα ἐστερει Αριστοτελης ανθρωπον ουσης και μειρ τῳ ἐκινειδι τρεφεσιν αἱρι, τι χρη περι τον ἐκει ουσθαι.

[1] Plato, says Olympiodorus, directs his attention to the four quarters of the globe: for since there are two which we inhabit, viz. Europe and Asia, there must also be two others according to the antipodes. Καταστεχαζεται δε τον τετραρον τοπρατον, ἐπειδη δια καθ' ἡμας ειρος ἡ Ευρωπη και ἡ Ασιας ἀστε δεν αλλαι κατα τους αντιπεδας.

And

the water which they have drawn. But when this water, departing from thence, is impelled hither, it again fills the rivers on the earth; and these, when filled, flow through channels and through the earth; and when they have severally passed through the avenues, which are open to each, they produce seas, lakes, rivers, and fountains. Flowing back again from hence under the earth, and some of them streaming round longer and more numerous places, but others round such as are shorter and less numerous, they again hurl themselves into Tartarus; and some indeed much more profoundly, but others less so, than they were drawn: but the influxions of all of them are deeper than the places from which they flow upwards. And the effluxions of some are in a direction contrary to their influxions, but in others both take place according to the same part. There are some again which entirely flow round in a circle, folding themselves like snakes, once or often about the earth; and being bent downwards as much as possible, they are again hurled forth on each side till they arrive at the middle, but never beyond this. For each part of the earth becomes steep to both these streams.

The other rivers, indeed, are many, great, and various: but among this abundance there are certain streams, four [1] in number, of which the greatest, and which circularly flows round the earth the outermost of all, is called the Ocean. But that which flows opposite, and in a contrary direction to this, is Acheron; which, flowing through other solitary places, and under the earth, devolves its waters into the Acherusian marsh, into which many souls

[1] The four rivers which are here mentioned are, says Olympiodorus, according to the Interpreter (i. e. Ammonius Hermeas), the four elements in Tartarus. Of these Ocean is water; Cocytus, or rather Styx, is earth; Pyriphlegethon is fire; and Acheron is air. But Styx is opposed to Pyriphlegethon, as heat to cold; and Acheron to Ocean, as air to water. Hence also Orpheus [a] calls the Acherusian lake aërial. However, says Olympiodorus, the position of the rivers does not correspond to this interpretation. For Ocean is first, and in the higher place. Under this is Acheron. Under this again, Pyriphlegethon; and in the last place, Cocytus. Besides, all of them are called rivers, though the elements are different. It is better therefore, says he, to consider the allotments, and the places themselves of souls, as receiving a fourfold division, according to depth. And prior to the places, we should consider the divine idioms, viz. the definitive, according to Ocean; the cathartic, according to Acheron; that which punishes through heat, according to Pyriphlegethon; and that which punishes through cold, according to Cocytus.

[a] Δεῖ καὶ Ὀρφέως τὴν Ἀχερουσίαν ἐκεῖνο αἰρίαν καλεῖ.

of

time baſe; and that, if any thing happens to be unpleaſant and uſeful, this it may ſay and ſing, whether it gratifies the ſpectators or not? According to which of theſe modes does the poeſy of tragedy appear to you to conſiſt?

CAL. It is evident, Socrates, that it is more impelled to pleaſure, and the gratification of the ſpectators.

SOC. Did we not, therefore, Callicles, juſt now ſay that a thing of this kind is flattery?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Come then, if any one ſhould take from all poeſy, melody, rhythm, and meaſure, would any thing elſe than diſcourſes remain?

CAL. Neceſſarily nothing elſe.

SOC. Are not, therefore, theſe diſcourſes delivered to a great multitude of people?

CAL. I ſay ſo.

SOC. Poeſy, therefore, is a certain popular ſpeech. Or do not poets appear to you to employ rhetoric in the theatres?

CAL. To me they do.

SOC. Now, therefore, we have found a certain rhetoric among a people conſiſting of boys, and at the ſame time women and men, ſlaves and the free-born; and which we do not altogether approve. For we ſaid that it was adulation.

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Be it ſo. But what ſhall we ſay that rhetoric is, which ſubſiſts among the Athenian people, and the people conſiſting of free-born men in other cities? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to ſpeak with a view to that which is beſt, directing their attention to this, that the citizens through their diſcourſes may become the beſt of men? Or are they alſo impelled to the gratification of the citizens? and, neglecting public for the ſake of private advantage, do they converſe with the people as with boys, alone endeavouring to gratify them, without being in the leaſt concerned whether through this they become better or worſe?

CAL. This which you aſk is not a ſimple thing. For ſome rhetoricians are ſolicitous in what they ſay for the good of the citizens: but others are ſuch as you repreſent them.

SOC. It is ſufficient. For, if this alſo is twofold, one part of it will be adulation,

having mentioned his name, he says[a] that he was the most royal of mortal kings, and that he reigned over many neighbouring men, having the sceptre of Jupiter, with which also he governed cities. And he calls the sceptre of Jupiter nothing else than the discipline of Jupiter, by which he governed Crete.

Min. On what account then, Socrates, came the report to be spread that Minos was an unlearned and morose man?

Soc. On that account through which you, O best of men, if you are prudent, and every other man who intends to be celebrated, will be cautious never to offend a poet. For poets are able to effect much with respect to opinion, both in praising men and blaming them. In this particular, therefore, Minos erred when he warred on this city, in which there is much other wisdom, together with tragic and other poets of every description. But the tragedy here is antient, not originating, as is generally thought, from Thespis, nor from Phrynicus; but, if you consider, you will find that it is a very antient invention of this city. Tragedy indeed is of all poetry the most pleasing to the vulgar, and the most alluring; to which applying ourselves we have taken vengeance on Minos, for which he has compelled us to pay those tributes. In offending us, therefore, Minos erred; whence, in reply to your question, he became infamous. For that he was a good man, a friend to law, and a good shepherd of the people, as I have before observed, this is the greatest token, that his laws are immutable, in consequence of having well discovered the truth concerning the government of a city.

Min. You appear to me, Socrates, to have discovered a probable reason.

Soc. If, therefore, I speak the truth, do not the Cretans, the citizens of Minos and Rhadamanthus, appear to you to have used the most antient laws?

Min. They do.

Soc. These, therefore, were the best legislators of the antients, and were also shepherds of men; just as Homer likewise says, that a good general is the shepherd of the people.

Min. Entirely so.

Soc. Come then, by Jupiter, who presides over friendship, if any one who

[a] What Plato here cites from Hesiod is not to be found in any of the writings of that poet now extant.

is a good legiſlator and ſhepherd of the body ſhould aſk us what thoſe things are which when diſtributed to the body will make it better, we ſhould well and briefly anſwer, that they are nutriment and labour, the former of which by increaſing, and the latter by exerciſing, give ſtability to the body.

MIN. Right.

SOC. If, therefore, after this, that good legiſlator and ſhepherd ſhould alſo aſk us what thoſe things are which being diſtributed to the ſoul make it better, what ſhall we anſwer, that we may not be aſhamed of ourſelves and of our age?

MIN. I am no longer able to anſwer this queſtion.

SOC. It is however diſgraceful to the ſoul of each of us, if we ſhould appear to be ignorant of things pertaining to our ſouls, in which good and evil are contained, but to be knowing in particulars pertaining to the body, and together things.

THE END OF THE MINOS.

have made the great Socrates himſelf become the patron of their own ſhallow and diſtorted conceptions. But to return to the Apology.

Lyſias, one of the moſt celebrated orators of the age, compoſed an oration, in a laboured and pathetic ſtyle, which he offered to Socrates to be pronounced as his defence in the preſence of his judges. Socrates however refuſed it, obſerving, that a philoſopher ought to be conſpicuous for magnanimity and firmneſs of ſoul. Hence, in his Apology, he paid no attention to the ſplendor of diction, but truſted wholly to the intrinſic dignity of his ſentiments. He contented himſelf with ſpeaking to his judges as he uſed to do in common diſcourſe, and with propoſing queſtions to his accuſers. Hence his defence was entirely the ſpontaneous effuſions of his genius; ſimple and plain, yet nervous and dignified.

Several perſons who aſſiſted in the court upon this occaſion, beſides Plato, drew up the Apology of Socrates. Amongſthe reſt Xenophon compiled one from the relation of Hermogenes the ſon of Hipponicus, for he himſelf was not then at Athens. None of them are extant, however, but thoſe of Plato and Xenophon. And of theſe, the firſt is in every reſpect worthy the greateſt diſciple of Socrates; but the other preſents us with an imperfect copy, becauſe compoſed by a diſciple that was abſent. This imperfect copy, however, ſufficiently proves that the ſubſtance of this Apology is accurate, how much ſoever it may have been amended by paſſing through ſuch a hand as that of Plato.

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degree, and, flying from it, ſeek to become eſſentially ſubſiſting by itſelf?—It appears ſo.—But what ſhall we ſay, Simmias, about ſuch things as the following? Do we ſay that the *juſt itſelf*[1] is ſomething or nothing?—By Jupiter, we ſay it is ſomething.—And do we not alſo ſay, that the *beautiful* and the *good* are each of them ſomething?—How is it poſſible we ſhould not?—But did you ever at any time behold any one of theſe with your eyes?—By no means, ſays he.—But did you ever touch upon theſe with any other corporeal ſenſe? (but I ſpeak concerning all of them; as for inſtance, about magnitude, health, ſtrength, and, in one word, about the eſſence of all the reſt, and which each truly poſſeſſes.) Is then the moſt true nature of theſe perceived through the miniſtry of the body? or rather ſhall we not ſay, that whoever among us prepares himſelf to think dianoëtically in the moſt eminent and accurate manner about each particular object of his ſpeculation, ſuch a one will accede the neareſt poſſible to the knowledge of each?—Entirely ſo.—Will not he, therefore, accompliſh this in the moſt pure manner, who in the higheſt degree betakes himſelf to each through his dianoëtic power, neither employing ſight in conjunction with the dianoëtic energy, nor attracting any other ſenſe, together with his reaſoning; but who, exerciſing a dianoëtic

[1] The energy of our ſoul, as we have before obſerved, is triple: for it either converts itſelf to things ſubordinate, obtaining a knowledge of and adorning them, or it converts itſelf to itſelf, and acquires a knowledge of itſelf, or it converts itſelf to natures more excellent than its own. Socrates, therefore, having ſhown that the philoſopher is willing to die, from a converſion to things ſubordinate, becauſe he flies from the body, deſpiſing it; and having alſo ſhown this from a converſion to himſelf, becauſe he attends to the body no further than extreme neceſſity obliges him; he now alſo ſhows that he is willing to die, from a converſion to things more excellent. For he wiſhes to know ideas; but it is impoſſible for the ſoul to know theſe while energizing with the body, or having this communicating with it in the inveſtigation of them. For, if ſenſe poſſeſſes ſomething impartible, as is evident from the collected nature of its perception: for it knows, for inſtance, at once, that this particular thing is white, and not black; ſince, if it knew this diviſibly, it would be juſt as if I ſhould perceive one part of a thing, and you another*;—much more therefore does the rational ſoul perceive impartibly. It differs however from ſenſe in this, that ſenſe knows, but does not know that it knows; for it is not converted to itſelf, ſince neither body, nor things which poſſeſs their being in body, are converted to themſelves; but the rational ſoul knows both ſenſibles and itſelf: for it knows that it knows. If this then be the caſe, the ſoul will not receive, as its aſſociate in inveſtigation, either the body or the ſenſes, or the inſtruments of ſenſe, if it wiſhes to know things accurately.

* For theſe partible perceptions would never produce a perception of that which is white, as one thing.

energy by itſelf ſincere, at the ſame time endeavours to hunt [1] after every thing which has true being ſubſiſting by itſelf ſeparate and pure; and who in the moſt eminent degree is liberated from the eyes and ears, and in ſhort from the whole body, as diſturbing the ſoul, and not ſuffering it to acquire truth and wiſdom by its conjunction? Will not ſuch a man, Simmias, procure for himſelf real being, if this can ever be aſſerted of any one?—You ſpeak the truth, Socrates (ſays Simmias), in a tranſcendent [2] manner.

Is it not neceſſary, therefore (ſays Socrates), from hence, that an opinion of this kind ſhould be preſent with genuine philoſophers in ſuch a manner, that they will ſpeak among themſelves as follows: In the conſideration of things, this opinion, like a certain path, leads us in conjunction with reaſon from the vulgar track, that, as long as we are connected with a body, and our ſoul is contaminated with ſuch an evil, we can never ſufficiently obtain the object of our deſire; and this object we have aſſerted to be truth? For the body [3] ſubjects us to innumerable occupations through neceſſary aliment,

[1] The term *hunting*, ſays Olympiodorus, is adapted to intelligibles, becauſe theſe are known by an unapparent power of the ſoul, in the ſame manner as hunters ſtudy to be inviſible to the objects of their purſuit. Οικειον το θηρευειν επι των νοητων, διοτι αφανει δυναμει της ψυχης γινωσκεται ταυτα, καθαπερ και οι θηραται αφανες σπουδουσιν ειναι τοις θηραμασιν.

[2] The word in the original is ὑπερφυως, which is literally *ſupernaturally*. And, as Olympiodorus ſays, it is very properly uſed here, becauſe the diſcourſe is about intelligibles.

[3] The *vital irrational* part of our nature is an impediment to the rational ſoul. But this is twofold: for it is either beheld about the body alone, as fears, deſires and loves, or about things external, as wars, and the accumulation of wealth. The *gnoſtic irrational* part alſo becomes an impediment, as, for inſtance, the phantaſy, which is always a hindrance to our intellectual conceptions. For there are two paſſions which it is difficult to wipe away; in knowledge the phantaſy, and in life ambition; ſince theſe are the things with which the ſoul becomes firſt inveſted, and which ſhe, in the laſt place, lays aſide. For the firſt vital vehicle of the ſoul is ambition, and the firſt gnoſtic is the phantaſy. Hence, ſays Olympiodorus, Ulyſſes required the aſſiſtance of the mercurial moly, and right reaſon, in order to fly from Calypſo, or the phantaſy which like a cloud becomes an impediment to reaſon, the ſun of the ſoul. For the phantaſy is a veil; and hence ſome one calls it *long-veiled*. On this account, Ulyſſes firſt came to Circe, that is, Senſe, as being the daughter of the Sun. The phantaſy, therefore, is an impediment to our intellectual conceptions; and hence (Olympiodorus adds), when we are agitated by the inſpiring influence of Divinity, if the phantaſy intervenes, the enthuſiaſtic energy ceaſes: for enthuſiaſm and the phantaſy are contrary to each other. Should it be aſked, whether the ſoul is able to energize without the phantaſy? we reply, that its perceptions of univerſals prove that it is able. It has perceptions, therefore, independent of the phantaſy; at the ſame time, however, the phantaſy attends it in its energies, juſt as a ſtorm purſues him who ſails on the ſea.

and

and fills us with love, deſire, fear, all various images, and a multitude of trifling concerns; not to mention that, if we are invaded by certain diſeaſes, we are hindered by them in our hunting after real being; ſo that, as it is ſaid, *we can never truly, and in reality, acquire wiſdom through the body*. For nothing elſe but the body and its deſires cauſe wars, ſeditions, and conteſts, of every kind: for all wars ariſe through the poſſeſſion of wealth; and we are compelled to acquire riches through the body, becoming ſubſervient to its cultivation; ſo that on all theſe accounts we have no leiſure for the exerciſe of philoſophy. But this is the extremity of all evils, that if at any time we are at leiſure from its attendance, and betake ourſelves to the ſpeculation of any thing, then invading us on all ſides in our inveſtigations, it cauſes agitations and tumults, and ſo vehemently impels us, that we are not able through its preſence to perceive the truth; but it is in reality demonſtrated to us, that, if we are deſigned to know any thing purely, we muſt be liberated from the body, and behold things with the ſoul itſelf. And then, as it appears, we ſhall obtain the object of our deſire, and of which we profeſs ourſelves lovers, viz. wiſdom, when we are dead, as our diſcourſe evinces; but by no means [1] while we are alive: for, if we can know nothing purely in conjunction with the body, one of theſe two conſequences muſt enſue, either that we can never poſſeſs knowledge, or that we muſt obtain it after death; for then the ſoul will ſubſiſt apart by itſelf, ſeparate from the body, but never before this takes place; and while we live in the body, as it appears, we ſhall approach in the neareſt manner poſſible to knowledge, if in the moſt eminent degree we have no aſſociation with the body, nor any communication with it (except what the greateſt neceſſity [2] requires), nor are filled with its nature, but

[1] Socrates ſays this in conſequence of looking to the knowledge which the ſoul can participate in the preſent life, and to that which it poſſeſſes when it obtains hereafter the ſupreme perfection of its nature. For that it is poſſible according to Plato to live while connected with this body not only *cathartically* but *theoretically*, and this through the whole of life, is evident from his Coryphæan philoſopher in the Theætetus, who is repreſented as continually aſtronomizing above the heavens (του ουρανου ὑπεραστρονομουντες), and inveſtigating the nature of every *whole* in the univerſe; and alſo from thoſe guardians in his Republic who aſcend through dialectic as far as to *the good* itſelf. To live here however *theoretically* in *perfection* is impoſſible, on account of the occupations and moleſtations of the body, which do not permit us to enjoy the theoretic energy without impediment and diſtracted attention.

[2] There are three energies pertaining to the irrational nature; viz. phyſical and neceſſary, as to be

but purify ourſelves from its defiling connection, till Divinity itſelf diſſolves our bonds. And thus being pure, and liberated from the madneſs of body, it is proper to believe that we ſhall then aſſociate with others who are ſimilarly pure, and ſhall through ourſelves know every thing genuine and ſincere: and this perhaps is the truth itſelf; for it is by no means lawful that the pure ſhould be touched by that which is impure. And ſuch, O Simmias, in my opinion, ought to be the diſcourſe and ſentiments of all ſuch as are lovers of learning in a proper manner. Or does it not ſeem ſo to you?—It does, Socrates, more ſo than any thing.

If all this then (ſays Socrates) is true, my friend, much hope remains for him who arrives at that place to which I am now departing, that he ſhall there, if ever any where, ſufficiently obtain that for the ſake of which we take ſo much pains in the preſent life: ſo that the journey which is now aſſigned me will be accompanied with good hope; as will likewiſe be the caſe with any other man who thinks that he ought to prepare his dianoëtic part in ſuch a manner that it may become as it were pure.—Entirely ſo (ſays Simmias).—But does not purification conſiſt in this, as we formerly aſſerted in our diſcourſe: I mean, in ſeparating the ſoul from the body in the moſt eminent degree, and in accuſtoming it to call together and collect itſelf eſſentially on all ſides from the body, and to dwell as much as poſſible, both now and hereafter, alone by itſelf, becoming by this mean liberated, from the body as from detaining bonds?—Entirely ſo (ſays he).—Is not death called a ſolution and ſeparation of the ſoul from body?—Perfectly ſo (ſays he).—But thoſe alone who philoſophize rightly[1], as we have ſaid, always and

be nouriſhed and to ſleep; phyſical but not neceſſary, as venereal enjoyments; and thoſe which are neither phyſical nor neceſſary, as the decoration of the body, and ſuch things as pertain to variety of clothing: for that theſe laſt are neither phyſical nor neceſſary is evident from their not being uſed by other animals. As there are, therefore, theſe three energies, the philoſopher, ſays Olympiodorus, neither uſes thoſe which are phyſical and not neceſſary, nor thoſe which are neither phyſical nor neceſſary. For emiſſions in ſleep are ſufficient to him for the diſcharge of the ſeed; and he pays no attention to external decoration. He likewiſe uſes thoſe which are phyſical and neceſſary, no further than neceſſity requires. This being the caſe, the philoſopher is willing to die, and conſequently meditates death.

[1] Thoſe only, ſays Olympiodorus, who philoſophize rightly, i. e. with an undeviating energy, *eſpecially* and *always providentially* attend to a ſolution from the body; poſſeſſing the *providential* energy

and eſpecially providentially attend to the ſolution of the ſoul: and this is the meditation of philoſophers, a ſolution and ſeparation of the ſoul from the body; or do you not think ſo?—I do.—Would it not, therefore, as I ſaid at firſt, be ridiculous for a man who has ſo prepared himſelf in the preſent life as to approach very near to death, to live indeed in the manner we have deſcribed, and yet, when death arrives, be afflicted? would not this this be ridiculous?—How indeed ſhould it not?—In reality, therefore (ſays he), O Simmias, thoſe who philoſophize rightly will meditate how to *die*; and *to be dead* will be to them of all men a thing the leaſt terrible. But from hence conſider as follows: for, if they are on all ſides enemies to the body, but deſire to poſſeſs the ſoul ſubſiſting by itſelf, would it not be very irrational for them to be terrified and troubled when death approaches, and to be unwilling to depart to that place, where when they have arrived they may hope to enjoy that which they were lovers of in the preſent life (but they were lovers of wiſdom), and to be liberated from the aſſociation of that nature to which they were always inimical? Or do you think it poſſible, that many ſhould be willing, of their own accord, to deſcend into Hades, allured by the hope of ſeeing and converſing with departed beautiful youths, wives and children whom they have loved; and that the true lover of wiſdom, who has exceedingly nouriſhed this hope, that he ſhall never poſſeſs wiſdom as he ought any where but in Hades, ſhould be afflicted when dying, and ſhould not depart thither with readineſs and delight? For it is neceſſary, my friend, to think in this manner of one who is a true philoſopher; ſince ſuch a one is very much of opinion, that he ſhall never any where, but in that place, acquire the poſſeſſion of wiſdom with purity; and if this be the

energy from Prometheus, but the *eſpecially* and the *always* from Hercules. For the never-failing and the ſtrenuous make the ſolution ſtrong. In conſequence, too, of being deprived of good we are afflicted, and fall into evil. We rejoice, therefore, when we are liberated from evil, and meet with good; ſo that, according to each of theſe, it is neceſſary to be delighted with death, both as liberating us from the hated body, and as affording us the enjoyment of what we truly deſire. As fire too tends downwards by violence and through a certain artifice, but ſpontaneouſly aſcends, becauſe its *wholeneſs** is on high; in like manner the ſoul's attention to the body is the effect of compulſion, and its aſcent to true being ſpontaneous, becauſe its ſeparate wholeneſs is there.

* See the Introduction to the Timæus.

caſe, would it not be very irrational, as we juſt now ſaid, for a man of this kind to be terrified at death?—Very much ſo, by Jupiter, ſays he.

This then will be an argument ſufficient to convince you, that he whom you behold afflicted, when about to die, is not a philoſopher, but a lover of body; and this ſame perſon is a lover of riches and honours, either deſiring the poſſeſſion of one of theſe, or of both.—The caſe is entirely ſo (ſays he) as you repreſent it.—Does not then, O Simmias, that which is called fortitude eminently belong to ſuch as are thus diſpoſed?—Entirely ſo, (ſays he).—Does not temperance alſo, which even the multitude thus denominate as a virtue, through which we are not agitated by deſires, but regard them with moderation and contempt; does it not, I ſay, belong to thoſe only who deſpiſe the body in the moſt eminent degree, and live in the exerciſe of philoſophy?—It is neceſſary, ſays he.—For, if you are willing (ſays Socrates) to conſider the fortitude and temperance of others, they will appear to you to be abſurdities.—But how, Socrates? You know (ſays he) that all others look upon death as the greateſt of evils.—In the higheſt degree ſo, ſays he.—Thoſe who are bold, therefore, among theſe, ſuſtain death when they do ſuſtain it, through the dread of greater evils.—They do ſo.—All men, therefore, except philoſophers, are bold through fearing and dread, though it is abſurd that any one ſhould be bold through fear or cowardice.—Entirely ſo.—But what, are not the moderate among theſe affected in the ſame manner? and are they not temperate by a certain intemperance? Though this is in a certain reſpect impoſſible, yet a paſſion ſimilar to this happens to them with reſpect to this fooliſh temperance: for, fearing to be deprived of other pleaſures which at the ſame time they deſire, they abſtain from others, by others being vanquiſhed. And though they call intemperance a ſubjection to pleaſures; yet, at the ſame time it happens to them, that, being vanquiſhed by certain pleaſures, they rule over others; and this is ſimilar to what I juſt now ſaid, that after a certain manner they become temperate through intemperance.—It ſeems ſo, indeed.—But, O bleſſed Simmias, this is by no means the right road to virtue, to change pleaſures for pleaſures, pains for pains, fear for fear, and the greater for the leſſer, like pieces of money: but that alone is the proper coin, I mean wiſdom, for which all theſe ought to be changed. And indeed, for the ſake of this, and with this every thing muſt in reality be bought and ſold, both fortitude and temperance, juſtice, and,

in one word, true virtue, which ſubſiſts with wiſdom, whether pleaſures and pains, and every thing elſe of this kind, are preſent or abſent: but if theſe are ſeparated from wiſdom, and changed from one another, ſuch virtue does not merit to be called even a ſhadowy deſcription, but is in reality ſervile, and poſſeſſes nothing ſalutary and true. But that which is in reality true virtue [1] is a purification from every thing of this kind; and temperance and juſtice,

[1] The firſt of the virtues are the phyſical, which are common to brutes, being mingled with the temperaments, and for the moſt part contrary to each other; or rather pertaining to the animal. Or it may be ſaid that they are illuminations from reaſon, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament: or that they are the reſult of energies in a former life. Of theſe Plato ſpeaks in the Politicus and the Laws. The ethical virtues, which are above theſe, are ingenerated by cuſtom and a certain right opinion, and are the virtues of children when well educated. Theſe virtues alſo are to be found in ſome brute animals. They likewiſe tranſcend the temperaments, and on this account are not contrary to each other. Theſe virtues Plato delivers in The Laws. They pertain however at the ſame time both to reaſon and the irrational nature. In the third rank above theſe are the political virtues, which pertain to reaſon alone; for they are ſcientific. But they are the virtues of reaſon adorning the irrational part as its inſtrument; through prudence adorning the gnoſtic, through fortitude the iraſcible, and through temperance the deſiderative power; but adorning all the parts of the irrational nature through juſtice. And of theſe virtues Plato ſpeaks much in the Republic. Theſe virtues, too, follow each other. Above theſe are the cathartic virtues, which pertain to reaſon alone, withdrawing from other things to itſelf, throwing aſide the inſtruments of ſenſe as vain, repreſſing alſo the energies through theſe inſtruments, and liberating the ſoul from the bonds of generation. Plato particularly delivers to us theſe virtues in this dialogue. Prior to theſe, however, are the theoretic virtues, which pertain to the ſoul, introducing itſelf to natures ſuperior to itſelf, not only gnoſtically, as ſome one may be induced to think from the name, but alſo orectically: for it haſtens to become, as it were, intellect inſtead of ſoul; and intellect, as we have before obſerved, poſſeſſes both deſire and knowledge. Theſe virtues are the converſe of the political: for, as the latter energize about things ſubordinate according to reaſon, ſo the former about things more excellent according to intellect. Theſe virtues Plato delivers in the Theætetus.

According to Plotinus, there is alſo another gradation of the virtues beſides theſe, viz. the paradigmatic. For, as our eye, when it is firſt illuminated by the ſolar light, is different from that which illuminates, as being illuminated, but afterwards is in a certain reſpect united and conjoined with it, and becomes as it were ſolar form; ſo alſo our ſoul at firſt indeed is illuminated by intellect, and energizes according to the theoretic virtues, but afterwards becomes, as it were, that which is illuminated, and energizes uniformly according to the paradigmatic virtues. And it is the buſineſs indeed of philoſophy to make us intellect; but of theurgy to unite us to intelligibles, ſo as that we may energize paradigmatically. And as, when poſſeſſing the phyſical virtues, we know mundane bodies (for the ſubjects to virtues of this kind are bodies);

juſtice, fortitude, and prudence itſelf, are each of them a certain purification. And thoſe who inſtituted the myſteries for us appear to have been by no means

ſo, from poſſeſſing the ethical virtues, we know the fate of the univerſe, becauſe fate is converſant with irrational lives. For the rational ſoul is not under fate; and the ethical virtues are irrational. According to the political virtues we know mundane affairs, and according to the cathartic ſupermundane; but as poſſeſſing the theoretic we know intellectual, and from the paradigmatic intelligible natures. Temperance alſo pertains to the ethical virtues; juſtice to the political, on account of compacts; fortitude to the cathartic, through not verging to matter; and prudence to the theoretic. Obſerve too, that Plato calls the phyſical virtues ſervile, becauſe they may ſubſiſt in ſervile ſouls; but he calls the ethical σκιογραφιαι, becauſe their poſſeſſors only know *that* the energies of ſuch virtues are right, but do not know *why* they are ſo. It is well obſerved too here, by Olympiodorus, that Plato calls the cathartic and theoretic virtues, thoſe which are in reality true virtues. He alſo ſeparates them in another way, viz. that the politic are not teleſtic, i. e. do not pertain to myſtic ceremonies, but that the cathartic and theoretic are teleſtic. Hence, ſays Olympiodorus, the cathartic are denominated from the purification which is uſed in the myſteries; but the theoretic from perceiving things divine, απο του τα θεια οραν. On this account he accords with the Orphic verſes, that

The ſoul that uninitiated dies,
Plung'd in the blackeſt mire in Hades lies.

For initiation is the Bacchic myſteries of the virtues (τελετη γαρ εστιν η των αρετων βακχεια). Olympiodorus alſo further obſerves, that by the thyrſus-bearers, Plato means thoſe that energize according to the political virtues, but by the Bacchuſes thoſe that exerciſe the cathartic virtues. For we are bound in matter as Titans, through the great partibility of our nature; but we riſe from the dark mire as Bacchuſes. Hence we become more prophetic at the time of death: and Bacchus is the inſpective guardian of death, becauſe he is likewiſe of every thing pertaining to the Bacchic ſacred rites.

It is here too neceſſary to obſerve, that all the virtues exhibit their proper characters, theſe being every where common, but ſubſiſting appropriately in each. For the characteriſtic property of fortitude is the not declining to things ſubordinate; of temperance, a converſion from an inferior nature; of juſtice, a proper energy, and adapted to being; and of prudence, the election and ſelection of things good and evil. Obſerve too, with Olympiodorus, that all the virtues are in the Gods: for many Gods, ſays he, are adorned with their appellations; and all goodneſs originates from the Gods. Likewiſe prior to things which ſometimes participate the virtues, as is our caſe, it is neceſſary there ſhould be natures which always participate them. In what order, therefore, do the virtues firſt appear? Shall we ſay in the pſychical? For virtue is the perfection of the ſoul; and election and pre-election are the energies and projections of the ſoul. Hence the Chaldæan oracles conjoin ſontal virtue with ſontal ſoul, or, in other words, with ſoul ſubſiſting according to cauſe. But may it not alſo be ſaid, that the virtues naturally wiſh to give an orderly arrangement to diſorder? If this be admitted, they will originate from the demiurgic order.

means contemptible perſons, but to have really ſignified formerly, in an obſcure manner, *that whoever deſcended* [1] *into Hades uninitiated, and without being a partaker of the myſteries, ſhould be plunged into mire; but that*

order. How then will they be cathartic there? May we not ſay, that through the cathartic virtues conſidered according to their cauſal ſubſiſtence in Jupiter the demiurgus, he is enabled to abide in his accuſtomed mode, as Plato ſays in the Timæus? And further ſtill, according to antient theologiſts, he aſcends to the tower of Saturn.

[1] It is requiſite, ſays Olympiodorus, that dialectic conceptions ſhould either begin from divine ænigmas, unfolding the arcane truth which they contain; or that they ſhould become eſtabliſhed in them as in a port, and reſt in the demonſtrations of them; or that they ſhould accompliſh both theſe. Olympiodorus further obſerves that what is here ſaid imitates the myſtic and mundane circle of ſouls; for theſe, ſays he, flying from an impartible and Bacchic life, and energizing according to that which is Titannic, become fettered and impriſoned. Abiding however in puniſhment, and attending to themſelves, they are purified from Titannic defilements, and, paſſing into a collected from a diſperſed ſubſiſtence, they become Bacchuſes, i. e. entire and perfect, according to the Bacchus that abides on high. In the myſteries too, ſays Olympiodorus, popular purifications firſt take the lead; in the next place, ſuch as are more arcane than theſe; in the third place, things permanently abiding are introduced; in the fourth place, perceptions with the eyes cloſed (μυησεις); and, in the laſt place, an inſpection of the things themſelves (εποπτειαι). ὁτι εν τοις ἱεροις ηγουντο μεν αἱ πανδημοι καθαρσεις· ειτα επι ταυταις απορρητοτεραι· μετα δε ταυτας συστασεις παρελαμβανοντο· και επι ταυταις μυησεις· εν τελει δε εποπτειαι. Hence, ſays he, the ethical and political virtues are analogous to the apparent purifications; but ſuch of the cathartic virtues as reject every thing external, to the more arcane purifications. The energies alſo which are theoretic about intelligibles, are analogous to the things which permanently abide; but the contractions of theſe energies into the impartible are analogous to the perceptions with the eyes cloſed; and the ſimple intuitive perceptions of ſimple forms, to epoptic viſion, or an inſpection of the things themſelves.

Olympiodorus further obſerves, that the ſcope of the myſteries is to lead back ſouls to that end from which as a principle they made their firſt deſcent; and in which alſo Bacchus eſtabliſhed them, ſeating them in the throne of his proper father; or, in other words, in the whole of that life of which Jupiter is the ſource. He, therefore, who is initiated, neceſſarily dwells with the Gods, according to the ſcope of the initiating deities. But the greateſt and moſt myſtical ſacrifices (τελεται), ſays he, are twofold; the one here, being certain preparations; and the other hereafter. The latter alſo, he adds, are in his opinion twofold; ſome taking place about the pneumatic vehicle, as here about the ſhelly body (περι τον οστρεινον), and others about the luciform vehicle. For there are three gradations of myſtic as well as of philoſophic aſcent. For philoſophers are led back to their priſtine condition in the three thouſandth year, as it is ſaid in the Phædrus; and a chiliad, or a thouſand, ſignifies a perfect and periodic life. He, therefore, who is uninitiated, as remaining moſt remote from his proper end, lies in mire here, and much more there; for he is merged in the impurity of matter.

whoever arrived there, purified and initiated, ſhould dwell with the Gods. For, as it is ſaid by thoſe who write about the myſteries,

" The thyrſus-bearers [1] numerous are ſeen,
" But few the Bacchuſes have always been."

Theſe few are, in my opinion, no other than thoſe who philoſophize rightly; and that I may be ranked in the number of theſe, I ſhall leave nothing unattempted, but exert myſelf in all poſſible ways. But whether or not my exertions will be properly directed, and whether I ſhall accompliſh any thing when I arrive thither, I ſhall clearly know, very ſhortly, if Divinity pleaſes, as it appears to me. And this (ſays he), Simmias and Cebes, is my apology [2], why upon leaving you, and the rulers of the preſent life, I ought not to be afflicted and indignant, ſince I am perſuaded that I ſhall there meet with maſters and companions not leſs good than ſuch as are here. This indeed is incredible to many; but if my apology ſhall have more influence with you than with the judges of the Athenians, it will have a good effect.

[1] The thyrſus, ſays Olympiodorus, is a ſymbol of material and partible fabrication, on account of its divulſed continuity, whence alſo it is a Titannic plant. For it is extended before Bacchus inſtead of his paternal ſceptre, and through this they call him into a partial nature. Beſides, ſays he, the Titans are thyrſus-bearers; and Prometheus concealed fire in a reed, whether by this we are to underſtand that he draws down celeſtial light into generation, or impels ſoul into body, or calls forth divine illumination, the whole of which is ungenerated, into generation. Hence Socrates Orphically calls the multitude thyrſus-bearers, as living Titannically. Olympiodorus further adds, that he who lives Bacchically, now reſts from his labours, is liberated from his bonds, and diſmiſſes his guard, or rather his confined life; and ſuch a one is a cathartic philoſopher. Some too, ſays he, prefer *philoſophy*, as Porphyry and Plotinus, and many other philoſophers; but others prefer the *hieratic* diſcipline, or the diſcipline pertaining to ſacred ceremonies, as Jamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus, and all the *hieratic* philoſophers. Plato, however, knowing that much may be ſaid on both ſides, collects the arguments into one, by calling the philoſopher a Bacchus.

[2] The apology of Socrates is twofold, one to the Athenian judges, and the other to the moſt genuine of his aſſociates. The one contending for the ſafety of the animal, i. e. of the compoſite of ſoul and body, but the other for the ſeparate and proper life of the ſoul. The one alſo being a mixture of ſcience and opinion, but the other of intellect and ſcience. The one proceeding from the political life, but the other from the cathartic life. And the one evincing that the death which is apparent and known to all men is good; but the other, that this muſt be aſſerted of the true death, and which is only known to philoſophers.

When

When Socrates had thus ſpoken, Cebes, renewing the diſcourſe, ſaid, Other things, Socrates, appear to me to be well ſpoken; but what you have aſſerted about the ſoul will produce in men much incredulity, who think, when it is liberated from the body, that it is no longer any where, but that, on that very day in which a man dies, it is corrupted [1] and periſhes, and this immediately as it is freed from the body; and, beſides this, that on its departure it becomes diſſipated like wind or ſmoke, makes its eſcape, and flies away, and is no longer any where: for if it remained any where eſſentially collected in itſelf, and liberated from thoſe evils which you have now enumerated, there would be an abundant and fair hope, Socrates, that what you have aſſerted is true. But it will perhaps require no ſmall allurement and faith, in order to be perſuaded that the ſoul remains, though the man dies, and that it poſſeſſes a certain power and prudence.—You ſpeak the truth, Cebes (ſays Socrates); but what ſhall we do? Are you willing that we ſhould diſcourſe about theſe particulars, whether it is proper that this ſhould be the caſe with the ſoul, or not?—Indeed (ſays Cebes), I ſhall hear with great pleaſure your opinion on this ſubject.—For I do not think (anſwered Socrates) that any one who ſhould hear this diſcuſſion, even though he ſhould be a comic poet, could ſay that I trifled, and diſcourſed about things not accommodated to my condition. If it is agreeable to you, therefore, and it is requiſite to inveſtigate theſe particulars, let us conſider whether the ſouls of dead men ſurvive in Hades, or not.

The aſſertion indeed, which we now call to mind, is an antient one, I mean that ſouls departing from hence exiſt in Hades, and that they again return hither, and are generated from the dead. And if the caſe is ſuch, that living [2] natures are again generated from the dead, can there be any other

[1] Some, ſays Olympiodorus, immortalize the ſoul from the rational part as far as to the animated habit, as the Pythagorean Numenius. Others as far as to nature, as Plotinus. Others as far as to the irrational part, as among the antients Xenocrates and Speuſippus, but among the moderns Jamblichus and Plutarch. Others again as far only as to the rational ſoul, as Proclus and Porphyry. Others as far only as to intellect; for they ſuppoſe that the doxaſtic part is corrupted, as many of the Peripatetics. And others as far as to the whole ſoul; for they admit that partial ſouls are corrupted into the whole ſoul of the univerſe.

[2] The deſign of what is here ſaid is not to ſhow that the ſoul is immortal, but that it continues for a certain time after the diſſolution of the body. Jamblichus, however, as we are informed by Olympiodorus,

other conſequence than that our ſouls are there? for they could not be again generated if they had no ſubſiſtence; and this will be a ſufficient argument that theſe things are ſo, if it is really evident that the living cannot be generated from any thing elſe than the dead. But, if this is not the caſe, it will be neceſſary to adduce ſome other reaſon.—Entirely ſo (ſays Cebes).—You ſhould not, therefore (ſays he), conſider this aſſertion with reſpect to men alone, if you wiſh to learn with facility; but we ſhould ſurvey it as connected with all animals and plants, and, in one word, with every thing which is endued with generation. Are not all things, therefore, ſo generated, that they are produced no otherwiſe than contraries from contraries, I mean thoſe to which any thing of this kind happens? as the beautiful is contrary to the baſe, and the juſt to the unjuſt; and a thouſand other particulars ſubſiſt in the ſame manner. We ſhould conſider, therefore, whether it is neceſſary, reſpecting every thing which has a contrary, that this contrary ſhould be generated from nothing elſe than that which is its contrary. As for inſtance, is it not neceſſary that, when any thing becomes greater, it ſhould become ſo from being before ſmaller?—It is ſo (ſays he).—And is not the weaker generated from the ſtronger, and the ſwifter from the ſlower?—Entirely ſo.—But what if any thing becomes worſe, muſt it

Olympiodorus, thought that each of the arguments in the Phædo demonſtrated the immortality of the ſoul. But, as Olympiodorus juſtly obſerves, Jamblichus ſaid this in conſequence of energizing according to intellect enthuſiaſtically, which, ſays he, was uſual with him.

Proclus, or rather Syrianus, as we learn from Olympiodorus, collects that life and death are generated from each other, becauſe life is a conjunction and death a disjunction. But theſe are contraries; and contraries change into each other; for that contraries change into each other, the text ſhows in a threefold reſpect. Firſt, from induction. Secondly, from generations themſelves, and the ways which lead to them: for if the ways change into each other, as for inſtance whitening into blackening, much more muſt the ends change into each other, viz. the white into the black. Thirdly, becauſe nature would be mutilated, if one of two contraries changed into the other, and the other not; and alſo becauſe in time the other would fail, and nothing would be contrary, the remainder not having any thing into which it can change. Juſt as if a vigilant ſhould be changed into a ſleepy ſtate, but not on the other hand a ſleepy into a vigilant ſtate, the deluſion of Endymion, as Socrates ſays, would take place; for not only he, but all things, would ſleep. Endymion, however, is ſaid to have ſlept perpetually, becauſe he applied himſelf in ſolitude to the ſtudy of aſtronomy. Hence, too, he is ſaid to have been beloved by the moon.

It is likewiſe neceſſary to obſerve that Plato here ſpeaks of things which are properly contraries; and that, if he alſo makes mention of relatives, theſe, from the participation of contraries, change into each other.

not become ſo from the better? and if more juſt, muſt it not be generated from the more unjuſt?—How ſhould it not?—We have then (ſays he) ſufficiently determined this, that every thing is thus generated, viz. contraries from contraries.—Entirely ſo.—But what, is there any thing among theſe which has a middle ſubſiſtence between both (ſince all contraries are two), ſo as to cauſe two generations from this to that, and from that again to this? for between a greater and a leſſer thing there is increaſe and diminution; and hence we ſay that the one is increaſed, but the other diminiſhed.—It is ſo (ſays he).—And muſt not to be ſeparated and mingled, to be cooled and heated, and every thing in the ſame manner, though ſometimes we do not diſtinguiſh the ſeveral particulars by names, muſt they not in reality be every where thus circumſtanced, be generated from each other, and be ſubject to a mutual generation of each into one another?—Entirely ſo (ſays he).

What then (ſays Socrates), is there any thing contrary to the being alive, as ſleeping is contrary to waking?—Entirely ſo (ſays he).—But what is this contrary?—To be dead.—Are not theſe, therefore, generated from each other, ſince they are contraries? and ſince they are two, are there not two generations between them?—How ſhould there not?—I will, therefore (ſays Socrates), tell you what one of theſe conjunctions is which I have juſt now ſpoken of, and what its generations are; do you tell me what the other is. But I ſay, that the one of theſe is *to ſleep*, but the other *to awake*; and from ſleeping awaking is generated, and from awaking ſleeping; and the generations of theſe are on the one hand to be laid aſleep, and on the other to be rouſed. Have I ſufficiently explained this to you or not?—Perfectly ſo.—Do you, therefore (ſays he), inform me, in a ſimilar manner, concerning life and death.—Do you not ſay that *living* is the contrary of *to be dead?*—I do.—And that they are generated from each other?—Certainly.—What then is generated from that which is alive?—That which is dead (ſays he).—But what (ſays Socrates) is generated from *the dead?*—It is neceſſary to confeſs (ſays he) that this muſt be *the living*.—From the dead, therefore (ſays he), O Cebes, living things, and men who are alive, are generated.—It appears ſo, (ſays he).—Our ſouls therefore (ſays Socrates) ſubſiſt in Hades.—So it ſeems.—Is not, therefore, one of the generations ſubſiſting about theſe manifeſt? for *to die* is, I think, ſufficiently clear; is it not?—

Entirely

Entirely ſo (ſays he).—What then ſhall we do? ſhall we not render back a contrary generation in its turn, but ſay that nature is defective and lame in this particular? Or is it neceſſary to aſſign a certain contrary generation *to the being dead?*—Entirely ſo, ſays he.—But what is this?—*To be reſtored back again to life.*—But (ſays Socrates), if there is ſuch a thing as to revive again, will not this reviving be a generation from the dead to the living?—Perfectly ſo.—This then is agreed upon by us, that the living are generated from the dead no leſs than the dead from the living: but, this being the caſe, it is a ſufficient argument to prove that the ſouls of the dead muſt neceſſarily exiſt ſomewhere, from whence they may again be generated.—It appears to me (ſays he), Socrates, that this muſt neceſſarily follow from what has been admitted.

Take notice then (ſays he), O Cebes! that we have not unjuſtly made theſe conceſſions, as it appears to me: for if other things, when generated, were not always reſtored in the place of others, revolving as it were in a circle, but generation ſubſiſted according to a right line, proceeding from one thing alone into its oppoſite, without recurring again to the other, and making an inflection, you know that all things would at length poſſeſs the ſame form, would be affected with the ſame paſſion, and would ceaſe to be generated.—How do you ſay? (ſays he.)—It is by no means difficult (replies Socrates) to underſtand what I aſſert; but juſt as if there ſhould be ſuch a thing as falling aſleep without recurring again to a vigilant ſtate, generated from a ſleepy condition, you know that all things would at length exhibit the deluſions of Endymion, and would nowhere preſent themſelves to the view, becauſe every thing elſe would ſuffer the ſame as happened to him, viz. would be laid aſleep. And if all things were mingled together, without ever being ſeparated, the doctrine of Anaxagoras would ſoon be verified; for all things would be at once collected in a heap. In the ſame manner, my dear Simmias, if all ſuch things as participate of life ſhould die, and after they are dead ſhould abide in that lifeleſs form, and not revive again, would there not be a great neceſſity that all things ſhould at length die, and that nothing ſhould live? for if living beings are generated from other things, and living beings die, how can it be otherwiſe but that all things muſt be extinguiſhed through being dead?—It appears to me, Socrates (ſays Cebes), that it can not be otherwiſe; and in my opinion you perfectly ſpeak the truth:—for to me, Cebes (ſays Socrates), it ſeems to be ſo more than any thing.

thing, and that we have not aſſented to this through deception; but that there is ſuch a thing in reality as reviving again; that the living are generated from the dead; that the ſouls of the dead have a ſubſiſtence; and that the condition of the good after this life will be better than at preſent; but of the evil, worſe.

But (ſays Cebes, interrupting him), according to that doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently accuſtomed to employ (if it is true), that learning, with reſpect to us, is nothing elſe than reminiſcence[1]; according to this, it is

[1] Socrates, having ſhown from life and death that the ſoul remains after its ſeparation from the body, now ſhows, from diſcipline being reminiſcence, that it ſubſiſted prior to the body; ſo that from both theſe poſitions it may be collected that the ſoul endures for a much longer time than the body. Olympiodorus however again informs us that Jamblichus thought that each of theſe poſitions evinced the immortality of the ſoul. For, ſays he, if life and death are always from each other, the ſoul is perpetual; and if alſo diſciplines are reminiſcences, according to this alſo the ſoul lives for ever. So that, by uniting both the arguments, he concludes that the ſoul is without generation and incorruptible. However, as Olympiodorus juſtly obſerves, neither nor both of theſe poſitions demonſtrate that the ſoul is immortal, but that it ſubſiſts for a certain time prior and poſterior to the body. Hence Plato, perceiving that he had not yet ſufficiently demonſtrated the thing propoſed, introduces other arguments in proof of it; and the fifth alone properly demonſtrates the immortality of the ſoul from its eſſence.

Since however, ſays Olympiodorus, the diſcourſe is now about reminiſcence, and memory is proximate to reminiſcence, and oblivion is oppoſed to memory, let us define what each of theſe three is, from their appellations. Reminiſcence, therefore, is renewed memory*, as its name evinces. But memory is permanency of intellect †. And oblivion is as it were a certain dimneſs of the ſight ‡. For as dimneſs is an impediment to the ſight, ſo oblivion is a dimneſs of our knowledge, as it were of our ſight. For memory, which is permanency of intellect, is firſt beheld in intellect; ſince it is a ſtable collection of knowledge: juſt as *the ever* is ſtability of being, and *immortality* is ſtability of life; for it is inextinguiſhable life. In like manner memory is ſtability of knowledge. As, therefore, our ſoul does not poſſeſs infinite power according to knowledge, though it does according to life, hence oblivion intervening, reminiſcence is a certain regeneration as it were of knowledge. Memory likewiſe firſt ſubſiſts in intellect, becauſe intellect always underſtands and abides in itſelf; but ſecondarily in divine ſouls, as poſſeſſing tranſitive intellections, and not knowing all things without time, and collectively; and it ſubſiſts, in the third place, in our ſouls, in which oblivion alſo intervenes. Memory likewiſe is ſimilar to eternity, perpetually ſubſiſting about the ſame; but reminiſcence, to time, through its tranſition.

But as Socrates ſhows from reminiſcence that the ſoul ſubſiſted prior to the body, the following Platonic arguments in defence of the ſoul's pre-exiſtence are offered to the earneſt conſideration of

* Αναμνησις εστι ανανεωσις μνημης. † Μνημη δε μονη του νου. ‡ Λησμη δε οιον λημη τις.

is neceſſary that we muſt have learned the things which we now call to mind in ſome former period of time. But this is impoſſible, unleſs our ſoul ſub-

the reader. Unleſs the ſoul then had a being prior to her connexion with the preſent body, ſhe never would be led to ſearch after knowledge. For if the objects of her inveſtigation were things which ſhe had never before been acquainted with, how could ſhe ever be certain that ſhe detected them? Indeed it would be as impoſſible on this hypotheſis for the ſoul to know any thing about them, even when ſhe perceived them, as it would be to tell the meaning of the words of an unknown language on hearing them pronounced. The Peripatetics, in order to ſubvert this conſequence, have recourſe to an intellect in capacity, which is the paſſive recipient of all forms. The doubt however ſtill remains. For how does this intellect underſtand? For it muſt either underſtand the things which it already knows, or things which it does not know. But the Stoics aſſert, that natural conceptions are the cauſes of our inveſtigating and diſcovering truth. If, therefore, theſe conceptions are in capacity, we aſk the ſame queſtion as before; but if they are in energy, why do we inveſtigate things which we know? Laſtly, the Epicureans affirm that anticipations are the cauſes of our inveſtigations. If then they ſay that theſe anticipations ſubſiſt diſtinctly, inveſtigation muſt be vain; but if indiſtinctly, why do we ſeek after any thing beſides theſe anticipations? Or, in other words, why do we ſeek after diſtinct knowledge, of which we have no anticipation?

Again, there are numberleſs inſtances of perſons that are terrified at certain animals, ſuch as cats, lizards, and tortoiſes, without knowing the cauſe of their terror. Thus the nephews of Berius, ſays Olympiodorus, that were accuſtomed to hunt bears and lions, could not endure the ſight of a cock. The ſame author adds, that a certain apothecary could look undiſturbed at aſps and ſnakes, but was ſo exceedingly frightened at a waſp, that he would run from it crying aloud, and ſtupefied with terror. Thus too, ſays he, Themiſon the phyſician could apply himſelf to the cure of every diſeaſe except the hydrophobia; but if any perſon only mentioned this diſeaſe, he would be immediately agitated, and ſuffer in a manner ſimilar to thoſe afflicted with this malady. Now it is impoſſible to aſſign any other ſatisfactory cauſe of all this, than a reminiſcence of having ſuffered through theſe animals in a prior ſtate of exiſtence.

Further ſtill, infants are not ſeen to laugh for nearly three weeks after their birth, but paſs the greateſt part of this time in ſleep; however, in their ſleep they are often ſeen both to laugh and cry. But how is it poſſible that this can any otherwiſe happen than through the ſoul being agitated by the whirling motions of the animal nature, and moved in conformity to the paſſions which it had experienced in another life? Beſides, our looking into ourſelves, when we are endeavouring to diſcover any truth, evinces that we inwardly contain truth, though concealed in the darkneſs of oblivion. The delight too which attends our diſcovery of truth, ſufficiently proves that this diſcovery is nothing more than a recognition of ſomething moſt eminently allied to our nature, and which had been, as it were, loſt in the middle ſpace of time, between our former knowledge of the truth and the recovery of that knowledge. For the perception of a thing perfectly unknown and unconnected with our nature, would produce terrror inſtead of delight; and things are pleaſing only in proportion as they poſſeſs ſomething known and domeſtic to the natures by which they are known.

ſiſted

ſiſted ſomewhere before it took up its reſidence in this human form; ſo that from hence the ſoul will appear to be a certain immortal nature.—But, Cebes (ſays Simmias, interrupting him), recall into my memory what demonſtrations there are of theſe particulars; for I do not very much remember them at preſent.—The truth of this (ſays Cebes) is evinced by one argument, and that a moſt beautiful one; that men, when interrogated, if they are but interrogated properly, will ſpeak about every thing juſt as it is. At the ſame time, they could never do this unleſs ſcience and right reaſon reſided in their natures. And, in the ſecond place, if any one leads them to diagrams, or any thing of this kind, he will in theſe moſt clearly diſcover that this is really the caſe.—But if you are not perſuaded from this, Simmias (ſays Socrates), ſee if, from conſidering the ſubject in this manner, you will perceive as we do. For you do not believe how that which is called learning is reminiſcence.—I do not diſbelieve it (ſays Simmias); but I deſire to be informed concerning this, which is the ſubject of our diſcourſe, I mean reminiſcence; and indeed, from what Cebes has endeavoured to ſay, I almoſt now remember, and am perſuaded: but nevertheleſs I would at preſent hear how you attempt to ſupport this opinion.—We defend it then (ſays Socrates) as follows: we confeſs without doubt, that if any one calls any thing to mind, it is neceſſary that at ſome time or other he ſhould have previouſly known this.—Entirely ſo (ſays he).—Shall we not confeſs this alſo (ſays Socrates), that when ſcience is produced in us, after ſome particular manner, it is reminiſcence? But I mean by a particular manner, thus: If any one, upon ſeeing or hearing any thing, or apprehending it through the medium of any other ſenſe, ſhould not only know it, but ſhould alſo think upon ſomething elſe, of which there is not the ſame, but a different ſcience, ſhould we not juſtly ſay, that he recollects or remembers the particular, of which he receives a mental conception?—How do you mean?—Thus (ſays Socrates): In a certain reſpect the ſcience of a man is different from that of a lyre.—How ſhould it not?—Do you not, therefore, know that lovers when they ſee a lyre, or a veſtment, or any thing elſe which the objects of their affection were accuſtomed to uſe, no ſooner know the lyre, than they immediately receive in their dianoëtic part the form of the beloved perſon to whom the lyre belonged? But this is no other than reminiſcence: juſt as any one, upon ſeeing Simmias, often recollects Cebes; and

in a certain reſpect an infinite number of ſuch particulars continually occur.—An infinite number indeed, by Jupiter (ſays Simmias).—Is not then (ſays Socrates) ſomething of this kind a certain reminiſcence; and then eſpecially ſo, when any one experiences this affection about things which, through time, and ceaſing to conſider them, he has now forgotten?—Entirely ſo (ſays Simmias).—But what (ſays Socrates), does it happen, that when any one ſees a painted horſe and a painted lyre, he calls to mind a man? and that when he beholds a picture of Simmias, he recollects Cebes?—Entirely ſo.—And will it not alſo happen, that on ſeeing a picture of Simmias he will recollect Simmias himſelf?—It certainly will happen ſo (ſays he).

Does it not therefore follow, that in all theſe inſtances reminiſcence partly takes place from things ſimilar, and partly from ſuch as are diſſimilar?—It does.—But when any one recollects any thing from ſimilars, muſt it not alſo happen to him, that he muſt know whether this ſimilitude is deficient in any reſpect, as to likeneſs, from that particular of which he has the remembrance?—It is neceſſary (ſays he).—Conſider then (ſays Socrates) if the following particulars are thus circumſtanced: Do we ſay that any thing is in a certain reſpect equal? I do not ſay one piece of wood to another, nor one ſtone to another, nor any thing elſe of this kind; but do we ſay that equal itſelf, which is ſomething different from all theſe, is ſomething or nothing?—We ſay it is ſomething different, by Jupiter, Socrates (ſays Simmias), and that in a wonderful manner.—Have we alſo a ſcientific knowledge of that which is equal itſelf?—Entirely ſo (ſays he).—But from whence do we receive the ſcience of it? Is it not from the particulars we have juſt now ſpoken of, viz. on ſeeing wood, ſtones, or other things of this kind, which are equals, do we not form a conception of that which is different from theſe? But conſider the affair in this manner: Do not equal ſtones and pieces of wood, which ſometimes remain the ſame, at one time appear equal, and at another not?—Entirely ſo.—But what, can *equals themſelves* ever appear to you unequal? or can equality ſeem to be inequality?—By no means, Socrates.—Theſe equals, therefore, are not the ſame with equal itſelf.—By no means, Socrates, as it appears to me.—But from theſe equals (ſays he), which are different from equal itſelf, you at the ſame time underſtand and receive the ſcience of *equal itſelf*.—You ſpeak moſt true (ſays he).—I it not, therefore, either ſimilar to theſe or diſſimilar?

milar?—Entirely ſo.—But indeed (ſays Socrates) this is of no conſequence: for while, in conſequence of ſeeing one thing, you underſtand another, from the view of this, whether it is diſſimilar or ſimilar, it is neceſſary that this conception of another thing ſhould be reminiſcence.—Entirely ſo.—But what will you determine concerning this (ſays Socrates)?—Do we ſuffer any thing of this kind reſpecting the equality in pieces of wood, and other ſuch equals as we have juſt now ſpoken of? and do they appear to us to be equal in the ſame manner as equal itſelf? and is ſomething or nothing wanting, through which they are leſs equal than equal itſelf?—There is much wanting (ſays he).—Muſt we not, therefore, confeſs, that when any one, on beholding ſome particular thing, underſtands that he wiſhes this which I now perceive to be ſuch as ſomething elſe is, but that it is deficient, and falls ſhort of its perfection; muſt we not confeſs that he who underſtands this, neceſſarily had a previous knowledge of that to which he aſſerts this to be ſimilar, but in a defective degree?—It is neceſſary.—What then, do we ſuffer ſomething of this kind or not about equals and equal itſelf?—Perfectly ſo.—It is neceſſary, therefore, that we muſt have previouſly known *equal itſelf* before that time, in which, from firſt ſeeing equal things, we underſtood that we deſired all theſe to be ſuch as *equal itſelf*, but that they had a defective ſubſiſtence.—It is ſo.—But this alſo we muſt confeſs, that we neither underſtood this, nor are able to underſtand it, by any other means than either by the ſight, or the touch, or ſome other of the ſenſes.—I ſpeak in the ſame manner about all theſe. For they are the ſame, Socrates, with reſpect to that which your diſcourſe wiſhes to evince. But indeed, from the ſenſes, it is neceſſary to underſtand that all equals in ſenſible objects aſpire after *equal itſelf*, and are deficient from its perfection. Or how ſhall we ſay?—In this manner: Before, therefore, we begin to ſee, or hear, and to perceive other things, it neceſſarily follows, that we muſt in a certain reſpect have received the ſcience of *equal itſelf*, ſo as to know what it is, or elſe we could never refer the equals among ſenſibles to *equal itſelf*, and be convinced that all theſe deſire to become ſuch as *equal itſelf*, but fall ſhort of its perfection.—This, Socrates, is neceſſary, from what has been previouſly ſaid.—But do we not, as ſoon as we are born, ſee and hear, and poſſeſs the other ſenſes?—Entirely ſo.—But we have ſaid it is neceſſary that prior to

theſe we ſhould have received the ſcience of *equal itſelf*.—Certainly.—We muſt neceſſarily, therefore, as it appears, have received it before we were born.—It appears ſo.

If, therefore, receiving this before we were born, we were born poſſeſſing it; we both knew prior to our birth, and as ſoon as we were born, not only *the equal*, *the greater*, and *the leſſer*, but every thing of this kind: for our diſcourſe at preſent is not more concerning *the equal* than *the beautiful*, *the good*, *the juſt*, and *the holy*, and in one word, about every thing which we mark with the ſignature of *that which is*, both in our interrogations when we interrogate, and in our anſwers when we reply: ſo that it is neceſſary we ſhould have received the ſcience of all theſe before we were born.—All this is true.—And if, ſince we receive theſe ſciences, we did not forget each of them, we ſhould always be born knowing, and ſhould always know them, through the whole courſe of our life: for to know is nothing elſe than this, to retain the ſcience which we have received, and not to loſe it. Or do we not call oblivion the loſs of ſcience?—Entirely ſo (ſays he), Socrates.—But if, receiving ſcience before we were born, we loſe it at the time of our birth, and afterwards, through exerciſing the ſenſes about theſe particulars, receive back again thoſe ſciences which we once before poſſeſſed, will not that which we call learning be a recovery of our own proper ſcience? and ſhall we not ſpeak rightly when we call this a certain reminiſcence?—Entirely ſo.—For this appears to be poſſible, that when any one perceives any thing, either by ſeeing or hearing, or employing any other ſenſe, he may at the ſame time know ſomething different from this, which he had forgotten, and to which this approaches, whether it is diſſimilar or ſimilar. So that, as I ſaid, one of theſe two things muſt be the conſequence: either that we were born knowing theſe, and poſſeſs a knowledge of all of them, through the whole of our life; or that we only remember what we are ſaid to learn afterwards; and thus learning will be reminiſcence.—The caſe is perfectly ſo, Socrates.

Which, therefore, will you chooſe, Simmias: that we are born knowing, or that we afterwards remember the particulars of which we formerly received the ſcience?—At preſent, Socrates, I have no choice.—But what will be your choice in the following inſtance, and what will be your opinion about

about it? Can a man, who poſſeſſes ſcience, render a reaſon concerning the objects of his knowledge, or not?—There is a great neceſſity (ſays he), Socrates, that he ſhould.—And does it alſo appear to you, that all men can render a reaſon of the particulars concerning which we have juſt now ſpoken?—I wiſh they could, ſays Simmias; but I am much more afraid, that to-morrow there will no longer be any one here who can accompliſh this in a becoming manner.—You do not therefore think, Simmias, that all men know theſe particulars?—By no means.—They remember, therefore, the things which they have once learned.—It is neceſſary.—But when did our ſouls receive this ſcience? for they did not receive them from thoſe from whom we are born men.—Certainly not.—Before this period, therefore.—Certainly.—Our ſouls therefore, Simmias, had a ſubſiſtence before they were in a human form, ſeparate from bodies, and poſſeſſed intellectual prudence.—Unleſs, Socrates, we received theſe ſciences while we were making our entrance into the preſent life; for that ſpace of time is yet left for us.—Let it be ſo, my friend. But in what other time did we loſe theſe? for we were not born poſſeſſing them, as we have juſt now acknowledged. Did we loſe them at the very time in which we received them? Or can you mention any other time?—By no means, Socrates: but I was ignorant that I ſpoke nothing to the purpoſe.

Will then the caſe remain thus for us, Simmias? For if thoſe things have a ſubſiſtence which we perpetually proclaim, viz. a certain ſomething beautiful and good, and every ſuch eſſence; and if we refer to this all ſenſible objects, as finding it to have a prior ſubſiſtence, and to be ours, and aſſimilate theſe to it, as images to their exemplar; it is neceſſary that, as theſe have a ſubſiſtence, ſo likewiſe that our ſoul ſhould have ſubſiſted before we were born: but if theſe are not, this diſcourſe will have been undertaken in vain. Is it not ſo? and is there not an equal neceſſity, both that theſe ſhould have a ſubſiſtence, and that our ſouls ſhould have had a being before we were born, and that the one cannot be without the other?—The ſame neceſſity, Socrates (ſays Simmias), appears to me to take place in a moſt tranſcendent manner; and the diſcourſe flies to a beautiful circumſtance, I mean that our ſoul ſubſiſted before we were born, in a manner ſimilar to that eſſence which you now ſpeak of. For I poſſeſs nothing which is ſo clear to me as this, that all ſuch things as the beautiful and the good ſubſiſt, in the moſt

moſt eminent degree, together with every thing elſe which you now mention; and, with reſpect to myſelf, it is ſufficiently demonſtrated.—But how does it appear to Cebes? ſays Socrates: for it is neceſſary that Cebes alſo ſhould be perſuaded.—In my opinion he is ſufficiently ſo (ſays Simmias), although he is the moſt reſolute of all men in not aſſenting to what is ſaid. Yet I think he is ſufficiently perſuaded that our ſoul had a ſubſiſtence before we were born. But whether or not the ſoul remains after death, does not appear to me, Socrates (ſays he), to be yet demonſtrated; but that doubt of the multitude, which Cebes mentioned, ſtill preſſes hard upon me, whether, when a man dies, the ſoul is not diſſipated, and this is the end of its exiſtence. For what hinders but that it may be born, and may have had a ſubſiſtence elſewhere, and this before it came into a human body; and yet, after it departs, and is liberated from this body, may then die and be corrupted?—You ſpeak well, Simmias (ſays Cebes); for it appears that the half only of what was neceſſary has been demonſtrated, I mean that our ſoul ſubſiſted before we were born: but it is neceſſary that you ſhould demonſtrate, beſides this, that it no leſs ſubſiſts after we are dead, than it did before we were born, in order that the demonſtration may be complete.—This, Simmias and Cebes (ſays Socrates), is even now demonſtrated, if you are only willing to connect into one and the ſame the preſent diſcourſe and that which we before aſſented to; I mean that every vital nature is generated from that which is dead. For if the ſoul had a prior ſubſiſtence, and it is neceſſary when it proceeds into the preſent life, and is generated man, that it ſhould be generated from nothing elſe than death, and to be dead; how is it not neceſſary that it ſhould alſo ſubſiſt after death, ſince it is requiſite that it ſhould be generated again? Its exiſtence therefore, after death, is even now, as I ſaid, demonſtrated. But you and Simmias appear to me ſtill more earneſtly to diſcuſs this aſſertion in a very pleaſant manner, and to be afraid like boys, leſt on the ſoul's departure from the body the winds ſhould tear it in pieces, and widely diſperſe it, eſpecially if any one ſhould die during a ſtormy blaſt, and not when the heavens are ſerene.—Upon this Cebes laughing, Endeavour (ſays he), O Socrates, to perſuade us of the contrary, as if we were afraid, or rather as if we were not afraid; though, perhaps, there is ſome boy among us, by whom circumſtances of this kind may be dreaded: him, therefore, we ſhould endeavour to perſuade not to be terrified at death,

as if it was ſome dreadful ſpectre.—But it is neceſſary (ſays Socrates) to charm him every day till he becomes well.—But from whence (ſays he), O Socrates, can a man acquire ſkill in ſuch enchantment, ſince you are about to leave us?—Greece (ſays he), Cebes, is very ſpacious, in ſome part of which good men may be found: and there are many barbarous nations, all which muſt be wandered over, inquiring after an enchanter of this kind, without ſparing either riches or labour, as there is nothing for which wealth can be more ſeaſonably beſtowed. But it is neceſſary that you ſhould inquire among yourſelves; for perhaps you will not eaſily find any one who is more able to accompliſh this than yourſelves.—Let theſe things be ſo (ſays Cebes): but, if you pleaſe, let us return from whence we made this digreſſion. —It will be agreeable to me (ſays Socrates): for how ſhould it not be ſo?—You ſpeak well, ſays Cebes.

Some ſuch thing, therefore (ſays Socrates), we ought to inquire of ourſelves, viz. to what being the paſſion of becoming diſſipated belongs; and reſpecting what we ought to fear, leſt this ſhould take place; and to whom a fear of this kind is proper: and after this, we ſhould conſider whether it is ſoul or not; and, as the reſult of theſe ſpeculations, ſhould either be confident or fearful concerning our ſoul.—You ſpeak true (ſays he).—Is it not, therefore, a paſſion natural to that which is collected together, and a compoſite, that it ſhould be diſſolved ſo far as it is a compoſite; and that, if there is any thing without compoſition, to this alone, if to any other, it belongs not to ſuffer affections of this kind?—This (ſays Cebes) appears to me to be the caſe. But does it not follow, that things which always ſubſiſt according to the ſame, and in a ſimilar manner, are in the moſt eminent degree incompoſites; but that ſuch things as ſubſiſt differently at different times, and never according to the ſame, are compoſites?—To me it appears ſo.—Let us return, therefore (ſays he), to the particulars of our former diſcourſe: Whether is *eſſence itſelf* (which both in our inquiries and anſwers we eſtabliſhed as having a being) that which always ſubſiſts ſimilarly, and according to the ſame, or that which ſubſiſts differently at different times? And does *the equal itſelf*, *the beautiful itſelf*, and every thing which truly is, ever receive any kind of mutation? Or does not every thing which always truly is, and has a uniform ſubſiſtence, eſſentially abide in a ſimilar manner according to the ſame, and never in any reſpect receive any mutation?—It is

neceſſary, Socrates (ſays Cebes), that it ſhould ſubſiſt ſimilarly, and according to the ſame.—But what ſhall we ſay concerning many beautiful things, ſuch as men, horſes, garments, or other things of this kind, which are either equal, or beautiful; and of all ſuch as are ſynonymous to theſe? Do theſe alſo ſubſiſt according to the ſame, or rather are they not entirely contrary to thoſe, ſo that they neither ſubſiſt ſimilarly according to the ſame, either with reſpect to themſelves or to one another, or, in one word, in any manner whatever?—Theſe (ſays Cebes) never ſubſiſt in a ſimilar condition. Theſe, therefore, may be touched, may be ſeen and perceived by the other ſenſes; but thoſe natures which always ſubſiſt according to the ſame, cannot be apprehended by any other means than the diſcurſive energy of the dianoëtic power. But things of this kind are inviſible, and cannot be ſeen. Are you willing, therefore (ſays he), that we ſhould eſtabliſh two ſpecies of beings, the one viſible, and the other inviſible?—Let us eſtabliſh them (ſays he).—And that the inviſible ſubſiſts always according to the ſame, but the viſible never according to the ſame.—And this alſo (ſays he) we will eſtabliſh.—Come then (ſays Socrates), is there any thing elſe belonging to us, than on the one hand body, and on the other ſoul?—Nothing elſe (ſays he).—To which ſpecies, therefore, ſhall we ſay the body is more ſimilar and allied?—It is manifeſt to every one (ſays he), that it is allied to the viſible ſpecies.—But what ſhall we ſay of the ſoul? Is it viſible, or inviſible?—It is certainly not viſible to men, Socrates (ſays he).—But we ſpeak of things which are viſible or not ſo, with reſpect to the nature of men. Or do you think we ſpeak of things viſible to any other nature?—Of thoſe which regard the nature of men.—What then ſhall we ſay reſpecting the ſoul, that it is viſible, or cannot be ſeen?—That it cannot be ſeen.—The ſoul, therefore, is more ſimilar to the inviſible ſpecies than the body, but the body is more ſimilar to the viſible.—It is perfectly neceſſary it ſhould be ſo, Socrates.

And have we not alſo formerly aſſerted this, that the ſoul, when it employs the body in the ſpeculation of any thing, either through ſight, or hearing, or ſome other ſenſe (for to ſpeculate through ſenſe is to ſpeculate through body), then, indeed, it is drawn by the body to things which never ſubſiſt according to the ſame, wanders[1] and is agitated, and becomes giddy like one intoxicated, through

[1] The term *wandering*, ſays Olympiodorus, is common both to life and knowledge; but the term

through paſſing into contact with things of this kind?—Entirely ſo.—But when it ſpeculates any thing, itſelf ſubſiſting by itſelf, then it departs to that which is pure, eternal, and immortal, and which poſſeſſes a ſameneſs of ſubſiſtence: and, as being allied to ſuch a nature, it perpetually becomes united with it, when it ſubſiſts alone by itſelf, and as often as it is lawful for it to obtain ſuch a conjunction: and then, too, it reſts from its wanderings, and perpetually ſubſiſts ſimilarly according to the ſame, about ſuch natures, as paſſing into contact with them; and this paſſion [1] of the ſoul is denominated prudence.—You ſpeak (ſays he), Socrates, in every reſpect beautifully and true.—To which ſpecies, therefore, of things, formerly and now ſpoken of, does the ſoul appear to you to be more ſimilar and allied?—It appears to me, Socrates (ſays he), that every one, and even the moſt indocile, muſt admit, in conſequence of this method of reaſoning, that the ſoul is both totally and univerſally more ſimilar to that which ſubſiſts perpetually the ſame, than to that which does not ſo.—But to which is the body moſt ſimilar?—To the other ſpecies.

But conſider alſo as follows [2]: that, ſince ſoul and body ſubſiſt together, nature commands that the one ſhould be ſubſervient and obey, but that the other ſhould rule and poſſeſs dominion. And in conſequence of this, which again of theſe appears to you to be ſimilar to a divine nature, and which to the mortal nature? Or does it not appear to you that the divine nature is eſſentially adapted to govern and rule, but the mortal to be governed and be ſubſervient?—To me it does ſo.—To which, therefore, is the ſoul ſimilar?—It is manifeſt, Socrates, that the ſoul is ſimilar to the divine, but the

term *agitated* belongs to life alone; and the term *giddineſs* to knowledge alone. But giddineſs is an evil. For as thoſe who are thus affected, through the inward whirl which they experience, think that things external to them are in a ſimilar condition, ſo the ſoul, through alone beholding ſenſibles, thinks that all things flow and are in motion.

[1] Olympiodorus here inquires how Plato calls *prudence* a *paſſion* of the ſoul. To which he replies, that all the virtues are *paſſions*. For it is evident, ſays he, that things which participate *ſuffer*. Hence alſo *being*, conſidered as participating *the one*, is ſaid by Plato to *ſuffer* or be *paſſive* to *the one*. Since, therefore, the ſoul participates of the prudence which ſubſiſts in intellect, or, in other words, of intellectual prudence, on this account he calls prudence the paſſion of the ſoul. Or we may ſay, that ſince the whole ſoul is through the whole of itſelf ſelf-motive, ſo far as it *moves itſelf* it *acts*, but ſo far as it is *moved* it *ſuffers*.

[2] This is the third argument derived from life, that the ſoul rules over the body. For that which uſes an inſtrument poſſeſſes dominion over it.

body to the mortal nature.—But conſider (ſays he), Cebes, whether, from all that has been ſaid, theſe concluſions will reſult to us, that the ſoul is moſt ſimilar to the divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform and indiſſoluble nature, and which always ſubſiſts ſimilarly according to the ſame; but that the body is moſt ſimilar to the nature which is human, mortal, void of intellect, multiform, diſſoluble, and which never ſubſiſts according to the ſame. Can we, my dear Cebes, produce any arguments to ſhow that this is not the caſe?—We cannot.

What then? in conſequence of all this, muſt it not be the property of the body, to be ſwiftly diſſolved; but of the ſoul, on the contrary, to be entirely indiſſoluble, or ſomething bordering on ſuch an affection?—How ſhould it not?—Do you conceive, therefore (ſays he), that when a man dies, the viſible part of him, or the body, which is ſituated in a viſible region (and which we call a dead body ſubject to diſſolution, ruin, and diſſipation), does not immediately ſuffer any of theſe affections, but remains for a conſiderable ſpace of time; and if any one dies poſſeſſing a graceful body, that it very much retains its elegant form? for, when the body is bound and buried according to the manner in which the Egyptians bury their dead, it remains almoſt entire for an incredible ſpace of time; and though ſome parts of the body may become rotten, yet the bones and nerves, and every thing of this kind, are preſerved as one may ſay immortal. Is it not ſo?—Certainly.—Can the ſoul, therefore, which is inviſible, and which departs into another place of this kind, a place noble, pure, and inviſible, viz. into Hades[1], to a beneficent and prudent God (at which place, if Divinity is willing, my ſoul will ſhortly arrive); can the ſoul, I ſay, ſince it is naturally of this kind, be immediately diſſipated and periſh on its being liberated from the body, as is aſſerted by the many? This is certainly, my dear Cebes and Simmias, far from being the caſe. But this will much more abundantly take place, if it is liberated in a pure condition, attracting to itſelf nothing of the body, as not having willingly communicated with it in the preſent life, but fled from it and collected itſelf into itſelf; an employment of this kind having been the ſubject of its perpetual meditation. But this is nothing elſe than to phi-

[1] Pluto, ſays Olympiodorus, is celebrated as prudent and good, becauſe he imparts to ſouls the virtue and ſcience which they loſt in the realms of generation. He is alſo Hades, becauſe he wipes away the viſible, which is, as it were, burnt in in the nature of the ſoul.

loſophize

loſophize rightly, and to meditate with facility, how *to be dead in reality*. Or will not this be a meditation of death?—Entirely ſo.—Will not the ſoul, therefore, when in this condition, depart to that which is ſimilar to itſelf, a divine nature, and which is likewiſe immortal and prudent? and when it arrives thither, will it not become happy, being liberated from wandering and ignorance, terror and infane love, and from all other evils belonging to the human nature; and ſo, as it is ſaid of the initiated [1], will in reality paſs the reſt of its time in the ſociety of the Gods? Shall we ſpeak in this manner, Cebes, or otherwiſe?—In this manner, by Jupiter (ſays Cebes).

But I think that if the ſoul departs polluted and impure from the body, as having always been its aſſociate, attending upon and loving the body, and becoming enchanted by it, through its deſires and pleaſures, in ſuch a manner as to think that nothing really is, except what is corporeal, which can be touched and ſeen, eaten and drunk, and employed for the purpoſes of venereal occupations, and at the ſame time is accuſtomed to hate, dread and avoid, that which is dark and inviſible to the eye of ſenſe, which is intelligible and apprehended by philoſophy; do you think that a ſoul thus affected can be liberated from the body, ſo as to ſubſiſt ſincerely by itſelf?—By no means (ſays he).—But I think that it will be contaminated by a corporeal nature, to which its converſe and familiarity with the body, through perpetual aſſociation and abundant meditation, have rendered it ſimilar and allied.—Entirely ſo.—But it is proper, my dear Cebes, to think that ſuch a nature is ponderous and heavy, terreſtrial and viſible [2]; and that a ſoul of this kind, through being connected with ſuch a nature, is rendered heavy, and drawn down again into the viſible region from its dread of that which is inviſible and Hades, and, as it is ſaid, wanders about monuments and tombs; about which

[1] The ſoul when living with Divinity may be ſaid to be truly initiated, as flying both to its own *one* or ſummit, and that of divine natures.

[2] The irrational nature is the image of the rational ſoul. This nature alſo is corporeal, conſiſting of a corporeal life, and a certain body more attenuated than this viſible body. This image, Plato ſays, becomes heavy, and is ſeen about ſepulchres. Hence ſouls that are ſtill bound to the viſible nature through a ſtrong propenſity to body, are ſaid to follow this phantom; and thus they become viſible through participation of the viſible, or ſympathy towards it. But ſuch ſouls, ſays Olympiodorus, are not only willing, but are compelled to wander about ſepulchres, as a puniſhment of their ſympathy about the body. He adds, that the image having a connate deſire towards the outward body, ſometimes alſo draws to it the ſoul, with the conſent of Juſtice.

indeed

indeed certain ſhadowy phantoms of ſouls appear, being the images produced by ſuch ſouls as have not been purely liberated from the body, but which participate of the viſible nature; and on this account they become viſible.—It is very reaſonable to ſuppoſe ſo, Socrates.—It is reaſonable indeed, Cebes: and likewiſe that theſe are not the ſouls of the worthy, but of the depraved, who are compelled to wander about ſuch places; by theſe means ſuffering the puniſhment of their former conduct, which was evil; and they are compelled thus to wander [1] till, through the deſire of a corporeal nature, which attends them, they are again bound to a body.

They are bound, however, as it is proper they ſhould be, to ſuch manners as they have exerciſed in the preſent life.—But what do you ſay theſe manners are, Socrates?—As for example, that ſuch as are addicted to gluttony, arrogant injuries, and drinking, and this without any fear of conſequences, ſhall enter into the tribes of aſſes and brutes of this kind. Or do you not think it proper that they ſhould?—You ſpeak in a manner perfectly becoming.—But ſhall we not ſay, that ſuch as held in the higheſt eſtimation injuſtice, tyranny, and rapine ſhall enter into the tribes of wolves, hawks, and kites? Or where elſe can we ſay ſuch ſouls depart?—Into tribes of this kind, certainly (ſays Cebes).—It will, therefore, be manifeſt concerning the reſt into what nature each departs, according to the ſimilitudes of manners which they have exerciſed.—It is manifeſt (ſays he); for how ſhould it not be ſo?—Are not, therefore (ſays he), thoſe among theſe the moſt happy, and ſuch as depart into the beſt place, who have made popular and political [2] virtue their ſtudy, which they call indeed temperance and juſtice, and which is produced from cuſtom and exerciſe, without philoſophy and intellect?—But how are theſe the moſt happy?—Becauſe it is fit that theſe ſhould again migrate into a political and mild tribe of this kind; ſuch as bees, waſps, or

[1] "Guilty ſouls," ſays the philoſopher Salluſt (De Diis et Mundo, cap. 19.), "are puniſhed on their departure from the preſent body; ſome by wandering about this part of the earth; others about certain of its hot or cold regions; and others are tormented by avenging dæmons. But, univerſally, the rational ſoul ſuffers puniſhment in conjunction with the irrational ſoul, the partner of its guilt; and through this that ſhadowy body derives its ſubſiſtence which is beheld about ſepulchres, and eſpecially about the tombs of ſuch as have lived an abandoned life."

[2] It muſt here be obvious to the moſt careleſs reader, that, according to Plato, the *political* are not the *true* virtues.

ants, or into the ſame human tribe again, and from theſe become moderate men.—It is fit.

But it is not lawful for any to paſs into the genus of Gods, except ſuch as, through a love of learning, have philoſophized, and departed from hence perfectly pure. And for the ſake of this, my dear Simmias and Cebes, thoſe who have philoſophized rightly abſtain from all deſires belonging to the body, and ſtrenuouſly perſevere in this abſtinence, without giving themſelves up to their dominion; nor is it becauſe they dread the ruin of their families, and poverty, like the multitude of the lovers of wealth; nor yet becauſe they are afraid of ignominy and the infamy of improbity, like thoſe who are lovers of dominion and honours, that they abſtain from theſe deſires.—For it would not, Socrates, become them ſo to do (ſays Cebes).—It would not, by Jupiter (ſays he).—Hence thoſe (ſays he), O Cebes! who take care of their ſoul, and do not live in a ſtate of ſubſerviency to their bodies, bidding farewell to all ſuch characters as we have mentioned above, do not proceed in the ſame path with theſe during the journey of life, becauſe ſuch characters are ignorant how they ſhould direct their courſe; but conſidering that they ought not to act contrary to philoſophy, and to its ſolution and purification, they give themſelves up to its direction, and follow wherever it leads.—In what manner, Socrates?—I will tell you (ſays he).

The lovers of learning well know, that when philoſophy receives their ſoul into her protection (and when ſhe does ſo, ſhe finds it vehemently bound and agglutinated to the body, and compelled to ſpeculate things through this, as through a place of confinement, inſtead of beholding herſelf through herſelf; and beſides this, rolled in every kind of ignorance: philoſophy likewiſe beholds the dire nature of the confinement, that it ariſes through deſire; ſo that he who is bound in an eminent degree aſſiſts in binding himſelf); the lovers of learning therefore, I ſay, know that philoſophy, receiving their ſoul in this condition, endeavours gently to exhort it, and diſſolve its bonds; and this ſhe attempts to accompliſh, by ſhowing that the inſpection of things through the eyes is full of deception, and that this is likewiſe the caſe with perception through the ears and the other ſenſes. Philoſophy too perſuades the ſoul to depart from all theſe fallacious informations, and to employ them no further than neceſſity requires; and exhorts her to call together and collect herſelf into one. And beſides this, to believe in no other than herſelf, with

reſpect

reſpect to what ſhe underſtands, herſelf ſubſiſting by herſelf, of that which has likewiſe a real ſubſiſtence by itſelf; and not to conſider that as having a true being which ſhe ſpeculates through others, and which has its ſubſiſtence in others. And laſtly, that a thing of this kind is ſenſible and viſible; but that what ſhe herſelf perceives is intelligible and inviſible. The ſoul of a true philoſopher, therefore, thinking that he ought not to oppoſe this ſolution, abſtains as much as poſſible from pleaſures and deſires, griefs and fears, conſidering that when any one is vehemently delighted or terrified, afflicted or deſirous, he does not ſuffer any ſuch mighty evil from theſe as ſome one may perhaps conceive, I mean ſuch as diſeaſe and a conſumption of wealth, through indulging his deſires; but that he ſuffers that which is the greateſt, and the extremity of all evils, and this without apprehending that he does ſo.—But what is this evil, Socrates (ſays Cebes)?—That the ſoul of every man is compelled at the ſame time to be either vehemently delighted or afflicted about ſome particular thing, and to conſider that about which it is thus eminently paſſive, as having a moſt evident and true ſubſiſtence, though this is by no means the caſe; and that theſe are moſt eſpecially viſible objects. Is it not ſo?—Entirely.—In this paſſion, therefore, is not the ſoul in the higheſt degree bound to the body?—In what manner?—Becauſe every pleaſure and pain, as if armed with a nail, faſten and rivet the ſoul to the body, cauſe it to become corporeal, and fill it with an opinion, that whatever the body aſſerts is true. For, in conſequence of the ſoul forming the ſame opinions with the body, and being delighted with the ſame objects, it appears to me that it is compelled to poſſeſs ſimilar manners, and to be ſimilarly nouriſhed, and to become ſo affected, that it can never paſs into Hades in a pure condition; but always departs full of a corporeal nature; and thus ſwiftly falls again into another body, and, becoming as it were ſown, is engendered; and laſtly, that from theſe it becomes deſtitute of a divine, pure, and uniform aſſociation.—You ſpeak moſt true, Socrates (ſays Cebes).

For the ſake of theſe things therefore, O Cebes! thoſe who are juſtly lovers of learning are moderate and brave, and not for the ſake of ſuch as the multitude aſſert. Or do you think it is?—By no means; for it cannot be.—But the ſoul of a philoſopher reaſons in this manner; and does not think that philoſophy ought to free him from the body, but that when he is freed he may give himſelf up to pleaſures and pains, by which he will again be bound

bound to the body, and will undertake a work which it is impoſſible to finiſh, reweaving a certain web of Penelope[1]. But procuring tranquillity with reſpect to theſe, and following the guidance of the reaſoning power, and being always converſant with this, contemplating at the ſame time that which is true, divine, and not the ſubject of opinion, and being likewiſe nouriſhed by ſuch an object of contemplation, he will think that he ought to live in this manner while he lives, and that when he dies he ſhall depart to a kindred eſſence, and an eſſence of this kind, being liberated from the maladies of the human nature. But from a nutriment of this kind the ſoul has no occaſion to fear (while it makes theſe, O Simmias and Cebes! its ſtudy) leſt, in its liberation from the body, it ſhould be lacerated, and, being blown about and diſſipated by the winds, ſhould vaniſh, and no longer have anywhere a ſubſiſtence.

When Socrates had thus ſpoken, a long ſilence enſued; and Socrates ſeemed to revolve with himſelf what had been ſaid; as likewiſe did the greateſt part of us: but Cebes and Simmias diſcourſed a little with each other. And Socrates at length looking upon them, What (ſays he), do our aſſertions appear to you to have been not ſufficiently demonſtrated? for many doubts and ſuſpicions yet remain, if any one undertakes to inveſtigate them ſufficiently. If, therefore, you are conſidering ſomething elſe among yourſelves, I have nothing to ſay; but if you are doubting about thoſe particulars which we have juſt now made the ſubject of our diſcourſe, do not be remiſs in ſpeaking about and running over what has been ſaid, if it appears to you in any reſpect that we might have ſpoken better; and receive me again as your aſſociate, if you think that you can be any ways benefited by my aſſiſtance. Upon this Simmias ſaid, Indeed, Socrates, I will tell you the truth: for ſome time ſince each of us being agitated with doubts, we impelled and exhorted one another to interrogate you, through our deſire of hearing them ſolved; but we were afraid of cauſing a debate, leſt it ſhould be diſagreeable to you in your preſent circumſtances. But Socrates, upon hearing this, gently laughed, and ſaid, This is ſtrange, indeed, Simmias; for

[1] As Penelope, who is the image of Philoſophy, unwove by night what ſhe had woven by day, ſo Ignorance reweaves what Philoſophy unweaves. Hence Philoſophy diſſolves the ſoul from, but Ignorance weaves it to, the body.

I ſhall with difficulty be able to perſuade other men that I do not conſider the preſent fortune as a calamity, ſince I am not able to perſuade even you; but you are afraid leſt I ſhould be more moroſe now than I was prior to the preſent event. And, as it ſeems, I appear to you to be more deſpicable than ſwans with reſpect to divination, who, when they perceive that it is neceſſary for them to die, ſing not only as uſual, but then more than ever; rejoicing that they are about to depart to that Deity in whoſe ſervice they are engaged. But men, becauſe they themſelves are afraid of death, falſely accuſe the ſwans, and aſſert that, in conſequence of their being afflicted at death, their ſong is the reſult of grief. Nor do they conſider that no bird ſings when it is hungry or cold, or is afflicted with any other malady; neither the nightingale, nor the ſwallow, nor the lapwing, all which they ſay ſing lamenting through diſtreſs. But neither do theſe birds, as it appears to me, ſing through ſorrow, nor yet the ſwans; but in my opinion theſe laſt are prophetic, as belonging to Apollo; and in conſequence of foreſeeing the good which Hades contains, they ſing and rejoice at that period more remarkably than at any preceding time. But I conſider myſelf as a fellow-ſervant of the ſwans, and ſacred to the ſame Divinity. I poſſeſs a divining power from our common maſter no leſs than they; nor ſhall I be more afflicted than the ſwan in being liberated from the preſent life. Hence it is proper that you ſhould both ſpeak and inquire about whatever you pleaſe, as long as the eleven magiſtrates will permit. You ſpeak excellently well (ſays Simmias); and as you give me permiſſion, I will both tell you what are my doubts, and how far Cebes does not admit what has been ſaid. For, as to myſelf, Socrates, I am perhaps of the ſame opinion about theſe particulars as yourſelf; that to know them clearly in the preſent life is either impoſſible, or a thing very difficult to obtain. But not to argue about what has been ſaid in every poſſible way, and to deſiſt before by an arduous inveſtigation on all ſides wearineſs is produced, can only take place among indolent and effeminate men. For it is neceſſary, in things of this kind, either to learn or to diſcover the manner of their ſubſiſtence; or, if both theſe are impoſſible, then, by receiving the beſt of human reaſons, and that which is the moſt difficult of confutation, to venture upon this as on a raft, and ſail in it through the ocean of life, unleſs ſome one ſhould be able to be carried more ſafely,

ſafely, and with leſs danger, by means of a firmer vehicle, or a certain *divine reaſon*[1]. I ſhall not, therefore, now be aſhamed to interrogate, in conſequence of the confeſſion which you have made; nor ſhall I blame myſelf hereafter, that I have not ſpoken what appears to me at preſent: for, upon conſidering what has been ſaid, both with myſelf and together with Cebes, your doctrine did not ſeem to be ſufficiently confirmed.

And perhaps, my friend (ſays Socrates), you have the truth on your ſide; but inform me in what reſpect it did not ſeem to be ſufficiently confirmed.—In this (ſays he); becauſe any one may aſſert the ſame about harmony[2], and a lyre, and its chords; that, for inſtance, harmony is ſomething inviſible and incorporeal, all-beautiful and divine, in a well-modulated lyre: but the lyre and its chords are bodies, and of a corporeal nature; are compoſites and terreſtrial, and allied to that which is mortal. When any one, therefore, ſhall either have broken the lyre, or cut and burſt the chords, ſome perſon may contend from the ſame reaſoning as yours, that it is neceſſary the harmony ſhould yet remain, and not be deſtroyed (for it cannot in any reſpect be poſſible that the lyre ſhould ſubſiſt when the chords are burſt, and the chords themſelves are of a mortal nature; but the harmony, which is connate and allied to that which is divine and immortal, will become extinct, and periſh prior to the mortal nature itſelf); becauſe it is neceſſary that harmony ſhould be ſomewhere, and that the wood and chords muſt ſuffer putrefaction, before this can be ſubject to any paſſion. For I think, Socrates, that you yourſelf have alſo perceived this, that we conſider the ſoul in the moſt eminent degree, as ſomething of ſuch a kind as to become the temperament of hot and cold, moiſt and dry, and ſuch-like affections, for the reception of which our body is extended, and by which it is contained: and

[1] See the Introduction to this Dialogue.

[2] Harmony has a triple ſubſiſtence. For it is either harmony itſelf, or it is that which is firſt harmonized, and which is ſuch according to the whole of itſelf; or it is that which is ſecondarily harmonized, and which partially participates of harmony. The firſt of theſe muſt be aſſigned to intellect, the ſecond to ſoul, and the third to body. This laſt too is corruptible, becauſe it ſubſiſts in a ſubject; but the other two are incorruptible, becauſe they are neither compoſites, nor dependent on a ſubject. Simmias, therefore, reaſons falſely in what he here ſays, in conſequence of looking to the third ſpecies of harmony only. Hence, the rational ſoul is analogous to a muſician, but the animated body to harmonized chords: for the former has a ſubſiſtence ſeparate, but the latter inſeparable from the muſical inſtrument.

that the ſoul is the harmony of all theſe, when they are beautifully and moderately tempered with each other. If, therefore, the ſoul is a certain harmony, it is evident that when our body ſuffers either intenſion or remiſſion, through diſeaſes and other maladies, the ſoul muſt from neceſſity immediately periſh, though of the moſt divine nature (in the ſame manner as other harmonies periſh, which either ſubſiſt in ſounds or in the works of artificers); but the remaining parts of the body of each perſon muſt ſubſiſt for a long time, till they are either burnt or become rotten. Conſider then what we ſhall ſay to this diſcourſe, if any one ſhould think, ſince the ſoul is the temperament of things ſubſiſting in the body, that it periſhes the firſt, in that which is called death.

Socrates, therefore, beholding us, and laughing as he was accuſtomed to do very often, Simmias (ſays he) ſpeaks juſtly. If any one of you, therefore, is more prompt than I am, why does he not reply to theſe objections? for he ſeems not to have handled this affair badly. But it appears to me, that before we make our reply we ſhould firſt hear Cebes, and know what it is which he objects to our diſcourſe; that, in conſequence of ſome time intervening, we may deliberate what we ſhall ſay; and that afterwards, upon hearing the objections, we may either aſſent to them, if they appear to aſſert any thing becoming; or, if they do not, that we may defend the diſcourſe we have already delivered. But (ſays he) tell me, Cebes, what it is which ſo diſturbs you, as to cauſe your unbelief.—I will tell you (ſays Cebes): your diſcourſe ſeems to me to be yet in the ſame ſtate, and to be liable to the ſame accuſation as we mentioned before. For, that our ſoul had a ſubſiſtence before it came into the preſent form, is an aſſertion, I will not deny, of a very elegant kind, and (if it is not too much to ſay) ſufficiently demonſtrated: but, that it ſtill remains when we are dead, does not appear to me to have been clearly proved; nor do I aſſent to the objection of Simmias, that the ſoul is not ſtronger and more laſting than the body, for it appears to me to be much more excellent than all theſe. Why then, ſays reaſon, do you yet diſbelieve? for, ſince you ſee that when a man dies that which is more imbecil ſtill remains, does it not appear to you to be neceſſary that the more laſting nature ſhould be preſerved during this period of time? Conſider, therefore, whether I ſhall ſay any thing to the purpoſe in reply. For I, as well as Simmias, as it ſeems, ſtand in need of a certain ſimilitude: for to me

theſe things appear to be aſſerted in the ſame manner, as if any one ſhould ſay concerning an aged dead weaver, that the man has not yet periſhed, but perhaps ſtill ſurvives ſomewhere; and ſhould exhibit as an argument in proof of this aſſertion a veſtment woven by himſelf, which he wore, and which is yet ſafe and entire. And if he ſhould aſk ſome one not crediting his aſſertion, which is the more laſting, the genus of man or of a garment, whoſe ſubſiſtence conſiſts in its uſe and in being worn; then ſhould it be replied, that the genus of man is much more laſting, he might think it demonſtrated, that the man is by a much ſtronger reaſon preſerved, ſince that which is of a ſhorter duration has not yet periſhed. But I do not think, Simmias, that this is the caſe. For conſider with yourſelf what I ſay: ſince every perſon muſt apprehend, that he who aſſerts this ſpeaks fooliſhly. For this weaver, having worn and woven many ſuch veſtments, died *after* them being many, but I think *before* the laſt; and yet it cannot be any thing the more inferred on this account, that the man is viler or more imbecil than a veſtment. And I think that the ſoul, with reſpect to the body, will receive the ſame ſimilitude; and he who ſhall aſſert the ſame concerning theſe, will appear to me to ſpeak in a very equitable manner; I mean that the ſoul is of a laſting nature, but the body more debile and leſs durable. But I ſhould ſay that each ſoul wears many bodies, eſpecially if it lives many years; for, if the body glides away like a ſtream, and is diſſolved while the man yet lives, but the ſoul perpetually re-weaves that which is worn and conſumed, it will be neceſſary indeed, that when the ſoul is deſtroyed it ſhould then be clothed with the laſt veſtment, and ſhould periſh prior to this alone. But the ſoul having periſhed, then the body will evince the nature of its imbecility, and, becoming rapidly rotten, will be perfectly diſſolved: ſo that, in conſequence of this reaſoning, it is not yet proper that we ſhould be perſuaded to believe with confidence, that our ſoul ſubſiſts ſomewhere after we are dead. For, if any one ſhould aſſent to him who aſſerts even more than you have done, and ſhould grant that not only our ſoul had an exiſtence before we were born into the preſent life, but that nothing hinders us from admitting that certain ſouls after death may ſtill have a ſubſiſtence, exiſt in ſome future period, and often be born, and again periſh (for ſo naturally ſtrong is the ſoul, that it will preſerve itſelf through frequent births); but this being granted, it may ſtill follow, that it will not only labour in

thoſe many generations, but that, finiſhing its courſe, in ſome one of theſe deaths, it will entirely periſh. But no one ſhould ſay that this death and diſſolution of the body, which alſo introduces deſtruction to the ſoul, can be known: for it is impoſſible that it can be perceived by any one of us. If this, however, be the caſe, it will not follow that he who poſſeſſes the confidence of good hope concerning death is not fooliſhly confident, unleſs he can demonſtrate that the ſoul is perfectly immortal and undecaying: for otherwiſe it will be neceſſary, that he who is about to die ſhould always fear for his ſoul, leſt in the death, which is at hand, he ſhould entirely periſh through the ſeparation of his body.

When we heard them, therefore, ſpeak in this manner, we were all of us very diſagreeably affected, as we afterwards declared to each other; becauſe, as we were in the higheſt degree perſuaded by the former diſcourſe, they again ſeemed to diſturb us and to caſt us into unbelief; and this in ſuch a manner, as not only to cauſe us to deny our aſſent to the arguments which had been already adduced, but to ſuch as might afterwards be aſſerted, fearing leſt either we ſhould not be proper judges of any thing, or that the things themſelves ſhould be unworthy of belief.

Echec. By the Gods, Phædo, I can eaſily pardon you: for, while I am now hearing you, I cannot refrain from ſaying to myſelf, In what arguments can we any longer believe? For the diſcourſe of Socrates, which a little before was exceedingly credible, is now fallen into unbelief. For the aſſertion, that our ſoul is a certain harmony, gained my aſſent both now and always in a wonderful manner; and now it is mentioned, it recalls as it were into my memory a knowledge that I formerly was of the ſame opinion. And thus I am perfectly indigent again of ſome other reaſon, as if from the very beginning, which may perſuade me that the ſoul of a dead man does not die together with the body. Tell me therefore, by Jupiter, how Socrates purſued the diſcourſe; and whether he, as you confeſs was the caſe with yourſelf, ſeemed troubled at theſe objections; or, on the contrary, anſwered them with facility; and whether he defended his doctrine ſufficiently, or in a defective manner. Relate all theſe particulars to us as accurately as you can.

Phæd. Indeed, Echecrates, I have often admired Socrates; but never more ſo than at that time. That he ſhould be able indeed to ſay ſomething

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in reply, is perhaps not wonderful; but I eſpecially admired, in the firſt place, this in him, that he received the diſcourſe of the young men in ſuch a pleaſant, benevolent and wonderful manner; and, in the next place, that he ſo acutely perceived how we were affected by their objections; and laſtly, that he ſo well cured our diſturbance, recalled us, as if flying and vanquiſhed, and cauſed us, in conjunction with himſelf, to purſue and conſider the diſcourſe.

Echec. But how did he do this?

Phæd. I will tell you: I happened at that time to ſit at his right hand, upon a low ſeat near his bed; but he himſelf ſat much higher than I did. Stroking me on the head, therefore, and compreſſing the hair which hung on my neck (for he uſed ſometimes to play with my hairs), To-morrow (ſays he), Phædo, you will perhaps cut off theſe beautiful locks.—It ſeems ſo, indeed (ſays I), Socrates.—But you will not (ſays he), if you will be perſuaded by me.—But why not (ſays I)?—For both you and I (ſays he) ought to cut off our hair to-day, if our diſcourſe muſt die, and we are not able to recall it to life again. And I indeed, if I was you, and I found that diſcourſe fled from me, would take an oath after the manner of the Argives, that I would never ſuffer my hair to grow, till, by conteſting in diſputation, I had vanquiſhed the objections of Simmias and Cebes.—But (ſays I) Hercules is reported not to have been ſufficient againſt two.—Call upon me, therefore (ſays he), as your Iolaus[1] while the light yet laſts.—I call then (ſays I), not as Hercules upon Iolaus, but as Iolaus upon Hercules.—It is of no conſequence (ſays he).

But, in the firſt place, we muſt be careful that we are not influenced by a certain paſſion.—What paſſion (ſays I)?—That we do not become (ſays he) haters[2] of reaſon, in the ſame manner as ſome become haters of men. For no greater evil can happen to any one than to be a hater of reaſons. But a

[1] Iolaus was the ſon of Iphiclus king of Theſſaly. He aſſiſted Hercules in conquering the Hydra, and burnt with a hot iron the place where the heads had been cut off, to prevent the growth of others.

[2] Four inevitable conſequences attend the man who hates reaſon. In the firſt place, he muſt hate himſelf; for he is eſſentially rational. In the ſecond place, he muſt hate truth; for this can only be diſcovered by the exerciſe of reaſon. In the third place, he muſt be a lover of that which is irrational. And, in the fourth place, he muſt be brutalized, as far as this is poſſible to man.

hatred

hatred of reaſon and a hatred of mankind are both produced in the ſame manner. For miſanthropy is produced in us through very much believing without art in ſome particular perſon, and conſidering him as a man true, ſincere, and faithful, whom in the courſe of a ſhort acquaintance we find to be depraved and unfaithful; and that this is the caſe again with another. And when any one often ſuffers this diſappointment, and eſpecially from thoſe whom he conſidered as his moſt intimate familiars and friends, at length, through finding himſelf thus frequently hurt, he hates all men, and thinks that there is nothing in any reſpect ſincere in any one. Or have you never perceived that this is the caſe?—Entirely ſo (ſays I).—But is not this baſe (ſays he)? and is it not evident that ſuch a one attempts to make uſe of men, without poſſeſſing the art which reſpects human affairs? For if, in a certain reſpect, he employed them with art, he would think, as the caſe really is, that men very good, or very bad, are but few in number; and that the greater part of mankind are thoſe which ſubſiſt between theſe.—How do you mean (ſays I)?—In the ſame manner (ſays he) as about things very ſmall and very great. Do you think that any thing is more rare than to find a very large or a very ſmall man, or dog, or any thing elſe; and again any thing exceſſively ſwift or ſlow, beautiful or baſe, white or black? Or do you not perceive that the ſummits of the extremes of all theſe are rare and few, but that things ſubſiſting between theſe are copious and many?—Entirely ſo (ſays I).—Do you not, therefore, think (ſays he) that if a conteſt of improbity ſhould be propoſed, thoſe who hold the firſt rank among the baſe would be found to be but few?—It is agreeable to reaſon to think ſo (ſays I).—It is ſo, indeed (ſays he); but in this reſpect reaſons are not ſimilar to men (for I ſhall now follow you as the leader); but in this they are ſimilar, when any one, for inſtance, without poſſeſſing the art belonging to diſcourſe, believes that a certain diſcourſe is true, and ſhortly after it appears to him to be falſe, as it is ſometimes the one and ſometimes the other, and the ſame thing happens to him about different diſcourſes. And this is particularly the caſe with thoſe who are familiar with contradictory arguments; for theſe you know think that they at length become moſt wiſe, and alone perceive that there is nothing ſound and ſtable either in things or reaſons; but that every thing is whirled upwards and downwards, as if exiſting in the river Euripus, and does not abide in any one condition for any

any portion of time whatever.—You ſpeak perfectly true (ſays I).—Would it not then (ſays he), Phædo, be a paſſion worthy of commiſeration, if, when a certain reaſon is true and firm, and is capable of being underſtood, yet ſome one falling from this ſhould be involved in doubt, becauſe he has heard reaſons, which, though remaining the ſame, yet have at one time appeared to be true, and at another falſe; and ſhould not accuſe himſelf and his own want of ſkill, but at length through grief ſhould transfer all the blame from himſelf to the reaſons; and thus ſhould paſs the remainder of his life, hating and ſlandering reaſons, and deprived of the truth and ſcience of things?—By Jupiter (ſays I), ſuch a one would be miſerable indeed.

In the firſt place, therefore (ſays he), we ſhould be very careful againſt admitting an opinion, that no reaſoning appears to be valid; but we ſhould much rather think that we are not yet in a healthy condition, and that we ought vigorouſly and cheerfully to ſtudy how to be well. And this indeed ought to be the caſe with you and others, for the ſake of the whole remainder of your life, but with me, for the ſake of death itſelf; as there is danger at the preſent time, leſt I ſhould not behave philoſophically, but, like thoſe who are perfectly unſkilled, contentiouſly. For ſuch as theſe, when they controvert any particular, are not at all concerned how that ſubſiſts about which they diſpute; but are alone anxious, that what they have eſtabliſhed may appear to the perſons preſent to be true. And I ſeem to myſelf at preſent to differ alone in this reſpect from ſuch as theſe: for I am not ſolicitous that my diſcourſe may appear true to thoſe who are preſent (except juſt as it may happen in paſſing), but that it may appear to be ſo in the moſt eminent degree to me myſelf. For I thus reaſon, my dear friend (and ſee in how fraudulent a manner), that if my aſſertions are true, it will be a beautiful circumſtance to be perſuaded of their truth; but that if nothing remains for the dead, I ſhall at leaſt have the advantage of being leſs afflicted with my preſent condition than others. But this ignorance of mine will not continue long (for it would be bad if it ſhould), but ſhortly after this will be diſſolved; and being thus prepared (ſays he), Simmias and Cebes, I ſhall now return to the diſcourſe. But, that you may be perſuaded by me, pay no attention to the perſon of Socrates, but be much more ſolicitous in aſſenting to the truth, if I ſhould appear to you to aſſert any thing true; but if this ſhould not be the caſe, oppoſe me with all your might, and beware, leſt

through too much ardour I ſhould deceive both myſelf and you, and, acting in this reſpect like bees, ſhould depart from you, leaving my ſting behind.

But to begin (ſays he): In the firſt place, remind me of what you have ſaid, if it ſhould appear that I have forgotten it. For Simmias, I think, diſtruſted and was afraid leſt the ſoul, though it is at the ſame time more divine and beautiful than the body, ſhould periſh before it, as ſubſiſting in the form of harmony. But Cebes appears to me to have admitted this, that the ſoul is more laſting than the body; but yet that it is perfectly uncertain, whether after the ſoul has worn out many bodies, and this often, it may not at length, leaving body behind, itſelf alſo periſh; ſo that this will be death itſelf, I mean the deſtruction of the ſoul, ſince the body perpetually periſhes without ceaſing. Are not theſe the things, Simmias and Cebes, which we ought to conſider?—They both confeſſed that the particulars were theſe.—Whether, therefore (ſays he), do you reject the whole of our former diſcourſe, or do you reject ſome things and not others?—They replied, We admit ſome things, and not others.—What then (ſays he) do you ſay about that diſcourſe, in which we aſſerted that learning is reminiſcence; and that, this being the caſe, our ſoul muſt neceſſarily have ſubſiſted ſomewhere before it was bound in the body?—I indeed (ſays Cebes) was both then wonderfully perſuaded by that diſcourſe, and now firmly abide in the ſame opinion.—And I alſo (ſays Simmias) am affected in the ſame manner; and I ſhould very much wonder ſhould I ever conceive otherwiſe about this particular.—But (ſays Socrates) it is neceſſary, my Theban gueſt, that it ſhould appear otherwiſe to you, if you ſtill continue of the opinion, that harmony is ſomething compoſite, and that the ſoul is a certain harmony, compoſed from things extended through the body. For you will never aſſent to yourſelf aſſerting, that harmony was compoſed prior to the things from which it ought to be compoſed; or do you think you can?—By no means (ſays he), Socrates.—Do you perceive, therefore (ſays he), that you will not be conſiſtent in your aſſertions, when you ſay that the ſoul had a ſubſiſtence before it came into a human form and into body, but that at the ſame time it was compoſed from things which then had not a being? For neither is harmony ſuch as that to which you aſſimilate it; but the lyre, and the chords, and the ſounds yet unharmonized, have a prior exiſtence; but harmony is compoſed the laſt of all, and is the firſt diſſolved. How, therefore, can this diſcourſe be conſonant with that?—In no reſpect (ſays Simmias).—

mias).—But it certainly is proper (ſays he) that a diſcourſe about harmony ſhould be conſonant, if this can ever be aſſerted of any other.—It is proper, indeed (ſays Simmias).—But this diſcourſe of yours is not conſonant. Conſider, therefore, which of theſe aſſertions you will chooſe, that learning is reminiſcence, or that the ſoul is harmony. I prefer the former, Socrates, by much; for the latter gained my aſſent without a demonſtration, through nothing more than a certain probability and ſpecious appearance; from whence alſo it appears evident to the multitude of mankind. But I well know, that the diſcourſes which frame their demonſtrations from aſſimilative reaſons only are nothing more than empty boaſtings; and unleſs a man defends himſelf againſt them, they will very much deceive him, both in geometry and all other ſpeculations. But the diſcourſe about reminiſcence and learning was delivered through an hypotheſis highly worthy of reception. For in this it was ſaid that our ſoul had a ſubſiſtence ſomewhere before it came into the preſent body, as it is an eſſence poſſeſſing the appellation of that which truly is. But, as I perſuade myſelf, I aſſent to this doctrine in a manner ſufficient and proper; and hence it is neceſſary, as it appears to me, that I ſhould neither aſſent to myſelf nor to any other aſſerting that the ſoul is harmony.

But what (ſays he), Simmias? Does it appear to you that it can either belong to this harmony, or to any compoſition, to ſubſiſt differently from the things from which it is compoſed?—By no means.—And indeed, as it appears to me, it can neither perform nor ſuffer any thing elſe, beſides what theſe perform and ſuffer.—He agreed it could not.—It does not, therefore, belong to harmony to be the leader of the materials from which it is compoſed, but to follow them.—This alſo he granted.—It is far, therefore, from being the caſe, that harmony will either be moved or ſound contrary, or in any other reſpect be adverſe to its parts.—Very far, indeed, (ſays he).—But what, does not every harmony naturally ſubſiſt in ſuch a manner as to be harmony, ſo far as it receives a congruous temperament?—I do not underſtand you.—But (ſays he) if it were poſſible that it could be congruouſly tempered with ſtill greater vehemence, and more in quantity, would it not be more vehemently harmony and more in quantity; but if leſs vehemently and leſs in quantity, juſt the contrary?—Entirely ſo.—But can it be ſaid of the ſoul, that, even in the ſmalleſt circumſtance, one ſoul is more vehemently and

more in quantity, or leſs vehemently and leſs in quantity, ſoul, than another?—By no means (ſays he).—Conſider then (ſays he), by Jupiter, is it truly ſaid, that one ſoul poſſeſſes intellect and virtue, and is good; but that another is fooliſh and vicious, and is bad?—It is truly ſaid.—Among thoſe, therefore, who eſtabliſh the ſoul as harmony, what can any one call virtue and vice in the ſoul? Will he call the one harmony, and the other diſcord? And that the one, that is to ſay the good ſoul, is harmonized; and, as it is harmony, poſſeſſes another harmony in itſelf; but that the other is diſcord, and does not contain in itſelf another harmony?—I know not what to reply (ſays Simmias); but it is manifeſt, that he who eſtabliſhes this would make ſome ſuch reply. But it has been granted (ſays he), that one ſoul is not more or leſs ſoul than another; and this is no other than to confeſs, that one harmony is not more vehemently and more in quantity, nor leſs vehemently and leſs in quantity, harmony, than another: is it not ſo?—Entirely ſo.—But that which is neither more nor leſs harmony, is neither more nor leſs harmonized: is it not ſo?—It is.—But can that which is neither more nor leſs harmonized participate more or leſs of harmony[1]? or does it equally participate?—Equally.—The ſoul, therefore, ſince it is not more or leſs ſoul than another, is not more or leſs harmonized.—It is not.—But ſince it is thus affected, it will neither participate more of diſcord nor of harmony.—By no means.—And again, in conſequence of this paſſion, can one ſoul participate more of vice or virtue than another, ſince vice is diſcord, but virtue harmony?—It cannot.—But rather, Simmias, according to right reaſon, no ſoul will participate of vice, ſince it is harmony: for doubtleſs the harmony, which is perfectly ſuch, can never participate of diſcord.—It certainly cannot.—Neither, therefore, can the ſoul, which is perfectly

[1] As every rational ſoul is an incorporeal harmony ſeparate from a ſubject, it does not admit of intenſions and remiſſions; and, therefore, one rational ſoul is neither more nor leſs harmony than another, ſo far as each is *eſſentially* harmony. One ſoul, however, may be more ſimilar to intellect, or harmony itſelf, than another, and, ſo far as it is more ſimilar, will be more harmony in *energy*. Hence, virtue may be conſidered as the concord, and vice as the diſcord, of the rational and irrational nature; the former being produced from the rational harmonizing the irrational part, in conſequence of being a harmony more energetic; and the latter ariſing from the irrational being unharmonized by the rational part, becauſe in this caſe the eſſential harmony of the ſoul is more dormant than energetic. The reaſoning, therefore, of Socrates does not apply to that harmony which is ſeparate, but to that which is inſeparable from body.

ſoul,

ſoul, participate of vice: for how can it, in conſequence of what has been ſaid? In conſequence of this reaſoning, therefore, the ſouls of all animals will be ſimilarly good; ſince they are naturally ſimilarly ſouls, with reſpect to the eſſence of ſoul.—To me it appears ſo, Socrates (ſays he).—If the hypotheſis therefore was right, would it appear to you to be beautifully ſaid, and that this conſequence enſued, that the ſoul is harmony?—By no means (ſays he).

But what (ſays Socrates), among all the things which are inherent in man, would you ſay that any thing elſe governed except ſoul, if he be a prudent man?—I ſhould not.—But whether does the ſoul govern, by aſſenting to the paſſions belonging to the body, or by oppoſing them? My meaning is this, that when heat and thirſt are preſent, the ſoul, if it governs, will frequently draw the body to the contrary, i. e. not to drink; and hunger being preſent, that it ſhall not eat; and in a thouſand other inſtances we may behold the ſoul oppoſing the deſires of the body: may we not?—Entirely ſo.—Have we not above confeſſed, that if the ſoul was harmony, it would never ſound contrary to the intenſions, remiſſions, or vibrations, or any other paſſion belonging to its component parts, but that it would follow, and never rule over them?—We have granted this (ſays he); for how could we do otherwiſe?—But what, does not the ſoul now appear to act juſt the contrary to this, ruling over all thoſe particulars, from which it may be ſaid it ſubſiſts, nearly oppoſing all of them through the whole of life, and exerciſing abſolute dominion over them all manner of ways, puniſhing ſome of theſe indeed with greater difficulty, and accompanied with pain; ſome through gymnaſtic and medicine, and ſome by milder methods, and ſome again by threats, and others by admoniſhing deſire, anger, and fear; addreſſing that which it oppoſes, as being itſelf of a different nature? juſt as Homer does in the Odyſſey [1], where he ſays of Ulyſſes:

"His breaſt he ſtruck, and cried, My heart, ſuſtain
"This ill! for thou haſt borne far greater pain."

Do you think that Homer deviſed this in conſequence of thinking that the ſoul is harmony, and of ſuch a kind as to be led by the paſſions of the body,

[1] Lib. xix. ver. 15.

and

and not ſuch as is naturally adapted to lead and govern, and which is ſomething much more divine than harmony?—By Jupiter, Socrates, I do not think that he did.—By no means, therefore, moſt excellent man, ſhall we do well, in aſſerting that the ſoul is a *certain*[1] harmony: for by thus aſſerting, as it appears, we ſhall neither agree with Homer, that divine poet, nor be conſiſtent with ourſelves.—It is ſo, indeed (ſays he).

Let it then be ſo (ſays Socrates); and thus, as it appears, we have ſufficiently appeaſed the patrons of the Theban harmony. But how, Cebes, and by what diſcourſe ſhall we appeaſe the patrons of Cadmus[2]?—You appear to me (ſays Cebes) to be likely to find out a way: for you have delivered this diſcourſe againſt harmony in a wonderful manner, and beyond what I expected. For, while Simmias related his doubts, I thought it would be a moſt admirable thing, ſhould any one be able to reply to his diſcourſe. He therefore appears to me, in a manner perfectly extraordinary, not to have ſuſtained the very firſt aſſault of your diſcourſe. I ſhould not, therefore, be ſurpriſed if the arguments of Cadmus met with the ſame fate.—My good friend (ſays Socrates), do not ſpeak ſo magnificently, leſt a certain envy ſhould ſubvert our future diſcourſe. Theſe things, indeed, will be taken care of by Divinity. But we, approaching near in an Homeric manner, will try whether you ſay any thing to the purpoſe. This then is the ſum of what you inquire: you think it proper to demonſtrate that our ſoul is without decay, and immortal; that a philoſopher who is about to die with all the confidence of hope, and who thinks that after death he ſhall be far more happy than in the preſent life, may not indulge a ſtupid and fooliſh confidence. But you

[1] That is, a harmony ſubſiſting in, and therefore inſeparable from, a ſubject.

[2] "Cadmus," ſays Olympiodorus, "is the ſublunary world, as being Dionyſiacal, on which account Harmony is united to the God, and as being the father of the four Bacchuſes. But they make the four elements to be Dionyſiacal, viz. *fire*, to be *Semele*; *earth*, *Agave*, tearing in pieces her own offſpring; *water*, *Ino*; and laſtly, *air*, *Autonoe*." There is great beauty in conjoining *Harmonia*, or *Harmony*, the daughter of Venus and Mars, with Cadmus. For Venus is the cauſe of all the harmony and analogy in the univerſe, and beautifully illuminates the order and communion of all mundane concerns. But Mars excites the contrarieties of the univerſe, that the world may exiſt perfect and entire from all its parts. The progeny, therefore, of theſe two Divinities muſt be the *concordant diſcord* or *harmony* of the ſublunary world. But Socrates (as Forſter well obſerves in his notes on this dialogue) repreſents Cebes as another Cadmus, becauſe, according to his doctrine, men after they are buried, like the teeth of the ſerpent ſlain by Cadmus, will revive in another form, and in a ſhort time like the Cadmæan men will entirely periſh.

ſay,

ſay, though it ſhould be ſhown that the ſoul is ſomething robuſt and deiform, and that it ſubſiſted before we were born, yet nothing hinders but that all theſe arguments may not evince its immortality, but only that the ſoul is more laſting than the body, that it formerly exiſted ſomewhere for an immenſe period of time, and that it knew and performed a multitude of things. But that, for all this, it will be nothing the more immortal; but that, entering into the body of a man, it will be the principle of deſtruction to itſelf, as if connected with a diſeaſe: ſo that it will both lead a miſerable life in the body, and at laſt will periſh in that which is called death. But you ſay it is of no conſequence whether it comes into body once or often, with reſpect to our occaſion of fear: for it is very proper that he who neither knows, nor is able to render a reaſon, why the ſoul is immortal, ſhould be afraid of death, unleſs he is deprived of intellect. This, I think, Cebes, is the ſum of what you ſay; and I have repeated it often, that nothing may eſcape our obſervation; and that, if you are willing, you may either add or take away from our ſtatement of the objections. But Cebes replied, I have nothing at preſent either to add or take away; but theſe are the objections which I make.

Socrates, therefore, after he had been ſilent for a long time, and conſidering ſomething by himſelf, ſaid, You require, Cebes, a thing of no ſmall importance: for it is perfectly neceſſary to treat concerning the cauſe of generation and corruption. If you are willing, therefore, I will relate to you what happened to me in this inveſtigation; and afterwards, if any thing which I ſhall ſay ſhall appear to you uſeful, with reſpect to perſuading you in the preſent inquiry, employ it for this purpoſe.—But I am moſt aſſuredly willing (ſays Cebes).—Hear then my narration: When I was a young man, Cebes, I was in a wonderful manner deſirous of that wiſdom which they call a hiſtory[1] of nature: for it appeared to me to be a very ſuperb affair to know the cauſes of each particular, on what account each is generated, why it periſhes, and why it exiſts. And I often toſſed myſelf as it were upwards and

[1] What Socrates here calls *a hiſtory of nature*, is what the moderns call *experimental philoſophy*. The danger of directing the attention ſolely to this ſtudy is, as Socrates juſtly obſerves, truly great. For by ſpeculating no other cauſes than ſuch as are inſtrumental, and which are involved in the darkneſs of matter, the mental eye becomes at length incapable of beholding true and primary cauſes, the ſplendid principles of all things.

downwards; conſidering, in the firſt place, whether after that which is hot and cold has received a certain rottenneſs, as ſome ſay, then animals are nouriſhed; and whether the blood is that through which we become prudent, or air, or fire; or whether none of theſe, but the brain, is that which affords the ſenſes of hearing, ſeeing, and ſmelling; ſo that memory and opinion are generated from theſe, and that from memory and opinion obtaining tranquillity, ſcience is accordingly produced? And again conſidering the corruptions of theſe, and the properties which take place about the heavens and the earth, I at length appeared to myſelf ſo unſkilful in the ſpeculation of theſe, as to receive no advantage from my inquiries. But I will give you a ſufficient proof of the truth of this: for I then became ſo very blind, with reſpect to things which I knew before with great clearneſs (as it appeared both to myſelf and others) through this ſpeculation, as to want inſtruction both in many particulars, which I thought I had known before, and in this, why a man is increaſed. For I thought it was evident to every one that this took place through eating and drinking: for when, from the aliment, fleſh accedes to fleſh, bone to bone, and every where kindred to kindred parts, then the bulk which was ſmall becomes afterwards great; and thus a little man becomes a large one. Such was then my opinion; does it appear to you a becoming one?—To me, indeed, it does (ſays Cebes).—But ſtill further, conſider as follows: for I thought that I ſeemed to myſelf ſufficiently right in my opinion, when, on ſeeing a tall man ſtanding by a ſhort one, I judged that he was taller by the head; and in like manner one horſe than another: and ſtill more evident than theſe, ten things appeared to me to be more than eight, becauſe two is added to them, and that a bicubital is greater than a cubital magnitude, through its ſurpaſſing it by the half.—But now (ſays Cebes) what appears to you reſpecting theſe?—By Jupiter (ſays he), I am ſo far from thinking that I know the cauſe of theſe, that I cannot even perſuade myſelf, when any perſon adds one to one, that then the one to which the addition was made becomes two; or that the added one, and that to which it is added, become two, through the addition of the one to the other. For I ſhould wonder, ſince each of theſe, when ſeparate from one another, was one, and not then two; if, after they have approached nearer to each other, this ſhould be the cauſe of their becoming two, viz. the aſſociation through which they are placed nearer to each other. Nor

yet

yet, if any perſon ſhould divide one, am I able to perſuade myſelf that this diviſion is the cauſe of its becoming two. For that former[1] cauſe of two being produced is contrary to this. For then this took place, becauſe they were collected near to each other, and the one was applied to the other; but now, becauſe the one is removed and ſeparated from the other. Nor do I any longer perſuade myſelf, that I know why one is produced; nor, in one word, why any thing elſe is either generated or corrupted, or is, according to this method of proceeding: but, in order to obtain this knowledge, I venture to mingle another method of my own, by no means admitting this which I have mentioned.

But having once heard a perſon reading from a certain book, compoſed, as he ſaid, by Anaxagoras[2]—when he came to that part, in which he ſays that intellect orders and is the cauſe of all things, I was delighted with this cauſe, and thought that, in *a certain reſpect*[3], it was an excellent thing for intellect to be the cauſe of all; and I conſidered that, if this was the caſe, diſpoſing intellect would adorn all things, and place every thing in that ſituation in which it would ſubſiſt in the beſt manner. If any one, therefore, ſhould be willing to diſcover the cauſe through which every thing is generated, or corrupted, or is, he ought to diſcover how it may ſubſiſt in the beſt manner, or ſuffer, or perform any thing elſe. In conſequence of this, therefore, it is proper that a man ſhould conſider nothing elſe, either about himſelf or about others, except that which is the moſt excellent and the beſt: but it is neceſſary that he who knows this ſhould alſo know that which is ſubordinate, ſince there is one and the ſame ſcience of both. But thus reaſoning with myſelf, I rejoiced, thinking that I had found a preceptor in Anaxagoras, who would inſtruct me in the cauſes of things agreeably to my own conceptions; and that he would inform me, in the firſt place, whether

[1] Addition is no more the proper cauſe of two than diviſion; but each of theſe is nothing but a concauſe. For one and one by junction become the ſubject or matter of the participation of the incorporeal duad; and this is likewiſe the caſe when one thing is divided.

[2] See an extract of ſome length from that work of Anaxagoras to which Plato here alludes, in the Notes on the firſt book of my tranſlation of Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics.

[3] Socrates here uſes the words *in a certain reſpect* with the greateſt accuracy: for *intellect*, conſidered according to its higheſt ſubſiſtence in the intelligible order, may be ſaid to be the cauſe of all things poſterior to *the one*; but *the one*, being above intellect, is truly in every reſpect the cauſe of all.

the earth is flat or round; and afterwards explain the cauſe and neceſſity of its being ſo, adducing for this purpoſe that which is better, and ſhowing that it is better for the earth to exiſt in this manner. And if he ſhould ſay it is ſituated in the middle, that he would, beſides this, ſhow that it is better for it to be in the middle; and if he ſhould render all this apparent to me, I was ſo diſpoſed as not to require any other ſpecies of cauſe. I had likewiſe prepared myſelf in a ſimilar manner for an inquiry reſpecting the ſun, and moon, and the other ſtars, their velocities and revolutions about each other, and all their other properties; ſo as to be able to know why it is better for each to operate in a certain manner, and to ſuffer that which it ſuffers. For I by no means thought, after he had ſaid that all theſe were orderly diſpoſed by intellect, he would introduce any other cauſe of their ſubſiſtence, except that which ſhows[1] that it is beſt for them to exiſt as they do. Hence I thought that in aſſigning the cauſe common to each particular, and to all things, he would explain that which is beſt for each, and is the common good of all. And indeed I would not have exchanged theſe hopes for a mighty gain! but having obtained his books with prodigious eagerneſs, I read them with great celerity, that I might with great celerity know that which is the beſt, and that which is baſe.

From this admirable hope however, my friend, I was forced away, when, in the courſe of my reading, I ſaw him make no uſe of intellect, nor employ certain cauſes, for the purpoſe of orderly diſpoſing particulars, but aſſign air, æther, and water, and many other things equally abſurd, as the cauſes of things. And he appeared to me to be affected in a manner ſimilar to him who ſhould aſſert, that all the actions of Socrates are produced by intellect; and afterwards, endeavouring to relate the cauſes of each particular action, ſhould ſay, that, in the firſt place, I now ſit here becauſe my body is compoſed from bones and nerves, and that the bones are ſolid, and are ſeparated by intervals from each other; but that the nerves, which are of a nature capable of intenſion and remiſſion, cover the bones, together with the fleſh and ſkin by which they are contained. The bones, therefore, being ſuſpended from their joints, the nerves, by ſtraining and relaxing them, enable me to bend my limbs as at preſent; and through this cauſe I here ſit in an

[1] Concauſes can never ſhow that it is beſt for things to exiſt as they do; but this can only be effected by primary, viz. *effective*, *paradigmatic*, and *final* cauſes.

inflected

inflected poſition—and again, ſhould aſſign other ſuch-like cauſes of my converſation with you, viz. voice, and air, and hearing, and a thouſand other ſuch particulars, neglecting to adduce the true cauſe, that ſince it appeared to the Athenians better to condemn me, on this account, it alſo appeared to me to be better and more juſt to ſit here, and, thus abiding, ſuſtain the puniſhment which they have ordained me. For otherwiſe, by the dog, as it appears to me, theſe nerves and bones would have been carried long ago either into Megara or Bœotia, through an opinion of that which is beſt, if I had not thought it more juſt and becoming to ſuſtain the puniſhment ordered by my country, whatever it might be, than to withdraw myſelf and run away. But to call things of this kind cauſes is extremely abſurd. Indeed, if any one ſhould ſay that without poſſeſſing ſuch things as bones and nerves, and other particulars which belong to me, I could not act in the manner I appear to do, he would ſpeak the truth: but to aſſert that I act as I do at preſent through theſe, and that I operate with this intellect, and not from the choice of that which is beſt, would be an aſſertion full of extreme negligence and ſloth. For this would be the conſequence of not being able to collect by diviſion, that the true cauſe of a thing is very different from that without which a cauſe would not be a cauſe. And this indeed appears to me to be the caſe with the multitude of mankind, who, handling things as it were in darkneſs, call them by names foreign from the truth, and thus denominate things cauſes which are not ſo. Hence, one placing round the earth a certain vortex, produced by the celeſtial motion, renders by this mean the earth fixt in the centre; but another places air under it, as if it was a baſis to a broad trough. But they neither inveſtigate that power through which things are now diſpoſed in the beſt manner poſſible, nor do they think that it is endued with any dæmoniacal ſtrength: but they fancy they have found a certain Atlas, more ſtrong and immortal than ſuch a ſtrength, and far more ſuſtaining all things; and they think that the good and the becoming do not in reality connect and ſuſtain any thing. With reſpect to myſelf, indeed, I would moſt willingly become the diſciple of any one; ſo that I might perceive in what manner a cauſe of this kind ſubſiſts. But ſince I am deprived of this advantage, and have neither been able to diſcover it myſelf, nor to learn it from another, are you willing, Cebes, that I ſhould ſhow you the manner in which I made a proſperous voyage to diſ-

cover the cauſe of things?—I am willing (ſays he) in a moſt tranſcendent degree.

It appeared to me therefore (ſays Socrates) afterwards, when I was wearied with ſuch ſpeculations, that I ought to take care leſt I ſhould be affected in the ſame manner as thoſe are who attentively behold the ſun in an eclipſe: for ſome would be deprived of their ſight, unleſs they beheld its image in water, or in a ſimilar medium. And ſomething of this kind I perceived with reſpect to myſelf, and was afraid leſt my ſoul ſhould be perfectly blinded through beholding things with the eyes of my body, and through endeavouring to apprehend them by means of the ſeveral ſenſes. Hence I conſidered that I ought to fly to reaſons, and in them ſurvey the truth of things. Perhaps, indeed, this ſimilitude of mine may not in a certain reſpect be proper: for I do not entirely admit that he who contemplates things in reaſons, ſurveys them in images, more than he who contemplates them in external effects. This method, therefore, I have adopted; and always eſtabliſhing that reaſon as an hypotheſis, which I judge to be the moſt valid, whatever appears to me to be conſonant to this, I fix upon as true, both concerning the cauſe of things and every thing elſe; but ſuch as are not conſonant I conſider as not true. But I wiſh to explain to you what I ſay in a clearer manner: for I think that you do not at preſent underſtand me.—Not very much, by Jupiter, ſays Cebes.

However (ſays he), I now aſſert nothing new, but what I have always aſſerted at other times, and in the preceding diſputation. For I ſhall now attempt to demonſtrate to you that ſpecies of cauſe which I have been diſcourſing about, and ſhall return again to thoſe particulars which are ſo much celebrated; beginning from theſe, and laying down as an hypotheſis, that there is a certain ſomething beautiful, itſelf ſubſiſting by itſelf; and a certain ſomething good and great, and ſo of all the reſt; which if you permit me to do, and allow that ſuch things have a ſubſiſtence, I hope that I ſhall be able from theſe to demonſtrate this cauſe to you, and diſcover that the ſoul is immortal.—But (ſays Cebes), in conſequence of having granted you this already, you cannot be hindered from drawing ſuch a concluſion.—But conſider (ſays he) the things conſequent to theſe, and ſee whether you will then likewiſe agree with me. For it appears to me, that if there be any thing elſe beautiful, beſides the beautiful itſelf, it cannot be beautiful on any other

other account than becauſe it participates of the beautiful itſelf; and I ſhould ſpeak in the ſame manner of all things. Do you admit ſuch a cauſe?—I admit it (ſays he).—I do not therefore (ſays Socrates) any longer perceive, nor am I able to underſtand, thoſe other *wiſe* cauſes; but if any one tells me why a certain thing is beautiful, and aſſigns as a reaſon, either its poſſeſſing a florid colour, or figure, or ſomething elſe of this kind, I bid farewell to other hypotheſes (for in all others I find myſelf diſturbed); but this I retain with myſelf, ſimply, unartificially, and perhaps fooliſhly, that nothing elſe cauſes it to be beautiful, than either the preſence, or communion, or in whatever manner the operations may take place, of the beautiful itſelf. For I cannot yet affirm how this takes place; but only this, that all beautiful things become ſuch through the beautiful itſelf. For it appears to me moſt ſafe thus to anſwer both myſelf and others; and adhering to this, I think that I can never fall, but that I ſhall be ſecure in anſwering, that all beautiful things are beautiful through the beautiful itſelf. Does it not alſo appear ſo to you?—It does.—And that great things, therefore, are great, and things greater, greater through magnitude itſelf; and things leſſer, leſſer through ſmallneſs itſelf?—Certainly.—Neither, therefore, would you aſſent, if it ſhould be ſaid that ſome one is larger than another by the head, and that he who is leſſer is leſſer by the very ſame thing, i. e. the head: but you would teſtify that you ſaid nothing elſe than that, with reſpect to every thing great, one thing is greater than another by nothing elſe than magnitude, and that through this it is greater, i. e. through magnitude; and that the leſſer is leſſer through nothing elſe than ſmallneſs, and that through this it is leſſer, i. e. through ſmallneſs. For you would be afraid, I think, leſt, if you ſhould ſay that any one is greater and leſſer by the head, you ſhould contradict yourſelf: firſt, in aſſerting that the greater is greater, and the leſſer leſſer, by the very ſame thing; and afterwards that the greater is greater by the head, which is a ſmall thing; and that it is monſtrous to ſuppoſe, that any thing which is great can become ſo through ſomething which is ſmall. Would you not be afraid of all this?—Indeed I ſhould (ſays Cebes, laughing).—Would you not alſo (ſays he) be afraid to ſay that ten things are more than eight by two, and that through this cauſe ten tranſcends eight, and not by multitude and through multitude? And in like manner, that a thing which

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is two cubits in length is greater than that which is but one cubit, by the half, and not by magnitude? for the dread is indeed the ſame.—Entirely ſo (ſays he).—But what? one being added to one, will the addition be the cauſe of their becoming two? or if one is divided, and two produced, would you not be afraid to aſſign diviſion as the cauſe? Indeed you would cry with a loud voice, that you know no other way by which any thing ſubſiſts, than by participating the proper eſſence of every thing which it participates; and that in theſe you can aſſign no other cauſe of their becoming two, than the participation of the duad; and that it is proper all ſuch things as are about to become two, ſhould participate of this, and of unity, whatever is about to become one. But you would bid farewell to theſe diviſions and additions, and other ſubtilties of this kind, and would leave them to be employed in anſwering, by thoſe who are wiſer than yourſelf. And fearing, as it is ſaid, your own ſhadow, and your own unſkilfulneſs, you would adhere to this ſafe hypotheſis, and anſwer in the manner I have deſcribed. But if any one ſhould adhere to this hypotheſis, you would refrain from anſwering him till you had conſidered the conſequences reſulting from thence, and whether they were conſonant or diſſonant to one another. But when it is neceſſary for you to aſſign a reaſon for your belief in this hypotheſis, you will aſſign it in a ſimilar manner, laying down again another hypotheſis, which ſhall appear to be the beſt among ſupernal natures, till you arrive at ſomething ſufficient. At the ſame time you will by no means confound things by mingling them together, after the manner of the contentious, when you diſcourſe concerning the principle and the conſequences ariſing from thence, if you are willing to diſcover any thing of true beings. For by ſuch as theſe, perhaps, no attention is paid to this. For theſe, through their wiſdom, are ſufficiently able to mingle all things together, and at the ſame time pleaſe themſelves. But you, if you rank among the philoſophers, will act, I think, in the manner I have deſcribed.—Both Simmias and Cebes ſaid, You ſpeak moſt truly.

Echec. By Jupiter, Phædo, they aſſented with great propriety: for he appears to me to have aſſerted this in a manner wonderfully clear; and this even to one endued with the ſmalleſt degree of intellect.

Phæd. And ſo indeed, Echecrates, it appeared in every reſpect to all who were preſent.

Echec.

ECHEC. And well it might: for it appears ſo to us, now we hear it, who were not preſent. But what was the diſcourſe after this?

If I remember right, after they had granted all this, and had confeſſed that each of the ſeveral ſpecies was ſomething, and that others participating of theſe received the ſame denomination, he afterwards interrogated them as follows: If then you allow that theſe things are ſo, when you ſay that Simmias is greater than Socrates, but leſs than Phædo, do you not then aſſert that both magnitude and parvitude are inherent in Simmias?—I do.—And yet (ſays he) you muſt confeſs, that this circumſtance of Simmias ſurpaſſing Socrates does not truly ſubſiſt in the manner which the words ſeem to imply. For Simmias is not naturally adapted to ſurpaſs Socrates, ſo far as he is Simmias, but by the magnitude which he poſſeſſes: nor, again, does he ſurpaſs Socrates ſo far as Socrates is Socrates, but becauſe Socrates poſſeſſes parvitude with reſpect to his magnitude.—True.—Nor, again, is Simmias ſurpaſſed by Phædo, becauſe Phædo is Phædo, but becauſe Phædo poſſeſſes magnitude with reſpect to the parvitude of Simmias.—It is ſo.—Simmias, therefore, is allotted the appellation of both ſmall and great, being ſituated in the middle of both; exhibiting his ſmallneſs to be ſurpaſſed by the greatneſs of the one, and his greatneſs to the other's ſmallneſs, which it ſurpaſſes. And at the ſame time, gently laughing, I ſeem (ſays he) to have ſpoken with all the preciſion of an hiſtorian; but, notwithſtanding this, it is as I ſay.—He allowed it.—But I have mentioned theſe things, in order that you may be of the ſame opinion as myſelf. For to me it appears, not only that magnitude is never willing to be at the ſame time both great and ſmall, but that the magnitude which we contain never deſires to receive that which is ſmall, nor be ſurpaſſed; but that it is willing to do one of theſe two things, either to fly away, and gradually withdraw itſelf, when its contrary the ſmall approaches to it, or to periſh when it arrives; but that it is unwilling, by ſuſtaining and receiving parvitude, to be different from what it was. In the ſame manner as I myſelf receiving and ſuſtaining parvitude, and ſtill remaining that which I am, am nevertheleſs ſmall. But that being great dares not to be ſmall. And in like manner *the ſmall*, which reſides in us, is not willing at any time *to ſubſiſt in becoming to be* great, or *to be* great: nor does any thing elſe among contraries, while it remains that which it was, wiſh at the ſame time *to ſubſiſt in becoming to be*, and *to be*, its contrary; but

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it either departs or periſhes in conſequence of this paſſion.—It appears ſo to me (ſays Cebes) in every reſpect.

But a certain perſon, who was preſent, upon hearing this (I do not clearly remember who it was), By the Gods (ſays he), was not the very contrary of what you now aſſert admitted by you in the former part of your diſcourſe, viz. that the greater was generated from the leſs, and the leſs from the greater; and that generation among contraries plainly took place from contraries? But now you appear to me to ſay, that this can never be the caſe. Upon this Socrates, after he had extended his head a little further, and had liſtened to his diſcourſe, ſaid, You very manfully put me in mind; yet you do not underſtand the difference between what is now and what was then aſſerted. For then it was ſaid, that a contrary thing was generated from a contrary; but now, that a contrary can never become contrary to itſelf, neither that contrary which ſubſiſts in us, nor that which ſubſiſts in nature. For then, my friend, we ſpoke concerning things which poſſeſs contraries, calling the contraries by the appellation of the things in which they reſide; but now we ſpeak of things which receive their denomination from the contraries reſiding in them. And we ſhould never be willing to aſſert that theſe contraries receive a generation from one another. And at the ſame time, beholding Cebes, he ſaid, Did any thing which has been ſaid by this perſon diſturb you alſo?—Indeed (ſays Cebes) it did not; and at ſuch a time as this there are not many things which can diſturb me.—We ingenuouſly, therefore (ſays he), aſſent to this, that a contrary can never become contrary to itſelf.—Entirely ſo (ſays Cebes).

But ſtill further (ſays he), conſider whether you agree with me in this alſo. Do you call *the hot* and *the cold* any thing?—I do.—Are they the ſame with ſnow and fire?—They are not, by Jupiter.—*The hot*, therefore, is ſomething different from *fire*, and *the cold* from *ſnow*.—Certainly.—But this alſo is, I think, apparent to you, that ſnow, as long as it is ſuch, can never, by receiving heat, remain what it was before, viz. ſnow, and at the ſame time become hot; but, on the acceſſion of heat, muſt either withdraw itſelf from it, or periſh.—Entirely ſo.—And again, that fire, when cold approaches to it, muſt either depart or periſh; but that it will never dare, by receiving coldneſs, ſtill to remain what it was, i. e. fire, and yet be at the ſame time cold.—You ſpeak truly (ſays he).—But (ſays Socrates) it happens to ſome

of theſe, that not only the ſpecies itſelf is always thought worthy of the ſame appellation, but likewiſe ſomething elſe, which is not indeed that ſpecies, but which perpetually poſſeſſes the form of it as long as it exiſts. But in the following inſtances my meaning will perhaps be more apparent: for the odd number ought always to poſſeſs that name by which we now call it: ſhould it not?—Entirely ſo.—But is this the caſe with the odd number alone (for this is what I inquire)? or is there any thing elſe which is not indeed the ſame with the odd, but yet which ought always to be called odd, together with its own proper name, becauſe it naturally ſubſiſts in ſuch a manner, that it can never deſert the form of the odd? But this is no other than what happens to the number three, and many other things. For conſider, does not the number three appear to you to be always called by its proper name, and at the ſame time by the name of the odd, though *the odd* is not the ſame as *the triad?* Yet the triad, and the pentad, and the entire half of number, naturally ſubſiſt in ſuch a manner, that though they are not the ſame as *the odd*, yet each of them is always odd. And again, two and four, and the whole other order of number, though they are not the ſame as *the even*, yet each of them is always even: do you admit this or not?—How ſhould I not (ſays he)?—See then (ſays Socrates) what I wiſh to evince. But it is as follows: It has appeared, not only that contraries do not receive one another, but that even ſuch things as are not contrary to each other, and yet always poſſeſs contraries, do not appear to receive that idea which is contrary to the idea which they contain; but that on its approach they either periſh or depart. Shall we not, therefore, ſay that three things would firſt periſh, and endure any thing whatever, ſooner than ſuſtain to be three things, and at the ſame time to be even?—Entirely ſo (ſays Cebes).—And yet (ſays Socrates) the duad is not contrary to the triad.—Certainly not.—Not only, therefore, do contrary ſpecies never ſuſtain the approach of each other, but certain other things likewiſe cannot ſuſtain the acceſſion of contraries.—You ſpeak moſt true (ſays he).

Are you willing, therefore (ſays he), that, if we are able, we ſhould define what kind of things theſe are?—Entirely ſo.—Will they not then, Cebes (ſays he), be ſuch things as compel whatever they occupy, not only to retain their idea, but likewiſe not to receive a contrary to it?—How do you mean?—Exactly as we juſt now ſaid. For you know it is neceſſary, that

whatever things the idea of three occupies ſhould not only be three, but likewiſe odd.—Entirely ſo.—To a thing of this kind, therefore, we aſſert, that an idea contrary to that form, through which it becomes what it is, will never approach.—It cannot.—But it becomes what it is through the odd: does it not?—Certainly.—But is not the contrary to this the idea of the even?—It is.—The idea of the even, therefore, will never accede to three things.—Never.—Are not three things, therefore, deſtitute of the even?—Deſtitute.—The triad, therefore, is an odd number.—It is.—The things which I mentioned then are defined, viz. ſuch things, which, though they are not contrary to ſome particular nature, yet do not at the ſame time receive that which is contrary; juſt as the triad in the preſent inſtance, though it is not contrary to the even, yet does not any thing more receive it on this account: for it always brings with it that which is contrary to the even; and in like manner the duad to the odd, and fire to cold, and an abundant multitude of other particulars. But ſee whether you would thus define, not only that a contrary does not receive a contrary, but likewiſe that the nature which brings with it a contrary to that to which it approaches, will never receive the contrariety of that which it introduces. But recollect again, for it will not be uſeleſs to hear it repeated often. Five things will not receive the form of the even; neither will ten things, which are the double of five, receive the form of the odd. This[1], therefore, though it is itſelf contrary to ſomething[2] elſe, yet will not receive the form of the odd; nor will the ſeſquialter, nor other things of this kind, ſuch as the half and the third part, ever receive the form of the whole, if you purſue and aſſent to theſe conſequences.—I moſt vehemently (ſays he) purſue and aſſent to them.

Again, therefore (ſays Socrates), ſpeak to me from the beginning; and this not by anſwering to what I inquire, but, in a different manner, imitating me. For I ſay this, in conſequence of perceiving another mode of anſwering, ariſing from what has now been ſaid, no leſs ſecure than that which was eſtabliſhed at firſt. For, if you ſhould aſk me what that is, which, when inherent in any body, cauſes the body to be hot, I ſhould not give you that cautious and unſkilful anſwer, that it is heat, but one more elegant deduced from what we have juſt now ſaid; I mean, that it is fire. Nor, if you

[1] That is, the double. [2] That is, the half.

ſhould

ſhould aſk me what that is, which when inherent in a certain body, the body is diſeaſed, I ſhould not ſay that it is diſeaſe, but a fever. Nor, if you ſhould aſk what that is, which when inherent in a number, the number will be odd, I ſhould not ſay that it is imparity, but unity, and in a ſimilar manner in other particulars. But ſee whether you ſufficiently underſtand my meaning.—Perfectly ſo (ſays he).—Anſwer me then (ſays Socrates), what that is, which when inherent in the body, the body will be alive?—Soul [1] (ſays he).—Is this then always the caſe?—How ſhould it not (ſays he)?—Will ſoul, therefore, always introduce life to that which it occupies?—It will truly (ſays he).—But is there any thing contrary to life, or not?—There is.—But what?—Death.—The ſoul, therefore, will never receive the contrary to that which it introduces, in conſequence of what has been already admitted.—And this moſt vehemently ſo (ſays Cebes).

But what? how do we denominate that which does not receive the idea of the even?—Odd (ſays he).—And how do we call that which does not receive juſtice, and that which does not receive muſic?—We call (ſays he) the one unjuſt, and the other unmuſical.—Be it ſo.—But what do we call that which does not receive death?—Immortal (ſays he).—The ſoul does not receive death?—It does not.—The ſoul, therefore, is immortal.—Immortal.—Let it be ſo (ſays he).—And ſhall we ſay that this is now demonſtrated? Or how does it appear to you?—It appears to me, Socrates, to be moſt ſufficiently demonſtrated.—What then (ſays he), Cebes, if it were neceſſary to *the odd* that it ſhould be free from deſtruction, would not three things be indeſtructible?—How ſhould they not?—If, therefore, it was alſo neceſſary that a thing void of heat ſhould be indeſtructible, when any one ſhould introduce heat to ſnow, would not the ſnow withdraw itſelf, ſafe and unliquefied? For it would not periſh; nor yet, abiding, would it receive the heat.—You ſpeak the truth (ſays he).—In like manner, I think if that which is void of cold was indeſtructible, that when any thing cold approached to fire, the fire would neither be extinguiſhed nor deſtroyed, but would depart free from damage.—It is neceſſary (ſays he).—Hence (ſays Socrates) it is neceſſary to ſpeak in this manner concerning that which is immortal: for, if that which is immortal is indeſtructible, it is impoſſible that the ſoul, when

[1] This, which is the fifth argument, properly and fully demonſtrates the immortality of the ſoul from its eſſence.

death approaches to it, ſhould periſh. For it follows, from what has been ſaid, that it does not receive death, and of courſe it will never be dead. Juſt as we ſaid, that three things will never be even, nor will this ever be the caſe with that which is odd: nor will fire ever be cold, nor yet the heat which is inherent in fire. But ſome one may ſay, What hinders but that the odd may never become the even, through the acceſſion of the even, as we have confeſſed; and yet, when the odd is deſtroyed, the even may ſucceed inſtead of it? We cannot contend with him who makes this objection, that it is not deſtroyed: for the odd is not free from deſtruction; ſince, if this was granted to us, we might eaſily oppoſe the objection, and obtain this conceſſion, that the odd and three things would depart, on the approach of the even; and we might contend in the ſame manner about fire and heat, and other particulars: might we not?—Entirely ſo.—And now, therefore, ſince we have confeſſed reſpecting that which is immortal, that it is indeſtructible, it muſt follow that the ſoul is, together with being immortal, likewiſe indeſtructible: but if this be not admitted, other arguments will be neceſſary for our conviction. But there is no occaſion for this (ſays he). For it is ſcarcely poſſible that any thing elſe ſhould be void of corruption, if that which is immortal and eternal is ſubject to diſſolution.

But I think (ſays Socrates) that Divinity, and the form itſelf of life, and if any thing elſe beſides this is immortal, muſt be confeſſed by all beings to be entirely free from diſſolution. All men, indeed (ſays he), by Jupiter, muſt acknowledge this; and much more, as it appears to me, muſt it be admitted by the Gods. Since, therefore, that which is immortal is alſo incorruptible, will not the ſoul, ſince it is immortal, be indeſtructible?—It is perfectly neceſſary.—When, therefore, death invades a man, the mortal part of him, as it appears, dies; but the immortal part departs ſafe and uncorrupted, and withdraws itſelf from death.—It appears ſo.—The ſoul, therefore (ſays he), O Cebes, will, more[1] than any thing, be immortal and indeſtructible; and our ſouls will in reality ſubſiſt in Hades. And therefore (ſays he), Socrates, I have nothing further to object to theſe arguments, nor any reaſon why I ſhould diſbelieve their reality: but if either Simmias, or any perſon preſent, has any thing to ſay, he will do well not to be ſilent: for

[1] Socrates ſays, with great propriety, that the ſoul will be immortal *more than any thing*. For ſoul is *eſſentially vital*; and *immortality* is *ſtability of life*.

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I know not what other opportunity he can have, beſides the preſent, if he wiſhes either to ſpeak or hear about things of this kind.—But indeed (ſays Simmias) I have nothing which can hinder my belief in what has been ſaid. But yet on account of the magnitude [1] of the things about which we have diſcourſed, and through my deſpiſing human imbecility, I am compelled to retain with myſelf an unbelief about what has been aſſerted.—Indeed, Simmias (ſays Socrates), you not only ſpeak well in the preſent inſtance, but it is neceſſary that even thoſe firſt hypotheſes which we eſtabliſhed, and which are believed by us, ſhould at the ſame time be more clearly conſidered: and if you ſufficiently inveſtigate them, you will follow reaſon, as it appears to me, in as great a degree as is poſſible to man. And if this becomes manifeſt, you will no longer make any further inquiry.—You ſpeak true (ſays he).

But it is juſt, my friends (ſays he), to think that if the ſoul is immortal, it requires our care and attention, not only for the preſent time, in which we ſay it lives, but likewiſe with a view to the whole of time: and it will now appear, that he who neglects it muſt ſubject himſelf to a moſt dreadful danger. For, if death were the liberation of the whole man, it would be an unexpected gain to the wicked to be liberated at the ſame time from the body, and from their vices together with their ſoul: but now; ſince the ſoul appears to be immortal, no other flight from evils, and no other ſafety remains for it, than in becoming the beſt and moſt prudent poſſible. For when the ſoul arrives at Hades, it will poſſeſs nothing but diſcipline and education, which are ſaid to be of the greateſt advantage or detriment to the dead, in the very beginning of their progreſſion thither. For thus it is ſaid: that the dæmon [2] of each perſon, which was allotted to him while living,

endeavours

[1] Simmias ſays this, in conſequence of not having arrived at the ſummit of philoſophical attainments, and, therefore, not ſeeing the full force of this fifth argument of Socrates. For it poſſeſſes a moſt wonderful and invincible ſtrength; and by thoſe that underſtand it will be acknowledged to have all the force of geometrical demonſtration. Socrates himſelf inſinuates as much as this, when he ſays in reply to Simmias, that by ſufficiently inveſtigating the hypotheſes on which this argument is founded, we ſhall follow reaſon in as great a degree as is poſſible to man, and at length make no further inquiry. That is, we ſhall at length perceive this truth by the projecting energies of intellect, which is a degree of evidence, as I have already obſerved in the Introduction to this dialogue, ſuperior to that of any tradition however divine.

[2] Since there are in the univerſe, ſays Olympiodorus, things which ſubſiſt differently at different

times,

endeavours[1] to lead each to a certain place, where it is neceſſary that all of them, being collected together, after they have been judged, ſhould proceed to Hades, together with their leader, who is ordered to conduct them from hence thither. But there receiving the allotments proper to their condition, and abiding for a neceſſary time, another leader brings them back hither again, in many and long periods of time. The journey, therefore, is not ſuch as Telephus aſſerts it to be in Eſchylus. For he ſays that a ſimple path leads to Hades: but it appears to me that the path is neither ſimple nor one. For there would be no occaſion of leaders, nor could any one ever wander from the right road, if there was but one way. But now it appears to have many diviſions and dubious turnings: and this I conjecture from our holy and legal rites. The ſoul, therefore, which is properly adorned with virtue,

times, and ſince there are alſo natures which are conjoined with the ſupereſſential unities, it is neceſſary that there ſhould be a certain middle genus, which is neither immediately ſuſpended from Deity, nor ſubſiſts differently at different times according to better and worſe, but which is always perfect, and does not depart from its proper virtue; and is immutable indeed, but is not conjoined with the ſupereſſential. The whole of this genus is dæmoniacal. There are alſo different genera of dæmons: for they are placed under the mundane Gods. The higheſt of theſe ſubſiſts according to *the one* of the Gods, which is called an unific and divine genus of dæmons. The next according to the intellect which is ſuſpended from Deity, and is called intellectual. The third ſubſiſts according to ſoul, and is called rational. The fourth according to nature, which is denominated phyſical. The fifth according to body, which is called corporeal-formed. And the ſixth according to matter, and this is denominated material. Or after another manner it may be ſaid, Olympiodorus adds, that ſome of theſe are celeſtial, others ethereal, others aërial, others aquatic, others terreſtrial, and others ſubterranean. With reſpect to this diviſion, it is evident that it is derived from the parts of the univerſe. But irrational dæmons originate from the aërial governors, whence alſo the Oracle ſays, "being the charioteer of the aërial, terreſtrial and aquatic dogs."

ηεριων ελατηρα κυνων χθονιων τε και ὑγρων.

Our guardian dæmons, however, belong to that order of dæmons which is arranged under the Gods that preſide over the aſcent and deſcent of ſouls.

[1] Olympiodorus obſerves here, that the dæmon endeavours to lead the ſoul, as exciting its conceptions and phantaſies; at the ſame time, however, yielding to the ſelf-motive power of the ſoul. But in conſequence of the dæmon exciting, one ſoul follows voluntarily, another violently, and another according to a mode ſubſiſting between theſe. Olympiodorus further obſerves that there is one dæmon who leads the ſoul to its judges from the preſent life; another, who is miniſtrant to the judges, giving completion, as it were, to the ſentence which is paſſed; and a third who is again allotted the guardianſhip of life.

and which poſſeſſes prudence, willingly follows its leader, and is not ignorant of its preſent condition: but the ſoul which ſtill adheres to body through deſire (as I ſaid before), being for a long ſpace of time terrified about it, and ſtruggling and ſuffering abundantly about the viſible place, is with violence and great difficulty led away by its preſiding dæmon. And when it arrives at that place where other ſouls are aſſembled, all the reſt fly from and avoid this unpurified ſoul, which has been guilty either of unjuſt ſlaughter, or has perpetrated ſuch deeds as are allied to this, and are the works of kindred ſouls; nor is any one willing to become either its companion or leader. But ſuch a ſoul wanders about, oppreſſed with every kind of anxiety and trouble, till certain periods of time are accompliſhed: and theſe being completed, it is driven by neceſſity to an abode accommodated to its nature. But the ſoul which has paſſed through life with purity and moderation, obtaining the Gods for its companions and leaders, will reſide in a place adapted to its purified condition.

There are indeed many and admirable places belonging to the earth [1]; and the earth itſelf is neither of ſuch a kind, nor of ſuch a magnitude, as thoſe

[1] With reſpect to the earth which is here mentioned, Olympiodorus informs us, that ſome of the antients conſidered it as incorporeal, others as corporeal, and each of theſe in a twofold reſpect. For thoſe who conſidered it as incorporeal ſaid that it was either an idea, or nature; but of thoſe who conſidered it as corporeal, ſome aſſerted that it was the whole world, and others the ſublunary region. Plato, however, as is evident from the text, appears to ſpeak of this our earth.

Olympiodorus adds, that as the earth is a *pleroma** of the univerſe, it is a God. For, if the univerſe is a God, it is evident that the parts from which it derives its completion muſt alſo be Gods. Beſides, if the earth contains Divinities, much more muſt it be itſelf a God, as Timæus alſo ſays. Hence, intellect and a rational ſoul muſt be ſuſpended from it, and conſequently it muſt have a luciform prior to this apparent body.

Again, that the univerſe is ſpherical, may be ſhown from its final cauſe. For a ſphere imitates *the one*, becauſe it is the beſt and moſt indiſſoluble of figures, as being free from angles, and the moſt capacious of all things. This is alſo evident from its paradigmatic cauſe, becauſe *animal itſelf*, or the extremity of the intelligible order, to which looking, the demiurgus fabricated the world, is all-perfect. And further ſtill, this is evident from its producing cauſe. For the demiurgus made it to be perpetual and indiſſoluble, and both the circle and ſphere are figures of this kind.

Further ſtill, as every part of the whole, which ranks as a whole, imitates the univerſe in the *whole* and the *all*, ſo likewiſe in figure. Every whole, therefore, in the univerſe, is ſpherical, and

* i. e. A whole, which gives completion to the univerſe.

conſequently

thoſe who are accuſtomed to ſpeak about it imagine, as I am perſuaded from a certain perſon's account.—How is this, Socrates (ſays Simmias)? For I myſelf alſo have heard many things about the earth; and yet perhaps not theſe particulars which have obtained your belief. I ſhould therefore be glad to hear you relate them.—Indeed, Simmias (ſays he), the art of Glaucus does not appear to me to be neceſſary, in order to relate theſe particulars; but to evince their truth, ſeems to me to be an undertaking beyond what the art of Glaucus can accompliſh. Beſides, I myſelf perhaps am not able to accompliſh this; and even though I ſhould know how, the time which is allotted me to live, Simmias, ſeems by no means ſufficient for the length of ſuch a diſcourſe. However, nothing hinders me from informing you what I am perſuaded is the truth, reſpecting the form of the earth, and the places which it contains.—And this information (ſays Simmias) will be ſufficient.—I am perſuaded, therefore (ſays he), in the firſt place, that if the earth is in the middle of the heavens, and is of a ſpherical figure, it has no occaſion of air, nor of any other ſuch-like neceſſity, to prevent it from falling: but that the perfect ſimilitude of the heavens to themſelves, and the equilibrity of the earth, are ſufficient cauſes of its ſupport. For that which is equally inclined, when placed in the middle of a ſimilar nature, cannot tend more or leſs to one part than another; but, ſubſiſting on all ſides ſimilarly affected, it will remain free from all inclination. This is the firſt thing of which I am perſuaded.—And very properly ſo (ſays Cebes).—But yet further (ſays he), that the earth is prodigiouſly[1] great; that we who

conſequently this muſt alſo be true of the earth. It is likewiſe evident that the earth is in the middle. For, if the univerſe is ſpherical, it ſubſiſts about the centre: the parts of the univerſe, therefore, which rank as wholes will alſo ſubſiſt about centres, and conſequently this will be the caſe with the earth. Let it, however, be admitted, that it ſubſiſts about a centre, but whence is it evident that it ſubſiſts about the centre of the univerſe? We reply, that if it is the moſt groſs of all the bodies, it will be the laſt of them; for the moſt attenuated of bodies, as being able to pervade through each other, poſſeſs the higher place, conſequently to the order of attenuation; and the earth the lower.

[1] That the earth is very great, ſays Olympiodorus, is evident from the Atlantic iſland ſurpaſſing in magnitude both Aſia and Libya. It is alſo evident from the perfection of the places which we inhabit, ſince ſuch places cannot rank as firſt. It is likewiſe evident from the ſummits of things boundary wiſhing to be aſſimilated to the extremities of things prior to them; ſo that the ſummit of earth muſt be attenuated and paſſive, ſimilar to the moſt precious ſtones and metals.

who dwell in places extending from Phaſis to the pillars of Hercules, inhabit only a certain ſmall portion of it, about the Mediterranean ſea, like ants or frogs about a marſh; and that there are many others elſewhere, who dwell in many ſuch-like places. For I am perſuaded, that there are every where about the earth many hollow places of all-various forms and magnitudes; into which there is a confluence of water, miſts, and air: but that the earth itſelf, which is of a pure nature, is ſituated in the pure heavens, in which the ſtars are contained, and which moſt of thoſe who are accuſtomed to ſpeak about ſuch particulars denominate æther. But the places which we inhabit are nothing more than the dregs of this pure earth, or cavities into which its dregs continually flow. We are ignorant, therefore, that we dwell in the cavities of this earth, and imagine that we inhabit its upper parts. Juſt as if ſome one dwelling in the middle bottom of the ſea, ſhould think that he reſided on its ſurface, and, beholding the ſun and the other ſtars through the water, ſhould imagine that the ſea is the heavens; but through ſloth and im-

metals. And laſtly, this is evident from the profundity of the hollows in which we dwell, and the height of the mountains; for theſe evince that the ſpheric ſuperficies of the earth is larger than that which is generally conſidered as its ſurface. On this ſummit of the earth, therefore, the true heavens are viſible. They are alſo ſeen near, and not through æther only, and with more beautiful eyes. According to Ammonius Hermeas, too, whom Olympiodorus calls the Interpreter, the ſtars themſelves, as I have before obſerved, are not ſeen by us here, but inflammations of them in the air. And perhaps, ſays he, this is the meaning of that aſſertion of Heraclitus, "enkindling meaſures and extinguiſhing meaſures." For he certainly did not ſay this of the ſun itſelf, but of the ſun with reference to us.

Olympiodorus further obſerves, that there is a triple diviſion of the earth, according to the three Saturnian deities Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto: for to theſe, ſays Homer, heaven and earth are common. But if common, it is evident that theſe two are divided among them. Hence, in the heavens, the inerratic ſphere belongs to Jupiter; from thence, as far as to the ſphere of the ſun, to Neptune; and the remaining part of the heavens to Pluto. If there is alſo a diviſion of the earth according to the univerſe, it muſt be divided into celeſtial, terreſtrial, and middle. For Olympian earth is honoured, as well as that which is properly terreſtrial. There muſt, therefore, be a certain middle earth. If, likewiſe, there is a diviſion of the earth conformably to that of an animal, for the earth is an animal, it muſt be divided into the head, middle parts, and feet.

It is alſo beautifully obſerved by Olympiodorus, that each of the elements has the dodecahedron in common, as preparatory to becoming a ſphere. Hence, ſays he, the earth has from itſelf the cubic, water the icoſahedric, air the octahedric, and fire the pyramid; but from the ſupermundane Gods the dodecahedron is imparted to all of them, as preparatory to intellectual participation, which is ſphericity, or the reception of a ſpherical figure.

becility having never aſcended to the top of the ſea, nor emerged from its deeps into this region, has never perceived how much purer and more beautiful it is than the place which he inhabits, nor has received this information from any other who has beheld this place of our abode. In the very ſame manner are we affected: for, dwelling in a certain hollow of the earth, we think that we reſide on its ſurface; and we call the air heaven, as if the ſtars paſſed through this, as through the heavens themſelves. And this likewiſe, in the ſame manner as in the above inſtance, happens to us through our imbecility and ſloth, which render us incapable of aſcending to the ſummit of the air. For, otherwiſe, if any one could arrive at its ſummit, or, becoming winged, could fly thither, he would be ſeen emerging from hence; and juſt as fiſhes, emerging hither from the ſea, perceive what our region contains, in the ſame manner would he behold the ſeveral particulars belonging to the ſummit of the earth. And beſides this, if his nature was ſufficient for ſuch an elevated ſurvey, he would know that the heavens which he there beheld were the true heavens, and that he perceived the true light and the true earth. For this earth which we inhabit, the ſtones which it contains, and the whole region of our abode, are all corrupted and gnawed, juſt as things in the ſea are corroded by the ſalt: for nothing worthy of eſtimation grows in the ſea, nor does it contain any thing perfect; but caverns and ſand, and immenſe quantities of mud and filth, are found in it wherever there is earth. Nor are its contents to be by any means compared with the beauty of the various particulars in our place of abode. But thoſe upper regions of the earth will appear to be yet far more excellent than theſe which we inhabit. For, if it is proper to tell you a beautiful fable, it is well worth hearing, Simmias, what kind of places thoſe are on the upper earth, ſituated under the heavens.

It is reported then, my friend (ſays he), in the firſt place, that this earth, if any one ſurveys it from on high, appears like globes covered with twelve ſkins, various[1], and diſtinguiſhed with colours; a pattern of which are the colours

[1] The earth is diſtinguiſhed with colours, ſays Olympiodorus, according to the *phyſical* variety of colours; according to the defluxions of celeſtial illuminations from Mars and the Sun; and according to incorporeal lives, which proceed as far as to ſenſible beauty. With reſpect to the elements likewiſe on the ſummit of the earth, water there is as vapour, and as moiſt air; but air is æther,

colours found among us, and which our painters uſe. But there the whole earth is compoſed from materials of this kind, and ſuch as are much more ſplendid and pure than our region contains: for they are partly indeed purple, and endued with a wonderful beauty; partly of a golden colour; and partly more white than plaſter or ſnow; and are compoſed from other colours in a ſimilar manner, and thoſe more in number and more beautiful than any we have ever beheld. For the hollow parts of this pure earth, being filled with water and air, exhibit a certain ſpecies of colour, ſhining among the variety of other colours in ſuch a manner, that one particular various form of the earth continually preſents itſelf to the view. Hence, whatever grows in this earth grows analogous to its nature, ſuch as trees, and flowers, and fruits: and again, its mountains and ſtones poſſeſs a ſimilar perfection and tranſparency, and are rendered beautiful through various colours; of which the ſtones ſo much honoured by us in this place of our abode are but ſmall parts, ſuch as ſardin-ſtones, jaſpers, and emeralds, and all of this kind. But there nothing ſubſiſts which is not of ſuch a nature as I have deſcribed; and there are other things far more beautiful than even theſe. But the reaſon of this is becauſe the ſtones there are pure, and not conſumed and corrupted, like ours, through rottenneſs and ſalt, from a conflux of various particulars, which in our places of abode cauſe filthineſs and diſeaſe to the ſtones and earth, animals and plants, which are found among us. But this pure earth is adorned with all theſe, and with gold and ſilver, and other things of a ſimilar nature: for all theſe are naturally apparent, ſince they are both numerous and large, and are diffuſed every where throughout the earth; ſo that to behold it is the ſpectacle of bleſſed ſpectators. This earth too contains many other animals [1] and men, ſome of whom inhabit its middle parts; others

æther, and æther is the ſummit of æther. If, alſo, there are mountains there, it is evident, ſays he, that from their nearneſs they reach the heavens. In ſhort, he adds, the æthers of the elements are there, as the Chaldæan oracles ſay.

[1] Theſe forms of life, ſays Olympiodorus, on the ſummit of the earth, ſubſiſt between the forms of perpetual animals and thoſe that live but for a ſhort time. For a medium is every where neceſſary. But the excellent temperature of the ſeaſons and the elements cauſes the inhabitants there to die eaſily, and to live long. And what is there wonderful in this, ſays Olympiodorus, ſince this in a certain reſpect is the caſe with the Æthiopians, through the ſymmetry of the air? He adds, if alſo Ariſtotle relates, that a man lived here without ſleep, and nouriſhed by the ſolar-form air

others dwell about the air, as we do about the ſea; and others reſide in iſlands which the air flows round, and which are ſituated not far from the continent. And in one word, what water and the ſea are to us, with reſpect to utility, that air is to them: but what air is to us, that æther is to the inhabitants of this pure earth. But the ſeaſons there are endued with ſuch an excellent temperament, that the inhabitants are never moleſted with diſeaſe, and live for a much longer time than thoſe who dwell in our regions; and they ſurpaſs us in ſight, hearing, and prudence, and every thing of this kind, as much as air excels water in purity—and æther, air. And beſides this, they have groves and temples of the Gods, in which the Gods dwell in reality; and likewiſe oracles and divinations, and ſenſible perceptions of the Gods, and ſuch-like aſſociations with them. The ſun too, and moon, and ſtars, are ſeen by them ſuch as they really are; and in every other reſpect their felicity is of a correſpondent nature.

And in this manner indeed the whole earth naturally ſubſiſts, and the parts which are ſituated about it. But it contains about the whole of its ambit many places in its concavities; ſome of which are more profound and extended than the region which we inhabit: but others are more profound, indeed, but yet have a leſs chaſm than the places of our abode; and there are certain parts which are leſs profound [1], but broader than ours. But all theſe are in many places perforated into one another under the earth, according to narrower and broader avenues, and have paſſages of communication through which a great quantity of water flows into the different hollows of the earth, as into bowls; and beſides this, there are immenſe bulks of ever-flowing rivers under the earth, and of hot and cold waters; likewiſe a great quantity of fire, mighty rivers of fire, and many of moiſt mire, ſome of which are purer, and others more muddy; as in Sicily there are rivers of mud, which flow before a ſtream of fire, which is itſelf a flaming torrent.

alone, what ought we to think of the inhabitants which are there? Και τι θαυμαστον, ὁτι και ὁι Αιθιοπες ὡδε πως εχουσι δια την των αἐρων συμμετριαν. και ει ενταυθα ἱστορει Αριστοτελης ανθρωπον αὐπνοον και μονῳ τῳ ἡλιοειδει τρεφομενον αἐρι, τι χρη περι των εκει οιεσθαι.

[1] Plato, ſays Olympiodorus, directs his attention to the four quarters of the globe: for ſince there are two which we inhabit, viz. Europe and Aſia, there muſt alſo be two others according to the antipodes. Καταστοχαζεται δε των τεσσαρων τμηματων, επειδη δυο καθ' ἡμας εισιν, ἡ Ευρωπη και ἡ Ασια· ὡστε δυο αλλοι κατα τους αντιποδας.

And

And from theſe the ſeveral places are filled, into which each flows at particular times. But all theſe are moved upwards and downwards, like a hanging veſſel, ſituated in the earth. This hanging veſſel too, through a certain nature of this kind, is one of the chaſms of the earth; and this the greateſt, and totally perforated through the whole earth. And of this Homer[1] thus ſpeaks:

Far, very far, where under earth is found
A gulf, of every depth, the moſt profound:

which he elſewhere and many other poets denominate Tartarus[2]. For into this chaſm there is a conflux of all rivers, from which they again flow upwards. But each derives its quality from the earth through which it flows. And the reaſon why they all flow into, and again out of this chaſm, is becauſe this moiſture cannot find either a bottom or a baſis. Hence it becomes elevated, and fluctuates upwards and downwards: and this too is the caſe with the air and ſpirit[3] which are ſituated about it. For they follow this moiſture, both when they are impelled to more remote places of the earth, and when to the places of our abode. And as in reſpiration the flowing breath is perpetually expired and inſpired, ſo there the ſpirit, which is elevated together with the moiſture, cauſes certain vehement and immenſe winds during its ingreſs and departure. When the water, therefore, being impelled, flows into that place which we call downwards, then the rivers flow through the earth into different channels, and fill them; juſt as thoſe who pour into another veſſel

[1] Iliad. lib. viii.

[2] Tartarus, ſays Olympiodorus, is the extremity of the univerſe, and ſubſiſts oppoſitely to Olympus. But Tartarus is a deity, the inſpective guardian of that which is laſt in every order. Hence, ſays he, we have a celeſtial Tartarus, in which Heaven concealed his offspring; a Saturnian Tartarus, in which alſo Saturn concealed his offspring; and alſo a Jovian of this kind, which is demiurgic.

[3] As fire, water, and air, are in the middle of the earth, much vapour muſt be there, as Olympiodorus juſtly obſerves, water being analyſed into vapour through fire. Earth alſo being an animal, and living, muſt be willing to reſpire, as it were, and muſt make certain refluxes by its inſpirations and expirations. Further ſtill, its luciform muſt be its firſt vehicle, and its apparent muſt be this corporeal bulk. It muſt, therefore, require a middle, or aërial vehicle, the province of which is to cheriſh and move more attenuated bodies, through its all-various motion.

Olympiodorus further obſerves, that of Tartarus, and Earth which is conjoined with Heaven, Typhon, Echidna, and Python, form as it were a certain Chaldaïc triad, the inſpective guardian of all inordinate fabrication.

the

the water which they have drawn. But when this water, departing from thence, is impelled hither, it again fills the rivers on the earth; and theſe, when filled, flow through channels and through the earth; and when they have ſeverally paſſed through the avenues, which are open to each, they produce ſeas, lakes, rivers, and fountains. Flowing back again from hence under the earth, and ſome of them ſtreaming round longer and more numerous places, but others round ſuch as are ſhorter and leſs numerous, they again hurl themſelves into Tartarus; and ſome indeed much more profoundly, but others leſs ſo, than they were drawn: but the influxions of all of them are deeper than the places from which they flow upwards. And the effluxions of ſome are in a direction contrary to their influxions, but in others both take place according to the ſame part. There are ſome again which entirely flow round in a circle, folding themſelves like ſnakes, once or often about the earth; and being bent downwards as much as poſſible, they are again hurled forth on each ſide till they arrive at the middle, but never beyond this. For each part of the earth becomes ſteep to both theſe ſtreams.

The other rivers, indeed, are many, great, and various: but among this abundance there are certain ſtreams, four [1] in number, of which the greateſt, and which circularly flows round the earth the outermoſt of all, is called the Ocean. But that which flows oppoſite, and in a contrary direction to this, is Acheron; which, flowing through other ſolitary places, and under the earth, devolves its waters into the Acheruſian marſh, into which many ſouls

[1] The four rivers which are here mentioned are, ſays Olympiodorus, according to the Interpreter (i. e. Ammonius Hermeas), the four elements in Tartarus. Of theſe Ocean is water; Cocytus, or rather Styx, is earth; Pyriphlegethon is fire; and Acheron is air. But Styx is oppoſed to Pyriphlegethon, as heat to cold; and Acheron to Ocean, as air to water. Hence alſo Orpheus * calls the Acheruſian lake aërial. However, ſays Olympiodorus, the poſition of the rivers does not correſpond to this interpretation. For Ocean is firſt, and in the higher place. Under this is Acheron. Under this again, Pyriphlegethon; and in the laſt place, Cocytus. Beſides, all of them are called rivers, though the elements are different. It is better therefore, ſays he, to conſider the allotments, and the places themſelves of ſouls, as receiving a fourfold diviſion, according to depth. And prior to the places, we ſhould conſider the divine idioms, viz. the definitive, according to Ocean; the cathartic, according to Acheron; that which puniſhes through heat, according to Pyriphlegethon: and that which puniſhes through cold, according to Cocytus.

* Διο και Ορφευς την Αχερουσιαν λιμνην αέριαν καλει.

of

of the dead paſs; and abiding there for certain deſtined ſpaces of time, ſome of which are more and others leſs extended, they are again ſent into the generations of animals. The third river of theſe hurls itſelf forth in the middle, and near its ſource falls into a mighty place, burning with abundance of fire, and produces a lake greater than our ſea, and hot with water and mud. But it proceeds from hence in a circle, turbulent and miry, and, ſurrounding the earth, arrives both elſewhere and at the extremities of the Acheruſian marſh, with the water of which it does not become mingled; but, often revolving itſelf under the earth, flows into the more downward parts of Tartarus. And this is the river which they ſtill denominate Pyriphlegethon; the ſtreams of which ſend forth diſſevered rivers to various parts of the earth. But the fourth river, which is oppoſite to this, firſt falls as it is ſaid into a place dreadful and wild, and wholly tinged with an azure colour, which they denominate Styx: and the influxive ſtreams of this river form the Stygian marſh. But falling into this, and receiving vehement powers in its water, it hides itſelf under the earth, and, rolling round, proceeds contrary to Pyriphlegethon, and meets with it in the Acheruſian marſh, in a contrary direction. Nor is the water of this river mingled with any thing, but, revolving in a circle, it hurls itſelf into Tartarus, in a courſe oppoſite to Pyriphlegethon. But its name, according to the poets, is Cocytus.

Theſe being thus naturally conſtituted, when the dead arrive at that place into which the dæmon leads each, in the firſt place they are judged, as well thoſe who have lived in a becoming manner, and piouſly, and juſtly, as thoſe who have not. And thoſe who appear to have paſſed a middle kind of life, proceeding to Acheron, and aſcending the vehicles [1] prepared for them, arrive in theſe at the Acheruſian lake, and dwell there; till being purified, and having ſuffered puniſhment for any injuries they may have committed, they are enlarged; and each receives the reward of his beneficence, according to his deſerts. But thoſe who appear to be incurable, through the magnitude of their offences, becauſe they have perpetrated either many and great ſacrileges, or many unjuſt ſlaughters, and ſuch as are contrary to law, or other things of this

[1] Theſe vehicles are aërial: for ſouls are moved locally according to the vehicles which are ſuſpended from them. And theſe aërial vehicles, as being corruptible, are naturally adapted to receive puniſhment.

kind—theſe, a deſtiny adapted to their guilt hurls into Tartarus, from which they will *never*[1] be diſcharged. But thoſe who are found to have committed curable, but yet mighty crimes, ſuch as thoſe who have been guilty through anger of any violence againſt their father or mother, and have lived the remainder of their lives penitent for the offence, or who have become homicides in any other ſimilar manner; with reſpect to theſe, it is neceſſary that they ſhould fall into Tartarus: but after they have fallen, and have dwelt there for a year, the waves hurl them out of Tartarus; and the homicides indeed into Cocytus, but the violators of fathers and mothers into Pyriphlegethon. But when, being borne along by theſe rivers, they arrive at the Acheruſian marſh, they here bellow and invoke one part thoſe whom they have ſlaughtered, and another part thoſe whom they have injured. But, invoking theſe, they ſuppliantly entreat that they would ſuffer them to enter into the lake, and forgive them. And if they perſuade them to do this, they depart, and find an end to their maladies: but if they are unable to accompliſh this, they are carried back again into Tartarus, and from thence again into the rivers. And they do not ceaſe from ſuffering this, till they have perſuaded thoſe they have injured to forgiveneſs. For this puniſhment was ordained them by the judges. But thoſe who ſhall appear to have lived moſt excellently, with reſpect to piety—theſe are they, who, being liberated and diſmiſſed from theſe places in the earth, as from the abodes of a priſon, ſhall arrive at the pure habitation on high, and dwell on the ætherial earth[2]. And among theſe, thoſe who are ſufficiently purified by philoſophy ſhall live without bodies, through the whole of the ſucceeding time, and

[1] Let not the reader imagine, that by the word *never*, here, an eternal duration is implied; for Divinity does not puniſh the ſoul as if influenced by anger, but, like a good phyſician, for the ſake of healing the maladies which ſhe has contracted through guilt. We muſt ſay, therefore, as Olympiodorus well obſerves, that the incurable ſoul is puniſhed *eternally*, calling eternity her life and the partial period of her exiſtence. "For, in reality (ſays he), ſouls which have offended in the higheſt degree cannot be ſufficiently purified in one period, but are *continually* in life, as it were, in Tartarus; and this period is called by Plato eternity."

[2] Obſerve here, that thoſe who have lived a holy and guiltleſs life, without philoſophy, will after death dwell on the ſummit of the earth; and their bodies will conſequently conſiſt of the moſt attenuated air. Thoſe who have philoſophized politically, ſays Olympiodorus, will live in the heavens with luciform bodies. And thoſe that are perfectly purified will be reſtored to the ſupermundane place, without bodies.

ſhall

ſhall arrive at habitations yet more beautiful than theſe, which it is neither eaſy to deſcribe, nor is the preſent time ſufficient for ſuch an undertaking.

But for the ſake of theſe particulars which we have related, we ſhould undertake every thing, Simmias, that we may participate of virtue and prudence in the preſent life. For the reward is beautiful, and the hope mighty. To affirm, indeed, that theſe things ſubſiſt exactly as I have deſcribed them, is not the province of a man endued with intellect. But to aſſert that either theſe or certain particulars of this kind take place, with reſpect to our ſouls and their habitations—ſince our ſoul appears to be immortal—this is, I think, both becoming, and deſerves to be hazarded by him who believes in its reality. For the danger is beautiful; and it is neceſſary to allure ourſelves with things of this kind, as with inchantments: and, on this account, I produced the fable which you have juſt now heard me relate. But, for the ſake of theſe, it is proper that the man ſhould be confident about his ſoul, who in the preſent life bidding farewell to thoſe pleaſures which regard the body and its ornaments, as things foreign from his nature, has earneſtly applied himſelf to diſciplines, as things of far greater conſequence; and who having adorned his ſoul not with a foreign but its own proper ornament, viz. with temperance and juſtice, fortitude, liberty and truth, expects a migration to Hades, as one who is ready to depart whenever he ſhall be called upon by Fate. You, therefore (ſays he), Simmias and Cebes, and the reſt who are here aſſembled, will each depart in ſome period of time poſterior to the preſent; but

Me now calling, Fate demands:

(as ſome tragic poet would ſay) and it is almoſt time that I ſhould betake myſelf to the bath. For it appears to me better to waſh myſelf before I drink the poiſon, and not to trouble the women with waſhing my dead body.

When, therefore, he had thus ſpoken,—Be it ſo, Socrates (ſays Crito): but what orders do you leave to theſe who are preſent, or to myſelf, or reſpecting your children, or any thing elſe in the execution of which we can particularly oblige you?—None ſuch as are new (ſays he), Crito, but that which I have always ſaid to you; that if you take care of yourſelves, you will always perform in whatever you do that which is acceptable to

myſelf, to my family, and to your own ſelves, though you ſhould not promiſe me any thing at preſent. But if you neglect yourſelves, and are unwilling to live according to what has been now and formerly ſaid, as veſtiges of direction in your courſe, you will accompliſh nothing, though you ſhould now promiſe many things, and in a very vehement manner.—We ſhall take care, therefore (ſays Crito), to act as you deſire. But how would you be buried?—Juſt as you pleaſe (ſays he), if you can but catch me, and I do not elude your purſuit. And at the ſame time gently laughing, and addreſſing himſelf to us, I cannot perſuade Crito (ſays he), my friends, that I am that Socrates who now diſputes with you, and methodizes every part of the diſcourſe; but he thinks that I am he whom he will ſhortly behold dead, and aſks how I ought to be buried. But all that long diſcourſe which ſome time ſince I addreſſed to you, in which I aſſerted that after I had drunk the poiſon I ſhould no longer remain with you, but ſhould depart to certain felicities of the bleſſed, this I ſeem to have declared to him in vain, though it was undertaken to conſole both you and myſelf. Promiſe, therefore (ſays he), for me to Crito, juſt the contrary of what he promiſed to my judges. For he promiſed that I ſhould not run away; but do you engage that when I die I ſhall not ſtay with you, but ſhall depart and entirely leave you; that Crito may more eaſily bear this ſeparation, and may not be afflicted when he ſees my body either burnt or buried, as if I ſuffered ſome dreadful misfortune; and that he may not ſay at my interment, that Socrates is laid out, or is carried out, or is buried. For be well aſſured of this (ſays he), excellent Crito, that when we do not ſpeak in a becoming manner, we are not only culpable with reſpect to our ſpeech, but likewiſe affect our ſouls with a certain evil. But it is proper to be confident, and to ſay that my body will be buried, and in ſuch a manner as is pleaſing to you, and which you think is moſt agreeable to our laws.

When he had thus ſpoken he roſe, and went into a certain room, that he might waſh himſelf, and Crito followed him: but he ordered us to wait for him. We waited, therefore, accordingly, diſcourſing over and reviewing among ourſelves what had been ſaid; and ſometimes ſpeaking about his death, how great a calamity it would be to us; and ſincerely thinking that we, like thoſe who are deprived of their father, ſhould paſs the reſt of our life in the condition of orphans. But when he had waſhed himſelf, his ſons were brought to him

him (for he had two little ones, and one conſiderably advanced in age), and the women belonging to his family likewiſe came in to him: but when he had ſpoken to them before Crito, and had left them ſuch injunctions as he thought proper, he ordered the boys and women to depart; and he himſelf returned to us. And it was now near the ſetting of the ſun: for he had been abſent for a long time in the bathing-room. But when he came in from waſhing, he ſat down; and did not ſpeak much afterwards. For then the ſervant of the eleven magiſtrates came in, and ſtanding near him, I do not perceive that in you, Socrates, ſays he, which I have taken notice of in others; I mean, that they are angry with me, and curſe me, when, being compelled by the magiſtrates, I announce to them that they muſt drink the poiſon. But, on the contrary, I have found you at the preſent time to be the moſt generous, mild, and the beſt of all the men that ever came into this place: and, therefore, I am well convinced that you are not angry with me, but with the authors of your preſent condition. You know thoſe whom I allude to. Now, therefore (for you know what I came to tell you), farewell, and endeavour to bear this neceſſity as eaſily as poſſible. And at the ſame time burſting into tears, and turning himſelf away, he departed. But Socrates looking after him, And thou too (ſays he), farewell; and we ſhall take care to act as you adviſe. And at the ſame time turning to us, How courteous (ſays he) is the behaviour of that man! During the whole time of my abode here, he has viſited and often converſed with me, and proved himſelf to be the beſt of men; and now how generouſly he weeps on my account! But let us obey him, Crito, and let ſome one bring the poiſon, if it is bruiſed; but if not, let the man whoſe buſineſs it is bruiſe it himſelf. But, Socrates (ſays Crito), I think that the ſun ſtill hangs over the mountains, and is not yet ſet. And at the ſame time I have known others who have drunk the poiſon very late, after it was announced to them; who have ſupped and drunk abundantly; and who have enjoyed the objects of their love. Therefore, do not be in ſuch haſte; for there is yet time enough. Upon this Socrates replied, Such men, Crito, act with great propriety in the manner you have deſcribed (for they think to derive ſome advantage by ſo doing), and I alſo with great propriety ſhall not act in this manner. For I do not think I ſhall gain any thing by drinking it later, except becoming

ridiculous to myſelf through deſiring to live, and being ſparing of life when nothing of it any longer remains. Go, then (ſays he), be perſuaded, and comply with my requeſt.

Then Crito, hearing this, gave the ſign to the boy that ſtood near him. And the boy departing, and having ſtaid for ſome time, came, bringing with him the perſon that was to adminiſter the poiſon, and who brought it properly prepared in a cup. But Socrates, beholding the man—It is well, my friend (ſays he); but what is proper to do with it? for you are knowing in theſe affairs.—You have nothing elſe to do (ſays he), but when you have drunk it to walk about, till a heavineſs takes place in your legs; and afterwards lie down: this is the manner in which you ſhould act. And at the ſame time he extended the cup to Socrates. But Socrates received it from him—and indeed, Echecrates, with great cheerfulneſs; neither trembling, nor ſuffering any alteration for the worſe in his colour or countenance: but, as he was accuſtomed to do, beholding the man with a bull-like aſpect, What ſay you (ſays he) reſpecting this potion? Is it lawful to make a libation of it, or not?—We only bruiſe (ſays he), Socrates, as much as we think ſufficient for the purpoſe.—I underſtand you (ſays he): but it is certainly both lawful and proper to pray to the Gods, that my departure from hence thither may be attended with proſperous fortune; which I entreat them to grant may be the caſe. And at the ſame time ending his diſcourſe, he drank the poiſon with exceeding facility and alacrity. And thus far, indeed, the greater part of us were tolerably well able to refrain from weeping: but when we ſaw him drinking, and that he had drunk it, we could no longer reſtrain our tears. But from me, indeed, notwithſtanding the violence which I employed in checking them, they flowed abundantly; ſo that, covering myſelf with my mantle, I deplored my misfortune. I did not indeed weep for him, but for my own fortune; conſidering what an aſſociate I ſhould be deprived of. But Crito, who was not able to reſtrain his tears, was compelled to riſe before me. And Apollodorus, who during the whole time prior to this had not ceaſed from weeping, then wept aloud with great bitterneſs; ſo that he infected all who were preſent, except Socrates. But Socrates, upon ſeeing this, exclaimed—What are you doing, excellent men? For, indeed, I principally ſent away the women, leſt they ſhould produce a diſturbance of this

kind. For I have heard that it is proper[1] to die joyfully and with propitious omens. Be quiet, therefore, and ſummon fortitude to your aſſiſtance.—When we heard this we bluſhed, and reſtrained our tears. But he, when he found during his walking that his legs felt heavy, and had told us ſo, laid himſelf down in a ſupine poſition. For the man had ordered him to do ſo. And at the ſame time he who gave him the poiſon, touching him at intervals, conſidered his feet and legs. And after he had vehemently preſſed his foot, he aſked him if he felt it. But Socrates anſwered he did not. And after this he again preſſed his thighs: and thus aſcending with his hand, he ſhowed us that he was cold and ſtiff. And Socrates alſo touched himſelf, and ſaid, that when the poiſon reached his heart he ſhould then leave us. But now his lower belly was almoſt cold; when uncovering himſelf (for he was covered), he ſaid (which were his laſt words): Crito, we owe a cock[2] to Æſculapius. Diſcharge this debt, therefore, for me, and do not neglect it.—It ſhall be done (ſays Crito): but conſider whether you have any other commands. To this inquiry of Crito he made no reply; but ſhortly after moved himſelf, and the man covered him. And Socrates fixed his eyes. Which when Crito perceived, he cloſed[3] his mouth and eyes. This, Echecrates, was the end of

[1] The Pythagoreans, ſays Olympiodorus, thought it proper to die joyfully, becauſe death is a good and ſacred thing; and becauſe ſometimes a contrary conduct deſtroys that impulſe by which the ſoul is led back to her true felicity. Beſides this, when the ſoul departs in ſorrow, a crowd of dæmons who are lovers of body are by this mean evocated; and who, in conſequence of rejoicing in a life converſant with generation, render the pneumatic vehicle of the ſoul heavy.

[2] Should it be aſked, ſays Olympiodorus, why Socrates deſired that a cock might be offered for him to Æſculapius, we reply, that by this mean he might heal the diſeaſes which his ſoul had contracted in generation. Perhaps too, ſays he, according to the oracle, he was willing to return to his proper principles, celebrating Pæon. Olympiodorus adds, that Socrates is ſaid by Plato to have been the beſt of men, becauſe he was in every reſpect good; the moſt prudent, according to knowledge; and the moſt juſt, according to deſire.

[3] The meaning of the Attic ſymbols reſpecting thoſe that die is, according to Olympiodorus, as follows: The cloſing of the mouth and eyes ſignifies the ceſſation of external energy, and the converſion of the ſoul to that which is inward. The being laid on the earth recalls to our memory, that the ſoul is conjoined with wholes. The waſhing of the dead body indicates purification from generation. The anointing the parts of the body ſignifies a divulſion from the dark mire of matter, and that divine inſpiration is evocated. But the burning ſignifies the being led to that which is on high, and to an impartible nature. And the being laid in the earth indicates a conjunction

of our aſſociate; a man, as it appears to me, the beſt of thoſe whom we were acquainted with at that time, and, beſides this, the moſt prudent and juſt.

tion with intelligibles. Τινων συμβολα τα περι τους αποιχομενους πατρια αττικα. το μεν ουν καμμυειν, του παυειν μεν της εξω ενεργειας, προς δε την εισω επιστρεφειν. το δε επι γης τιθεναι του αναμιμνησκειν ὁπως αν τοις ὁλοις ἡ ψυχη συναφθειη. το δε λουειν, το αποκαθαιρειν της γενεσεως. το δε μυριζειν, το αποσπαν μεν του βορβορου της ὑλης, την δε θειαν επιπνοιαν προκαλεισθαι. το δε καιειν, το περιαγειν εις το ανω, και το αμεριστον. το δε εντιθεναι τῃ γῃ το συναπτειν τοις νοητοις.

THE END OF THE PHÆDO.

THE

THE GORGIAS:

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE PRINCIPLES WHICH LEAD TO POLITICAL FELICITY.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE GORGIAS.

IT is neceſſary in the firſt place, ſays Olympiodorus[1], to inveſtigate the dramatic apparatus of the dialogue; in the ſecond place, its ſcope; in the third place, the diviſion of it; in the fourth place, the perſons in it, and the analogy of the perſons; and in the fifth place, (that which is inveſtigated by many, though it does not deſerve to be diſcuſſed, and was not doubted by men of greater antiquity,) on what account Plato introduces Gorgias here, who was very far from being contemporary with Socrates.

The dramatic apparatus then is as follows: Gorgias, the Leontine, came from the Leontines in Sicily, as an ambaſſador to the Athenians, reſpecting a confederation, and the war againſt the Syracuſians. He had alſo with him Polus, who delighted in rhetoric; and he dwelt in the houſe of Callicles, the public orator of the Athenians. This Callicles, too, was delighted with ſkilful rhetoricians, but made pleaſure the end of life, and deceived the Athenians, always addreſſing them in the language of Demoſthenes, "What do you wiſh? What ſhall I write? In what can I gratify you?" Gorgias, therefore, diſplayed his art, and ſo captivated the Athenian people, that they called the days in which he exhibited *feſtivals*, and his periods *lamps*. Whence Socrates, perceiving the people thus deceived, and being able to extend good to all the youth, formed the deſign of ſaving the ſouls both of the Athenians and of Gorgias himſelf. Taking, therefore, with him Chærepho the philoſopher, who is mentioned by Ariſtophanes, they went to the houſe of Callicles, and there their conferences and inveſtigations of theorems took place.

[1] In his MS. Scholia on this Dialogue.

But he went with Chærepho, and did not go alone, that he might ſhow how ſcientific men conducted themſelves and diſcourſed. And thus much for the apparatus of the dialogue.

With reſpect to its ſcope, it has appeared to be different to different perſons. For ſome ſay that the deſign of Plato was to diſcourſe concerning rhetoric; and they inſcribe it "Gorgias, or concerning Rhetoric;" but improperly: for they characterize the whole from a part. Others again ſay, that the dialogue is concerning juſtice and injuſtice; ſhowing that the juſt are happy, and the unjuſt unfortunate and miſerable. Likewiſe, that by how much the more unjuſt a man is, by ſo much the more is he miſerable; that in proportion as his injuſtice is extended by time, in ſuch proportion is he more miſerable; and that if it were immortal, he would be moſt miſerable. Theſe too receive the ſcope of the dialogue from a part, viz. from the arguments againſt Polus. Others ſay that its ſcope is to ſpeak concerning the demiurgus. But theſe alſo collect the ſcope from a part; becauſe in the fable in the latter part of this dialogue the demiurgus is mentioned. Theſe, however, ſpeak abſurdly, and foreign from the purpoſe. We ſay, therefore, that its ſcope is *to diſcourſe concerning the principles which conduct us to political felicity.*

Since, then, we have mentioned principles and a polity, let us ſpeak concerning principles univerſally, and concerning political felicity, and alſo what the principles are of the political ſcience. The principles, therefore, of every thing are ſix. *Matter*, as with a carpenter wood. *Form*, the writing table, or ſomething of this kind. *That which makes*, as the carpenter himſelf. *The paradigm*, that to which directing his phantaſy, he made the table. *The inſtrument*, the ſaw perhaps, or the axe. And *the end*, that on account of which it was made. The multitude, therefore, and rhetoricians, not looking to truth, ſay that *the matter* of the political ſcience is the body which is preſerved; *the form*, luxury; *the producing cauſe*, rhetoric; *the paradigm*, a tyranny; *the inſtrument*, perſuaſion; and *the end*, pleaſure. And ſuch are their aſſertions. We however ſay that the *matter* is ſoul, and this not the rational, but that which conſiſts of three[1] parts: for it imitates a polity. And as in cities there are governors, ſoldiers, and mercenaries; ſo, in us,

[1] i. e. Of reaſon, anger, and deſire.

reaſon

reaſon is analogous to the governor; anger to the ſoldier, ſubſiſting as a medium, and being obedient to reaſon, but commanding and ranking the mercenaries, that is deſire. The *matter*, therefore, is the ſoul conſidered as divided into three parts. For the political character wiſhes to be angry and to deſire, with reſpect to ſuch things as are proper, and when it is proper. Juſt as the loweſt ſtring of a muſical inſtrument accords with the higheſt, and emits the ſame ſound with it, though more acute. For thus deſire is conjoined with reaſon. But *the form* is juſtice and temperance. *The producing cauſe* is a philoſophic life. But *the paradigm* is the world. For the political philoſopher arranges all things in imitation of the univerſe, which is replete with excellent order. For this univerſe is *order* (κοσμος) according to Plato, and not diſorder (ακοσμια). Manners and diſcipline are *the inſtrument*. And *the end* is good. It muſt, however, be obſerved, that good is twofold, one of which pertains to us in the preſent life, but the other we poſſeſs hereafter [1]. *Political good*, therefore, belongs to us in the preſent, but *theoretic good* will be our portion in another life. To Gorgias, therefore, the diſcourſe is about the *producing cauſe*; to Polus, about the *formal*; and to Callicles, about the *final*. Nor is it wonderful if all appear to be in all. For in the producing cauſe the reſt are found, and in the others all: for there is a certain communion among them, and they pervade through each other. But they derive their order from that which abounds.

Hence, therefore, the diviſion of the dialogue becomes apparent. For it is divided into three parts: into the diſcourſe with Gorgias; into that with Polus; and into that with Callicles. It is neceſſary alſo to obſerve, that juſtice and temperance are peculiarly ſaid to be the form of the political ſcience. For it is neceſſary to know that all the virtues contribute to political felicity, but eſpecially theſe two. Hence Plato always makes mention of theſe, as being neglected by men. For they wiſh to know the other two, though not perfectly, yet fictitiouſly, and under a falſe appellation. Hence they ſay, Such a one is a prudent man; he knows how to enrich himſelf. And in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to fortitude; but they neglect the other two. There is, however, occaſion for theſe, ſince they proceed through all

[1] Though a few are able to exerciſe the *theoretic* as well as the *political* virtues in the preſent life, yet we can only poſſeſs the good of the former in perfection hereafter.—For an accurate account of theſe virtues, ſee the Notes on the Phædo.

the parts of the ſoul. For as he who in the city performs his proper work, and gives to every man that which is his due, is ſaid to be juſt; in like manner juſtice rules in the ſoul, when reaſon, anger, and deſire, reſpectively perform the office accommodated to each. If this be the caſe, temperance then ſubſiſts in the ſoul, when each part does not deſire that which is foreign to its nature.

In the next place, it is worth while to inquire into the number and analogy of the perſons. Five perſons, therefore, are introduced, viz. Socrates, Chærepho, Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. Of theſe, Socrates is analogous to that which is intellectual and ſcientific; Chærepho to right opinion; Gorgias to diſtorted opinion; for he was not entirely vanquiſhed by injuſtice, but was dubious whether he ſhould be perſuaded or not. But Polus is analogous to injuſtice, and to one who is alone ambitious; and Callicles is analogous to a ſwiniſh nature, and which is a lover of pleaſure. Some, however, doubt on what account the orators are three, but the philoſophers two; and why the number of the orators is indiviſible [1], but that of the philoſophers diviſible. We ſay, however, that this is not true. For Socrates imitates the *monad* [2] looking to *the one*. And divinity (or *the one*) is ſimple, produced from nothing. Hence the hymn to him ſays, "From whom all things emerge into light; but thy ſubſiſtence alone is not on account of any thing [3]." Chærepho alſo imitates the monad, but that which is material and inſeparable from matter; but Socrates the ſeparate monad. And as ſubordinate do not proceed to better, or better to ſubordinate natures, without a medium, on this account Chærepho has a middle order; and conſequently it is incumbent on him to tranſmit that which the extremes poſſeſs.

It now remains to inquire how Plato makes mention of Gorgias. I ſay, therefore, in the firſt place, that there is nothing abſurd in a writer recording unknown men, and introducing them as diſcourſing with each other. And, in the ſecond place, we ſay that Socrates and Gorgias were contemporaries. For Socrates lived in the third year of the 77th Olympiad: and Empedocles the Pythagorean, the preceptor of Gorgias, aſſociated with him. To which we may add, that Gorgias wrote a treatiſe concerning Nature, not

[1] For three, being an odd number, is indiviſible.

[2] The *monad* is the united ſubſiſtence of ſeparated multitude; but *the one* is the ſummit of multitude.

[3] Ἐξ οὐ παντα πεφηνε· συ δ' ουδενος ουνεκα μουνος.

inelegant,

inelegant, in the 84th Olympiad; ſo that this was twenty-eight or a few more years before Socrates. Beſides, Plato, in the Theætetus, ſays that Socrates, when a very young man, met with Parmenides, when he was very much advanced in years, and found him to be a moſt profound man. But Parmenides was the preceptor of Empedocles, who was the preceptor of Gorgias. And Gorgias was very old: for, according to hiſtory, he died in the one-hundred-and-ninth year of his age. So that theſe two lived about the ſame time.

I ſhall only obſerve, in addition to what Olympiodorus has ſaid, that Plato does not condemn all orators, but thoſe only who ſtudy to perſuade their hearers to embrace whatever they pleaſe, whether it be good or bad, falſe or true; ſuch as were Lyſias the Theban, Tiſias, and Gorgias. But, in the Phædrus, he prefers Pericles and Iſocrates to all the other orators, becauſe they combined eloquence with philoſophy. He alſo adds, that a legitimate orator ought to underſtand the reaſons of things, the laws of manners, the powers of words, and the different diſpoſitions of men; that he ſhould know how to compoſe words adapted, as much as poſſible, to the genius of his hearers; and that he ſhould not be ſo anxious that what he ſays may be pleaſing to men, as that it may be acceptable to Divinity.

THE

THE GORGIAS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CALLICLES, | CHÆREPHO,
SOCRATES, | GORGIAS,
And POLUS.

CALLICLES.

IN this manner, Socrates, they ſay it is requiſite to engage in war and contention.

Soc. But have we not, according to the proverb, come after the feſtival? and are we not late?

CAL. And, indeed, after a very elegant feſtival. For Gorgias, a little before, exhibited to us many and beautiful things.

Soc. But Chærepho, O Callicles, was the cauſe of our being ſo late: for he compelled us to waſte our time in the forum.

CHÆR. It is, however, of no conſequence, Socrates: for I can apply a remedy, as Gorgias is my friend, who either now, or at ſome future time, will, if you pleaſe, exhibit the ſame things to us.

CAL. But what, Chærepho, does Socrates deſire to hear Gorgias?

CHÆR. We are certainly come hither for this very purpoſe.

CAL. Whenever, therefore, you pleaſe, come to me at my houſe: for Gorgias reſides with me, and will exhibit to you whatever you deſire.

Soc. You ſpeak well, Callicles. But will he be willing to diſcourſe with us now? For I wiſh to inquire of the man what the power of his art is, and what it is he profeſſes and teaches. But the other things which you ſpeak of, he may ſhow us ſome other time.

CAL. There is nothing like aſking [1] him, Socrates: for this is one of the things which he exhibited. He, therefore, juſt now promiſed all that are in the houſe, that he would anſwer any queſtion that might be aſked him.

Soc. You certainly ſpeak well. Aſk him, therefore, Chærepho.

CHÆR. What muſt I aſk him?

Soc. What he is.

CHÆR. How do you ſay?

[1] Rhetoric, ſays Olympiodorus, is twofold; the one being art, and the other ſkill. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire, on what account ſkill is not art? It is juſtly then obſerved in the Phædrus, that he who intends to diſcourſe about any thing ſhould firſt define, and afterwards teach: for he who does not do this muſt neceſſarily totally err. Thus, for inſtance, in inveſtigating if the ſoul is immortal, we ought not immediately to ſhow that it is immortal; but, previous to this, we ſhould make a diviſion, and ſay that ſoul is not one thing, but many things. For there is both rational and irrational ſoul: and there is alſo a plantal ſoul,—whence likewiſe we ſay that plants live. We ſay, then, that the rational ſoul is both immortal and not immortal. It is not immortal, indeed, if we conſider the immortal according to a ſubſiſtence perpetual and uniform; but it is immortal both in its eſſence and energy.

Again, the definition of art is twofold. For art is a method proceeding in an orderly path in conjunction with phantaſy. Olympiodorus adds in conjunction with phantaſy, in order to diſtinguiſh it from nature. For nature alſo proceeds in an orderly way, but not with phantaſy. Again, art is a ſyſtem of concluſions, coexerciſed to a certain end, beneficial to ſome of the purpoſes of life. According to the firſt definition, therefore, rhetoric, falſely ſo denominated, may be called an art. For it proceeds in an orderly path; in the firſt place, arranging the proem; and afterwards the ſtate or condition (κατασταση), and what is conſequent to this. But it is not an art according to the ſecond definition, ſince this can only apply to true rhetoric, which aſſigns the cauſes of what it aſſerts. Indeed, not only rhetoric, falſely ſo called, is an art, according to the firſt definition, but alſo cookery, and the dreſſing of hair. For to cook is not the province of any caſual perſon, but of one who poſſeſſes ſkill, and proceeds in a certain way. In like manner, the decoration of the hair has a knowledge of ointments, and knows how to adorn the hairs. The rhetoric, therefore, which knows not how to aſſign the cauſe of what it aſſerts, but proceeds to both ſides, i. e. to the true and the falſe, is not an art. For art is that which has one good end. But true rhetoric, which ſubſiſts under the political character, is an art. For, as the rational phyſician knows how to cure an ophthalmy, ſo likewiſe the empiric. But the former, who alſo acts according to art, can aſſign the cauſes of what he does, which the empiric cannot. Again, if ſome one ſhould aſk in what art differs from ſcience, ſince art alſo aſſigns cauſes, we reply, that ſcience produces the knowledge of things whoſe ſubſiſtence is perpetual and uniform, but art the knowledge of things flowing. Shall we ſay, therefore, that the phyſiologiſt is not ſcientific who inveſtigates things flowing and material? By no means: for his inveſtigation is not of things material, but he refers them to univerſals, and explores the hypoſtaſis of univerſal phyſical natures. So that Plato reprobates falſe and not true rhetoric.

Soc.

Soc. Juſt as, if he ſhould happen to be an artificer of ſhoes, he would anſwer you that he was a ſhoemaker. Or do you not underſtand what I ſay?

Chær. I do; and I will aſk him. Tell me, O Gorgias, did Callicles here ſay true, that you promiſed to anſwer whatever ſhould be aſked you?

Gorg. He ſpoke the truth, Chærepho: for I juſt now made this promiſe: and I ſay that no one has aſked me any thing new for many years.

Chær. You will, therefore, anſwer eaſily, Gorgias.

Gorg. We ſhall make trial of this, Chærepho.

Pol. Do ſo, by Jupiter: but if you pleaſe, Chærepho, diſcourſe with me: for Gorgias appears to me to be weary; as he has juſt now diſcuſſed many particulars.

Chær. But what, Polus, do you think that you can anſwer better than Gorgias?

Pol. Of what conſequence is it, if you are anſwered ſufficiently?

Chær. It is of no conſequence: but, ſince you are willing, anſwer me.

Pol. Aſk.

Chær. I aſk you then, if Gorgias were knowing in that art[1] in which his brother Herodicus is ſkilled, by what name we might juſtly call him? Might we not call him the ſame as his brother?

Pol. Entirely ſo.

Chær. Calling him, therefore, a phyſician, we ſhould rightly denominate him?

Pol. We ſhould.

Chær. But if he were ſkilled in that art in which Ariſtopho, the ſon of Aglaophon, is ſkilled, or his brother, what ſhould we then rightly call him?

[1] There are two kinds of rhetoric, ſays Olympiodorus; but of theſe the genera, and the ends, and the ways, are different. For the genus of true rhetoric is art; but, of the falſe, ſkill. Again, the end of the true is good; but, of the falſe, perſuaſion, whether the thing perſuaded to be done, or not, be good or bad. And again, the way of the true is to know the powers of the ſoul; but, of the falſe, not to know them. *Doctrinal* faith alſo is the way of the true; but *credible* that of the falſe. For the geometrician wiſhes to perſuade, but in a demonſtrative way, and not from credibility, as the rhetorician. As, therefore, the medicinal art announces health through different auxiliaries, ſo rhetorics proceed through different forms. As a knife, therefore, is not of itſelf either good or bad, but is beneficial, or the contrary, to him who uſes it; ſo rhetoric is not of itſelf beautiful, but is beneficial to him who uſes it.

Pol.

POL. Evidently, a painter.

CHÆR. But now, ſince he is knowing in a certain art, what can we properly call him?

POL. O Chærepho! there are many arts in men which are from ſkill[1] ſkilfully diſcovered. For ſkill cauſes our life to proceed according to art; but unſkilfulneſs according to fortune. Of each of theſe, different perſons differently participate: but the beſt participate of the beſt; in the number of which is Gorgias here, who participates of the moſt beautiful of arts.

SOC. Polus, Gorgias appears to be very well furniſhed for diſcourſe; but he does not fulfil his promiſe to Chærepho.

GORG. In what principally, Socrates?

SOC. He does not appear to me altogether to anſwer what he was aſked.

GORG. But do you, if you pleaſe, aſk him.

SOC. Not if you yourſelf would be willing to anſwer me; for this would be much more agreeable to me. For it is evident to me that Polus, from what he ſaid, has applied himſelf more to what is called the rhetoric art than to the art of diſcourſe.

POL. Why do you ſay ſo, Socrates?

SOC. Becauſe, Polus, when Chærepho aſked you in what art Gorgias was ſkilled, you praiſed indeed his art, as if any one had blamed it, but you did not ſay what the art itſelf is.

POL. Did I not anſwer, that it was the moſt beautiful of arts?

SOC. Very much ſo. But no one aſked you concerning the quality of the art of Gorgias, but what it was, and what Gorgias ought to be called; in

[1] Experiment (πειρα), ſays Olympiodorus, differs from ſkill (εμπειρια). For ſkill is aſſerted of actions, but experiment of things artificial according to a part. And again, experiment is converſant with things partial, but ſkill with things more univerſal. Skill, therefore, does not produce art, if ſkill is of things ſubordinate; for, if it did, ſuperior would be produced from inferior natures. But it may be ſaid, Do we not arrive at ſkill from experiment, and at art from ſkill? We reply, that experiment, indeed, contributes to ſkill, and ſkill to art; but they are not producing cauſes. This, however, takes place from our poſſeſſing the gnoſtic reaſons of things, and being excited by ſenſibles. As, therefore, he who makes the ſparks which have for a long time been concealed in aſhes apparent, is not ſaid to have made light, but to have rendered it manifeſt; and in like manner, he who purifies the eye from an ophthalmy does not produce light, but contributes to the preſence of it to the eye: ſo the reaſons in us require that which may cauſe us to recollect. For we are analogous to a geometrician ſleeping. So that ſkill is not effective.

the ſame manner as Chærepho propoſed to you before, and you anſwered him beautifully, and with brevity. Now, therefore, inform me in the ſame manner, what the art of Gorgias is, and what we ought to call Gorgias. Or rather, do you, O Gorgias, tell us yourſelf what we ought to call you, as knowing in a certain art.

GORG. A perſon ſkilled in rhetoric.

SOC. Ought we, therefore, to call you a rhetorician?

GORG. And a good one, Socrates, if you wiſh to give me a name; which, as Homer ſays, I pray may be the caſe.

SOC. But I do wiſh.

GORG. Denominate me, therefore.

SOC. Shall we ſay too, that you are able to make others rhetoricians?

GORG. I profeſs this not only here, but elſewhere.

SOC. Are you willing therefore, Gorgias, we ſhould proceed in the mode of diſcourſe we juſt now adopted, viz. by queſtion and anſwer, employing on ſome other occaſion that prolixity of ſpeech which Polus juſt now began to uſe? But do not deceive me in what you promiſed, but be willing to anſwer with brevity what is aſked you.

GORG. There are, Socrates, certain anſwers which muſt neceſſarily be prolix: however, I will endeavour to anſwer you in the ſhorteſt manner poſſible. For this is one of the things which I profeſs, viz. that no one can ſay the ſame things in fewer words than myſelf.

SOC. I have occaſion, Gorgias, for this brevity: and I requeſt that you will now give me a ſpecimen of it, reſerving prolixity of ſpeech for another time.

GORG. I will give you a ſpecimen; and ſuch a one that you will ſay you never heard a ſhorter diſcourſe.

SOC. Come, then (for you ſay that you are knowing in the rhetorical art, and that you can make others rhetoricians), is not rhetoric converſant with a certain thing, in the ſame manner as the weaving art is employed about the making of garments?

GORG. It is.

SOC. And is not muſic, therefore, converſant with the production of melodies?

GORG. Yes.

Soc. By Juno, Gorgias, I am delighted with your anſwers, becauſe they are the ſhorteſt poſſible.

Gorg. I entirely think, Socrates, that I ſhall give you ſatisfaction in this reſpect.

Soc. You ſpeak well. But anſwer me in this manner reſpecting the rhetorical art, and inform me of what thing it is the ſcience.

Gorg. Of diſcourſes.

Soc. Of what diſcourſes, Gorgias? Is it of ſuch diſcourſes as thoſe employ who ſhow the ſick by what mode of living they may become well?

Gorg. It is not.

Soc. The rhetorical art, therefore, is not converſant with all diſcourſes.

Gorg. It certainly is not.

Soc. But yet it enables men to ſpeak.

Gorg. It does.

Soc. Does it impart the power of intellection in thoſe things in which it imparts the ability of ſpeaking?

Gorg. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Does not, therefore, the medicinal art, of which we juſt now ſpoke, render us able to underſtand and ſpeak about the maladies of the ſick?

Gorg. Neceſſarily ſo.

Soc. The medicinal art, therefore, as it appears, is converſant with diſcourſes.

Gorg. It is.

Soc. And is it not converſant with diſcourſes about diſeaſes?

Gorg. Eſpecially ſo.

Soc. The gymnaſtic art, therefore, is alſo converſant with diſcourſes about the good and bad habit of bodies.

Gorg. Entirely ſo.

Soc. And, indeed, other arts, O Gorgias, will ſubſiſt in this manner. For each of them will be converſant with thoſe diſcourſes which are employed about that particular thing of which each is the art.

Gorg. It appears ſo.

Soc. Why, therefore, do you not call other arts rhetorical, ſince they are converſant with diſcourſes, and you call this very thing which is employed about diſcourſes, rhetoric?

GORG. Becauſe, Socrates, all the ſcience of other arts is converſant, as I may ſay, with manual and ſuch-like operations; but nothing belonging to the rhetorical art is manual, ſince all its action and authority ſubſiſt through diſcourſes. On this account, I think that the rhetorical art is converſant with diſcourſes, and I affirm that in this I ſpeak rightly.

SOC. I underſtand what kind of an art you wiſh to call it; but perhaps I may comprehend it yet ſtill more clearly. However, anſwer me. Have we not arts?

GORG. Yes.

SOC. I think that, with reſpect to all the arts, ſome are very much employed in operation, and ſtand very little in need of diſcourſe; but others do not require it at all, but accompliſh their deſign in ſilence; ſuch as the arts of painting and ſtatuary, and many others. You appear, therefore, to me to ſay that the rhetorical art is not converſant with ſuch arts as theſe. Or do you not?

GORG. You apprehend my meaning very well, Socrates.

SOC. But there are other arts which accompliſh the whole of their intention through diſcourſe, and either require, as I may ſay, nothing of operation, or very little, ſuch as the arithmetic, logiſtic, pettutic [1], and many other arts; ſome of which have diſcourſes nearly equal to their operations; but with many the diſcourſes ſurpaſs the operations: and, univerſally, all their action and authority ſubſiſt through diſcourſes. You appear to me to ſay that rhetoric ranks among things of this laſt kind.

GORG. You ſpeak the truth.

SOC. Yet I do not think you are willing to call rhetoric any one of theſe, though you ſaid that the rhetorical art was that which poſſeſſed its authority through diſcourſe. For ſome one diſpoſed to be troubleſome might aſk, Do you therefore, Gorgias, ſay that the arithmetical is the rhetorical art? But I do not think that you call either the arithmetical, or the geometrical, the rhetorical art.

GORG. You think rightly, Socrates, and apprehend me perfectly well.

SOC. Now, therefore, complete the anſwer to my queſtion. For, ſince rhetoric is one of thoſe arts which very much uſe diſcourſe, and there are

[1] The art of cheſs.

other

other arts of this kind, endeavour to tell us about what particular thing in diſcourſe the authority of rhetoric is exerciſed. Juſt as if any one ſhould aſk me reſpecting the arts which I lately mentioned, O Socrates, what is the arithmetical art, I ſhould ſay as you did juſt now, that it is one of the arts which poſſeſſes all its power through diſcourſe. And if he ſhould again aſk me about what it is converſant, I ſhould anſwer, About the knowledge of the even and the odd, viz. what the nature is of each. But if he ſhould further aſk me, What do you call the logiſtic art? I ſhould anſwer, that this alſo is one of thoſe arts which poſſeſs all their authority through diſcourſe. And if he ſhould aſk me about what it is converſant, I ſhould anſwer, like thoſe who write decrees in the Senate-houſe, that the logiſtic in other reſpects ſubſiſts in the ſame manner as the arithmetical art (for each is employed about the even and the odd); but that it differs in this, that it conſiders the amount of the even and odd, both with reſpect to themſelves and to each other. And if any one ſhould aſk me about what the diſcourſes of aſtronomy are employed, in conſequence of my ſaying that it ranked among thoſe arts the whole of whoſe authority conſiſts in diſcourſe, I ſhould ſay that they are employed about the lation of the ſtars, of the ſun and the moon, viz. how they are related to each other with reſpect to ſwiftneſs.

GORG. And you would anſwer very properly, Socrates.

SOC. Now then do you anſwer, Gorgias. For rhetoric is one of thoſe arts which accompliſh every thing, and derive all their authority through diſcourſe. Is it not?

GORG. It is.

SOC. Tell me then, what that particular thing is, about which the diſcourſes are converſant which rhetoric employs.

GORG. The greateſt and the beſt, Socrates, of human concerns.

SOC. But, Gorgias, what you now ſay is ambiguous, and in no reſpect clear. For I think you have heard that convivial ſong, which is ſung at banquets, in which the ſingers thus enumerate: that to be well is the beſt thing; but to be beautiful ranks in the ſecond place; and, as the author of the ſong ſays, to be rich without fraud, in the third place [1].

GORG.

[1] Theſe verſes, according to the Greek Scholia of Ruhnkenius, are by ſome aſcribed to Simonides, and by others to Epicharmus. But they form a part of one of thoſe ſongs which were

Gorg. I have heard it: but why do you say this?

Soc. Because there those artificers will immediately present themselves to you, who are celebrated by the author of this song; viz. the physician,

were sung at entertainments, and were called σκολια, *scolia*. They mostly consisted of short verses, and were sung by the few of the company that were best skilled in music. These *scolia* were chiefly used by the Athenians; yet they were not unknown in other parts of Greece, where several celebrated writers of scolia lived, such as Anacreon of Teos, Alcæus of Lesbos, Praxilla of Sicyon, and others. Their arguments were of various kinds; some of them being ludicrous and satirical, others amorous, and many of them serious. Those of a serious nature sometimes contained a practical exhortation or sentence, such as that which is now cited by Plato. And sometimes they consisted of the praises and illustrious actions of great men.

But the following additional information on this subject, from the MS. Scholia of Olympiodorus on this dialogue, will I doubt not be gratefully received by all lovers of antiquity, as the whole of it is not to be found in any other writer.

Olympiodorus then, after observing that Plato admitted music in his republic, though not the popular, but that which adorns the soul, adds as follows: "The antients especially used music in their banquets; since banquets excite the passions. A choir, therefore, was formed. And if they danced from the left hand to the right hand part, a thing of this kind was called *progression* (προοδος); but if to the left hand, *epode* (επωδος); and if to the middle, it was called *mesodos* (μεσωδος). Again, if, turning in a backward direction, they went to the right hand part, it was called *strophe* (στροφη); but if to the middle, *mesodos* (μεσωδος); and if to the more left hand parts, *antistrophe* (αντιστροφη). Of these also Stesichorus makes mention. But these things were symbolical: for they imitated the celestial motions. For the motion from the left to the right hand parts is western; but that from the right to the left, eastern. In like manner those that began to sing, and who moved to the middle, and ended the dance, obscurely signified by all this the earth, which is a certain *beginning*, as being the centre; a *middle*, through its position; and an *end*, as being the dregs of the universe. When, therefore, the music partially ceased, they used wine mixed with myrtle; and some one taking it, and singing, did not give it to the person next to him, but to the one opposite to him. Afterwards, he gave it to the first, and he again to the second, and the communication became *scolia*. And the part here is called *scolion*. Μαλιστα τοινυν εν τοις συμποσιοις μουσικη εκεχρηντο· επειδη τα συμποσια διατε ην εις παθος κινησα· χορος ουν εγενετο· και ει μεν απο αριστερων επι το δεξιον μερος εφεροντο, εκαλειτο προοδος το τοιουτον· ει δε επι το αριστερον επωδος· ει δε επι το μεσον, μεσωδος. και παλιν, ει επι τα οπισθεν στραφεντες επι το δεξιον μερος ιεσαν, στροφη εκαλειτο· ει δε επι το μεσον, μεσωδος· ει δε επι το αριστερον αντιστροφη· τουτων μεν ουν και Στεσιχορος μεμνηται· συμβολικα δε ταυτα ησαν· επιμιμουνται γαρ τας ουρανιας κινησεις· η μεν γαρ απο των αριστερων εις τα δεξια δυτικη εστιν· η δε απο των δεξιων επι τα αριστερα ανατολικη· ωσαυτως και οι αρχομενοι αδειν και μεσουντες και ληγοντες, την γην ηνιττοντο, η μεν αρχη μεν εστιν ως κεντρον· μεση δε δια την θεσιν· τελευτη δε ως υποσταθμη του παντος· επει τοινυν εξελιμπανη κατα μερος η μουσικη, μυρρινας εκεχρηντο. και ελαμβανε τις αυτην, και αδων ου παρειχετο μετ' αυτου, αλλα τω κατα αντικρυ αυτου· ειτα εκεινος τω πρωτω· και παλιν εκεινος τω δευτερω· και σκολια η μεταδοσις εγενετο· και ενταυθα το σκολιον μερος ειρηται.

Information similar to the above may be found in the Greek Scholia on Hephestion, but by no means so complete.

the maſter of gymnaſtic, and the collector of wealth. And, in the firſt place, the phyſician will ſay: Gorgias, O Socrates, deceives you. For his art is not employed about that which procures the greateſt good to men, but this is the province of my art. If, therefore, I ſhould aſk him, What are you who aſſert theſe things? he would perhaps ſay that he is a phyſician. What then do you ſay? Or is the employment of your art the greateſt good? How is it poſſible, perhaps he will ſay, Socrates, it ſhould not, ſince the work of my art is health? For what can be a greater good to men than health? But if after this the maſter of gymnaſtic ſhould ſay, I ſhould wonder, Socrates, if Gorgias could ſhow you that there is greater good in his art than I can evince there is in mine, I ſhould again ſay to him, And what are you, O man? and what is your work? he would ſay, I am a maſter of gymnaſtic, and my employment conſiſts in rendering the bodies of men beautiful and ſtrong. But after the maſter of gymnaſtic, the collector of wealth would ſay, deſpiſing all others, as it appears to me, Conſider, Socrates, whether there is any greater good than riches, either with Gorgias, or any other perſon? I ſhould therefore ſay to him, What then, are you the artificer of this good? He would ſay that he is. And what are you? A collector of money. What then? Do you think that riches are the greateſt good to men? Undoubtedly, he will ſay. To this we ſhall reply, Gorgias here contends that his art is the cauſe of greater good than yours. It is evident, therefore, that after this he will ſay, And what is this good? Let Gorgias anſwer. Think then, Gorgias, that you are thus interrogated by them and me, and anſwer, What is this, which you ſay is the greateſt good to men, and of which you are the artificer?

GORG. That which is in reality, Socrates, the greateſt good, and is at the ſame time the cauſe of liberty to men, and of their being able to rule over others in their own city.

SOC. What then do you ſay this is?

GORG. The ability of perſuading by words in a court of juſtice judges, in the ſenate-houſe ſenators, and in a public aſſembly the hearers, and in every other convention of a political nature. Likewiſe through this art you will make the phyſician and the maſter of gymnaſtic your ſlaves. And as to the collector of money, it will appear that he exerciſes his employment, not for himſelf, but for you who are able to ſpeak, and perſuade the multitude.

SOC.

Soc. Now you appear to me, Gorgias, very nearly to evince what kind of an art rhetoric is in your opinion: and if I underſtand you, you ſay that the rhetorical art is the artificer of perſuaſion, and that the whole of its employment and its very ſummit terminate in this. Or are you able to ſay any thing further reſpecting rhetoric, than that it is able to cauſe perſuaſion in the ſouls of the hearers?

Gorg. I have nothing further to ſay, Socrates; but you appear to me to have ſufficiently defined it. For this is its ſummit.

Soc. But hear, Gorgias. For I well know, as I perſuade myſelf, that if ever any one, diſcourſing with another, wiſhed to know that about which he diſcourſed, this is my caſe. And I think that you are likewiſe affected in the ſame manner.

Gorg. But to what purpoſe is all this, Socrates?

Soc. I will now tell you. I very clearly perceive that I do not know what the rhetorical perſuaſion is which you ſpeak of, or with what particulars it is converſant: and though I conjecture what I think you ſay, and about what you ſpeak, yet I do not the leſs ceaſe to aſk you, what you aſſert rhetorical perſuaſion to be, and about what it is employed. Though I, therefore, ſuſpect that for the ſake of which it ſubſiſts, yet I do not aſk on your account, but for the ſake of diſcourſe, that it may proceed in ſuch a manner as to render apparent in the higheſt degree the ſubject of the preſent diſcuſſion. For conſider whether I appear to interrogate you juſtly: juſt as, if I ſhould aſk you what kind of a painter is Zeuxis, and you ſhould anſwer me that he paints animals,—might I not juſtly inquire of you, what are the animals which he paints, and how he paints them?

Gorg. Entirely ſo.

Soc. And would not my inquiry be made on this account, becauſe there are many other painters who paint many other animals?

Gorg. It would.

Soc. But if there were no one beſides Zeuxis that painted animals, you would have anſwered properly.

Gorg. Undoubtedly.

Soc. This being the caſe, then, inform me reſpecting rhetoric, whether it appears to you that the rhetorical art alone produces perſuaſion, or whether this

this is effected by other arts? But my meaning is this: Does he who teaches any thing perſuade that which he teaches, or not?

GORG. He does perſuade, Socrates, and the moſt of all things.

SOC. Again, if we ſhould ſpeak reſpecting the ſame arts as we did juſt now, does not the arithmetical art teach us ſuch things as pertain to number; and does not an arithmetician do the ſame?

GORG. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Does he not, therefore, alſo perſuade?

GORG. He does.

SOC. The arithmetical art, therefore, is the artificer of perſuaſion.

GORG. It appears ſo.

SOC. If, therefore, any one ſhould aſk us what perſuaſions it produces, and about what, we ſhould reply, that it produces preceptive perſuaſions about the quantity of the even and the odd. And in like manner we might ſhow, that the other arts which we juſt now mentioned are effective of perſuaſions, and what theſe perſuaſions are, and about what they are employed. Or might we not?

GORG. We might.

SOC. The rhetorical art, therefore, is not alone effective of perſuaſion.

GORG. True.

SOC. Since, therefore, it does not alone effect this, but likewiſe other arts accompliſh the ſame thing, we may juſtly after this make the ſame inquiry concerning the rhetorical art as we did about the painter; viz. what kind of perſuaſion rhetoric produces, and about what its perſuaſion is employed. Or does it not appear to you to be juſt to make ſuch inquiry?

GORG. It does.

SOC. Anſwer then, Gorgias, ſince this appears to you to be the caſe.

GORG. I ſay, therefore, Socrates, that rhetoric is the cauſe of the perſuaſion which is produced in courts of juſtice, and in other public aſſociations, as I juſt now ſaid; and likewiſe that this perſuaſion is employed about things juſt and unjuſt.

SOC. And I likewiſe did ſuſpect, Gorgias, that you would give this anſwer reſpecting rhetorical perſuaſion. But do not wonder if a little after this I ſhall aſk you a thing of ſuch a kind as indeed appears to be evident, but which I ſhall notwithſtanding repeat. For, as I before obſerved, I aſk not

for your ſake, but that the diſcourſe may be brought to a concluſion in an orderly manner, that we may not accuſtom ourſelves by conjecture to ſnatch from each other what is ſaid. But do you finiſh your hypotheſis in ſuch a manner as is moſt agreeable to you.

GORG. You appear to me to act rightly, Socrates.

SOC. Come then, let us alſo conſider this. Do you ſay that to learn is any thing?

GORG. I do.

SOC. Again, do you ſay that to believe is any thing?

GORG. I do.

SOC. Whether, therefore, does it appear to you, that to learn and to believe are the ſame, and likewiſe that diſcipline and faith are the ſame, or that they differ from each other?

GORG. I think, Socrates, that they differ from each other.

SOC. And you think well: but you may know that you do ſo from hence. For if any one ſhould aſk you, Are there ſuch things, Gorgias, as falſe and true belief? you would, I think, ſay there are.

GORG. I ſhould.

SOC. But what, is there ſuch a thing as true and falſe ſcience?

GORG. There is not.

SOC. It is evident, therefore, that true and falſe ſcience are not the ſame.

GORG. True.

SOC. But thoſe that learn, and thoſe that believe, are perſuaded.

GORG. They are.

SOC. Are you willing, therefore, that we ſhould eſtabliſh two ſpecies of perſuaſion, one of which produces faith without knowledge, but the other ſcience?

GORG. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Whether, therefore, does the rhetorical art produce perſuaſion in courts of juſtice, and other numerous aſſemblies, reſpecting things juſt and unjuſt? And is it that perſuaſion from which faith without knowledge is produced, or that from which knowledge ariſes?

GORG. It is evident, Socrates, that it is that from which faith is produced.

SOC. The rhetorical art, therefore, as it ſeems, is the artificer of the

perſuaſion which produces belief, and not of that which teaches reſpecting the juſt and unjuſt.

GORG. It is ſo.

SOC. A rhetorician, therefore, does not teach courts of juſtice, and other numerous aſſemblies, reſpecting things juſt and unjuſt, but only procures belief concerning theſe. For he, doubtleſs, is not able to teach ſo great a multitude in a ſhort time things of ſuch great importance.

GORG. He, doubtleſs, is not.

SOC. But come, let us ſee what we ſhould ſay concerning the rhetorical art. For I, indeed, as yet, am not able to underſtand what I ſay. When an aſſembly, then, is held in a city, reſpecting the choice of phyſicians, or ſhipwrights, or any other kind of artiſts, does the rhetorician then do any thing elſe than refrain from giving his advice? For it is evident that, in each election, he who is the moſt conſummate artiſt ought to be choſen. Nor in conſultations reſpecting the building of walls, or the conſtruction of ports or docks, will any other advice be attended to but that of architects. Nor, again, in the election of commanders, or any military order, in times of war, or in deliberations reſpecting the capture of certain places, will rhetoricians be conſulted, but thoſe that are ſkilled in military affairs. Or how do you ſay, Gorgias, reſpecting things of this kind? For ſince you ſay that you are a rhetorician, and are able to make others rhetoricians, it is very proper to inquire of you about the things pertaining to your art. And believe that I ſhall benefit you by acting in this manner. For, perhaps, ſome one who is now within the houſe may wiſh to become your diſciple: and I nearly perceive a collected multitude who, perhaps, are aſhamed to interrogate you. Theſe, therefore, being interrogated by me, think that you alſo are aſked by them, What would be the conſequence, Gorgias, if we ſhould aſſociate with you? About what particulars ſhall we be able to give advice to the city? Whether about the juſt alone and the unjuſt; or reſpecting thoſe things which Socrates juſt now mentioned? Endeavour, therefore, to anſwer them.

GORG. But I will endeavour, Socrates, clearly to unfold to you all the power of the rhetorical art. For you have beautifully led the way. For you doubtleſs know that theſe docks and walls of the Athenians, and the ſtructure of the ports, were partly the conſequence of the advice of Themiſ-

tocles, and partly of Pericles, but were not built from the advice of artificers.

Soc. Theſe things are ſaid, Gorgias, reſpecting Themiſtocles: but I myſelf heard Pericles when he gave us his advice reſpecting the middle wall.

Gorg. And when an election is made reſpecting the particulars of which you ſpeak, you ſee, Socrates, that rhetoricians are the perſons that give advice, and whoſe opinion reſpecting theſe things vanquiſhes.

Soc. Wondering, therefore, that this is the caſe, Gorgias, I ſome time ago aſked you, what the power of the rhetorical art is. For, while I conſider it in this manner, it appears to me to be ſomething divine with reſpect to its magnitude.

Gorg. If you knew all, Socrates, you would find, as I may ſay, that it comprehends under itſelf all powers. But of this I will give you a great example. For I have often, with my brother, and other phyſicians, viſited certain ſick perſons, who were unwilling either to drink the medicine, or ſuffer themſelves to be cut or burnt by the phyſician, in conſequence of the inability of the phyſician to perſuade them; but theſe I have perſuaded by no other art than the rhetorical. I ſay further, that if a rhetorician and a phyſician ſhould in any city verbally contend with each other in a place of diſputation, or any other aſſembly, which ought to be choſen in preference, a rhetorician or a phyſician, the deciſion would by no means be given in favour of the phyſician, but of the rhetorician, if he was willing to be choſen. And if the rhetorician ſhould contend with any other artiſt, he would perſuade his hearers that he ought to be choſen in preference to any other. For there is not any thing about which the rhetorician will not ſpeak more perſuaſively to the multitude than any other artiſt. Such, therefore, and ſo great is the power of this art. Indeed, Socrates, the rhetorical art ought to be uſed like every other conteſt. For in other conteſts it is not proper for any one to ſtrike, pierce, and ſlay his friends, becauſe he has learned to contend in boxing, in the pancratium, and with arms, ſo as to be ſuperior both to friends and enemies. Nor, by Jupiter, if ſome one going to the palæſtra, whoſe body is in a flouriſhing condition, and becoming a pugiliſt, ſhould afterwards ſtrike his father and mother, or any other of his kindred or friends, it would not on this account be proper to hate, and expel from cities, the maſters of gymnaſtics,

gymnaſtics, and thoſe who inſtruct men to fight with arms. For they impart theſe arts to their pupils, in order that they may uſe them juſtly againſt enemies, and thoſe that injure others, defending themſelves, but not offering violence to others. But ſuch a one, as I have juſt mentioned, acting perverſely, does not rightly employ his ſtrength and art. The teachers, therefore, are not baſe characters, nor is art to be blamed, nor is it to be conſidered as on this account baſe: but I think thoſe are to be conſidered ſo who do not uſe theſe arts properly. The ſame may be ſaid of the rhetorical art. For a rhetorician is able to ſpeak againſt all men, and about every thing; ſo that, in ſhort, he can perſuade the multitude reſpecting whatever he pleaſes more than any other: but yet phyſicians ought not to ſuffer in our opinion, nor other artificers, becauſe this can be done by rhetoricians. But the rhetorical art, as well as that pertaining to conteſt, is to be uſed juſtly. In my opinion, however, if any one becoming a rhetorician acts unjuſtly through this power and art, it is not proper to hate and expel from cities the teacher of rhetoric; for he imparts the knowledge of it for juſt purpoſes, but the other applies it to contrary purpoſes. It is juſt, therefore, to hate, baniſh, and ſlay him who does not uſe rhetoric properly, but not him by whom it is taught.

Soc. I think, Gorgias, that you are ſkilled in a multitude of arguments, and that you have perceived this in them, that it is not eaſy for men to diſſolve their conference reſpecting things of which they endeavour to diſcourſe, by mutually defining, learning from others, and teaching themſelves: but that, if they contend about any thing, and the one ſays that the other does not ſpeak with rectitude or clearneſs, they are indignant, and think it is ſaid through envy of themſelves, and through a deſire of victory, and not in conſequence of exploring the thing propoſed in the diſputation: and that ſome, indeed, depart in a ſhameful manner, after they have reviled others, and ſpoken and heard ſuch things about themſelves as cauſe thoſe that are preſent to be indignant, that they have deigned to become auditors of ſuch men as theſe. But on what account do I aſſert theſe things? Becauſe you now appear to me to ſpeak not altogether conformably to what you firſt ſaid reſpecting the rhetorical art. I am afraid, therefore, to confute you, leſt you ſhould think that I do not ſpeak with an ardent deſire that the thing itſelf

may

may become manifeſt, but that my diſcourſe is directed to you. If, therefore, you are ſuch a man as I am, I ſhall willingly interrogate you; but if not, I ſhall ceaſe my interrogations. But among what kind of men do I rank? Among thoſe who are willingly confuted, if they do not ſpeak the truth, and who willingly confute others when they aſſert what is falſe; and who are not leſs pleaſed when they are confuted than when they confute. For I conſider the former to be as much a greater good than the latter, as for a man to liberate himſelf from the greateſt evil rather than another. For I do not think that any evil happens to men of ſuch a magnitude as falſe opinion reſpecting the things which are the ſubject of our preſent diſcourſe. If, therefore, you ſay that you are a man of this kind, let us converſe; but if it appears to you that we ought to deſiſt, let us bid farewell to our diſcuſſion, and diſſolve the diſcourſe.

Gorg. But indeed, Socrates, I profeſs myſelf to be ſuch a man as you have mentioned. Perhaps, however, it is proper to attend to thoſe that are preſent. For, ſome time ſince, before I came to you, I evinced many things to the perſons now preſent: and now, perhaps, if we diſcourſe, we ſhall extend our diſcuſſion to a great length. Some attention, therefore, ought to be paid to the perſons preſent, leſt we ſhould detain any of them, when at the ſame time they wiſh to do ſomething elſe.

Chær. Do but attend, Gorgias and Socrates, to the clamour of theſe men, who wiſh to hear if you ſay any thing. As to myſelf, therefore, I am not ſo engaged, that, leaving theſe and the former diſcourſes, I can do any thing better.

Cal. By the Gods, Chærepho, I alſo have been preſent at many conferences; but I do not know that I was ever ſo delighted as with the preſent diſputation: ſo that you will gratify me, ſhould you be even willing to diſcourſe the whole day.

Soc. But indeed, Callicles, nothing prevents, with reſpect to myſelf, if Gorgias is willing.

Gorg. After this, Socrates, it would be ſhameful that I ſhould not be willing, eſpecially as I have announced that any one might aſk what he pleaſed. But, if it is agreeable to theſe men, diſcourſe, and aſk any queſtion you pleaſe.

Soc. Hear then, Gorgias, the particulars which I wondered at in the diſcourſe

courſe which you juſt now made. For, perhaps, what you ſaid is right, and I did not rightly apprehend you. Did you not ſay that you could make any one a rhetorician, who was willing to be inſtructed by you?

GORG. I did.

SOC. And, therefore, that you could enable him to ſpeak in a perſuaſive manner about every thing to the multitude, not by teaching but perſuading?

GORG. Entirely ſo.

SOC. You ſay, therefore, that a rhetorician is more capable of perſuading with reſpect to what pertains to the health of the body, than a phyſician.

GORG. I did ſay that this was the caſe in a crowd.

SOC. Is not, therefore, that which takes place in a crowd the ſame as that which takes place among the ignorant? For, doubtleſs, among thoſe endued with knowledge, the rhetorician will not be more capable of perſuading than the phyſician.

GORG. You ſpeak the truth.

SOC. Will it not, therefore, follow, that if the rhetorician is more capable of perſuading than the phyſician, he will be more capable of perſuading than one endued with knowledge?

GORG. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And this, not being a phyſician?

GORG. Yes.

SOC. But he who is not a phyſician muſt, doubtleſs, be ignorant of thoſe things in which a phyſician is ſkilled.

GORG. It is evident.

SOC. He, therefore, who is ignorant will be more capable of perſuading among the ignorant than he who is endued with knowledge, ſince a rhetorician is more capable of perſuading than a phyſician. Does this happen to be the caſe, or any thing elſe?

GORG. In this inſtance this happens to be the caſe.

SOC. Can the ſame thing, therefore, be ſaid reſpecting a rhetorician and the rhetorical art, in all the other arts? I mean, that the rhetorical art has no occaſion to know how things themſelves are circumſtanced, but that it diſcovers a certain device of perſuaſion, ſo as that a rhetorician may appear to the ignorant to know more than thoſe endued with knowledge.

GORG. Is there not great facility in this, Socrates, that a man who has not learned

learned the other arts, but has learned this one, may become in no reſpect inferior to artificers?

Soc. Whether, from this being the caſe, a rhetorician is inferior, or not, to others, we will ſhortly conſider, if it contributes any thing to our diſputation. But let us now firſt of all conſider this: Whether a rhetorician is affected in the ſame manner reſpecting the juſt and the unjuſt, the baſe and the becoming, good and evil, as reſpecting that which pertains to health, and other things of which there are other arts: I mean, that he does not know what is good, or what is evil, what is becoming, or what is baſe, what is juſt, or what is unjuſt; but is able to deviſe perſuaſion reſpecting them, ſo as among the ignorant to appear more knowing than one endued with knowledge, at the ſame time that he is himſelf ignorant? Or is it neceſſary that he ſhould know theſe? and is it requiſite that he who is about to learn the rhetorical art ſhould, when he comes to you, previouſly poſſeſs a knowledge of theſe? But if he does not, ſhall we ſay that you, who are a teacher of rhetoric, will not inſtruct ſuch a one in any of theſe things (for it is not your province), but that you will cauſe him to appear knowing in ſuch particulars among the multitude, at the ſame time that he is ignorant of them, and to ſeem to be a good man, when he is not good? Or, in ſhort, are you not able to teach him the rhetorical art, unleſs he previouſly knows the truth reſpecting theſe things? Or how do ſuch-like particulars take place, Gorgias? And, by Jupiter, as you juſt now ſaid, unfold to me what the power is of the rhetorical art.

Gorg. But I think, Socrates, that if ſuch a one ſhould happen to be ignorant, he would learn theſe things from me.

Soc. Granted: for you ſpeak well. And if you make any one a rhetorician, it is neceſſary that he ſhould know things juſt and unjuſt, either before he is under your tuition, or afterwards, in conſequence of being inſtructed by you.

Gorg. Entirely ſo.

Soc. What then? Is he who learns things pertaining to building, tectonic, or not?

Gorg. He is.

Soc. And is he, therefore, who learns things pertaining to muſic, a muſician?

Gorg.

GORG. Yes.

SOC. And he who learns things pertaining to medicine, a phyſician? And ſo, according to the ſame reaſoning, in other things, he who learns any thing is ſuch as ſcience renders its votaries.

GORG. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Does it not, therefore, follow from this reaſoning, that he who learns juſt things is juſt?

GORG. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But does not he who is juſt act juſtly?

GORG. Yes.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, neceſſary that a rhetorician ſhould be juſt, and that he who is juſt ſhould be willing to act juſtly?

GORG. It appears ſo.

SOC. A juſt man, therefore, will never be willing to act unjuſtly.

GORG. It is neceſſary.

SOC. But, from what has been ſaid, it is neceſſary that a rhetorician ſhould be juſt.

GORG. It is.

SOC. A rhetorician, therefore, will never be willing to act unjuſtly.

GORG. It does not appear that he will.

SOC. Do you remember, therefore, that you ſaid a little before, that the preceptors of youth ought not to be called to account, nor expelled from cities, if a pugiliſt does not uſe in a becoming manner the pugiliſtic art, and acts unjuſtly? And that, in a ſimilar manner, if a rhetorician unjuſtly uſes the rhetoric art, the preceptor is not to be called to account, nor expelled from the city, but he who acts unjuſtly, and does not properly uſe the rhetorical art? Were theſe things ſaid, or not?

GORG. They were ſaid.

SOC. But now it appears that this very ſame rhetorician will never act unjuſtly. Or does it not?

GORG. It appears ſo.

SOC. And in the former part of our diſcourſe, Gorgias, it was ſaid that the rhetorical art is converſant with diſcourſes, not thoſe reſpecting the even and the odd, but thoſe reſpecting the juſt and the unjuſt. Was not this aſſerted?

GORG. It was.

Soc. I, therefore, in conſequence of your aſſerting theſe things, thought that the rhetorical art could never be an unjuſt thing, as it always diſcourſes concerning juſtice. But, ſince a little after you ſaid that a rhetorician might uſe the rhetorical art unjuſtly, I wondered at the aſſertion; and thinking that what was ſaid did not accord with itſelf, I ſaid, that if you ſhould think it a gain to be confuted, as it is in my opinion, then it would be worth while to diſcourſe, but if not, we ſhould bid farewell to diſcuſſion. Afterwards, however, while we were conſidering, you ſeem to have again confeſſed that it was impoſſible a rhetorician could uſe the rhetorical art unjuſtly, and be willing to do an injury. To determine, therefore, ſufficiently, how theſe things take place, requires, by the dog, Gorgias, no brief diſcuſſion.

Pol. But what, Socrates? Do you really form ſuch an opinion of the rhetorical art as you now ſay? Or do you think Gorgias is aſhamed that he has not acknowledged to you, that a rhetorician knows things juſt, beautiful, and good, and that, if any one goes to him who is ignorant of theſe things, he will inſtruct him in them? From this confeſſion, ſomething contrary will, perhaps, take place in the diſcourſe. This, however, is what you love, ſince you lead interrogations to things of this kind. But what man do you think will deny that he knows things juſt, and teaches them to others? To bring the diſcourſe, therefore, to things of this kind, is very ruſtic.

Soc. O moſt excellent Polus! we deſignedly procure aſſociates and children, that when, through being advanced in years, we fall into error, you that are younger being preſent may correct our life both in words and deeds. And now, if I and Gorgias err in any reſpect in what we have aſſerted, do you who are preſent correct us: for it is juſt ſo to do. And I wiſh you would retract any thing that has been granted, if it appears to you that it has not been properly admitted, if you only take care of one thing for me.

Pol. What is that?

Soc. That you would avoid in future prolixity of diſcourſe, which at firſt you attempted to uſe.

Pol. But what, may I not be permitted to ſpeak as much as I pleaſe?

Soc. O beſt of men, you would be uſed very unworthily, if, having come to Athens, where liberty of ſpeech is permitted more than in any part of Greece, you alone ſhould here be deprived of this liberty. But, on the contrary, conſider, if you ſhould ſpeak in a prolix manner, and be unwilling to

to anſwer what is aſked you, ſhould not I be uſed unworthily, if it is not permitted me to depart, and not hear you? But if you are at all concerned for what has been ſaid, and wiſh to correct it (as you juſt now ſaid), then, retracting whatever you think fit, and alternately aſking and being aſked, confute in the ſame manner as I and Gorgias. For, indeed, you ſay that you know the ſame things as Gorgias. Or do you not?

POL. I do.

SOC. Will not you, therefore, alſo exhort any one to aſk you whatever he pleaſes, as knowing how to anſwer him?

POL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And now you may do whichever of theſe you pleaſe, viz. either aſk or anſwer.

POL. I ſhall do ſo. And do you anſwer me, Socrates. Since Gorgias appears to you to doubt reſpecting the rhetorical art, what do you ſay he is?

SOC. Do you aſk me what his art is?

POL. I do.

SOC. It does not appear to me to be any art, that I may ſpeak the truth to you.

POL. But what does the rhetorical art appear to you to be?

SOC. A thing which you ſay produces art, in the book which I juſt now read.

POL. What do you call this thing?

SOC. A certain ſkill.

POL. Does the rhetorical art, therefore, apppear to you to be ſkill?

SOC. To me it does, unleſs you ſay otherwiſe.

POL. But of what is it the ſkill?

SOC. Of procuring a certain grace and pleaſure.

POL. Does not the rhetorical art, therefore, appear to you to be a beautiful thing, ſince it is capable of imparting delight to mankind?

SOC. But what, O Polus? Have you already heard me ſaying what the rhetorical art is, that you after this aſk me, if it does not appear to me to be a beautiful thing?

POL. Have I not heard you ſay that it is a certain ſkill?

SOC. Are you willing, therefore, ſince you honour gratification, to gratify me in a trifling thing?

POL. I am.

SOC. Aſk me then now, whether cooking appears to me to be an art?

POL. I aſk you then, what kind of an art is cooking?

SOC. It is no art, Polus.

POL. But tell me what it is.

SOC. I ſay, then, it is a certain ſkill.

POL. Inform me what ſkill.

SOC. I ſay it is the ſkill of procuring grace and pleaſure, Polus.

POL. But is cooking the ſame as rhetoric?

SOC. By no means, but a part of the ſame ſtudy.

POL. Of what ſtudy are you ſpeaking?

SOC. Leſt it ſhould be too ruſtic to ſpeak the truth, I am averſe to ſpeak, on account of Gorgias, leſt he ſhould think that I deride his purſuit. But I do not know whether this is that rhetoric which Gorgias ſtudies. For juſt now, it was by no means apparent to us, from the diſputation, what is his opinion. But that which I call rhetoric, is a part of a certain thing which does not rank among things becoming.

GORG. Tell me, Socrates, what this thing is; and do not be in the leaſt aſhamed becauſe I am preſent.

SOC. This thing therefore, Gorgias, appears to me to be a certain ſtudy, not of a technical nature, but belonging to a ſoul which ſagaciouſly conjectures, which is virile, and endued with a natural ſkill of converſing with men. But I call the ſummit of it adulation. It likewiſe appears to me that there are many other parts of this ſtudy, and that one of theſe is cookery; which, indeed, appears to be an art, but, according to my doctrine, is not an art, but ſkill and exerciſe. I likewiſe call rhetoric a part of this ſtudy, together with the ſophiſtic artifice, and that which pertains to the allurements of outward form. And theſe four parts belong to four things. If, therefore, Polus wiſhes to inquire, let him; for he has not yet heard what part of adulation I aſſert rhetoric to be: but he does not perceive that I have not yet anſwered, and aſks me if I do not think that rhetoric is beautiful. But I ſhall not anſwer him, whether I think rhetoric is beautiful or baſe, till I have firſt of all anſwered what rhetoric is. For it will not be juſt, Polus, to do otherwiſe. But if you wiſh to hear, aſk me what part of adulation I aſſert rhetoric to be.

POL.

POL. I aſk, then, and do you anſwer me what part it is.

SOC. Will you, therefore, underſtand when I have anſwered? For rhetoric, according to my doctrine, is an image of the politic part.

POL. What then? Do you ſay that it is ſomething beautiful, or that it is ſomething baſe?

SOC. I ſay that it is ſomething baſe: for I call things evil baſe; ſince it is requiſite I ſhould anſwer you, as now knowing what I aſſert.

GORG. By Jupiter, Socrates, but neither do I myſelf underſtand what you ſay.

SOC. It is likely, Gorgias: for I do not yet ſpeak any thing clearly. But Polus here is a young man and acute.

GORG. However, diſmiſs him; and inform me how it is you ſay that rhetoric is an image of the politic part.

SOC. But I will endeavour to tell you what rhetoric appears to me to be. And if it is not what I aſſert it to be, let Polus here confute me. Do you not call body ſomething, and likewiſe ſoul?

GORG. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Do you not, therefore, think that there is a certain good habit of each of theſe?

GORG. I do.

SOC. But what? Is this only a habit which appears to be good, but which is not in reality? As, for inſtance, many appear to have their bodies in a good condition, when at the ſame time no one, except a phyſician, and ſome one ſkilled in gymnaſtics, can eaſily perceive that theſe are not in a good condition.

GORG. You ſpeak the truth.

SOC. I ſay that a thing of this kind takes place both in body and ſoul, which cauſes both body and ſoul to appear to be in a good condition, when at the ſame time they are not ſo.

GORG. Theſe things take place.

SOC. But come, I will explain to you in a ſtill clearer manner, if I am able, what I ſay. As there are two things, I ſay there are two arts: and one of them, which pertains to the ſoul, I call politic; but the other, belonging to the body, I cannot in like manner diſtinguiſh by one appellation. But ſince the culture of the body is one, I call the two parts gymnaſtic and medicine.

dicine. But in the politic art I eſtabliſh legiſlation, as correſponding to gymnaſtic, and juſtice as reciprocating with medicine. Theſe communicate with each other, as ſubſiſting about the ſame thing, viz. medicine communicates with gymnaſtic, and juſtice with legiſlation; but at the ſame time they differ in a certain reſpect from each other. But ſince theſe are four, and always procure remedies, looking to that which is beſt, one part of them curing the body, and the other the ſoul, the adulatory power perceiving this, I do not ſay knowing, but conjecturing it, in conſequence of giving to itſelf a fourfold diſtribution, and entering under each of the parts, it feigns itſelf to be that under which it enters. And it is not, indeed, in the leaſt concerned for that which is beſt; but always, through that which is pleaſant, hunts after folly, and deceives; ſo as to appear to be of great worth. Cookery, therefore, enters under medicine, and feigns that it knows the beſt aliment for the body. So that if a cook and a phyſician ſhould contend with each other among boys, or among men as ſtupid as boys, which of them poſſeſſed the knowledge of good and bad aliment, the phyſician would die through hunger. This, therefore, I call adulation; and I ſay, O Polus, that a thing of this kind is baſe. For this I ſay to you, that it looks to the pleaſant without regarding that which is beſt. But I do not call it an art, but ſkill, becauſe it has no reaſon by which it can ſhow what the nature is of the things which it introduces; ſo that it is unable to tell the cauſe of each. But I do not call that an art which is an irrational thing. If you are doubtful reſpecting theſe things, I am willing to give you a reaſon for them. The adulation, therefore, pertaining to cookery is, as I have ſaid, placed under medicine; but, after the ſame manner, the artifice reſpecting the allurements of outward form is placed under gymnaſtic: and this artifice is productive of evil, is deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal, deceiving by figures and colours, by ſmoothneſs and the ſenſes; ſo as to cauſe thoſe who attract to themſelves foreign beauty, to neglect that which is properly their own, and which is procured through gymnaſtic. That I may not, therefore, be prolix, I wiſh to tell you, after the manner of geometricians (for perhaps you can now follow me), that the artifice reſpecting the allurements of outward form is to gymnaſtic as cookery to medicine. Or rather thus, that the artifice reſpecting the allurements of outward form is to gymnaſtic as the ſophiſtic to the legiſlative power; and that cookery is to medicine as rhetoric to

juſtice. As I have ſaid, they are thus diſtinguiſhed by nature: but as ſophiſts and rhetoricians are proximate to each other, they are mingled in the ſame, and about the ſame things, and do not poſſeſs any thing by which they can benefit themſelves, or be benefited by other men. For, if the ſoul did not preſide over the body, but the body over itſelf, and cookery and medicine were not conſidered and judged of by the ſoul, but the body itſelf judged, eſtimating things by its own gratifications; then, friend Polus, that doctrine of Anaxagoras would abundantly take place, (for you are ſkilled in theſe things,) viz. that all things would be mingled together in the ſame, things ſalubrious, medicinal, and pertaining to cookery, ſubſiſting undiſtinguiſhed from each other. You have heard, therefore, what I aſſert rhetoric to be, viz. that it is a thing reciprocating with cookery in the ſoul, as that in the body. Perhaps, therefore, I have acted abſurdly, ſince, not permitting you to uſe prolixity of diſcourſe, I myſelf have made a long oration. I deſerve however to be pardoned: for, if I had ſpoken with brevity, you would not have underſtood me, nor have been able to make any uſe of my anſwer to you, but would have required an explication. If, therefore, when you anſwer, I in my turn am not able to reply, do you alſo extend your diſcourſe: but, if I can, ſuffer me to reply; for it is juſt. And now, if you can make any uſe of this anſwer, do ſo.

Pol. What then do you ſay? Does rhetoric appear to you to be adulation?

Soc. I ſaid, indeed, that it was a part of adulation. But cannot you remember, Polus, though ſo young? What then will you do when you become advanced in years?

Pol. Do, therefore, good rhetoricians appear to you to be conſidered in the ſame place as vile flatterers in cities?

Soc. Do you propoſe this as a queſtion, or as the beginning of a certain diſcourſe?

Pol. As a queſtion.

Soc. They do not then appear to me to be conſidered in the ſame place as vile flatterers in cities.

Pol. How not *to be conſidered?* Are they not able to accompliſh the greateſt things in cities?

Soc.

Soc. They are not, if you allow that to be endued with power is good to him who is endued with it.

Pol. But this indeed I do ſay.

Soc. Rhetoricians, therefore, appear to me to poſſeſs the leaſt power of all men in cities.

Pol. But what, do they not like tyrants ſlay, take away poſſeſſions, and baniſh from cities whomever they pleaſe?

Soc. By the dog, Polus, I am doubtful with reſpect to each of the things ſaid by you, whether you aſſert theſe things yourſelf, and exhibit your own opinion, or interrogate me.

Pol. But I interrogate you.

Soc. Be it ſo, my friend. But do you not aſk me two things at once?

Pol. How two things?

Soc. Did you not juſt now ſay, that rhetoricians like tyrants ſlew whomever they pleaſed, deprived them of their poſſeſſions, and expelled them from cities?

Pol. I did.

Soc. I therefore ſay to you that theſe are two queſtions, and I ſhall give you an anſwer to both. For I ſay, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants poſſeſs the leaſt power of all men, in cities, as I juſt now ſaid. For, in ſhort, they accompliſh nothing which they wiſh to accompliſh; and yet they do that which appears to them to be beſt.

Pol. Is not this, therefore, to poſſeſs the power of accompliſhing great things?

Soc. It is not, as ſays Polus.

Pol. Do I ſay not? On the contrary, I ſay it is.

Soc. By Jupiter, not you. For you ſaid that to be able to do great things is good to him who poſſeſſes this power.

Pol. And I now ſay ſo.

Soc. Do you think, therefore, it is a good thing, if any one void of intellect does that which appears to him to be beſt? And do you call this the ability of accompliſhing ſomething great?

Pol. Not I.

Soc. Will you not, therefore, evince that rhetoricians are endued with intellect,

intellect, and, confuting me, ſhow that rhetoric is an art, and not adulation? For, if you do not confute me, rhetoricians and tyrants, who do in cities whatever they pleaſe, will not by ſo doing obtain any thing good. But power is, as you ſay, good; though, for a man to do without intellect whatever he pleaſes, you alſo have acknowledged to be evil. Or have you not?

POL. I have.

SOC. How then can rhetoricians or tyrants be able to accompliſh any thing great in cities, unleſs Polus evinces, againſt Socrates, that they do whatever they pleaſe?

POL. Is it poſſible any one can ſpeak ſo abſurdly?

SOC. I do not ſay that they accompliſh what they wiſh: but confute me if you can.

POL. Did you not juſt now acknowledge, that they accompliſhed things which appeared to them to be beſt?

SOC. And I now acknowledge this.

POL. Do they not, therefore, do that which they wiſh to do?

SOC. I ſay they do not.

POL. But do they do that which they think fit?

SOC. I ſay they do.

POL. You ſpeak importunately and unnaturally.

SOC. Do not accuſe me, moſt excellent Polus, that I may ſpeak to you in your own way; but, if you are capable of interrogating me any further, evince in what it is I am deceived; but if not, do you yourſelf anſwer.

POL. But I am willing to anſwer, that I may alſo know what you ſay.

SOC. Whether, therefore, do men appear to you to wiſh this, which every individual accompliſhes, or that for the ſake of which they accompliſh this which they accompliſh? As for inſtance, whether do thoſe who take medicines from a phyſician appear to you to wiſh this which they do, viz. to drink the medicine, and ſuffer pain; or do they wiſh to be well, for the ſake of which they take the medicine?

POL. They doubtleſs wiſh to be well, for the ſake of which they drink the medicine.

SOC. Does not the like happen to navigators, and to thoſe who are engaged in other employments, viz. that the object of their wiſhes is not that which

each of them does (for who would wiſh to ſail, to encounter dangers, and to be entangled with a multiplicity of affairs?); but, in my opinion, the object of their wiſhes is that for the ſake of which they venture on the ſea, viz. to acquire riches. For they ſail for the ſake of wealth.

POL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. In like manner, with reſpect to all other things, he who does any thing for the ſake of ſome particular thing does not wiſh this which he does, but that for the ſake of which he does it.

POL. It is ſo.

SOC. Is there any thing, therefore, in the whole of exiſtence, which is neither good nor evil? Or is there a medium between theſe, which is neither good nor evil?

POL. It is abundantly neceſſary, Socrates, that there ſhould.

SOC. Do you not, therefore, ſay that wiſdom and health, riches, and other things of this kind, are good, but the contraries of theſe evil?

POL. I do.

SOC. But do you ſay that things which are neither good nor evil are of ſuch a kind, that they ſometimes partake of good, ſometimes of evil, and ſometimes of neither; ſuch as to ſit, to run, to walk, and to ſail; and again, ſuch things as ſtones, wood, and other things of this kind? Are not theſe the things which you ſpeak of? Or do you denominate other certain things neither good nor evil?

POL. I do not: but theſe are the things.

SOC. Whether, therefore, do men, when they act, accompliſh theſe things which ſubſiſt as media, for the ſake of things good, or things good for the ſake of theſe media?

POL. Doubtleſs, the media for the ſake of things good.

SOC. Purſuing good, therefore, we both walk when we walk, thinking it is better ſo to do; and, on the contrary, we ſtand when we ſtand, for the ſake of the ſame good. Or is it not ſo?

POL. It is.

SOC. Do we not, therefore, when we ſlay, or baniſh or deprive any one of his poſſeſſions, think that it is better for us to do theſe things than not to do them?

POL.

POL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Thoſe, therefore, that do all theſe things do them for the ſake of good.

POL. I ſay ſo.

SOC. Do we not, therefore, grant, that we do not wiſh thoſe things which we do for the ſake of ſomething, but that for the ſake of which we do theſe things?

POL. We eſpecially admit this.

SOC. We do not, therefore, ſimply wiſh to ſlay, exterminate, or deprive any one of his poſſeſſions; but if theſe things are uſeful we wiſh to do them, but by no means if they are noxious. For we deſire good things, as you ſay, but not ſuch as are neither good nor evil, nor yet ſuch as are evil. Do I, therefore, Polus, appear to you to ſpeak the truth, or not? Why do you not anſwer?

POL. You ſpeak the truth.

SOC. Does it not follow, therefore, if we aſſent to theſe things, that if any one ſlays, exterminates from a city, or takes away the poſſeſſions of another, whether he is a tyrant or a rhetorician, thinking that it is better for him ſo to do, though it is worſe,—does it not follow, that in ſo doing he acts in a manner which to him ſeems fit?

POL. Yes.

SOC. Does he, therefore, do the things which he wiſhes to do, if theſe things are evil? Why do you not anſwer?

POL. But he does not appear to me to do the things which he wiſhes.

SOC. Will, therefore, a man of this kind be able to accompliſh great things in a city, if to be able to accompliſh great things is ſomething good, according to your confeſſion?

POL. He will not.

SOC. I therefore ſaid true, when I ſaid that a man might do that in a city which ſeemed fit to him, and yet not be able to accompliſh great things, nor do that which he wiſhed to do.

POL. As if, Socrates, you would not admit, that it is poſſible for you to do what you pleaſe in a city, rather than that it is not poſſible, and that you would not be envious when you ſaw any one ſlaying or taking away the poſſeſſions of another, or confining in bonds whomever he pleaſed.

Soc. Do you ſpeak juſtly or unjuſtly?

Pol. Whichever of theſe he may do, is he not in each of theſe actions to be envied?

Soc. Good words, I beſeech you, Polus.

Pol. But why?

Soc. Becauſe it is not proper, either to envy thoſe that are not to be envied, or the unhappy; but they ought to be pitied.

Pol. But what? Does this appear to you to be the caſe reſpecting the men of whom I ſpeak?

Soc. Undoubtedly.

Pol. Does he, therefore, who juſtly ſlays any one whom he thinks fit, appear to you to be miſerable, and an object of pity?

Soc. He does not to me, indeed; nor does he appear to me to be an object of envy.

Pol. Did you not juſt now ſay that he was miſerable?

Soc. I ſaid, my friend, that he was miſerable who ſlew another unjuſtly, and that, beſides this, he was to be pitied; but that he who ſlew another juſtly was not to be envied.

Pol. He indeed who dies unjuſtly is an object of pity, and is miſerable.

Soc. But leſs ſo, Polus, than he who ſlays another; and leſs than he who dies juſtly.

Pol. How ſo, Socrates?

Soc. Thus: becauſe to do an injury is the greateſt of evils.

Pol. But is this really the greateſt of evils? Is it not a greater evil to ſuffer an injury?

Soc. By no means.

Pol. Would you, therefore, rather be injured than do an injury?

Soc. I ſhould rather indeed have no concern with either of theſe. But if it were neceſſary that I ſhould either do an injury, or be injured, I ſhould chooſe the latter in preference to the former.

Pol. Would you not, therefore, receive the power of a tyrant?

Soc. I would not, if you ſay that to tyrannize is what I ſay it is.

Pol. But I ſay it is that which I juſt now mentioned, viz. for a man to

do in a city whatever he pleaſes; to ſlay or baniſh any one, and do every thing according to his own opinion.

Soc. O bleſſed man, attend to what I ſay. If in a crowded forum, taking a dagger under my arm, I ſhould ſay to you, O Polus, a certain wonderful power and tyranny has juſt now fallen to my lot: for, if it appears to me that any one of theſe men whom you ſee ought immediately to die, he dies; and if it appears to me that any one of them ought to loſe his head, he is immediately beheaded; or if his garment ſhould be torn aſunder, it is immediately torn. Such mighty power do I poſſeſs in this city. If, therefore, in conſequence of your not believing me, I ſhould ſhow you the dagger, perhaps on ſeeing it you would ſay: After this manner, Socrates, all men are capable of effecting great things, ſince thus armed you may burn any houſe that you pleaſe, all the docks and three-banked galleys of the Athenians, together with all their ſhips as well public as private. But this is not to poſſeſs the ability of effecting great things,—I mean, for a man to do whatever he pleaſes. Or does it appear to you that it is?

Pol. It does not after this manner.

Soc. Can you, therefore, tell me why you blame a power of this kind?

Pol. I can.

Soc. Tell me then.

Pol. Becauſe it is neceſſary that he who acts in this manner ſhould be puniſhed.

Soc. But is not the being puniſhed an evil?

Pol. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Will it not, therefore, O wonderful man, again appear to you, on the contrary, that to be able to accompliſh great things is good, if acting in a uſeful manner follows him who does what he pleaſes? And this, as it appears, is to be able to effect great things: but the contrary to this is evil, and the ability of accompliſhing ſmall things. But let us alſo conſider this. Have we not acknowledged that it is ſometimes better to do the things which we juſt now ſpoke of, viz. to ſlay, exterminate, and deprive men of their poſſeſſions, and ſometimes not?

Pol. Entirely ſo.

Soc. This then, as it appears, is acknowledged both by you and me.

Pol. It is.

Soc.

Soc. When, then, do you ſay it is better to do theſe things? Inform me what boundary you eſtabliſh.

Pol. Anſwer yourſelf, Socrates, to this queſtion.

Soc. I ſay therefore, Polus, if it is more agreeable to you to hear it from me, that it is better when any one does theſe things juſtly, but worſe when he does them unjuſtly.

Pol. It is difficult to confute you, Socrates; but may not even a boy convince you that you do not ſpeak the truth?

Soc. I ſhall give the boy, therefore, great thanks, and I ſhall be equally thankful to you if you can confute me, and liberate me from my nugacity. But be not weary in benefiting a man who is your friend, but confute me.

Pol. But, Socrates, there is no occaſion to confute you by antient examples. For thoſe things which happened lately, and even but yeſterday, are ſufficient to convince you, and to ſhow that many unjuſt men are happy.

Soc. Who are theſe?

Pol. Do you not ſee Archelaus here, the ſon of Perdiccas, governing Macedonia?

Soc. If I do not, at leaſt I hear ſo.

Pol. Does he, therefore, appear to you to be happy or miſerable?

Soc. I do not know, Polus: for I have not yet aſſociated with the man.

Pol. What then? if you aſſociated with him, would you know this? And would you not otherwiſe immediately know that he is happy?

Soc. I ſhould not, by Jupiter.

Pol. It is evident then, Socrates, you would ſay, that neither do you know that the great king[1] is happy.

Soc. And I ſhould ſay the truth. For I do not know how he is affected with reſpect to diſcipline and juſtice.

Pol. But what? Is all felicity placed in this?

Soc. As I ſay, it is, Polus. For I ſay that a worthy and good man and woman are happy; but ſuch as are unjuſt and baſe, miſerable.

Pol. This Archelaus, therefore, according to your doctrine, is miſerable.

Soc. If, my friend, he is unjuſt.

Pol. But how is it poſſible he ſhould not be unjuſt, to whom nothing of

[1] i. e. The king of Perſia.

the

the government which he now poſſeſſes belongs? as he was born of a woman who was the ſlave of Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas; who according to juſtice was himſelf the ſlave of Alcetas; and, if he had been willing to act juſtly, would have ſerved Alcetas in the capacity of a ſlave; and thus, according to your doctrine, would have been happy. But now he is become miſerable in a wonderful degree, ſince he has committed the greateſt injuries. For, in the firſt place, ſending for his maſter and uncle, as if he would reſtore the government which Perdiccas had taken from him, and entertaining and intoxicating both him, and his ſon Alexander, who was his uncle, and nearly his equal in age, he afterwards hurled them into a cart, and, cauſing them to be taken away by night, deſtroyed both of them by cutting their throats. And though he has committed theſe injuries, he is ignorant that he is become moſt miſerable, and does not repent of his conduct. But, a little after, he was unwilling to nurture and reſtore the government to his brother, the legitimate ſon of Perdiccas, a boy of about ſeven years of age, and who had a juſt right to the government, though by ſo doing he would have been happy: but hurling the youth into a well, and there ſuffocating him, he told his mother Cleopatra that he fell into the well and died, through purſuing a gooſe. This man, therefore, as having acted the moſt unjuſtly of all in Macedonia, is the moſt miſerable, and not the moſt bleſſed, of all the Macedonians. And, perhaps, every one of the Athenians, beginning from you, would rather be any other of the Macedonians than Archelaus.

Soc. In the beginning of our conference, Polus, I praiſed you, becauſe you appeared to me to be well inſtructed in rhetoric, but to have neglected the art of diſcourſe. And now, without relating any thing further, this is a diſcourſe by which even a boy might convince me. And, as you think, I am now convicted, by this narration, of having ſaid that he who acts unjuſtly is not happy. But whence, good man? For, indeed, I did not grant you any of the particulars which you mention.

Pol. You are not willing to grant them. For the thing appears to you as I ſay.

Soc. O bleſſed man! For you endeavour to confute me in a rhetorical manner, like thoſe who in courts of juſtice are thought to confute. For there ſome appear to confute others, when they procure many reſpectable witneſſes of what they ſay; but he who oppoſes them procures one certain witneſs,

witneſs, or none at all. But this mode of confutation is of no worth with reſpect to truth. For ſometimes falſe witneſs may be given againſt a man, by many men of great reputation. And now, reſpecting what you ſay, nearly all Athenians and ſtrangers accord with you in theſe things. And if you were willing to procure witneſſes againſt me to prove that I do not ſpeak the truth, Nicias, the ſon of Nicératus, and his brothers with him, would teſtify for you, by whom there are tripods placed in an orderly ſucceſſion in the temple of Bacchus. Or, if you wiſh it, Ariſtocrates the ſon of Scellius, of whom there is that beautiful offering in the Pythian temple. Or again, if you wiſh it, the whole family of Pericles, or any other family, that you may think proper to chooſe out of this city, will teſtify for you. But I, who am but one, do not aſſent to you. For you do not force me, but, procuring many falſe witneſſes againſt me, you endeavour to eject me from my poſſeſſions and the truth. But I, unleſs I can procure you being one, to teſtify the truth of what I ſay, ſhall think that I have not accompliſhed any thing worthy to be mentioned reſpecting the things which are the ſubject of our diſcourſe. Nor ſhall I think that you have accompliſhed any thing, unleſs I being one, alone teſtify for you, and all thoſe others are diſmiſſed by you. This, therefore, is a certain mode of confutation, as you and many others think: but there is alſo another mode, which I on the contrary adopt. Comparing, therefore, theſe with each other, we will conſider whether they differ in any reſpect from each other. For the ſubjects of our controverſy are not altogether trifling; but they are nearly ſomething the knowledge of which is moſt beautiful, but not to know it moſt baſe. For the ſummit of theſe things is to know, or to be ignorant, who is happy, and who is not. As, for inſtance, in the firſt place, reſpecting that which is the ſubject of our preſent diſcourſe, you think that a man can be bleſſed who acts unjuſtly and is unjuſt; ſince you are of opinion that Archelaus is, indeed, unjuſt, but happy. For, unleſs you ſay to the contrary, we muſt conſider you as thinking in this manner.

Pol. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But I ſay that this is impoſſible. And this one thing is the ſubject of our controverſy. Be it ſo then. But will he who acts unjuſtly be happy if he is juſtly puniſhed?

Pol. In the ſmalleſt degree; ſince he would thus be moſt miſerable.

Soc.

Soc. If, therefore, he who acts unjuſtly happens not to be puniſhed, according to your opinion he is happy.

Pol. So I ſay.

Soc. But, according to my opinion, Polus, he who acts unjuſtly, and is unjuſt, is miſerable. And, indeed, he is more miſerable if, when acting unjuſtly, he is not juſtly puniſhed; but he is leſs miſerable if he is puniſhed, and juſtice is inflicted on him both by Gods and men.

Pol. You endeavour, Socrates, to aſſert wonderful things.

Soc. And I ſhall alſo endeavour, my aſſociate, to make you ſay the ſame things as I do: for I conſider you as a friend. Now, therefore, the things about which we differ are theſe. But do you alſo conſider. I have already ſaid in ſome former part of our diſcourſe, that to do an injury is worſe than to be injured.

Pol. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But you ſay that it is worſe to be injured.

Pol. I do.

Soc. And I ſay that thoſe who do an injury are miſerable; and I am confuted by you.

Pol. You are ſo, by Jupiter.

Soc. As you think, Polus.

Pol. And perhaps I think the truth.

Soc. But, on the contrary, you think that thoſe who act unjuſtly are happy, if they eſcape puniſhment.

Pol. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But I ſay that they are moſt miſerable: and that thoſe who ſuffer puniſhment for acting unjuſtly are leſs miſerable. Are you willing to confute this alſo?

Pol. But it is more difficult to confute this than that, Socrates.

Soc. By no means, Polus: but it is impoſſible that this ſhould be the caſe. For that which is true can never be confuted.

Pol. How do you ſay? If a man acting unjuſtly is detected in attempting to acquire abſolute power by ſtratagem, and in conſequence of being detected is put on the rack, is caſtrated, and has his eyes burnt; and after he has ſuffered many other mighty and all-various torments, ſees his wife and children ſuffering the ſame, and at laſt is either crucified, or incruſted

with pitch; will he be more happy, than if, having eſcaped puniſhment, he obtains deſpotic power, and paſſes through life ruling in the city, doing whatever he pleaſes, and envied, and accounted happy, both by his citizens and ſtrangers? Do you ſay that theſe things cannot be confuted?

Soc. You terrify, and do not confute us, generous Polus: but juſt now you teſtified for us. At the ſame time remind me of a ſmall particular, whether you ſay that ſuch a one endeavours to gain abſolute power unjuſtly?

Pol. I do.

Soc. By no means, therefore, will either of theſe be more happy, neither he who has unjuſtly obtained the tyranny, nor he who is puniſhed. For, of two that are miſerable, one cannot be more happy than the other; but he is the more miſerable of the two who eſcapes puniſhment, and obtains the tyranny. Why do you laugh at this, Polus? Is this another ſpecies of confutation, to laugh when any one aſſerts ſomething, and not confute him?

Pol. Do you not think you are confuted, Socrates, when you ſay ſuch things as no man would ſay? For only aſk any man if he would.

Soc. O Polus, I am not among the number of politicians. And laſt year, when I happened to be elected to the office of a ſenator, in conſequence of my tribe poſſeſſing the chief authority, and it was requiſite I ſhould give ſentence, I excited laughter, through not knowing how to give ſentence. Do not, therefore, now order me to paſs ſentence on thoſe who are preſent. But if you have no better modes of confutation than theſe (as I juſt now ſaid), aſſign to me a part of the diſcourſe, and make trial of that mode of confutation which I think ought to be adopted. For I know how to procure one witneſs of what I ſay, viz. him with whom I diſcourſe; but I bid farewell to the multitude. And I know how to decide with one perſon, but I do not diſcourſe with the multitude. See, therefore, whether you are willing to give me my part in the argument, by anſwering to the interrogations. For I think that you and I, and other men, are of opinion, that to do an injury is worſe than to be injured; and not to ſuffer, than to ſuffer puniſhment.

Pol. But I, on the contrary, think that neither myſelf nor any other man is of this opinion. For would you rather be injured than do an injury?

Soc. Yes; and ſo would you, and all other men.

Pol. Very far from it: for neither I, nor you, nor any other, would ſay ſo.

Soc.

Soc. Will you not, therefore, anſwer?

Pol. By all means. For I am anxious to know what you will ſay.

Soc. Tell me then, that you may know, as if I aſked you from the beginning: Whether does it appear to you, Polus, worſe to do an injury, or to be injured?

Pol. It appears to me it is worſe to be injured.

Soc. But which is the more baſe? To do, or to ſuffer, an injury? Anſwer me.

Pol. To do an injury.

Soc. Is it not, therefore, worſe, ſince it is more baſe?

Pol. By no means.

Soc. I underſtand. You do not think, as it ſeems, that the beautiful and the good are the ſame, and likewiſe the evil and the baſe.

Pol. I do not.

Soc. But what will you ſay to this? Do you not call all beautiful things, ſuch as bodies, colours, figures, ſounds, and purſuits, beautiful, without looking to any thing elſe? As, for inſtance, in the firſt place, with reſpect to beautiful bodies, do you not ſay that they are beautiful, either according to their uſefulneſs to that particular thing to which each is uſeful, or according to ac ertain pleaſure, if the view of them gratifies the beholders? Have you any thing elſe beſides this to ſay, reſpecting the beauty of body?

Pol. I have not.

Soc. Do you not, therefore, denominate other things beautiful after this manner, ſuch as figures and colours, either through a certain pleaſure, or utility, or through both?

Pol. I do.

Soc. And do you not in a ſimilar manner denominate ſounds, and every thing pertaining to muſic?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And further ſtill, things which pertain to laws and purſuits are certainly not beautiful, unleſs they are either advantageous or pleaſant, or both.

Pol. It does not appear to me that they are.

Soc. And does not the beauty of diſciplines ſubſiſt in a ſimilar manner?

Pol. Entirely ſo. And now, Socrates, you define beautifully, ſince you define the beautiful by pleaſure and good.

Soc. Muſt not, therefore, the baſe be defined by the contrary, viz. by pain and evil?

Pol. Neceſſarily ſo.

Soc. When, therefore, of two beautiful things, one is more beautiful than the other, or when ſome other thing tranſcends in beauty either one or both of theſe, it muſt be more beautiful either through pleaſure, or advantage, or both.

Pol. Entirely ſo.

Soc. And when, of two things, one is more baſe, it muſt be more baſe through tranſcending either in pain or evil. Or is not this neceſſary?

Pol. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But, in the firſt place, let us conſider whether to do an injury ſurpaſſes in pain the being injured; and whether thoſe ſuffer greater pain that injure, than thoſe that are injured.

Pol. This is by no means the caſe, Socrates.

Soc. The former, therefore, does not tranſcend the latter in pain.

Pol. Certainly not.

Soc. Will it not therefore follow, that, if it does not tranſcend in pain, it will no longer tranſcend in both?

Pol. It does not appear that this will be the caſe.

Soc. Muſt it not, therefore, tranſcend in the other?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. In evil?

Pol. So it appears.

Soc. Will it not therefore follow, that to do an injury, ſince it tranſcends in evil, is worſe than to be injured?

Pol. Evidently ſo.

Soc. If, therefore, ſomething elſe were not admitted by the multitude of mankind, and by you formerly, it would follow that to do an injury is worſe than to be injured.

Pol. It would.

Soc. Now, however, it appears to be worſe.

Pol. So it ſeems.

Soc. Would you, therefore, admit that which is worſe and more baſe, rather than that which is leſs ſo? Do not heſitate to anſwer, Polus (for you will

will not be injured by ſo doing), but anſwer generouſly, committing yourſelf to diſcourſe as to a phyſician; and either admit or reject what I aſk.

Pol. But I ſhould not, Socrates, prefer that which is worſe and more baſe to that which is leſs ſo.

Soc. But would any other man?

Pol. It does not appear to me that he would, according to this reaſoning.

Soc. I therefore ſpoke the truth when I aſſerted, that neither I, nor you, nor any other man, would rather do an injury than be injured; for it would be worſe to do ſo.

Pol. So it appears.

Soc. Do you not therefore ſee, Polus, that, when argument is compared with argument, they do not in any reſpect accord? But all others aſſent to you, except myſelf. However, you, who are only one, are ſufficient for my purpoſe, both in aſſenting and teſtifying; and I, while I aſk your opinion alone, bid farewell to others. And thus is this affair circumſtanced with reſpect to us. But, after this, let us conſider that which was the occaſion of doubt to us in the ſecond place, viz. whether it is the greateſt of evils for him to be puniſhed who acts unjuſtly, as you think, or whether it is not a greater evil not to be puniſhed in this caſe, as I, on the contrary, think. But let us conſider this affair in the following manner: Do you call it the ſame thing for him to ſuffer puniſhment who has acted unjuſtly, and to be juſtly puniſhed?

Pol. I do.

Soc. Can you therefore deny that all juſt things are beautiful, ſo far as they are juſt? Conſider the affair, and anſwer me.

Pol. It appears to me that they are, Socrates.

Soc. Conſider alſo this: When a man performs any thing, muſt there not neceſſarily be ſomething which is paſſive to him as an agent?

Pol. It appears ſo to me.

Soc. Does it, therefore, ſuffer that which the agent performs, and of the ſame kind as that which he performs? But my meaning is this: If any one ſtrikes, is it not neceſſary that ſomething ſhould be ſtruck?

Pol. It is neceſſary.

Soc. And if he who ſtrikes, ſtrikes vehemently and ſwiftly, muſt not that which is ſtruck be in the ſame manner ſtruck?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. A paſſion, therefore, of ſuch a kind is in that which is ſtruck, as the ſtriker produces.

Pol. Entirely ſo.

Soc. If, therefore, any one burns, is it not neceſſary that ſomething ſhould be burned?

Pol. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And if he burns vehemently, or ſo as to cauſe pain, muſt not that which is burned be burned in ſuch a manner as he who burns burns?

Pol. Entirely ſo.

Soc. And will not the ſame reaſoning take place if any one cuts? For ſomething will be cut.

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And if the cut is great or deep, or attended with pain, that which is cut will be cut with ſuch a cleft as the cutter cuts.

Pol. It appears ſo.

Soc. In ſhort, ſee if you grant what I juſt now ſaid reſpecting all things, viz. that ſuch as the agent produces, ſuch does the patient ſuffer.

Pol. I do grant it.

Soc. Theſe things, therefore, being admitted, whether is the being puniſhed, to ſuffer, or to do ſomething?

Pol. Neceſſarily, Socrates, it is to ſuffer ſomething.

Soc. Muſt it not, therefore, be by ſome agent?

Pol. Undoubtedly. And by him who puniſhes.

Soc. But does not he who rightly puniſhes, puniſh juſtly?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Does he act juſtly, or not, by ſo doing?

Pol. Juſtly.

Soc. Muſt not, therefore, he who is puniſhed, in conſequence of being puniſhed, ſuffer juſtly?

Pol. It appears ſo.

Soc. But is it not acknowledged that juſt things are beautiful?

Pol. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Of theſe, therefore, the one does, and the other (who is puniſhed) ſuffers, that which is beautiful.

Pol. Yes.

Soc.

Soc. But if things are beautiful, are they not alſo good? For they are either pleaſant or uſeful.

Pol. It is neceſſary they ſhould.

Soc. He therefore who is puniſhed ſuffers that which is good.

Pol. It appears ſo.

Soc. He is benefited, therefore.

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Does it not, therefore, follow (as I underſtand advantage), that the ſoul becomes better if it is puniſhed juſtly?

Pol. It is probable.

Soc. The ſoul, therefore, of him who is puniſhed is liberated from vice.

Pol. It is.

Soc. And hence it is liberated from the greateſt evil. But conſider thus: In the acquiſition of wealth, do you perceive any other human evil than poverty?

Pol. No other.

Soc. But what, in the conſtitution of the body? do you call imbecility, diſeaſe, deformity, and things of this kind, evils, or not?

Pol. I do.

Soc. Do you think, therefore, that in the ſoul alſo there is a certain depravity?

Pol. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Do you not then call this injuſtice, ignorance, timidity, and the like?

Pol. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Since, therefore, riches, body, and ſoul, are three things, will you not ſay that there are three depravities, want, diſeaſe, injuſtice?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Which, therefore, of theſe depravities is the moſt baſe? Is it not injuſtice, and, in ſhort, the depravity of the ſoul?

Pol. Very much ſo.

Soc. But, if it is moſt baſe, is it not alſo the worſt?

Pol. How do you ſay, Socrates?

Soc. Thus. That which is moſt baſe is always ſo either by procuring the

the greateſt pain, or injury, or both, from what has been previouſly acknowledged by us.

POL. Eſpecially ſo.

SOC. But is it not at preſent acknowledged by us, that injuſtice, and the whole depravity of the ſoul, are moſt baſe?

POL. It is.

SOC. Are not theſe, therefore, either moſt troubleſome, and moſt baſe, through tranſcending in moleſtation, or from the injury which attends them, or from both?

POL. It is neceſſary.

SOC. Is therefore to be unjuſt, intemperate, timid, and unlearned, the cauſe of greater pain than to be poor and diſeaſed?

POL. It does not appear to me, Socrates, to be ſo, from what has been ſaid.

SOC. Another depravity of the ſoul, therefore, tranſcending in a certain mighty detriment, and wonderful evil, is the moſt baſe of all things; ſince, according to your aſſertion, it is not ſo, from tranſcending in pain.

POL. So it appears.

SOC. But, indeed, that which tranſcends in the greateſt of all detriments muſt be the greateſt evil of all things.

POL. It muſt.

SOC. Injuſtice, therefore, intemperance, and the other depravity of the ſoul, are each of them the greateſt evil of all things.

POL. So it appears.

SOC. What is the art, therefore, which liberates from poverty? Is it not that which procures money?

POL. Yes.

SOC. But what is that art which liberates from diſeaſe? Is it not the medicinal?

POL. Neceſſarily ſo.

SOC. And what is that which liberates from depravity and injuſtice? If you cannot anſwer this queſtion with the like facility, conſider thus: Whither, and to whom, do we conduct thoſe that are diſeaſed in body?

POL. To phyſicians, Socrates.

SOC.

Soc. But whither do we conduct thoſe who act unjuſtly, and live intemperately?

Pol. You ſay, to the judges.

Soc. And is it not, therefore, that they may be puniſhed?

Pol. I ſay ſo.

Soc. Do not then thoſe that puniſh rightly puniſh by employing a certain juſtice?

Pol. It is evident they do.

Soc. The art, therefore, which procures money liberates from poverty; the medicinal art, from diſeaſe; and puniſhment, from intemperance and injuſtice.

Pol. So it appears.

Soc. Which, therefore, of theſe do you conſider as the moſt beautiful?

Pol. Of what things are you ſpeaking?

Soc. Of the art of procuring money, the medicinal art, and puniſhment.

Pol. Puniſhment, Socrates, excells by far.

Soc. Does it not, therefore, again produce either abundant pleaſure, or advantage, or both, ſince it is the moſt beautiful?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Is it, therefore, pleaſant to be cured by a phyſician? and do thoſe who are cured rejoice?

Pol. It does not appear to me that they do.

Soc. But it is beneficial to be cured. Is it not?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. For it liberates from a great evil: ſo that it is advantageous to endure pain, and be well.

Pol. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Will the man, therefore, who is cured by a phyſician be thus moſt happy with reſpect to his body, or ought this to be ſaid of him who has never been diſeaſed?

Pol. Evidently of him who has never been diſeaſed.

Soc. For, as it ſeems, a liberation from diſeaſe would not be felicity; but, on the contrary, this is to be aſſerted of the non-poſſeſſion of it from the firſt.

Pol. It is ſo.

Soc. But what? Which of two men is the more miſerable, he who is diſeaſed in body, or he who is diſeaſed in ſoul? He who is cured by a phyſician, and liberated from diſeaſe, or he who is not cured, and is diſeaſed?

Pol. He who is not cured, as it appears to me.

Soc. Will it not, therefore, follow, that to ſuffer puniſhment will be a liberation from the greateſt of evils, depravity?

Pol. It will.

Soc. For puniſhment produces a ſound mind, makes men more juſt, and becomes the medicine of depravity.

Pol. It does.

Soc. He, therefore, is moſt happy who poſſeſſes no vice in his ſoul, ſince this appears to be the greateſt of evils.

Pol. It is evident.

Soc. But he doubtleſs ranks in the ſecond degree of felicity, who is liberated from vice.

Pol. It is likely.

Soc. But this is the man who is admoniſhed, reproved, and who ſuffers puniſhment.

Pol. He is.

Soc. He, therefore, lives in the worſt manner who poſſeſſes injuſtice, and is not liberated from it.

Pol. It appears ſo.

Soc. Is not, therefore, ſuch a one, a man who, having committed the greateſt injuries, and employing the greateſt injuſtice, cauſes it to come to paſs, that he is neither admoniſhed, nor reſtrained in his conduct, nor puniſhed; juſt as you ſaid was the caſe with Archelaus, and other tyrants, rhetoricians, and powerful noblemen?

Pol. It ſeems ſo.

Soc. For the conduct of theſe, O beſt of men, is nearly juſt as if ſome one afflicted with the greateſt diſeaſes ſhould prevent the phyſicians from inflicting on him the puniſhment of his bodily maladies, fearing as if he were a child to be burned and cut, becauſe theſe operations are attended with pain. Or does it not appear ſo to you?

Pol. It does.

Soc. And this through being ignorant, as it ſeems, of the nature of health, and

and the virtue of the body. For, from what has been now acknowledged by us, thoſe who eſcape puniſhment, Polus, appear to do ſomething of this kind; viz. they look to the pain attending puniſhment, but are blind to its utility; and are ignorant how much more miſerable it is to dwell with a ſoul not healthy, but corrupt, unjuſt and impious, than to have the body diſeaſed. Hence they do every thing that they may eſcape puniſhment, but are not liberated from the greateſt evil; and procure for themſelves riches and friends, and the ability of ſpeaking in the moſt perſuaſive manner. But if we have aſſented to the truth, Polus, do you perceive what conſequences follow from our diſcourſe? Or are you willing that we ſhould collect them?

POL. I am, if agreeable to you.

SOC. Does it, therefore, happen that injuſtice and to act unjuſtly are the greateſt evil?

POL. It appears ſo.

SOC. And it likewiſe appears that to ſuffer puniſhment is a liberation from this evil.

POL. It does appear.

SOC. But not to ſuffer puniſhment is a continuance of the evil.

POL. Yes.

SOC. To act unjuſtly, therefore, ranks in the ſecond degree of evils, as to magnitude; but, when acting unjuſtly, not to ſuffer puniſhment is naturally the greateſt and the firſt of all evils.

POL. It is likely.

SOC. Are we not, therefore, my friend, dubious about this thing? you conſidering Archelaus as happy, who commits the greateſt injuſtice, and ſuffers no puniſhment; but I on the contrary thinking, that whether it is Archelaus, or any other man whatever, who when acting unjuſtly is not puniſhed, it is proper that ſuch a one ſhould ſurpaſs in miſery other men; and that always he who does an injury ſhould be more wretched than he who is injured, and he who eſcapes than he who ſuffers puniſhment. Are not theſe the things which were ſaid by me?

POL. Yes.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, ſhown that theſe aſſertions are true?

POL. It appears ſo.

SOC. Be it ſo. If theſe things then are true, Polus, what is the great

utility of rhetoric? For, from what has been now aſſented to by us, every one ought eſpecially to guard himſelf from acting unjuſtly, as that through which he will poſſeſs a ſufficiency of evil. Is it not ſo?

Pol. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But if any man acts unjuſtly himſelf, or ſome one committed to his care, he ought willingly to betake himſelf thither, where with the utmoſt celerity he may be puniſhed by a judge, juſt as if he was haſtening to a phyſician; leſt, the diſeaſe of injuſtice becoming inveterate, it ſhould render the ſoul inſincere and incurable. Or how muſt we ſay, Polus, if the things before acknowledged by us remain? Is it not neceſſary that theſe things ſhould after this manner accord with thoſe, but not in any other way?

Pol. For what elſe can we ſay, Socrates?

Soc. For the purpoſe, therefore, of apologizing, either for our own injuſtice, or that of our parents, or aſſociates, or children, or country, rhetoric affords us, Polus, no utility. Unleſs, on the contrary, any one apprehends that he ought eſpecially to accuſe himſelf, and afterwards his domeſtic aſſociates, and any other of his friends, whom he may find acting unjuſtly; and that conduct of this kind ought not to be concealed, but ſhould be led forth into light, that he by whom it is committed may be puniſhed, and reſtored to health. Likewiſe, that he ſhould compel both himſelf and others to lay aſide fear, and with his eyes ſhut, and in a virile manner, deliver himſelf up, as to a phyſician, to be cut and burnt, purſuing the good and the beautiful, without paying any regard to pain: delivering himſelf to be beaten, if he has acted in ſuch a manner as to deſerve this chaſtiſement; and in like manner to bonds, to fines, to exile, and even to death; being the firſt accuſer of himſelf, and all his familiars, without ſparing either himſelf or them, but employing rhetoric for this very purpoſe; that, the crimes becoming manifeſt, they may be liberated from the greateſt of evils, injuſtice. Shall we ſpeak in this manner, Polus, or not?

Pol. Theſe things appear to me, Socrates, to be abſurd; but, from what has been before ſaid, they will, perhaps, be aſſented to by you.

Soc. Muſt not, therefore, either thoſe objections be ſolved, or theſe things neceſſarily follow?

Pol. This, indeed, muſt be the caſe.

Soc. But again, let us transfer the affair to the contrary ſide, if it is requiſite that

that any one ſhould act baſely, whether he is an enemy, or ſome other perſon, only admitting that he is not injured by an enemy; for this is to be guarded againſt. If, then, an enemy injures another, we ſhould endeavour by all poſſible means, both by actions and words, that he may not be puniſhed, nor brought before a judge: but, if he is brought before him, we ſhould deviſe ſome method by which he may eſcape, and not ſuffer puniſhment. And if this enemy has by force taken away a great quantity of gold, he ſhould not reſtore it, but, poſſeſſing, ſpend it on himſelf and his aſſociates in an unjuſt and impious manner. Likewiſe, if he acts in ſuch a manner as to deſerve death, we ſhould be careful that he does not die at any time, but, that being a depraved character, he may be immortal; but, as this is not poſſible, that he may live being ſuch for an extended period of time. Rhetoric, Polus, appears to me to be uſeful for purpoſes of this kind; ſince to him who has no intention to act unjuſtly, its utility, if it has any, is not, in my opinion, great: for it certainly has not at all appeared in the former part of our diſcourſe.

CAL. Inform me, Chærepho, does Socrates aſſert theſe things ſeriouſly, or in jeſt?

CHÆR. He appears to me, Callicles, to jeſt in a tranſcendent degree: but there is nothing like aſking him.

CAL. There is not, by the Gods! and I deſire to do it. Tell me, Socrates, whether we muſt ſay that you are now in earneſt, or in jeſt? For, if you are in earneſt, and theſe things which you ſay are true, is not our human life ſubverted, and are not all our actions, as it ſeems, contrary to what they ought to be?

SOC. If there were not a certain paſſion which, remaining the ſame, is different in different men, but ſome one of us ſhould ſuffer a certain paſſion different from others, it would not be eaſy for ſuch a one to exhibit his own paſſion to another. I ſpeak in this manner from conſidering, that I and you now happen to ſuffer the ſame thing; for, being two, we each of us love two things: I, indeed, Alcibiades the ſon of Clinias, and Philoſophy; and you likewiſe two, the Athenian people, and Demus the ſon of Pyrilampes. I continually, therefore, perceive you, though you are ſkilful, unable to contradict the objects of your love, however they may oppoſe you, and in whatever manner they may aſſert a thing to take place; but you are changed by them upwards and downwards. For, in the convention, if, when you ſay any

thing, the Athenian people ſays it is not ſo,—changing your own opinion, you ſpeak conformably to theirs: and you are affected in the ſame manner towards the beautiful ſon of Pyrilampes; for you cannot oppoſe the wiſhes and diſcourſes of the objects of your love. So that, if any one, in conſequence of what you ſay being the effect of compulſion through theſe, ſhould wonder at its abſurdity, perhaps you would ſay to him, if you wiſhed to ſpeak the truth, that unleſs ſome one cauſes the objects of your love to deſiſt from ſuch aſſertions, neither can you deſiſt from them. Think, therefore, that it is proper to hear other things of this kind from me; and do not wonder that I ſpeak in this manner; but cauſe Philoſophy, the object of my love, to deſiſt from ſuch aſſertions. For ſhe ſays, my friend, what you now hear from me; and ſhe is much leſs inſane than the other object of my love. For Clinicus, here, ſays different things at different times; but the aſſertions of Philoſophy are always the ſame. But ſhe ſays things which will now cauſe you to wonder: you have, however, been preſent at her diſcourſes. Either, therefore, confute her for what I juſt now ſaid, and evince, that to act unjuſtly, and when acting unjuſtly not to ſuffer puniſhment, is not the extremity of all evils: or, if you ſuffer this to remain unconfuted, then, by the dog, one of the deities of the Egyptians, Callicles will not accord with you, O Callicles, but will diſſent from you through the whole of life: though I think, O beſt of men, that it is better for my lyre to be unharmonized and diſſonant, and the choir of which I might be the leader (for many men do not aſſent to but oppoſe what I ſay), than that I, being one, ſhould be diſſonant with and contradict myſelf.

Cal. You appear, Socrates, to employ a juvenile audacity in your diſcourſes, as being in reality a popular orator: and now you aſſert theſe things in a popular manner, ſuffering that ſame paſſion of Polus, which he accuſed Gorgias of ſuffering from you. For he ſaid that Gorgias, when aſked by you, whether if any one ignorant of things juſt, and willing to learn rhetoric, ſhould come to him, he would teach him, was aſhamed, and ſaid that he would teach him; and this becauſe men are accuſtomed to be indignant if any one denies a thing of this kind. Through this conceſſion, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himſelf. But you were delighted with this very circumſtance; for which he then very properly, as it appeared to me, derided you. And now he again ſuffers the very ſame thing. But I,

indeed, do not praiſe Polus for granting you, that to do an injury is more baſe than to be injured. For, from this conceſſion, he being impeded by you in his diſcourſe, had not any thing further to ſay, being aſhamed to mention what he thought. For you in reality, Socrates, lead to theſe troubleſome and popular aſſertions, while you profeſs to be in ſearch of truth; aſſertions which are not naturally, but only legally beautiful. For theſe for the moſt part are contrary to each other, viz. nature and law. If any one, therefore, is aſhamed, and dares not ſay what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himſelf. But you, perceiving this ſubtle artifice, act fraudulently in diſcourſes. For, if any one aſſerts that things which are according to nature are according to law, you privately aſk him, if things which belong to nature belong to law; as in the preſent diſputation reſpecting doing an injury and being injured, when Polus ſpoke of that which is more baſe according to nature, you purſued that which is more baſe according to law. For, by nature, every thing is more baſe which is worſe, as to be injured; but, by law, it is worſe to do an injury. For to be injured is not the paſſion of a man, but of ſome ſlave, to whom to die is better than to live; and who, being injured and diſgraced, is incapable of defending either himſelf or any other perſon committed to his care. But I think that thoſe who eſtabliſh laws are imbecil men, and the multitude. Hence they eſtabliſh laws with a view to themſelves and their own advantage, and make ſome things laudable, and others blamable, with the ſame intention. They likewiſe terrify ſuch men as are more robuſt, and who are able to poſſeſs more than others, by aſſerting that to ſurpaſs others in poſſeſſions is baſe and unjuſt; and that to endeavour to poſſeſs more than others is to act unjuſtly. For, in my opinion, theſe men are ſatisfied with poſſeſſing an equal portion, in conſequence of being of a more abject nature. Hence, to endeavour to poſſeſs more than the multitude is, according to law, unjuſt and baſe; and they call this committing an injury. But I think nature herſelf evinces, that the better ſhould poſſeſs more than the worſe, and the more powerful than the more imbecil. But ſhe manifeſts in many places, both in other animals, and in whole cities and families of men, that the juſt ſhould be eſtabliſhed in ſuch a manner, as that the more excellent may rule over, and poſſeſs more than, the leſs excellent. For, with what kind of juſtice did Xerxes war upon Greece? or his father on the Scythians? or ten thouſand other things of this kind which might be adduced?

adduced? But I think that they do theſe things according to the nature of the juſt, and indeed, by Jupiter, according to the law of nature; not, perhaps, according to that law which we eſtabliſh, while we faſhion the beſt and moſt robuſt of our fellow-citizens, receiving them from their childhood like lions, and enſlaving them by incantations and faſcination; at the ſame time aſſerting that the equal ought to be preſerved, and that this is beautiful and juſt. But, in my opinion, if there ſhould be any man found with ſufficient ſtrength of mind,—ſuch a one, ſhaking off theſe things, and breaking them in pieces, abandoning and trampling upon your writings, magical allurements, incantations, and laws contrary to nature, will, by rebelling, from being a ſlave, appear to be our maſter; and in this caſe, that which is juſt according to nature will ſhine forth. It appears to me that Pindar alſo evinces the truth of what I aſſert, in the verſes in which he ſays, that "Law is the king of all mortals and immortals; and that he does that which is moſt juſt violently, and with a moſt lofty hand. And this, he adds, I infer from the deeds of Hercules, who drove away the oxen of Geryon unbought[1]." He nearly ſpeaks in this manner; for I do not perfectly remember the verſes. He ſays then, that Hercules drove away the oxen of Geryon, without having either purchaſed them, or received them as a gift; as if this was naturally juſt, that oxen, and all other poſſeſſions, when the property of the worſe and inferior, ſhould yield to the better and more excellent. Such then is the truth of the caſe: but you will know that it is ſo, if, diſmiſſing philoſophy, you betake yourſelf to greater things. For philoſophy, Socrates, is an elegant thing, if any one moderately meddles with it in his youth; but, if he is converſant with it more than is becoming, it corrupts the man. For, if he is naturally of a good diſpoſition, and philoſophizes at an advanced period of life, he muſt neceſſarily become unſkilled in all things in which he ought to be ſkilled, who deſigns to be a worthy, good, and illuſtrious man. For theſe men are unſkilled in the laws of the city, and in thoſe arguments which he ought to uſe, who is converſant with the compacts of men, both in public and private. They are likewiſe entirely unſkilled in human pleaſures and deſires, and, in ſhort, in the manners of men. When, therefore, they engage in any private or political undertaking, they become ridiculous. Juſt as, in my opi-

[1] Theſe words are cited from ſome one of the loſt writings of Pindar.

nion,

nion, politicians are ridiculous when they meddle with your diſputations and arguments. For that ſaying of Euripides here takes place: "Every one ſhines in this, and to this haſtens; conſuming the greater part of the day, in order that he may become better than himſelf [1]." But that in which a man is inferior he avoids and ſlanders; and praiſes that in which he excells, through his benevolence towards himſelf, thinking that after this manner he praiſes himſelf. But I think it is moſt right to partake of both theſe. Of philoſophy, indeed, it is beautiful to participate, ſo far as pertains to diſcipline, nor is it baſe for any one to philoſophize while he is a youth: but it is a ridiculous thing, Socrates, for a man ſtill to philoſophize when he is advanced in years. And I own myſelf ſimilarly affected towards thoſe who philoſophize, as to thoſe who ſtammer and ſport. For when I ſee a boy whom it yet becomes to diſcourſe, thus ſtammering and engaged in play, I rejoice, and his conduct appears to me to be elegant and liberal, and ſuch as is proper to the age of a boy. But when I hear a little boy diſcourſing with perſpicuity, it appears to me to be an unpleaſant circumſtance, offends my ears, and is, in my opinion, an illiberal thing. And when any one hears a man ſtammering, or ſees him engaged in play, he appears to be ridiculous, unmanly, and deſerving chaſtiſement. I therefore am affected in the ſame manner towards thoſe who philoſophize. For, when I ſee philoſophy in a young man, I am delighted, and it appears to me becoming, and I conſider the young man as liberal; but when I find a youth not philoſophizing, ſuch a one appears to me illiberal, and who will never think himſelf worthy of any beautiful or generous thing. But when I behold a man advanced in years, yet philoſophizing, and not liberated from philoſophy, ſuch a one, Socrates, appears to me to require chaſtiſement. For to this man, as I juſt now ſaid, it happens that he becomes effeminate, though born with the beſt diſpoſition, in conſequence of his avoiding the middle of the city, and the forum, in which, as the poet ſays, men become greatly illuſtrious; and that, concealing himſelf from the public view, he paſſes the remainder of his life with three or four lads, muttering in a corner; but he never utters any thing liberal, great, and ſufficient. But I, Socrates, am affected in an equitable and friendly manner towards you. For it ſeems that the ſame thing now happens to me

[1] Theſe verſes are taken from the Antiope of Euripides, and are edited by Barnes among the fragments of that tragedy.

which happened to Zethus towards Amphion in Euripides, whom I have already mentioned; ſince it occurs to me to ſay to you what he ſaid to his brother: that you neglect, Socrates, what you ought to attend to, and deſtroy the generous nature of your ſoul, by adorning it with a certain juvenile form; and that in conſultations pertaining to juſtice you do not ſpeak with rectitude, nor apprehend what is probable and perſuaſive, nor conſult for others in a ſtrenuous manner. Though, friend Socrates, (do not be angry with me, for I ſpeak to you with benevolence,) does it not appear to you ſhameful, that any one ſhould be affected in ſuch a manner as I think you are, and others who always make great advances in philoſophy? For now, if ſome one arreſting you, or any other, ſhould lead you to priſon, aſſerting that you had acted unjuſtly, when you had not, you know you would not be able in any reſpect to benefit yourſelf; but, being ſeized with a giddineſs, you would yawn, and not have any thing to ſay: and that aſcending to a court of juſtice, and meeting with an accuſer perfectly vile and baſe, you would die, if he wiſhed to puniſh you with death. And indeed, Socrates, how can that art poſſeſs any wiſdom, which, when poſſeſſed by a man of a naturally good diſpoſition, renders him worſe, and neither able to aſſiſt himſelf, nor preſerve either himſelf or any other from the greateſt dangers, but cauſes him to be plundered by enemies of all his poſſeſſions, and live in the city devoid of honour? Indeed (if I may ſpeak in a more ruſtic manner), it may be allowable to ſlap the face of ſuch a man with impunity. But, good man, be perſuaded by me, and deſiſt from confuting. Cultivate an elegant knowledge of things, and employ yourſelf in ſtudies which will cauſe you to appear wiſe, leaving to *others* theſe graceful ſubtilties, whether it is proper to call them deliriums, or mere trifles,

"Which leave *you* nothing but an empty houſe:"

and emulating, not thoſe men who are able to confute ſuch trifling things as theſe, but thoſe with whom there are poſſeſſions, renown, and many other goods.

Soc. If, Callicles, I ſhould happen to have a golden ſoul, do you not think I ſhould gladly find one of thoſe ſtones by which they try gold, particularly if it was one of the beſt ſort; to which if I ſhould introduce my ſoul, and it ſhould acknowledge to me my ſoul was well cultivated, ſhould I not

then well know that I was ſufficiently good, and that it was not neceſſary any further trial ſhould be made of me?

CAL. Why do you aſk this, Socrates?

SOC. I will now tell you. I think that I, in meeting with you, met with a gain of this kind.

CAL. Why ſo?

SOC. I well know that you agree with me in thoſe opinions which my ſoul entertains of certain particulars, and that you acknowledge them to be true. For I perceive that he who intends ſufficiently to explore, whether the ſoul lives uprightly or not, ought to poſſeſs three things, all which you poſſeſs, viz. ſcience, benevolence, and freedom of ſpeech. For I meet with many who are not able to make trial of me, through not being wiſe as you are; but others are wiſe, indeed, but are unwilling to ſpeak the truth to me, becauſe they are not concerned about me as you are. But theſe two gueſts, Gorgias and Polus, are indeed wiſe, and my friends, but are deficient in freedom of ſpeech, and are more baſhful than is becoming. For how ſhould it be otherwiſe? ſince they are ſo very baſhful that each dares to contradict himſelf, before many men, and this too about things of the greateſt conſequence. But you poſſeſs all theſe requiſites, which others have not. And you are both well inſtructed, as many of the Athenians affirm, and are benevolent to me. I will tell you what argument I uſe. I know that you four, Callicles, mutually partake of wiſdom, viz. you, and Tiſander the Aphidnan[1], Andron the ſon of Androtion, and Nauſicydes the Cholargean. I likewiſe once heard you deliberating how far wiſdom is to be exerciſed: and I know that this opinion prevailed among you, that we ſhould not ſtrenuouſly endeavour to philoſophize with accuracy; but you admoniſhed each other to be cautious, leſt, through being more wiſe than is proper, you ſhould be corrupted without perceiving it. Since, therefore, I hear you giving me the very ſame advice as you gave your moſt intimate aſſociates, it is to me a ſufficient argument, that you are truly benevolent to me. And beſides this, that you can uſe freedom of ſpeech, and not be aſhamed, both you yourſelf ſay, and the oration, which you a little before made, teſtifies. But the caſe is this: If, in the things which are now diſcuſſed by us, you in any particular conſent with

[1] Aphidnæ and Cholarges were two Attic villages.

me, this may be conſidered as ſufficiently explored by you and me, and as no longer requiring any further examination. For you would never have aſſented to ſuch a thing, either through a defect of wiſdom, or too much baſhfulneſs. Nor yet, again, would you have aſſented in order to deceive me: for you are, as you acknowledge, my friend. In reality, therefore, your and my aſſent has now its true end. But the conſideration, Callicles, of thoſe things reſpecting which you reproved me, is of all things the moſt beautiful, viz. what kind of perſon a man ought to be, what he ought to ſtudy, and how far he ſhould ſtudy, both when an elderly and a young man. For, with reſpect to myſelf, if there is any thing pertaining to my life in which I do not act rightly, I well know that I do not voluntarily err, but that this happens through my ignorance. Do you, therefore, as you began to admoniſh me, not deſiſt, but ſufficiently ſhow me what this is which I ought to ſtudy, and after what manner I may accompliſh it. And if you find me now aſſenting to you, but afterwards not acting conformably to the conceſſions which I have made, then conſider me as perfectly indolent: and in this caſe, as being a man of no worth, you ſhould afterwards no longer admoniſh me. But, reſuming the ſubject from the beginning, inform me how you and Pindar ſay, that it is naturally juſt for the more excellent to take away by force the poſſeſſions of the leſs excellent, and for the better to rule over the worſe, and poſſeſs more than the depraved. Do you ſay that the juſt is any thing elſe than this? Or do I rightly remember?

Cal. Theſe things I then ſaid, and I now ſay.

Soc. But whether do you call the ſame thing better and more excellent? For I could not then underſtand what you ſaid: whether you call the ſtronger the more excellent, and ſay it is requiſite that the more imbecil ſhould liſten to the more ſtrong; juſt as you then appeared to ſhow me, that great invaded ſmall cities, according to natural juſtice, becauſe they are more excellent and ſtrong; (as if the more excellent, the ſtronger, and the better, were the ſame;) or is it poſſible that a thing can be better, and at the ſame time inferior and more imbecil? and that it can be more excellent, and at the ſame time more depraved? or is there the ſame definition of the better and the more excellent? Define this for me clearly, whether the more excellent, the better, and the more ſtrong, are the ſame, or different?

Cal. But I clearly ſay to you, that they are the ſame.

Soc.

Soc. Are not, therefore, the multitude naturally more excellent than one perſon; ſince they eſtabliſh laws for one, as you juſt now ſaid?

Cal. Undoubtedly.

Soc. The laws, therefore, of the multitude are the laws of ſuch as are more excellent.

Cal. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Are they not then the laws of ſuch as are better? For the more excellent are, according to your aſſertion, far better.

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Are not, therefore, the legal inſtitutions of theſe naturally beautiful, ſince thoſe who eſtabliſh them are more excellent?

Cal. I ſay ſo.

Soc. Do not, therefore, the multitude think (as you juſt now ſaid) that it is juſt to poſſeſs the equal, and that it is more baſe to do an injury than to be injured? Are theſe things ſo, or not? And here take care that you are not caught through baſhfulneſs. Do the multitude, or not, think that to poſſeſs the equal, but not more than others, is juſt? and that it is more baſe to do an injury than to be injured? Do not deny me an anſwer to this, Callicles; that, if you aſſent to me, I may be confirmed in my opinion by you, as being a man whoſe aſſent is ſufficient to the clear knowledge of a thing.

Cal. The multitude, then, do think in this manner.

Soc. Not by law therefore only is it more baſe to do an injury than to be injured, or juſt to have equality of poſſeſſions, but likewiſe according to nature. So that you appear not to have ſpoken the truth above, nor to have rightly accuſed me, in ſaying that law and nature are contrary to each other; which I alſo perceiving, I have acted fraudulently in my diſcourſe with you, by leading him to law, who ſays a thing is according to nature; and to nature, who ſays a thing is according to law.

Cal. This man will not ceaſe to trifle. Tell me, Socrates, are you not aſhamed, at your time of life, to hunt after names, and, if any one errs in a word, to make it an unexpected gain? For, did you think I ſaid any thing elſe than that the more excellent were better? Did I not ſome time ſince tell you, that I conſidered the better and the more excellent as the ſame? Or did you ſuppoſe I ſaid, that if a crowd of ſlaves, and all ſorts of men of no worth,

worth, except perhaps they might poſſeſs bodily ſtrength, ſhould be collected together, and eſtabliſh certain things, that theſe would be legal inſtitutions?

Soc. Be it ſo, moſt wiſe Callicles: do you mean as you ſay?

Cal. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But I, O divine man, ſome time ſince conjectured that you ſaid ſomething better than this; and therefore I aſked you, deſiring clearly to know what you ſaid. For you doubtleſs do not think that two are better than one, nor that your ſlaves are better than you becauſe they are ſtronger. But again from the beginning tell me who thoſe are which you ſay are better, when at the ſame time they are not ſtronger. And, O wonderful man, previouſly inſtruct me in a milder manner, that I may not leave you.

Cal. You ſpeak ironically, Socrates.

Soc. By Zethus, Callicles, your familiar, you have now ſaid many things ironically to me. But come, tell me who you ſay are better.

Cal. Thoſe that are more worthy.

Soc. You ſee, therefore, that you yourſelf mention names, but evince nothing. Will you not tell me whether you ſay that the better and more excellent are more prudent, or that this is the caſe with certain others?

Cal. But, by Jupiter, I ſay that theſe are more prudent, and very much ſo.

Soc. Often, therefore, according to your aſſertion, one wiſe man is better than ten thouſand men that are unwiſe; and it is proper that he ſhould govern, but the others be governed, and that the governor ſhould poſſeſs more than the governed. For you appear to me to wiſh to ſay this (for I do not hunt after words), if one man is more excellent than ten thouſand.

Cal. But theſe are the things which I ſay. For I am of opinion that this is the juſt according to nature, viz. that he who is better and more prudent ſhould rule over and poſſeſs more than ſuch as are depraved.

Soc. I attend to what you ſay. But what will you again now ſay? If we, who are many, were crowded together in the ſame place as at preſent, and abundance of food and drink was placed for us in common, but we were men of all-various deſcriptions, ſome of us being ſtrong, and others weak, and one of us ſhould happen to be more ſkilful reſpecting theſe things, as being a phyſician, but at the ſame time ſhould be (as is likely)

ſtronger than ſome, and weaker than others,—would not this man, ſince he excells us in prudence, be better and more excellent with reſpect to theſe things?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Ought he, therefore, to have more of this food than us, becauſe he is better? Or is it proper that in governing he ſhould diſtribute all things; but that, in conſuming and uſing them for his own body, he ſhould not poſſeſs more than others, unleſs with detriment to himſelf? But that he ſhould poſſeſs more than ſome, and leſs than others. But if he is the moſt imbecil of all, then he who is beſt ſhould poſſeſs the leaſt of all. Is it not ſo, O good man?

CAL. You ſpeak of meat and drink, and phyſicians, and trifles; but I do not ſpeak of theſe.

SOC. Whether, therefore, do you ſay that a more prudent is a better man? Do you ſay ſo, or not?

CAL. I do.

SOC. And do you not ſay that he who is better than others ought not to poſſeſs more than others?

CAL. He ought not to poſſeſs more of meat and drink.

SOC. I underſtand you. But perhaps he ought of clothes: and it will be proper that he who is moſt ſkilled in weaving ſhould have the largeſt garment, and ſhould walk about inveſted with garments more numerous and more beautiful than thoſe of others.

CAL. What kind of garments do you mean?

SOC. But with reſpect to ſhoes, indeed, it is requiſite that he who is more prudent than others, and is the beſt of men, ſhould have more of them than others. And a ſhoemaker perhaps ought to walk with the largeſt ſhoes on his feet, and to have them in the greateſt abundance.

CAL. About what kind of ſhoes do you talk in this trifling manner?

SOC. But if you will not aſſert ſuch things as theſe, perhaps you will the following: for inſtance, perhaps it will be requiſite that a huſbandman who in cultivating the land is a prudent, worthy and good man, ſhould poſſeſs more ſeeds than others, and ſow them more abundantly in his own ground.

CAL.

CAL. How you always ſay the ſame things, Socrates!

Soc. Not only the ſame things, Callicles, but likewiſe reſpecting the ſame things.

CAL. Sincerely, by the Gods, you are always ſpeaking about ſhoemakers, fullers, cooks, and phyſicians, as if theſe were the ſubject of our diſcourſe.

Soc. Will not you, therefore, tell me, what the things are of which he who is better and more prudent than others, by poſſeſſing more than others, poſſeſſes juſtly? Or will you neither endure me ſuggeſting, nor ſpeak yourſelf?

CAL. But I ſaid ſome time ſince what theſe particulars are. And in the firſt place, I do not call thoſe that are better than others ſhoemakers, or cooks, but thoſe who are ſkilled in the affairs of a city, ſo as to know after what manner it will be well inhabited, and who are not only prudent but likewiſe brave, able to accompliſh what they conceive to be beſt, and are not wearied through effeminacy of ſoul.

Soc. You ſee, moſt excellent Callicles, that you and I do not reaſon about the ſame things. For you ſay that I always aſſert the ſame things; and I, on the contrary, that you never ſay the ſame things about the ſame. But at one time you define the better and more excellent to be the ſtronger, but at another time thoſe that are more prudent: and now again you come with ſomething elſe; for certain perſons that are braver are ſaid by you to be better and more excellent characters. But, O good man, tell me at length, who you ſay thoſe better and more excellent characters are, and about what they are converſant.

CAL. But I have ſaid that they are ſuch as are prudent and brave, with reſpect to the affairs of a city. For it is fit that theſe ſhould govern cities: and this is the juſt, that theſe ſhould have more than others, the governors than the governed.

Soc. But what of theſe governors conſidered with reſpect to themſelves? Ought they to have more, as governors, or as governed?

CAL. How do you ſay?

Soc. I ſpeak of every one as governing himſelf. Or is there no occaſion for a man to govern himſelf, but only others?

CAL. What do you mean by a man governing himſelf?

Soc.

Soc. Nothing various, but juſt as the vulgar call a man who is temperate, and maſter of himſelf, one that governs his pleaſures and deſires.

Cal. How pleaſant you are! You ſpeak of the fooliſhly temperate.

Soc. How ſo? There is not any one who is ignorant that this is not what I ſay.

Cal. But this is very much what you ſay, Socrates; ſince how can that man be happy who is a ſlave to any one? But this which I now freely tell you, is becoming and juſt according to nature; viz. that he who intends to live properly, ſhould ſuffer his deſires to be as great as poſſible, and ſhould not reſtrain them: but to theſe, as the greateſt poſſible, it will be ſufficient to be ſubſervient, through fortitude and prudence, and always to fill them with ſuch things as they require. This, however, I think, is not poſſible to the multitude. And hence they blame ſuch perſons as I have mentioned, concealing their own impotency through ſhame; and ſay that intemperance is baſe, enſlaving, as I ſaid before, men of a better nature than themſelves; and in conſequence of their inability to ſatisfy their own pleaſures, they praiſe through their ſlothfulneſs temperance and juſtice. For what in reality can be more baſe and evil than temperance, to men who from the firſt happen to be either the ſons of kings, or who are naturally ſufficient to procure for themſelves a tyranny, or a dynaſty? who, when it is lawful for them to enjoy good things without any impediment, impoſe a maſter on themſelves, viz. the law, diſcourſe, and the cenſure of the multitude? Or how is it poſſible that they ſhould not become miſerable through the beauty of juſtice and temperance, while they impart no more to their friends than to their enemies; and this while they poſſeſs the ſupreme authority in their own city? But in reality, Socrates, that which you ſay you purſue ſubſiſts in the following manner: Luxury, intemperance, and liberty, if attended with proper aſſiſtance, are virtue and felicity; but theſe other things are nothing more than ornaments, compacts contrary to nature, the nugacities of men, and of no worth.

Soc. In no ignoble manner, Callicles, do you freely attack the diſcourſe: for you now clearly ſay what others think, indeed, but are unwilling to ſay. I beg, therefore, that you would not by any means relax, that it may in reality become evident how we ought to live. Tell me then: do you ſay that deſires ought not to be repreſſed, if any one intends to be that which he

ought to be? and that, ſuffering them to be as great as poſſible, he ought to procure their full ſatisfaction from ſome other perſon? and that this conſtitutes virtue?

CAL. I do ſay theſe things.

SOC. Thoſe, therefore, that are not in want of any thing are not rightly ſaid to be happy.

CAL. For thus ſtones and dead bodies would be moſt happy.

SOC. But, indeed, as you alſo ſay, life is a grievous thing. For I ſhould not wonder if Euripides [1] ſpoke the truth when he ſays: "Who knows whether to live is not to die, and to die, is not to live?" And we, perhaps, are in reality dead. For I have heard from one of the wiſe, that we are now dead; and that the body is our ſepulchre; but that the part of the ſoul in which the deſires are contained is of ſuch a nature that it can be perſuaded, and hurled upwards and downwards. Hence, a certain elegant man, perhaps a Sicilian, or an Italian, denominated, mythologizing, this part of the ſoul a tub, by a derivation from the probable and the perſuaſive; and like-

[1] Euripides (in Phryxo) ſays, that to live is to die, and to die to live. For the ſoul coming hither, as ſhe imparts life to the body, ſo ſhe partakes of a certain privation of life; but this is an evil. When ſeparated, therefore, from the body, ſhe lives in reality: for ſhe dies here, through participating a privation of life, becauſe the body becomes the cauſe of evils. And hence it is neceſſary to ſubdue the body.

The meaning of the Pythagoric fable which is here introduced by Plato is as follows: We are ſaid then to be dead, becauſe, as we have before obſerved, we partake of a privation of life. The ſepulchre which we carry about with us is, as Plato himſelf explains it, the body. But Hades is the unapparent, becauſe we are ſituated in obſcurity, the ſoul being in a ſtate of ſervitude to the body. The tubs are the deſires, whether they are ſo called from haſtening to fill them as if they were tubs, or from deſire perſuading us that it is beautiful. The initiated, therefore, i. e. thoſe that have a perfect knowledge, pour into the entire tub: for theſe have their tub full, or, in other words, have perfect virtue. But the uninitiated, viz. thoſe that poſſeſs nothing perfect, have perforated tubs. For thoſe that are in a ſtate of ſervitude to deſire always wiſh to fill it, and are more inflamed; and on this account they have perforated tubs, as being never full. But the ſieve is the rational ſoul mingled with the irrational. For the ſoul is called a circle, becauſe it ſeeks itſelf, and is itſelf ſought; finds itſelf, and is itſelf found. But the irrational ſoul imitates a right line, ſince it does not revert to itſelf like a circle. So far, therefore, as the ſieve is circular, it is an image of the rational ſoul, but, as it is placed under the right lines formed from the holes, it is aſſumed for the irrational ſoul. Right lines, therefore, are in the middle of the cavities. Hence, by the ſieve, Plato ſignifies the rational in ſubjection to the irrational ſoul. The water is the flux of nature: for, as Heraclitus ſays, moiſture is the death of the ſoul.

wiſe

wiſe he called thoſe that are ſtupid, or deprived of intellect, uninitiated. He further ſaid, that the intemperate and uncovered nature of that part of the ſoul in which the deſires are contained was like a pierced tub, through its inſatiable greedineſs. But this man, Callicles, evinced, directly contrary to you, that of ſuch as were in Hades (which he called *aeides*, or the inviſible) thoſe were moſt miſerable who were not initiated, and that their employment conſiſted in carrying water to a pierced tub in a ſimilarly pierced ſieve. The ſieve, therefore, as he who ſpoke with me ſaid, is the ſoul. But he aſſimilated the ſoul of the unwiſe to a ſieve, becauſe, as this is full of holes, ſo their ſoul is unable to contain any thing, through incredulity and oblivion. Theſe aſſertions may, indeed, in a certain reſpect, be very juſtly conſidered as unuſual; but they evince what I wiſh to ſhow you, if I could but perſuade you to change your opinion, that, inſtead of having an inſatiable and intemperate life, you would chooſe one that is moderate, and which is ſufficiently and abundantly replete with things perpetually preſent. But can I in any reſpect perſuade you? And will you, changing your opinion, ſay that the moderate are more happy than the intemperate? Or ſhall I not at all perſuade you? And will you nothing the more alter your opinion, though I ſhould deliver in fables many things of this kind?

CAL. You have ſpoken this more truly, Socrates.

SOC. But come, I will exhibit to you another image from the ſame gymnaſium, as that which I juſt now exhibited to you. For conſider, whether you would ſpeak in this manner concerning the life of a temperate and intemperate man,—I mean, as if two men had each of them many tubs; and that the tubs belonging to one of theſe were entire and full, one of wine, another of honey, a third of milk, and many others of them with a multitude of many other things. Likewiſe, that each of theſe various liquors was rare and difficult to be obtained, and was procured with many labours and difficulties. Let us ſuppoſe, therefore, that this man whoſe tubs are thus full neither draws any liquor from them, nor is at all concerned about them, but, with reſpect to them, is at reſt. Let it be poſſible alſo to procure liquors for the other, though with difficulty; but let his veſſels be pierced, and defective, and let him always be compelled, both night and day, to fill them, or, if he does not, to ſuffer the moſt extreme pain. Will you therefore ſay, ſince ſuch is the life of each, that the life of the intemperate is more happy than that

of the moderate man? Can I in any reſpect perſuade you by theſe things, that a moderate is better than an intemperate life? Or ſhall I not perſuade you?

CAL. You will not perſuade me, Socrates. For he whoſe veſſel is full has not any pleaſure whatever: but this is, as I juſt now ſaid, to live like a ſtone, when once filled, neither rejoicing nor grieving: but living pleaſantly conſiſts in an abundant influx.

SOC. Is it not therefore neceſſary, if there is an influx of many things, that there ſhould alſo be an abundant efflux? and that there ſhould be certain large holes as paſſages for the effluxions?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. On the contrary, therefore, you ſpeak of a certain life of the bird called Charadrius, and not of that of a dead body, or a ſtone. But tell me, do you ſpeak of any ſuch thing as the being hungry, and, when hungry, of eating?

CAL. I do.

SOC. And of the being thirſty, and, when thirſty, of drinking?

CAL. I ſay ſo; and likewiſe that he who poſſeſſes all other deſires, and is able to ſatisfy them, will live rejoicing in a happy manner.

SOC. Well done, O beſt of men! Proceed as you have begun, and do not be hindered by ſhame. But it is likewiſe requiſite, as it ſeems, that neither ſhould I be reſtrained by ſhame. And, in the firſt place, inform me whether he who is ſcabby, and itches, who has abundantly the power of, and paſſes his life in, ſcratching, lives happily?

CAL. How abſurd you are, Socrates, and perfectly vulgar!

SOC. Hence it is, Callicles, that I have aſtoniſhed Polus and Gorgias, and made them aſhamed. But do not you be aſtoniſhed, nor aſhamed: for you are brave: but only anſwer.

CAL. I ſay, then, that he who ſcratches himſelf lives pleaſantly.

SOC. Does he not, therefore, live happily, if he lives pleaſantly?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. I again aſk you, whether this will be the caſe if he only itches in his head, or any other part of the body. See, Callicles, what you ſhould anſwer, if any one aſks you reſpecting all the parts of the body in ſucceſſion. And all the parts being thus affected, would not, in ſhort, this life of catamites be dire,

dire, baſe, and miſerable? Or will you alſo dare to call theſe happy, if they poſſeſs in abundance what they require?

CAL. Are you not aſhamed, Socrates, to bring the diſcourſe to things of this kind?

SOC. Do I bring it hither, O generous man? Or does not he rather, who ſays in ſo ſhameleſs a manner, that ſuch as rejoice, however they may rejoice, are happy; and does not define what pleaſures are good, and what are evil? But further ſtill, now tell me, whether you ſay that the pleaſant and the good are the ſame: or that there is ſomething pleaſant which is not good?

CAL. But my aſſertion would not diſſent from itſelf, if that which I ſay is different I ſhould alſo ſay is the ſame.

SOC. You ſubvert, Callicles, what was ſaid in the firſt part of our diſcourſe; nor can you any longer ſufficiently inveſtigate things with me, if you ſpeak contrary to your opinion.

CAL. But you, Socrates, do the ſame.

SOC. Neither, therefore, do I, nor you, act rightly in ſo doing. But, O bleſſed man, ſee whether it is not a good thing to rejoice in perfection. For many baſe conſequences, and a multitude of other things, appear to attend the particulars which I juſt now obſcurely ſignified, if they ſhould take place.

CAL. It is as you think, Socrates.

SOC. But do you in reality, Callicles, ſtrenuouſly aſſert theſe things?

CAL. I do.

SOC. Let us, therefore, enter on the diſcuſſion, as if you were ſerious.

CAL. And extremely ſo.

SOC. Come, then, ſince it is agreeable to you, divide as follows: Do you call ſcience any thing?

CAL. I do.

SOC. And did you not juſt now ſay, that there is a certain fortitude, together with ſcience?

CAL. I did ſay ſo.

SOC. You ſpoke, therefore, of theſe two, as if fortitude was ſomething different from ſcience.

CAL. Very much ſo.

SOC. But what? Are pleaſure and ſcience the ſame, or different?

CAL.

CAL. They are certainly different, O moſt wiſe man.

SOC. Is fortitude alſo different from pleaſure?

CAL. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Come, then, that we may remember theſe things, viz. that Callicles of Acharne ſaid that the pleaſant and the good are the ſame; but that ſcience and fortitude are both different from each other and the good; and that Socrates of Alopecia did not aſſent to theſe things. Or did he aſſent to them?

CAL. He did not aſſent.

SOC. But I think that neither will Callicles when he rightly beholds himſelf. For tell me, do you not think that thoſe who do well are affected in a manner entirely contrary to thoſe who do ill?

CAL. I do.

SOC. If theſe, therefore, are contrary to each other, muſt they not neceſſarily ſubſiſt in the ſame manner as health and diſeaſe? For, certainly, a man is not at the ſame time well and diſeaſed, nor at the ſame time liberated from health and diſeaſe.

CAL. How do you ſay?

SOC. Taking any part of the body you pleaſe, as, for inſtance, the eyes, conſider whether ſome man is diſeaſed with an ophthalmy.

CAL. Undoubtedly.

SOC. He certainly is not, if at the ſame time his eyes are well.

CAL. By no means.

SOC. But what? When he is liberated from the ophthalmy, is he then alſo liberated from the health of his eyes, and, laſtly, at the ſame time liberated from both?

CAL. In the leaſt degree.

SOC. For I think this would be wonderful and abſurd. Or would it not?

CAL. Very much ſo.

SOC. But I think he will alternately receive one, and loſe the other.

CAL. So I ſay.

SOC. And will he not, therefore, in a ſimilar manner receive and loſe ſtrength and weakneſs?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. And ſwiftneſs and ſlowneſs?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And with reſpect to things good, and felicity, and the contraries of theſe things, evil and infelicity, will he alternately receive and be liberated from each of theſe?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. If, therefore, we ſhould find certain things from which a man is at the ſame time liberated, and which he at the ſame time poſſeſſes, certainly theſe would not be good and evil. Do we mutually aſſent to theſe things? Well conſider, and anſwer me.

CAL. But I aſſent in a tranſcendent degree.

SOC. Let us then recur to what we aſſented to before. Do you ſay that to be hungry is pleaſant, or troubleſome? I ſay, to be hungry.

CAL. That it is troubleſome.

SOC. But it is pleaſant for him who is hungry to eat?

CAL. It is.

SOC. I underſtand you: but to be hungry you ſay is troubleſome. Do you not?

CAL. I do.

SOC. And is it not likewiſe troubleſome to be thirſty?

CAL. Very much ſo.

SOC. Whether, therefore, ſhall I aſk you any more queſtions? Or do you acknowledge that all indigence and deſire is troubleſome?

CAL. I do acknowledge it: but do not aſk me.

SOC. Be it ſo. But do you ſay it is any thing elſe than pleaſant, for a man who is thirſty to drink?

CAL. I ſay it is nothing elſe.

SOC. In this thing, therefore, which you ſpeak of, to be thirſty is, doubtleſs, painful. Is it not?

CAL. It is.

SOC. But is not to drink a repletion of indigence, and a pleaſure?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Do you not therefore ſay that drinking is attended with joy?

CAL. Very much ſo.

SOC. And do you not ſay that to be thirſty is painful?

CAL.

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Do you, therefore, perceive what follows? I mean, that you ſay he who is in pain at the ſame time rejoices, when you ſay that he who is thirſty drinks. Or does not this happen together, according to the ſame place and time, whether you conſider the ſoul or the body? For I think it is of no conſequence which of theſe you conſider. Are theſe things ſo, or not?

CAL. They are.

SOC. But you ſay it is impoſſible that he who is happy ſhould at the ſame time be unhappy.

CAL. I do ſay ſo.

SOC. But you have granted that he who is diſquieted may rejoice.

CAL. It appears ſo.

SOC. To rejoice, therefore, is not felicity, nor to be diſquieted, infelicity? So that the pleaſant is ſomething different from the good?

CAL. I know not what theſe particulars are, Socrates, which you ſophiſtically deviſe.

SOC. You know, though you pretend not, Callicles. In conſequence of trifling, too, you proceed to what was before ſaid; that you may know how wiſe you are that admoniſh me. Does not each of us at the ſame time ceaſe from being thirſty, and at the ſame time receive pleaſure from drinking?

CAL. I do not know what you ſay.

GORG. By no means, Callicles, act in this manner; but anſwer at leaſt for our ſakes, that the diſcourſe may be brought to a concluſion.

CAL. But this is always the way with Socrates, Gorgias, viz. he aſks and confutes trifling things, and ſuch as are of no worth.

GORG. But of what conſequence is this to you? This is altogether no concern of yours: but ſuffer Socrates to argue in whatever manner he pleaſes.

CAL. Aſk, then, ſince Gorgias thinks proper, theſe trifling and vile queſtions.

SOC. You are happy, Callicles, becauſe you are initiated in great myſteries prior to the ſmall: but I do not think this is lawful. Anſwer me, therefore, the queſtion which you left unanſwered, viz. whether each of us does not at the ſame time ceaſe to be thirſty, and to receive delight?

CAL.

CAL. I ſay ſo.

SOC. And with reſpect to hunger, and other deſires, do we not at the ſame time ceaſe to feel them, and to receive delight?

CAL. We do.

SOC. Do we not, therefore, at one and the ſame time experience a ceſſation of pains and pleaſures?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. But we do not at one and the ſame time experience a ceſſation of things good and evil, as you did acknowledge: but now do you not acknowledge this?

CAL. I do. But what then?

SOC. That things good are not the ſame with ſuch as are pleaſant, nor things evil with ſuch as procure moleſtation. For, from theſe we are liberated at once, but not from thoſe, becauſe they are different. How, therefore, can things pleaſant be the ſame with ſuch as are good, or things troubleſome with ſuch as are evil? But, if you pleaſe, conſider the affair thus: for I think that neither in this will you accord with yourſelf. Conſider now. Do you not call the good good, from the preſence of good things, in the ſame manner as you call thoſe beautiful to whom beauty is preſent?

CAL. I do.

SOC. But what? Do you call thoſe good men who are fooliſh and timid? For you did not juſt now; but you ſaid that good men were brave and prudent. Or do you not call the brave and prudent, good?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But what? Have you ever ſeen a ſtupid boy rejoicing?

CAL. I have.

SOC. And have you not alſo ſeen a ſtupid man rejoicing?

CAL. I think I have. But to what purpoſe is this?

SOC. To none: but anſwer.

CAL. I have ſeen ſuch a one.

SOC. But have you ſeen a man endued with intellect grieving and rejoicing?

CAL. I ſay I have.

SOC. But which rejoice and grieve the more; the wiſe, or the fooliſh?

CAL. I do not think there is much difference.

SOC. This is ſufficient. But have you ever in war ſeen a coward?

CAL. Undoubtedly I have.

SOC. What then? On the departure of the enemies, which have appeared to you to rejoice the more, cowards or the brave?

CAL. Both have appeared to me to rejoice more: or, if not, certainly in nearly the ſame degree.

SOC. It is of no conſequence. Cowards, therefore, alſo rejoice?

CAL. And very much ſo.

SOC. And thoſe that are ſtupid, likewiſe, as it ſeems?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. But, when enemies approach, do cowards only grieve? or is this alſo the caſe with the brave?

CAL. With both.

SOC. Do they, therefore, ſimilarly grieve?

CAL. Perhaps cowards grieve more.

SOC. But, when the enemies depart, do they rejoice more?

CAL. Perhaps ſo.

SOC. Do not, therefore, as you ſay, the ſtupid and the wiſe, cowards and the brave, ſimilarly grieve and rejoice, but cowards more than the brave?

CAL. I ſay ſo.

SOC. But the wiſe and brave are good, but cowards and the ſtupid, bad?

CAL. They are.

SOC. The good and the bad, therefore, rejoice and grieve ſimilarly?

CAL. I ſay ſo.

SOC. Are, therefore, the good and the bad ſimilarly good and bad? or are the good yet more good, and the bad more bad?

CAL. But, by Jupiter, I do not know what you ſay.

SOC. Do you not know that you ſaid the good were good, through the preſence of things good, and the bad through the preſence of things evil? And that pleaſures were good things, and pains bad?

CAL. I do know it.

SOC. Are not, therefore, good things, viz. pleaſures, preſent with thoſe that rejoice, if they rejoice?

CAL.

CAL. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Are not, therefore, thoſe that rejoice good, in conſequence of things good being preſent?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. But what? Are not things evil, viz. pains, preſent with thoſe that are diſquieted?

CAL. They are preſent.

SOC. But do you not ſay that the evil are evil, through the preſence of things evil? Or do you no longer ſay ſo?

CAL. I do.

SOC. Thoſe, therefore, that rejoice, are good; but thoſe that are diſquieted are evil?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And thoſe that are more ſo, more, but thoſe that are leſs ſo, leſs? and thoſe that are ſimilarly ſo, ſimilarly?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Do you ſay, therefore, that the wiſe and the ſtupid rejoice and grieve ſimilarly; and that this is likewiſe the caſe with cowards and the brave? Or that cowards rejoice and grieve more than the brave?

CAL. I do.

SOC. Collect, therefore, in common with me, what will be the conſequence of what we have aſſented to. For, as it is ſaid, it is beautiful to ſpeak and conſider twice, and even thrice, beautiful things. Do we ſay, then, that he who is prudent and brave is good, or not?

CAL. We do.

SOC. But that he is a bad man who is ſtupid and a coward?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And again, that he who rejoices is good?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. But that he is a bad man who is diſquieted?

CAL. Neceſſarily ſo.

SOC. Likewiſe, that to be diſquieted, and rejoice, are ſimilarly good and evil; but perhaps more evil than good?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Does not, therefore, a bad man become ſimilarly bad and good, with

the good man, or even more good? Do not theſe things follow, and likewiſe thoſe prior things, if any one ſays that the ſame things are pleaſant and good? Are not theſe conſequences neceſſary, Callicles?

CAL. A while ago, Socrates, I ſaid that I liſtened and aſſented to you, conſidering that if any one grants you any thing, though in jeſt, this you gladly lay hold of after the manner of lads. Juſt as if you could think that either I or any other perſon did not believe that ſome pleaſures are better, and others worſe.

SOC. Hey-day, Callicles, how crafty you are! And you uſe me as if I were a boy; at one time aſſerting that theſe things ſubſiſt in this manner, and at another in a different manner; and thus deceiving me. Though, from the firſt, I did not think that I ſhould be voluntarily deceived by you, becauſe you are my friend. But now I am deceived. And now, as it ſeems, it is neceſſary, according to the antient proverb, that I ſhould make good uſe of the preſent opportunity, and receive what you give. But it appears that what you now ſay is this, that with reſpect to pleaſures ſome are good, and others bad. Is it not ſo?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Are, therefore, the profitable good, but the noxious evil?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And are thoſe profitable which accompliſh a certain good, but thoſe evil, which effect a certain evil?

CAL. I ſay ſo.

SOC. Do you, therefore, ſpeak of ſuch things as the following; as, for inſtance, in the body, thoſe pleaſures of eating and drinking which we juſt now ſpoke of; and do you think that if ſome of theſe produce in the body health or ſtrength, or ſome other corporeal virtue, they are good, but that the contraries of theſe are evil?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And in like manner, with reſpect to pains, are you of opinion that ſome are worthy, and others baſe?

CAL. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Are not, therefore, ſuch pleaſures and pains as are worthy, to be choſen and embraced?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC.

Soc. But ſuch as are baſe, not?

Cal. It is evident.

Soc. For it appeared, if you remember, that all things are done by us, viz. by me and Polus, for the ſake of things good. Does it, therefore, appear alſo to you, that the good is the end of all actions? Likewiſe, that all other things ought to be done for its ſake; but that it is not to be obtained for the ſake of other things? Will you then make a third with us in the ſame opinion?

Cal. I will.

Soc. Both other things, therefore, and ſuch as are pleaſant, ought to be done for the ſake of things good, but not things good for the ſake of ſuch as are pleaſant?

Cal. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Is every man, therefore, able to chooſe ſuch pleaſant things as are good, and likewiſe ſuch as are evil? Or muſt this be the province of a man endued with art?

Cal. Of a man endued with art.

Soc. But let us again recall to our memory what I ſaid to Polus and Gorgias. For I ſaid (if you remember) that there were certain preparations, ſome as far as pleaſure, preparing this alone, but ignorant of the better and the worſe; but others that knew the nature both of good and evil. I likewiſe placed among the preparations reſpecting pleaſures, cooking as a ſkill pertaining to the body, but not an art; but among the preparations reſpecting the good I placed the medicinal art. And, by Jupiter, the guardian of friendſhip, Callicles, do not think that you ought to jeſt with me, nor anſwer me caſually contrary to your opinion, nor again receive my aſſertions as if I was in jeſt. For you ſee that our diſcourſe is about this, after what manner it is proper to live, than which, what can any man endued with the ſmalleſt degree of intellect more ſeriouſly diſcuſs? I mean, whether we ſhould adopt that mode of life to which you exhort me, engaging in ſuch employments of a man, as ſpeaking among the people, cultivating rhetoric, and managing political affairs, after the manner which you adopt; or whether we ſhould betake ourſelves to a philoſophic life, and conſider what it is in which it differs from the former life. Perhaps, therefore, as I juſt now ſaid, it is beſt to make a diviſion; and after we have divided, and

aſſented

aſſented to each other, to conſider, if theſe two ſpecies of life have an exiſtence, in what they differ from each other, and which of them ought to be purſued. But perhaps you do not yet underſtand what I ſay.

CAL. I do not.

SOC. But I will ſpeak to you ſtill more clearly. Since you and I have agreed that there is ſomething good, and likewiſe ſomething pleaſant, and that the pleaſant is different from the good, but that in each of them there is a certain exerciſe and preparation of acquiſition, one being the hunting after the pleaſant, and the other of the good; do you, in the firſt place, grant me this, or do you not grant it?

CAL. I do grant it.

SOC. But come, conſent with me in what I ſaid to theſe men, if I then appeared to you to ſpeak the truth. But I ſaid that cooking did not appear to me to be an art, but ſkill; and that medicine is an art. For I ſaid that medicine conſiders the nature of that which it cures, and the cauſe of the things which it does, and that it is able to give an account of each of theſe: but that cooking very inartificially proceeds to pleaſure, to which all its attention is directed, neither conſidering in any reſpect the nature nor the cauſe of pleaſure, but being entirely irrational, numbering nothing (as I may ſay), depending wholly on uſe and ſkill, and only preſerving the memory of that which uſually takes place, by which alſo it may impart pleaſures. In the firſt place, therefore, conſider whether theſe things appear to you to have been ſufficiently ſaid, and that there are alſo certain other ſtudies of this kind reſpecting the ſoul, ſome of which depend on art, and beſtow a certain attention to that which is beſt in the ſoul; but others neglect this, conſidering, in the ſame manner as cooking with reſpect to the body, only the pleaſure of the ſoul, and in what manner it may be procured; neither conſidering which is the better or the worſe of pleaſures, nor attending to any thing elſe than gratification only, whether it is better or worſe. For to me, Callicles, theſe things appear to take place; and I ſay that a thing of this kind is flattery, both reſpecting body and ſoul, and any thing elſe the pleaſure of which is ſeduloufly attended to by any one, without paying any regard to the better and the worſe. But whether do you entertain the ſame opinion reſpecting theſe things with us, or do you oppoſe them?

CAL.

CAL. I do not, but grant them, that your diſcourſe may come to an end, and that I may gratify Gorgias here.

SOC. But whether does this take place reſpecting one ſoul, but not reſpecting two and many ſouls?

CAL. It does not. But it takes place reſpecting both two and many ſouls.

SOC. May it not, therefore, be lawful to gratify ſouls collected together, without paying any attention to what is beſt?

CAL. I think ſo.

SOC. Can you, therefore, tell me what thoſe ſtudies are which effect this? Or rather, if you are willing, on my aſking, aſſent to whichever appears to you to be one of theſe, but to that which does not do not aſſent. And, in the firſt place, let us conſider the piper's art. Does it not appear to you to be a thing of this kind, Callicles; viz. which only purſues our pleaſure, but cares for nothing elſe?

CAL. It does appear to me.

SOC. Are not, therefore, all ſuch ſtudies as theſe like the harper's art in conteſts?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. But what? Does not the erudition of choirs, and the dithyrambic poeſy, appear to you to be a thing of this kind? Or do you think that Cineſias [1] the ſon of Meles is in the ſmalleſt degree ſolicitous that he may ſay any thing by which his hearers may become better? Or is he not rather ſolicitous about that which may gratify the crowd of ſpectators?

CAL. It is evident, Socrates, that this latter is the caſe reſpecting Cineſias.

SOC. But what with reſpect to his father Meles? Does he appear to you to play on the harp, looking to that which is beſt? Or does not he alſo regard that which is moſt pleaſant? For in ſinging he pleaſingly pains the ſpectators. But conſider, does not the whole of the harper's art, and dithyrambic poeſy, appear to you to have been invented for the ſake of pleaſure?

CAL. To me it does.

SOC. But what of the venerable and wonderful poeſy of tragedy? What does it ſtrive to accompliſh? Do its endeavour and ſtudy, as appears to you, alone conſiſt in gratifying ſpectators? or alſo in ſtriving not to ſay any thing which may be pleaſing and grateful to them, but at the ſame

[1] A bad dithyrambic poet, according to the Scholiaſt ad *Ranas* Ariſtoph.

time baſe; and that, if any thing happens to be unpleaſant and uſeful, this it may ſay and ſing, whether it gratifies the ſpectators or not? According to which of theſe modes does the poeſy of tragedy appear to you to conſiſt?

CAL. It is evident, Socrates, that it is more impelled to pleaſure, and the gratification of the ſpectators.

SOC. Did we not, therefore, Callicles, juſt now ſay that a thing of this kind is flattery?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Come then, if any one ſhould take from all poeſy, melody, rhythm, and meaſure, would any thing elſe than diſcourſes remain?

CAL. Neceſſarily nothing elſe.

SOC. Are not, therefore, theſe diſcourſes delivered to a great multitude of people?

CAL. I ſay ſo.

SOC. Poeſy, therefore, is a certain popular ſpeech. Or do not poets appear to you to employ rhetoric in the theatres?

CAL. To me they do.

SOC. Now, therefore, we have found a certain rhetoric among a people conſiſting of boys, and at the ſame time women and men, ſlaves and the free-born; and which we do not altogether approve. For we ſaid that it was adulation.

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Be it ſo. But what ſhall we ſay that rhetoric is, which ſubſiſts among the Athenian people, and the people conſiſting of free-born men in other cities? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to ſpeak with a view to that which is beſt, directing their attention to this, that the citizens through their diſcourſes may become the beſt of men? Or are they alſo impelled to the gratification of the citizens? and, neglecting public for the ſake of private advantage, do they converſe with the people as with boys, alone endeavouring to gratify them, without being in the leaſt concerned whether through this they become better or worſe?

CAL. This which you aſk is not a ſimple thing. For ſome rhetoricians are ſolicitous in what they ſay for the good of the citizens: but others are ſuch as you repreſent them.

SOC. It is ſufficient. For, if this alſo is twofold, one part of it will be adulation,

adulation, and baſe harangue; but the other, which cauſes the ſouls of the citizens to become moſt excellent, will be beautiful; and will always ſtrive to ſpeak ſuch things as are beſt, whether they are more pleaſant or more unpleaſant to the hearers. But you never have ſeen this kind of rhetoric. Or, if you can ſay that ſome one of the rhetoricians is a character of this kind, why have you not informed me who he is?

CAL. But, by Jupiter, I cannot inſtance to you any rhetorician of the preſent day.

SOC. But what? Can you inſtance any one of the antient rhetoricians, who was the means of rendering the Athenians better, after he began to harangue them, when previous to this they had been worſe? For I do not know who ſuch a one is.

CAL. But what? Have you not heard that Themiſtocles was a good man, and likewiſe Cimon and Miltiades, and Pericles here, who died lately, and whoſe harangues you alſo have heard?

SOC. Yes; if that virtue, Callicles, which you before ſpoke of is true, viz. for a man to repleniſh both his own deſires and thoſe of others. But if this is not the caſe, but, as we were afterwards compelled to confeſs, thoſe deſires are to be embraced, the repleniſhing of which renders a man better, but not thoſe which render him worſe, and if there is a certain art of this, as we alſo acknowledged, can you ſay that any one of theſe was a man of this kind?

CAL. I have not any thing to ſay.

SOC. But if you ſeek in a becoming manner you will find. Let us however, ſedately conſidering, ſee if any one of theſe was a character of this kind. Is it not true that a good man, who ſays what he ſays with a view to the beſt, does not ſpeak caſually, but looking to ſomething? in the ſame manner as all other artiſts, each of whom regards his own work, and does not raſhly chooſe what he introduces to his work, but ſo that the ſubject of his operation may have a certain form—as, for inſtance, if you are willing to look to painters, architects, ſhipwrights, and all other artificers, and to conſider how, whichever of them you pleaſe, places whatever he places in a certain order, and compels one thing to be adapted to and harmonize with another, until the whole thing is conſtituted with regularity and ornament. And indeed, both other artificers, and thoſe which I juſt now mentioned, who are employed about the body, viz. the maſters of gymnaſtic, and phyſicians,

adorn in a certain reſpect, and orderly diſpoſe the body. Do we grant that this is the caſe, or not?

CAL. It is the caſe.

SOC. A houſe, therefore, when it acquires order and ornament, will be a good houſe, but a bad one, when it is without order?

CAL. I ſay ſo.

SOC. And will not this in like manner be the caſe with a ſhip?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. And may we not aſſert the ſame things alſo reſpecting our bodies?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But what with reſpect to the ſoul? Will it be in a good condition, when it acquires diſorder, or when it acquires a certain order and ornament?

CAL. It is neceſſary, from what has been ſaid, to grant that the latter muſt be the caſe.

SOC. What then, in the body, is the name of that which ſubſiſts from order and ornament? Perhaps you will ſay it is health and ſtrength.

CAL. I do.

SOC. But what again is the name of that which ſubſiſts in the ſoul from order and ornament? Endeavour to find and mention it, in the ſame manner as the former name.

CAL. But why do not you ſay what it is, Socrates?

SOC. If you had rather, I will. But, if I ſpeak well, do you aſſent to me; if not, confute, and do not indulge me. To me then it appears that the name belonging to the orderly diſpoſition of the body is the healthful, from which health and every other virtue of the body are produced in the body. Is it ſo, or not?

CAL. It is.

SOC. But the name belonging to the orderly diſpoſition and ornament of the ſoul is the legitimate and law; whence alſo ſouls become legitimate and adorned with modeſt manners: but theſe are juſtice and temperance. Do you aſſent, or not?

CAL. Be it ſo.

SOC. Will not, therefore, that good rhetorician who is endued with art, looking to theſe things, introduce all his orations and actions to ſouls? and, if he ſhould beſtow a gift, beſtow it, and, if he ſhould take any thing away,

take

take it; always directing his attention to this, that juſtice may be produced in the ſouls of his fellow-citizens, and that they may be liberated from injuſtice: likewiſe that temperance may be produced in them, and that they may be liberated from intemperance: and, in ſhort, that every virtue may be planted in them, but vice expelled? Do you grant this, or not?

CAL. I do grant it.

SOC. For where is the utility, Callicles, in giving a body diſeaſed, and in a miſerable condition, abundance of the moſt agreeable food or drink, or any thing elſe, which will not be more profitable to it than the contrary, but even leſs, according to a juſt mode of reaſoning? Is this the caſe?

CAL. Be it ſo.

SOC. For I think it is not advantageous for a man to live with a miſerable body; for thus it would be neceſſary to live miſerably. Or would it not?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Do not, therefore, phyſicians for the moſt part permit a man in health to ſatisfy his deſires, (as, for inſtance, when hungry to eat as much as he pleaſes, or when thirſty to drink,) but never permit, as I may ſay, a diſeaſed man to be ſatiated with things which he deſires? Do you alſo grant this?

CAL. I do.

SOC. But is not the ſame mode, O moſt excellent man, to be adopted reſpecting the ſoul; viz. that as long as it is depraved, in conſequence of being ſtupid, intemperate, unjuſt and unholy, it ought to be reſtrained from deſires, and not permitted to do any thing elſe than what will render it better? Do you ſay ſo, or not?

CAL. I ſay ſo.

SOC. For ſuch a mode of conduct will indeed be better for the ſoul.

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Is not, therefore, to reſtrain any one from what he deſires to puniſh him?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. To be puniſhed, therefore, is better for the ſoul than intemperance, contrary to what you juſt now thought.

CAL. I do not know what you ſay, Socrates: but aſk ſomething elſe.

Soc. This man will not ſuffer himſelf to be be benefited by ſuffering this of which we are ſpeaking, viz. puniſhment.

Cal. I am not at all concerned about any thing which you ſay; and I have anſwered you theſe things for the ſake of Gorgias.

Soc. Be it ſo. But what then ſhall we do? Shall we diſſolve the conference in the midſt?

Cal. You know beſt.

Soc. But they ſay it is not lawful to leave even fables in the midſt, but that a head ſhould be placed on them, that they may not wander without a head.

Cal. How importunate you are, Socrates! But, if you will be perſuaded by me, you will bid farewell to this diſcourſe, or carry it on with ſome other perſon.

Soc. What other, then, is willing? for we muſt not leave the diſcourſe unfiniſhed.

Cal. Cannot you yourſelf finiſh the diſcourſe, by either ſpeaking to yourſelf, or anſwering yourſelf?

Soc. In order, I ſuppoſe, that the ſaying of Epicharmus may be verified, viz. I being one am ſufficient to accompliſh what was before ſaid by two. And it appears moſt neceſſary that it ſhould be ſo. But, if we do this, I think it will be proper that all of us ſhould in a friendly manner ſtrive to underſtand what is true, and what falſe, reſpecting the ſubjects of our diſcourſe. For it will be a common good to all for this to become manifeſt. I will, therefore, run over the affair in the manner in which it appears to me to take place. But, if I ſhall ſeem to any of you not to grant myſelf things which truly are, it will be proper that you ſhould apprehend and confute me. For I do not ſay what I do ſay as one endued with knowledge, but I inveſtigate in common with you. So that, if he who contends with me appears to ſay any thing to the purpoſe, I will be the firſt to concede to him. But I ſay theſe things on condition that you think it fit the diſcourſe ſhould be completed: but if you do not aſſent to this, let us bid farewell to it, and depart.

Gorg. But it does not appear to me, Socrates, proper to depart yet, but that you ſhould purſue the diſcourſe. It likewiſe ſeems to me that this is the opinion of the reſt of the company. For I alſo am willing to hear you diſcuſſing what remains.

Soc.

Soc. But indeed, Gorgias, I ſhould willingly have diſcourſed ſtill longer with Callicles here, till I had recompenſed him with the oration of Amphion, inſtead of that of Zethus. But as you are not willing, Callicles, to finiſh the diſcuſſion in conjunction with me, at leaſt attend to me, and expoſe me if I ſhall appear to you to aſſert any thing in an unbecoming manner. And if you confute me, I ſhall not be indignant with you, as you are with me, but you will be conſidered by me as my greateſt benefactor.

Cal. Speak then yourſelf, good man, and finiſh the diſcourſe.

Soc. Hear me then repeating the diſcourſe from the beginning. Are the pleaſant and the good the ſame?—They are not the ſame, as I and Callicles have mutually agreed.—But whether is the pleaſant to be done for the ſake of the good, or the good for the ſake of the pleaſant?—The pleaſant for the ſake of the good.—But is the pleaſant that, with which when preſent we are delighted; and the good that, through which when preſent we are good?—Entirely ſo.—But we are good, both ourſelves, and all other things that are good, when a certain virtue is preſent.—To me this appears to be neceſſary, Callicles.—But, indeed, the virtue of each thing, of an inſtrument, and of the body, and again of the ſoul, and every animal, does not fortuitouſly become thus beautiful, but from order, rectitude, and art, which are attributed to each of them.—Are theſe things, therefore, ſo? For I ſay they are.—The virtue of every thing, therefore, is diſpoſed and adorned by order.—So, indeed, I ſay.—Hence, in each thing, a certain order becoming inherent, which is domeſtic to each, renders each thing good.—It appears ſo to me.—The ſoul, therefore, which has a certain order of its own, is better than the ſoul which is without order.—It is neceſſary.—But the ſoul which has order is orderly.—For how is it poſſible it ſhould not?—But an orderly ſoul is temperate.—This is very neceſſary.—A temperate ſoul, therefore, is good. I, indeed, am not able to ſay any thing beſides theſe things, O friend Callicles. But do you, if you have any thing elſe, teach me.

Cal. Proceed, good man.

Soc. I ſay, then, if a temperate ſoul is good, the ſoul which is affected in a manner contrary to that of the temperate is vicious. But ſuch a ſoul will be deſtitute of intellect, and intemperate.—Entirely ſo.—And, indeed, a temperate man acts in a proper manner, both towards Gods and men. For he would not be temperate if he acted in an improper manner.—It is neceſſary that theſe things

things ſhould be ſo.—And beſides this, by acting in a proper manner towards men he will act juſtly, and by a proper conduct towards the Gods he will act piouſly. But it is neceſſary that he ſhould be juſt and holy, who acts in a juſt and holy manner.—It muſt be ſo.—It is likewiſe neceſſary that ſuch a one ſhould be brave. For it is not the province of a temperate man either to purſue or avoid things which ought neither to be purſued nor avoided: but it is proper that he ſhould both avoid and purſue things and men, pleaſures and pains, and bravely endure when it is requiſite. So that there is an abundant neceſſity, Callicles, that the temperate man, being juſt, brave, and pious, as we have deſcribed him, ſhould be a perfectly good man: likewiſe, that a good man ſhould do in a becoming and beautiful manner whatever he does; and that he who acts well ſhould be bleſſed and happy. And laſtly, it is neceſſary that the unworthy man, and who acts ill, ſhould be miſerable. But ſuch a man will be one who is directly contrary to the temperate man, viz. he will be the intemperate character which you praiſed. I, therefore, lay down theſe things, and aſſert that they are true. But if they are true, temperance muſt be purſued and cultivated, as it appears, by him who wiſhes to be happy, and he muſt fly from intemperance with the utmoſt celerity. He muſt likewiſe endeavour to live in ſuch a manner as not to require any degree of puniſhment: but if he does require it, or any other of his family,—or if this is the caſe with a private perſon, or a city,—juſtice muſt be adminiſtered, and puniſhment inflicted, if ſuch wiſh to be happy. This appears to me to be the mark with our eye directed to which it is proper to live: and all concerns, both private and public, ſhould tend to this, viz. if any one wiſhes to be happy, to act in ſuch a manner that juſtice and temperance may be ever preſent with him; not ſuffering his deſires to be unreſtrained, and endeavouring to fill them; which is an infinite evil, and cauſes a man to live the life of a robber. For a character of this kind can neither be dear to any other man, nor to Divinity. For it is impoſſible there can be any communion between them: but where there is no communion there can be no friendſhip. The wiſe too, Callicles, ſay that communion, friendſhip, decorum, temperance, and juſtice, connectedly comprehend heaven and earth, Gods and men. And on this account, my friend, they call this univerſe *koſmos*, or *order*, and not *akoſmia*, or *diſorder*, and *akolaſia*, or *intemperance*. However, you appear to me not to attend to theſe things, and this though you

are

are wiſe. But you are ignorant that geometric equality is able to accompliſh great things, both among Gods and men. On the contrary, you think that every one ſhould ſtrive to poſſeſs more than others: for you neglect geometry.—Be it ſo, then.—However, this our diſcourſe muſt either be confuted, viz. it muſt be ſhown that thoſe who are happy are not happy from the poſſeſſion of juſtice and temperance, and that thoſe who are miſerable are not miſerable from the poſſeſſion of vice; or, if our diſcourſe is true, we muſt conſider what conſequences reſult from it. Indeed, Callicles, all thoſe former things are the conſequences concerning which you aſked me if I was ſpeaking in earneſt. For I ſaid that a man ſhould accuſe himſelf, his ſon, and his friend, if he acted in any reſpect unjuſtly, and that rhetoric was to be uſed for this purpoſe. Hence, thoſe things which you thought Polus granted through ſhame are true, viz. that by how much it is more baſe to do an injury than to be injured, by ſo much is it the worſe; and that he who would be rightly ſkilled in rhetoric ought to be juſt, and endued with a ſcientific knowledge of things juſt; which, again, Polus ſaid that Gorgias acknowledged through ſhame.

This then being the caſe, let us conſider what are the things for which you reprove me, and whether they are well ſaid, or not. You aſſert, then, that I can neither aſſiſt myſelf, nor any of my friends or domeſtics, nor ſave myſelf from the greateſt dangers: but that I am obnoxious to the arbitrary will of any one, like men of infamous characters (though this is nothing more than the juvenile ardour of your diſcourſe), ſo as either to be ſtruck in the face, or deprived of my property, or expelled from the city, or, which is the extremity of injuſtice, to be ſlain. And to be thus circumſtanced, according to your doctrine, is the moſt ſhameful of all things. But, according to my doctrine, (which has indeed been often mentioned, yet nothing hinders but that it may again be repeated,) I do not ſay, Callicles, that to be ſtruck in the face unjuſtly is a moſt ſhameful thing; nor yet for my body, or my purſe, to be cut; but that to ſtrike and cut unjuſtly me and mine, is a thing more ſhameful and baſe. And that to defraud, enſlave, break open the houſe, and, in ſhort, to injure in any reſpect me and mine, is to him who does the injury more baſe and ſhameful than to me who am injured. Theſe things, which appeared to us to ſubſiſt in this manner in the former part of our

diſcourſe, are contained and bound in adamantine reaſons, though it is ſomewhat ruſtic to make ſuch an aſſertion. However, unleſs you can diſſolve theſe reaſons, or ſome one more robuſt than yourſelf, it is impoſſible that he who ſpeaks otherwiſe than I now ſpeak can ſpeak in a becoming manner. For I always aſſert the ſame thing, viz. that I know not how theſe things ſubſiſt: and that no one of thoſe whom I have ever met with, as at preſent, if unable to ſay otherwiſe, would be ridiculous. I therefore again determine that theſe things thus ſubſiſt. But, if this is the caſe, and injuſtice is the greateſt of evils to him that acts unjuſtly; and it is ſtill a greater evil, if poſſible, though this is the greateſt, for him who acts unjuſtly not to be puniſhed; what aſſiſtance will that be, which, when a man is unable to afford himſelf, he is in reality ridiculous? Will it not be that which averts from us the greateſt detriment? But there is an abundant neceſſity that this ſhould be the moſt ſhameful aſſiſtance, viz. for a man to be incapable of aſſiſting either himſelf, or his friends and domeſtics; that the next to this ſhould be that which pertains to the ſecond evil; and the third, that which pertains to the third evil; and thus in ſucceſſion, according to the magnitude of each evil. Thus alſo does the beauty of being able to give aſſiſtance, and the deformity of not being able, ſubſiſt. Does the thing take place in this manner, or otherwiſe, Callicles?

CAL. No otherwiſe.

SOC. Since, therefore, theſe things are two, to do an injury, and to be injured, we ſay that to do an injury is a greater, but to be injured, a leſs evil. By what means, then, may a man ſo aſſiſt himſelf as to poſſeſs both theſe advantages—I mean, that which ariſes from not doing an injury, and that which is the conſequence of not being injured? Is it by power, or will? But I ſay thus: Will a man, if he is unwilling to be injured, not be injured? Or, if he has procured the power of not being injured, will he not be injured?

CAL. It is evident that he will not, if he has procured the power.

SOC. But what with reſpect to acting unjuſtly? Whether, if any one is unwilling to do an injury, is this ſufficient (for in this caſe he will not commit an injury), or is it requiſite that for this purpoſe he ſhould procure a certain power and art, as one who will do an injury, unleſs he has learned and cultivated theſe? Why do you not anſwer me this queſtion, Callicles: whether

ther I and Polus appear to you to be rightly compelled to acknowledge this, or not? ſince we confeſs that no one is willing to act unjuſtly, but that thoſe who injure others do it unwillingly.

CAL. Let it be ſo, Socrates, that your diſcourſe may be brought to a concluſion.

SOC. For this purpoſe, therefore, a certain power and art, as it appears, are to be procured, in order that we may not act unjuſtly.

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. What then is the art which will enable a man not to be injured in any reſpect, or at leaſt in the ſmalleſt degree? Conſider, if it appears to you in the ſame manner as to me. For to me it appears thus: that he ought either to govern in a city, or obtain the tyranny, or be the aſſociate of the moſt powerful perſon in a polity.

CAL. Do you ſee, Socrates, how ready I am to praiſe you, if you ſay any thing beautifully? This you appear to me to have ſaid in a manner entirely beautiful.

SOC. Conſider alſo, whether I appear to you to ſpeak well in what follows: Thoſe ſeem to me to be friends in the higheſt degree, concerning whom antient and wiſe men ſay, "ſimilar to ſimilar." Does it not alſo appear ſo to you?

CAL. To me it does.

SOC. Does it not therefore follow, that when a tyrant who is ruſtic and unlearned governs, if there is any one in the city much better than him, the tyrant will fear ſuch a one, and will never be able to be cordially his friend?

CAL. It does follow.

SOC. Nor yet, if any one in the city ſhould be much worſe than the tyrant, would he be able to be his friend. For the tyrant would deſpiſe him, nor ever pay attention to him as a friend.

CAL. This alſo is true.

SOC. It remains, therefore, that he alone would be a friend to ſuch a one deſerving to be mentioned, who, in conſequence of being endued with ſimilar manners, would praiſe and blame him, be willing to be governed, and to be ſubject to him that governs. Such a one in this city will be able to accompliſh great things, and no one will injure him with impunity. Is it not ſo?

CAL. Yes.

Soc. If, therefore, any young man in this city ſhould thus think with himſelf, "After what manner may I be able to accompliſh great things, and be injured by no one?" this, as it appears, muſt be the way, viz. he muſt immediately from his youth be accuſtomed to rejoice and be afflicted with the ſame things as his maſter, and render himſelf in the higheſt degree ſimilar to him. Is it not ſo?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Will it not therefore follow, that ſuch a man will not be injured, and, as you ſay, that he will be able to accompliſh great things in a city?

Cal. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Will he not, therefore, be able to refrain from acting unjuſtly? Or will this be far from being the caſe, if, when the governor is unjuſt, he is ſimilar to him, and is able to accompliſh great things with him? But I think that the very contrary will take place, and that ſuch a one will render himſelf able to act unjuſtly in the higheſt degree, without being puniſhed for his unjuſt conduct. Will he not?

Cal. It appears ſo.

Soc. Will not, therefore, the greateſt evil be preſent with him, in conſequence of being corrupted and depraved in his ſoul, through the imitation and power of his maſter?

Cal. I do not know whither you are always turning the diſcourſe, Socrates, upwards and downwards. Or do you not know, that he who is imitated can, if he pleaſes, ſlay and take away the poſſeſſions of him who is not imitated?

Soc. I know it, good Callicles, unleſs I am deaf; for, a little before, I often heard this from you and Polus, and nearly, indeed, from all in the city. But do you alſo hear me: for he may indeed ſlay whom he pleaſes; but, being a depraved character, he may ſlay one who is worthy and good.

Cal. And is not this a circumſtance grievous to be borne?

Soc. Not to a man endued with intellect, as the diſcourſe evinces. Or do you think that a man ſhould endeavour to live to a moſt extended period, and ſhould apply himſelf to thoſe arts which always preſerve us from dangers—in the ſame manner as that rhetoric which preſerves in courts of juſtice, and which you exhorted me to cultivate?

Cal. I do indeed, by Jupiter, and I rightly adviſed you.

Soc. But what, O beſt of men, does the ſcience of ſwimming alſo appear to you to be a venerable thing?

Cal. By Jupiter, it does not.

Soc. And, indeed, this alſo ſaves men from death, when they fall into ſuch a danger as requires the aid of this ſcience. But if this ſcience appears to you to be a ſmall thing, I will mention to you a greater than this, viz. that of piloting a ſhip, which not only ſaves lives, but alſo bodies and poſſeſſions, from extreme danger, in the ſame manner as rhetoric. And this, indeed, is moderate and modeſt, and is not haughty with a grandeur of ornament, as if it accompliſhed ſomething tranſcendent. But ſince it accompliſhes the ſame things as the judicial art, if it ſaves any from Ægina hither, it demands, I think, two oboli; but if from Egypt, or Pontus, if it demands a great ſum, on account of the great benefit it has conferred, through ſaving thoſe I juſt now mentioned, viz. ourſelves and children, our riches and wives, and conducting them to the port, this ſum is uſually two drachms. And the man who poſſeſſes this art, and accompliſhes theſe things, going out of the ſhip, walks near the ſea and the ſhip, in a moderate garb. For he knows, I think, how to reaſon with himſelf, that it is uncertain whom he may aſſiſt of thoſe that ſail with him, not ſuffering them to be merged in the ſea, and whom he may injure, as knowing that neither the bodies nor ſouls of thoſe who depart from his ſhip are in any reſpect better than they were when they entered into it. He will, therefore, reaſon with himſelf, that the caſe is not as if ſome one who is afflicted in his body with great and incurable diſeaſes ſhould happen not to be ſuffocated, becauſe this man is indeed miſerable for having eſcaped death, and has not derived any advantage from him; but that if any one labours under many and incurable diſeaſes in that which is more honourable than body, viz. in his ſoul, ſuch a one ought to live; and that he will benefit him, whether he ſaves him from the ſea, or from a court of juſtice, or from any thing elſe. But he knows that it is not better for a depraved man to live; becauſe he muſt neceſſarily live badly. On this account, it is not uſual for a pilot to be arrogant, though he ſaves us; nor yet, O wonderful man, for an artificer of machines, who is ſometimes able to ſave a multitude in no reſpect inferior to that which is ſaved by the general of an army, or a pilot, or any other perſon. For ſometimes he ſaves whole cities. Does it appear to you that he is to be compared with a lawyer? Though, if he

ſhould wiſh to ſpeak, Callicles, ſuch things as you are accuſtomed to ſpeak, extolling his own art, he would overwhelm you with words, aſſerting and calling on you to conſider that you ought to be the artificers of machines, as if other things were of no conſequence. For he would have enough to ſay. But you nevertheleſs would deſpiſe him and his art, and would call him by way of reproach a maker of machines. Nor would you be willing to give your daughter to his ſon in marriage, nor his daughter to your ſon. Though, if you conſider what the particulars are from which you praiſe your own profeſſion, with what juſtice can you deſpiſe the artificer of machines, and the reſt whom I have juſt now mentioned? I know you will ſay that your profeſſion is better, and conſiſts of better things. But if that which is better is not what I ſay it is, but this very thing is virtue, i. e. for a man to ſave himſelf and his poſſeſſions, whatever kind of man he may happen to be, then your reprehenſion of the artificer of machines, of the phyſician, and of other arts, which are inſtituted for the ſake of preſervation, is ridiculous.

But, O bleſſed man, ſee whether or not the generous and the good are not ſomething elſe than to ſave and be ſaved. For perhaps to live for a period of time however extended, is not to be wiſhed, nor too much ſought after, by him who is truly a man; but leaving theſe things to the care of Divinity, and believing in prophetic women, that no one can avoid fate, he will afterwards conſider by what means he may paſs the remainder of his life in the moſt excellent manner. But will this be effected by rendering himſelf ſimilar to the polity in which he dwells? If this then were the caſe, it is neceſſary that you ſhould become moſt ſimilar to the Athenian people, if you wiſh to be dear to them, and to be able to accompliſh great things in the city. But conſider whether this is advantageous to you and me; and whether we ſhould not, O divine man, be expoſed to the ſame misfortune which they ſay happened to the Theſſalian[1] women in drawing down the moon. But, indeed, our choice of this power in the city ſhould be with the moſt friendly. If however you think that any man whatever is able to deliver a certain

[1] According to Suidas (in Proverbio επι σαυτῳ την σελήνην καθελκεις) the Theſſalian women who drew down the moon are ſaid to have been deprived of their eyes and feet. And hence, ſays he, the proverb is applied to thoſe who draw down evils on themſelves. It is neceſſary to obſerve that witches formerly were able to cauſe the *appearance* of drawing down the moon to take place. See my Notes on Pauſanias, vol. iii. p. 324.

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art of this kind, which will cauſe you to poſſeſs mighty power in this city, even when you are diſſimilar to the polity, and whether this power is for the better, or the worſe,—in this caſe you appear to me, Callicles, not to conſider the affair in a proper light. For it is not requiſite that you ſhould be a mimic, but that you ſhould be naturally ſimilar to them, if you deſign to effect a genuine friendſhip with the Athenian people, and, by Jupiter, beſides this with Demus the ſon of Pyrilampes. Whoever, therefore, ſhall render you moſt ſimilar to theſe will alſo render you, ſince you deſire to be ſkilled in civil affairs, both a politician and a rhetorician. For every one is delighted with orations adapted to his own manners, but is indignant with ſuch as are foreign from them; unleſs you, O beloved head, ſay otherwiſe. Can we ſay any thing againſt theſe things, Callicles?

CAL. I do not know how it is, but you appear to me, Socrates, to ſpeak well. But yet that which happens to many happens alſo to me: for I am not entirely perſuaded by you.

SOC. For the love of Demus, Callicles, which is reſident in your ſoul, oppoſes me: but if we ſhould often and in a better manner conſider theſe things, you would perhaps be perſuaded. Remember, therefore, that we ſaid there were two preparations, which in every thing were ſubſervient to the cultivation both of body and ſoul: one aſſociating with theſe with a view to pleaſure; but the other with a view to that which is beſt, not by gratifying, but oppoſing. Are not theſe the things which we then defined?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Is not, therefore, the one of theſe which looks to pleaſure ignoble, and nothing elſe than adulation?

CAL. Let it be ſo, if you pleaſe.

SOC. But the other endeavours that this which we cultivate may be the beſt poſſible, whether it is body or ſoul.

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Whether, therefore, are we after this manner to take upon ourſelves the care of a city and its citizens, I mean when the citizens are rendered the beſt poſſible? For without this, as we have found in what has been previouſly ſaid, it is of no uſe to beſtow any other benefit; viz. unleſs the dianoëtic part of thoſe who are to receive either abundance of riches, or dominion

dominion over certain perſons, or any other power, is beautiful and good. Shall we lay this down, as being the caſe?

CAL. Entirely ſo, if it is more agreeable to you.

SOC. If, therefore, Callicles, when publicly tranſacting political affairs, we ſhould publicly exhort each other to the art of building either walls, or docks, or temples, or, in ſhort, buildings of the largeſt kind, whether would it be neceſſary that we ſhould conſider and examine ourſelves, in the firſt place, if we knew or were ignorant of the art of building, and by whom we were inſtructed in it? Would this be requiſite, or not?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. In the ſecond place, therefore, this ought to be conſidered, whether we have ever built any private edifice, either for any one of our friends, or for ourſelves; and whether this edifice is beautiful or deformed. And if on conſidering we find that our maſters were good and illuſtrious, and that we have built, in conjunction with our maſters, many beautiful edifices, and many without their aſſiſtance, after we left our maſters,—if we find this to be the caſe, ought we not, if endued with intellect, to betake ourſelves to public works? But if we can neither evince that we had a maſter, and have either raiſed no buildings, or many of no worth, would it not in this caſe be ſtupid in us to attempt public works, and to exhort each other to ſuch an undertaking? Shall we ſay that theſe things are rightly aſſerted, or not?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And is not this the caſe with all other things? And if we ſhould engage publicly in medical affairs, exhorting each other as if we were ſkilful phyſicians, ought not you and I to conſider as follows: By the Gods, how is Socrates affected in his body with reſpect to health? Or is there any other perſon, whether a ſlave or free-born, who by the help of Socrates is liberated from diſeaſe? And indeed I think I may conſider other things of this kind reſpecting you. And if we do not find any one, ſtranger or citizen, man or woman, whoſe body has been benefited by our aſſiſtance, will it not, by Jupiter, Callicles, be truly ridiculous, that we ſhould proceed to that degree of folly as to attempt, according to the proverb[1], to

[1] This proverb, according to Zenobius, is applied to thoſe who paſs over the firſt diſciplines, and immediately apply themſelves to the greater. Juſt as if ſome one learning the potter's art ſhould attempt to make a tub before he had learned how to make tables, or any other ſmall utenſil.

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teach a potter in making a tub, before we have tranſacted many things privately, as they might happen to occur, and have happily accompliſhed many things, and been ſufficiently exerciſed in the medical art, and ſhould endeavour to exhort others like ourſelves to exerciſe medicine publicly? Does it not appear to you that a conduct of this kind would be ſtupid?

CAL. It does.

SOC. But now, O beſt of men, ſince you have juſt begun to tranſact public affairs, and you exhort me to the ſame, reproaching me at the ſame time that I do not engage in them, ought we not mutually to conſider as follows: What citizen has Callicles made a better man? Is there any one who, being before depraved, unjuſt, intemperate, and unwiſe, has through Callicles become a worthy and good man, whether he is a ſtranger or a citizen, a ſlave or free-born? Tell me, Callicles, if any one ſhould aſk you theſe things, what would you ſay? Whom would you aſſert to be a better man from aſſociating with you? Are you averſe to anſwer, if there is as yet any private work of this kind accompliſhed by you, before you engage in public affairs?

CAL. You are contentious, Socrates.

SOC. But I do not aſk through a love of contention, but in conſequence of really wiſhing to know, after what manner you think government ought to be conducted by us. Or would you, when applying yourſelf to public affairs, attend to any thing elſe than that we citizens may be rendered the beſt of men? Or have we not often acknowledged that this ought to be done by a politician? Have we, or not, acknowledged this? Anſwer. We have acknowledged it. I will anſwer for you. If, therefore, a good man ought to procure this for his city, now having recollected, inform me reſpecting thoſe men whom you a little before mentioned, if they any longer appear to you to have been good citizens,—I mean Pericles and Cimon, Miltiades and Themiſtocles.

CAL. To me they do.

SOC. If, therefore, they were good men, did not each of them render their fellow-citizens better inſtead of worſe? Did they render them ſo, or not?

CAL. They did.

SOC.

Soc. When Pericles, therefore, began to ſpeak to the people, were they not worſe than when he addreſſed them for the laſt time?

Cal. Perhaps ſo.

Soc. It is not proper to ſay 'perhaps', O beſt of men; but this muſt be a neceſſary conſequence from what has been granted, if he was a good citizen.

Cal. But what then?

Soc. Nothing. But beſides this inform me, whether the Athenians are ſaid to have become better men through Pericles, or on the contrary were corrupted by him. For I hear that Pericles rendered the Athenians indolent, timid, loquacious, and avaricious, having firſt of all rendered them mercenary.

Cal. You hear theſe things, Socrates, from thoſe whoſe ears are broken.

Soc. However, I no longer hear theſe things; but both you and I clearly know that Pericles at firſt was much celebrated, and was not condemned by the Athenians by any ignominious ſentence, at the very time when they were worſe; but when he had made them worthy and good, then towards the cloſe of his life they fraudulently condemned him, and were on the point of putting him to death as if he had been an unworthy man.

Cal. What then? Was Pericles on this account a bad man?

Soc. Indeed, a perſon of this kind who has the care of aſſes, horſes, and oxen, appears to be a bad character, if, receiving theſe animals neither kicking backwards, nor puſhing with their horns, nor biting, he cauſes them to do all theſe things through ferocity of diſpoſition. Or does not every curator of an animal appear to you to be a bad man, who, having received it of a milder nature, renders it more ſavage than when he received it? Does he appear to you to be ſo, or not?

Cal. Entirely ſo, that I may gratify you.

Soc. Gratify me alſo in this, by anſwering whether man is an animal, or not.

Cal. Undoubtedly he is.

Soc. Did not Pericles, therefore, take care of men?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. What then? Is it not requiſite, as we juſt now acknowledged, that they

they ſhould become through him more juſt, inſtead of more unjuſt, if he, being a good politician, took care of them?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Are not, therefore, the juſt mild, as Homer[1] ſays? But what do you ſay? Is it not ſo?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. But, indeed, he rendered them more ſavage than when he received them: and this againſt himſelf; which was far from being his intention.

CAL. Are you willing I ſhould aſſent to you?

SOC. If I appear to you to ſpeak the truth.

CAL. Be it ſo, then.

SOC. If, therefore, he rendered them more ſavage, muſt he not alſo have rendered them more unjuſt, and worſe characters?

CAL. Be it ſo.

SOC. From this reaſoning, therefore, it follows, that Pericles was not a good politician.

CAL. You, indeed, ſay not.

SOC. And, by Jupiter, you ſay ſo too, from what you have acknowledged. But, again, tell me reſpecting Cimon. Did not thoſe who were the objects of his care puniſh him by an oſtraciſm, and ſo as that for ten years they might not hear his voice? And they acted in a ſimilar manner towards Themiſtocles, and, beſides this, puniſhed him with exile. But they decreed that Miltiades, who fought at the battle of Marathon, ſhould be hurled into the Barathrum; and unleſs the Prytanis had defended him, he would have fallen into it. Though theſe, if they had been good men, as as you ſay they were, would never have ſuffered theſe things. Indeed, it can never happen that good charioteers ſhould at firſt not be thrown from their cars; but, when they have diſciplined their horſes, and have themſelves become better charioteers, that they ſhould then be thrown from them. This is never the caſe, either in driving a chariot, or in any other employment. Or does it appear to you that it is?

CAL. It does not.

SOC. Our former aſſertions, therefore, as it appears, are true, viz. that we

[1] Odyſſ. vii. ver. 120.

do not know any good politician in this city: but you acknowledge that you know of none at present, but that formerly there were some; and the names of these you have mentioned: but these have appeared to be equal to the politicians of the present day. So that, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use rhetoric truly (for otherwise they would not have fallen into disgrace), nor yet did they employ adulation.

Cal. But indeed, Socrates, it is far from being the case, that any one of the present day will ever accomplish such undertakings as were accomplished by any one of those I mentioned.

Soc. Neither, O divine man, do I blame these men, so far as they were servants of the city; but they appear to me to have been more skilful ministers than those of the present day, and more adapted to procure for the city such things as it desired. But in persuading, and at the same time compelling, the citizens to repress their desires, and not indulge them, by means of which they would become better men, in this those former politicians in no respect differed from such as exist at present; for this, indeed, is alone the work of a good citizen. But, with respect to procuring ships, walls, and docks, and many other things of this kind, I also agree with you, that those were more skilful than these. I, therefore, and you, act ridiculously in this disputation. For during the whole time of our conversation we have not ceased to revolve about the same thing, and to be mutually ignorant of what we said. I think, therefore, that you have often acknowledged and known, that there is this twofold employment, both respecting the body and soul: and that the one is ministrant, by which we are enabled, if hungry, to procure food for our bodies, and, if thirsty, drink; if cold, garments, coverlids, shoes, and other things which the body requires. And I will designedly speak to you through the same images, that you may more easily understand. If any one then supplies these things, being either a victualler, or a merchant, or an artificer of some one of them, viz. a baker, or a cook, a weaver, shoemaker, or mason, it is by no means wonderful that, being a person of this kind, he should appear, both to himself and others, to be a curator of the body; I mean, to all those who are ignorant that, besides all these, there is a certain gymnastic and medicinal art, to which the care of the body in reality pertains; to which it belongs to rule over all these arts, and to use their respective works; in consequence of knowing what is good and bad in solid or

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liquid aliment, with reſpect to the virtue of the body, while all the other arts are ignorant of this. On this account, it is neceſſary that theſe arts ſhould be ſervile, miniſtrant, and illiberal, reſpecting the concerns of the body; but that gymnaſtic and medicine ſhould be juſtly the miſtreſſes of theſe. That the very ſame things, likewiſe, take place in the ſoul, you appeared at the ſame time to grant me, as if knowing what I ſaid; but a little after you aſſerted that there had been worthy and good citizens in this city. And when I aſked you who they were, you appeared to me to exhibit juſt ſuch men, with reſpect to political concerns, as if, in conſequence of my aſking about gymnaſtic affairs, who have been, or are at preſent, good curators of bodies, you ſhould ſeriouſly anſwer me, that Thearion the baker, and Mithæcus, who wrote on the Sicilian art of cooking, and Sarambus the victualler, were wonderful curators of bodies; the firſt of whom made admirable bread; the ſecond procured admirable food; and the third admirable wine. Perhaps, therefore, you will be indignant if I ſhould ſay to you, O man, you underſtand nothing reſpecting gymnaſtic. You have told me of men who are the miniſters and purveyors of deſires, but you do not underſtand any thing beautiful and good concerning them; who, if it ſhould ſo happen, while they fill the bodies of men, and render them groſs, and are praiſed by them for ſo doing, at the ſame time deſtroy their antient fleſh. Theſe, therefore, through their unſkilfulneſs, do not accuſe men given to feaſting, as the cauſes of the diſeaſes with which they are infeſted, and of the loſs of their antient fleſh, but thoſe who happen to be then preſent, and give them ſome advice. But, after a long time, when repletion introduces diſeaſe, in conſequence of having taken place without the healthful, then they accuſe and blame theſe adviſers, and would injure them if they were able; but praiſe thoſe miniſters of their deſires, and the cauſes of their maladies. And now you, O Callicles, act in a manner moſt ſimilar to this; for you praiſe thoſe who delight ſuch-like men with feaſting, and who ſatiate them with the objects of their deſire, and ſay that they make the city great; but who do not perceive that the city is ſwoln, and inwardly in a bad condition, through thoſe antient men. For, without temperance and juſtice, they have filled the city with ports and docks, with walls and tributes, and ſuch-like trifles. When, therefore, this acceſſion of imbecility arrived, they accuſed the adviſers that were then preſent, but praiſed Themiſtocles,

Cimon, and Pericles, who were the cauſes of the maladies: but you perhaps, unleſs you are careful, they will apprehend, together with my aſſociate Alcibiades, ſince they have deſtroyed thoſe antient particulars, beſides thoſe which they have acquired; though you are not the cauſes, but perhaps the con-cauſes, of the evils. Indeed, I perceive that a very ſtupid affair takes place at preſent, and I hear that it has taken place with reſpect to antient men. For I ſee that when a city conducts itſelf towards any political character, as one that acts unjuſtly, ſuch a one is indignant, and complains as ſuffering grievouſly, though he has conferred many benefits on the city. Are, therefore, ſuch unjuſtly deſtroyed by the city, according to their aſſertion? But, indeed, their aſſertion is entirely falſe. For he who preſides over a city can never be unjuſtly cut off by the city over which he preſides. For thoſe who profeſs themſelves to be politicians, appear to be the ſame with thoſe that call themſelves ſophiſts. For the ſophiſts, though wiſe in other things, act abſurdly in this reſpect. Proclaiming themſelves to be teachers of virtue, they often accuſe their diſciples of acting unjuſtly towards them, by defrauding them of their wages, and other teſtimonies of gratitude for the benefits they receive from them. But what can be more irrational than ſuch an accuſation?—I mean, that men who have become good and juſt, being freed from injuſtice by their preceptor, and having obtained juſtice, ſhould yet act unjuſtly from that very thing which they have not? Does not this, my friend, appear to you to be abſurd? You compel me in reality, Callicles, to make a public harangue, becauſe you are unwilling to anſwer me.

CAL. But cannot you ſpeak unleſs ſome one anſwers you?

SOC. I ſeem, indeed, as if I could. For now I extend my diſcourſes, ſince you are not willing to anſwer me. But, O good man, tell me, by Jupiter, the guardian of friendſhip, does it not appear to you irrational, that he who ſays he can make another perſon a good man, ſhould blame this man, that, having become good through his inſtructions, and being ſo now, he is, notwithſtanding, an unworthy character?

CAL. To me it appears ſo.

SOC. Do you not, therefore, hear thoſe who profeſs to inſtruct men in virtue ſpeaking in this manner?

CAL. I do. But why do you ſpeak about men of no worth?

SOC. But what will you ſay reſpecting thoſe men, who, while they aſſert that

that they preſide over the city, and are careful that it may be the beſt poſſible, again accuſe it, when it ſo happens, as the worſt of cities? Do you think that theſe differ in any reſpect from thoſe? O bleſſed man! a ſophiſt and a rhetorician are the ſame, or they are ſomething near and ſimilar, as I and Polus have ſaid. But you, through ignorance, think that rhetoric is ſomething all-beautiful, and deſpiſe the ſophiſtic art. In reality, however, the ſophiſtic art is as much more beautiful than rhetoric, as the legiſlative than the judicial profeſſion, and gymnaſtic than medicine. But I think public ſpeakers and ſophiſts alone ought not to complain that the thing which they teach is evil to themſelves; or, if they do, that they muſt accuſe themſelves at the ſame time of not having in any reſpect benefited thoſe whom they profeſs to have benefited. Is it not ſo?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And, indeed, it will be proper to impart benefit to theſe alone, if they aſſerted what is true. For, if ſome one ſhould receive any other benefit, as, for inſtance, the power of running ſwiftly, through the inſtructions of a maſter of gymnaſtic, perhaps he would be averſe to recompenſe him, if the maſter of gymnaſtic benefited him without having made an agreement that he ſhould be paid for his trouble as ſoon as he had enabled him to run ſwiftly. For men, I think, do not act unjuſtly through ſlowneſs, but through injuſtice. Or do they not?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. If, therefore, any one ſhould take away this,—I mean injuſtice,—would it not follow, that there would be no occaſion to fear leſt he ſhould ſuffer injuſtice; but that to him alone it would be ſafe to impart this benefit, if any one is in reality able to form good men? Is it not ſo?

CAL. I ſay ſo.

SOC. Hence, as it appears, there is nothing baſe in taking money for giving advice about other things, as, for inſtance, reſpecting building, or other arts.

CAL. So it appears.

SOC. But, with reſpect to this action,—I mean, how any one may be rendered the beſt of men, and may govern his own family, or the city, in the moſt excellent manner,—it is reckoned baſe to withhold advice, unleſs money is given to the adviſer. Is it not ſo?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. For it is evident that the reaſon is this: that, of all benefits, this alone renders him who is benefited deſirous of making a recompenſe. So that it appears to be a beautiful ſign, if he who imparts the benefit is in his turn benefited; but by no means if he is not. Are theſe things ſo, or not?

CAL. They are.

SOC. Define, therefore, to which mode of healing the maladies of a city you exhort me: whether to that of contending with the Athenians, that they may become the beſt of men, as if I were a phyſician; or to that by which I may miniſter to their wants, in order to obtain their favour. Tell me the truth, Callicles. For it is but juſt, that, as you began to ſpeak to me freely, you ſhould continue to impart your conceptions. And now ſpeak well and generouſly.

CAL. I ſay, therefore, that I exhort you to act as miniſtrant to the city.

SOC. You exhort me, therefore, moſt generous man, to employ flattery.

CAL. Unleſs you had rather be the prey of the Myſians; which will be the caſe, if you do not act in this manner.

SOC. Do not ſay, what you often have ſaid, that any one who is willing might ſlay me, leſt I again ſhould ſay, that an unworthy would ſlay a good man; nor yet that he might take away whatever I poſſeſſed, leſt I alſo ſhould again ſay, that after he has taken away my poſſeſſions he would not derive any advantage from them; but that, as he has unjuſtly deprived me of them, he will alſo, having received them, uſe them unjuſtly; and if unjuſtly, baſely; and if baſely, wickedly.

CAL. You appear to me, Socrates, to believe that you ſhall never ſuffer any of theſe things, as being one who lives at a diſtance, and that you ſhall never be brought before a court of juſtice by a man, perhaps, entirely depraved and vile.

SOC. I am therefore, O Callicles, in reality ſtupid, unleſs I think that any one in this city may ſuffer whatever may happen to take place. But this I well know, that if I was brought before a court of juſtice, and I ſhould be in danger reſpecting any one of theſe particulars which you mention, he who brings me thither will be a depraved man. For no worthy man will bring one who is innocent before a court of juſtice. Nor would it be any thing wonderful,

wonderful, if in this caſe I ſhould be condemned to death. Are you willing I ſhould tell you why I ſhould expect theſe things?

CAL. By all means.

SOC. I think that I, in conjunction with a few Athenians, (that I may not ſay alone,) apply myſelf to the true political art, and alone of thoſe of the preſent day perform things political. As, therefore, the diſcourſes which I make are not compoſed for the ſake of popular favour, but with a view to that which is beſt, and not to that which is moſt pleaſant,—and as I am not willing to do thoſe elegant things which you now adviſe me to do,—I ſhould not have any thing to ſay in a court of juſtice. But the ſame diſcourſe occurs to me which I addreſſed to Polus. For I ſhould be judged in the ſame manner as a phyſician would be judged among boys, when accuſed by a cook. For conſider what would be the apology of ſuch a man, when apprehended by theſe, if any one ſhould accuſe him as follows: O boys, this man fabricates for you many evils, and corrupts both you and the youngeſt of you. For, by cutting, burning, emaciating, and almoſt ſuffocating you, he makes you deſperate; and likewiſe by giving you the moſt bitter potions, and compelling you to be hungry and thirſty; not delighting you, as I do, with many pleaſant and all-various dainties. What do you think the phyſician would have to ſay in ſuch a bad ſituation? If he ſpoke the truth, would he not ſay, I have done all theſe things, boys, for the ſake of health? But, upon this, in what manner do you think theſe judges would exclaim? Would they not loudly exclaim?

CAL. Perhaps it may be proper to think ſo.

SOC. Do you not think, therefore, that he would be perfectly at a loſs what to ſay?

CAL. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And I alſo know that I ſhould be affected in the very ſame manner, on coming into a court of juſtice. For I ſhould not be able to mention any pleaſures which I had imparted to them, and which they conſider as benefits and advantages. But I neither emulate thoſe that impart them, nor thoſe to whom they are imparted. And if any one ſhould ſay that I corrupt young men, by cauſing them to doubt, or accuſe elderly men, by employing bitter diſcourſes, either privately or publicly, I ſhould not be able to ſay that

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which is the truth, that I aſſert and do all theſe things juſtly; and that it is your province, O judges, to act in this manner, and to do nothing elſe. So that, perhaps, I ſhould ſuffer whatever might happen to be the conſequence.

CAL. Does therefore, Socrates, that man appear to you to be in a good condition in a city who is thus circumſtanced, and is unable to help himſelf?

SOC. He does, if he is in that condition, Callicles, which you have often allowed, viz. if he can aſſiſt himſelf, and has not either ſaid or done any thing unjuſtly reſpecting men or Gods. For it has often been acknowledged by us, that this is the beſt aid which any one can impart to himſelf. If, therefore, any one can prove that I am incapable of affording this aſſiſtance either to myſelf or another, I ſhall be aſhamed, whether I am convicted of this impotency before many, or a few, or alone, by myſelf alone. And if I ſhould be puniſhed with death on account of this impotency, I ſhould be indignant. But if I ſhould die through the want of adulatory rhetoric, I well know that you would behold me bearing death eaſily. For no one fears to die, who is not entirely irrational and effeminate: but he fears to act unjuſtly; ſince, for the ſoul to come to Hades full of unjuſt actions, is the extremity of all evils. But, if you pleaſe, I wiſh to ſhow you by a certain narration that this is the caſe.

CAL. Since you have finiſhed the other things which remained to be completed, finiſh this alſo.

SOC. Hear then, as they ſay, a very beautiful narration; which you indeed will, I think, conſider as a fable; but I conſider it as a relation of facts. For the particulars of the enſuing narration are true. As Homer ſays, then, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, divided[1] the government among themſelves, after

[1] The ineffable principle of things did not produce ſenſibles by his own *immediate* energy: for there would have been a privation of order, if we had been directly produced by the firſt cauſe. And, in the progreſſion of things, the ſimilar is always unfolded into ſubſiſtence prior to the diſſimilar. By how much greater, therefore, one cauſe is than another, by ſo much does one effect ſurpaſs another. Hence, he who poſſeſſes ſcience in a higher degree produces more illuſtrious diſciples. It is neceſſary, therefore, that other powers greater than we are ſhould be produced by the firſt cauſe, and thus that we afterwards ſhould be generated from theſe: for we are the dregs of the univerſe. Theſe mighty powers, from their ſurpaſſing ſimilitude to the firſt God, were very

after they had received it from their father. This law [1], therefore, reſpecting men ſubſiſted under Saturn, and always was, and now is, eſtabliſhed among the Gods,

very properly called by the antients Gods; and were conſidered by them as perpetually ſubſiſting in the moſt admirable and profound union with each other, and the firſt cauſe; yet, ſo as amidſt this union to preſerve their own eſſence diſtinct from that of their ineffable cauſe.

But theſe mighty powers are called by the poets a *golden chain*, on account of their connection with each other, and incorruptible nature. One of theſe powers you may call *intellectual*; a ſecond, *vivific*; a third, *Pæonian*, and ſo on; which the antients deſiring to ſignify to us by names, have ſymbolically denominated. Hence (ſays Olympiodorus, in MS. Comment. in Gorgiam) we ought not to be diſturbed on hearing ſuch names as a Saturnian power, the power of Jupiter, and ſuch-like, but explore the things to which they allude. Thus, for inſtance, by a Saturnian power rooted in the firſt cauſe, underſtand a pure intellect: for Κρονος, or Saturn, is κορος νους, i. e. ὁ καθαρος, or, a *pure intellect*. Hence, thoſe that are pure, and virgins, are called κοραι. On this account, too, poets * ſay that Saturn devoured his children, and afterwards again ſent them into the light, becauſe intellect is converted to itſelf, ſeeks itſelf, and is itſelf fought: but he again refunds them, becauſe intellect not only ſeeks and procreates, but produces into light and profits. On this account, too, he is called αγκυλομητις, or *inflected counſel*, becauſe an inflected figure verges to itſelf. Again, as there is nothing diſordered and novel in intellect, they repreſent Saturn as an old man, and as ſlow in his motion: and hence it is that aſtrologers ſay, that ſuch as have Saturn well ſituated in their nativity are prudent, and endued with intellect.

Further ſtill: the antient theologiſts called life by the name of Jupiter, to whom they gave a twofold appellation, δια and ζηνα, ſignifying by theſe names that he gives *life through* himſelf. They alſo aſſert that the ſun is drawn by four horſes, and that he is perpetually young, ſignifying by this his power, which is motive of the whole of nature ſubject to his dominion, his fourfold converſions, and the vigour of his energies. But they ſay that the moon is drawn by two bulls: by *two*, on account of her increaſe and diminution; but by *bulls*, becauſe, as theſe till the ground, ſo the moon governs all thoſe parts which ſurround the earth.

Plato ſays, therefore, that Jupiter and Neptune diſtributed the government from Saturn; and ſince Plato does not faſhion a political but a philoſophical fable, he does not ſay, like the poets, that they received the kingdom of Saturn by violence, but that they divided it. What then are we to underſtand by receiving law from Saturn? We reply that law is the diſtribution of intellect; and we have before obſerved that Saturn ſignifies intellect. Hence law is thence derived.

Again, mundane natures, ſays Olympiodorus, are triple; for ſome are celeſtial, others terreſtrial,

[1] Neither *was* nor *will be* can be aſſerted of a divine nature: for *was* is paſt, and no longer is, and *will be* is imperfect, and is not yet. But nothing of this kind can be conceived of Divinity. As, therefore, Plato introduces this as a fable, on this account he uſes the term *was*; but ſince the fable is not poetic, but philoſophic, he alſo introduces the word *always*.

* This is aſſerted by Heſiod in his Theogony.

Gods, viz. that the man who has paſſed through life in a juſt and holy manner, when he dies, departing to the iſlands of the bleſſed, ſhall dwell in all

reſtrial, and others between theſe, viz. the fiery, aërial, aquatic. And of theſe, Jupiter poſſeſſes the celeſtial, Pluto the terreſtrial, and Neptune thoſe between. Again, through theſe things the powers preſiding over theſe natures are ſignified. For Jupiter on this account has a ſceptre, as ſignifying the judicial; but Neptune a trident, as preſiding over the triple nature in the middle; and Pluto a helmet, on account of the obſcure. For, as a helmet conceals the head, ſo this power (i. e. Pluto) belongs to things unapparent. Nor muſt it be thought that philoſophers worſhip ſtones and images as things divine: but ſince, living according to ſenſe, we are not able to arrive at an incorporeal and immaterial power, images are deviſed for the purpoſe of recalling to the memory divine natures; that, ſeeing and reverencing theſe, we may form a conception of incorporeal powers. This, therefore, is alſo ſaid by the poets, that Jupiter mingling with Themis begot three daughters, Equity, Juſtice, and Peace. Equity, therefore, reigns in the inerratic ſphere: for there the ſame motion ſubſiſts perpetually, and after the ſame manner, and nothing is there diſtributed. But Juſtice rules in the planetary ſpheres: for here there is a ſeparation * of the ſtars; and where there is ſeparation, there juſtice is neceſſary, that an harmonious diſtribution may be made according to deſert. And Peace reigns over terreſtrial natures, becauſe contention is among theſe; and where there is contention, there peace is neceſſary. But there is a contention here of the hot and the cold, the moiſt and the dry. Hence they ſay that Ulyſſes wandered on the ſea by the will of Neptune. For they ſignify by this, that the Odyſſean life was neither terreſtrial, nor yet celeſtial, but between theſe. Since, therefore, Neptune is the lord of the middle natures, on this account they ſay that Ulyſſes wandered through the will of Neptune, becauſe he had the allotment of Neptune. Thus alſo they ſpeak of the ſons of Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, regarding the allotments of each. For we ſay that he who has a divine and celeſtial polity is the ſon of Jupiter; that he who has a terreſtrial polity is the ſon of Pluto; and that he is the ſon of Neptune whoſe polity or allotment is between theſe. Again, Vulcan is a certain power preſiding over bodies; and hence he ſays of himſelf in Homer:

All day I fell.....

becauſe his attention to bodies is perpetual. On this account, alſo, he operates with bellowſes (ἐν φυσαις ἐργαζεται) viz. in natures (ἀντι τῶν ἐν ταις φυσεσι). For this power leads forth nature to the care of bodies. Since, therefore, Plato makes mention here of the iſlands of the bleſſed, of puniſhment, and a priſon, let us unfold what each of them is. Geographers then ſay that the iſlands of the bleſſed are about the ocean, and that ſouls depart thither that have lived well. This, however, is abſurd, for ſouls thus would live a ſtormy life. What then ſhall we ſay? The ſolution is this: Philoſophers aſſimilate the life of men to the ſea, becauſe it is turbulent, prolific, bitter, and laborious. But it is neceſſary to know that iſlands are raiſed above the ſea, being more

* Viz. the planets are diſtributed into different ſpheres, and are not all of them contained in one ſphere, like the fixed ſtars.

elevated.

all felicity, removed from evil; but that he who has lived unjuſtly and impiouſly ſhall go to the priſon of puniſhment and juſtice, which they call Tartarus. But the judges of theſe, during the reign of Saturn, and even recently, Jupiter poſſeſſing the government, were living judges of the living, judging on that very day on which any one happened to die. In conſequence of this they judged badly. On this account, therefore, Pluto, and thoſe to whom the care of the iſlands of the bleſſed was committed, went to Jupiter, and informed him that men came to them who were unworthy, whether they were accuſers or the accuſed. But Jupiter ſaid, I will prevent this in future. For now judgments are badly exerciſed; becauſe thoſe that are judged are judged clothed; for they are judged while living. Many, therefore, ſays he, whoſe ſouls are depraved are inveſted with beautiful bodies, are noble by birth, and rich; and when judgment of their conduct takes place, many witneſſes appear in their behalf, teſtifying that they have lived juſtly. Hence the judges are aſtoniſhed at theſe things, and are at the ſame time themſelves clothed, while judging, as prior to their ſoul being concealed they have a veil before their eyes and ears, and the whole of their body [1]. All theſe things, indeed, are placed before them, as well their own veſtments

elevated. Hence, they call that polity which tranſcends the preſent life and generation, the iſlands of the bleſſed; and theſe are the ſame with the Elyſian fields. On this account, alſo, Hercules accompliſhed his laſt labour in the Heſperian regions, ſignifying by this, that, having vanquiſhed a dark and terreſtrial life, he afterwards lived in day, that is, in truth and light.

Philoſophers, then, are of opinion that the earth is cavernous, like a pumice ſtone, and that it is perforated as far as to its ultimate centre. They likewiſe think that about the centre there are different places, and certain fiery, cold, and Charonian powers, as the exhalations of the earth evince. The laſt place, therefore, is called Tartarus. Hence it is neceſſary to know that ſouls that have lived viciouſly remain in this place for a certain time, and are puniſhed in their pneumatic vehicle: for thoſe that have ſinned through the ſweetneſs of pleaſure can only be purified by the bitterneſs of pain.

Again, ſouls that are hurled into Tartarus are no longer moved: for it is the centre of the earth, and there is not any place beneath it. For, if they were moved, they would again begin to aſcend; ſince all beyond the centre is upwards. Hence, the priſon is there of dæmons and terreſtrial preſiding powers: for by Cerberus, and things of this kind, they ſignify dæmoniacal powers.

[1] Such, ſays Olympiodorus, is the fable, which, agreeably to the nature of a fable, does not preſerve *together* things which always ſubſiſt together, but divides them into prior and poſterior. It alſo firſt ſpeaks of the more imperfect, and afterwards of the perfect: for it is neceſſary to ad-

veſtments as the veſtments of thoſe that are judged. In the firſt place, therefore, ſays he, they muſt be deprived of the power of foreſeeing death: for now they do foreſee it. Hence, Prometheus[1] muſt be ordered to make this faculty

vance from the imperfect to the perfect. When the fable, therefore, ſays that the judges were living judges of the living, judging on that very day in which any one happened to die, and that in conſequence of this they judged badly; this ſignifies that we judge badly, but divine judges well. For they know who ought to be ſent to Tartarus, and who to the iſlands of the bleſſed. The fable, therefore, looking to our judgment, and beginning from the imperfect, ſays that formerly they judged badly; but, proceeding to the perfect, it ſays that now they judge juſtly. Jupiter does not effect this from himſelf, but at the requeſt of Pluto, becauſe ſubordinate convert themſelves to ſuperior natures.

Again, let us ſhow what is meant by the judges being formerly in bodies, but now naked. Here, therefore, again the fable divides, and calls us from the more imperfect to the perfect. It is neceſſary to know, therefore, that our life is obſcurely ſignified by this, both in the preſent ſtate of exiſtence, and hereafter. For, in this life, both we and thoſe that we judge are in bodies; and hence deception takes place. In conſequence of this, from judging paſſively, we do not ſend to Tartarus a depraved character, as one who is miſerable, but, on the contrary, to the iſlands of the bleſſed. But, in another life, both the judges and thoſe that are judged are naked.

[1] *Prometheus*, ſays Olympiodorus, is the inſpective guardian of the deſcent of rational ſouls: for to exert a *providential energy* is the employment of the rational ſoul, and, prior to any thing elſe, to know itſelf. Irrational natures, indeed, perceive through percuſſion, and prior to impulſion know nothing; but the rational nature is able, prior to information from another, to know what is uſeful. Hence, *Epimetheus* is the inſpective guardian of the irrational ſoul, becauſe it knows through percuſſion, and not prior to it. Prometheus, therefore, is that power which preſides over the deſcent of rational ſouls. But *fire* ſignifies the rational ſoul itſelf; becauſe, as fire tends upwards, ſo the rational ſoul purſues things on high. But you will ſay, Why is this fire ſaid to have been ſtolen? Becauſe that which is ſtolen is transferred from its proper place to one that is foreign. Since, therefore, the rational ſoul is ſent from its proper place of abode on high, to earth, as to a foreign region, on this account the fire is ſaid to be ſtolen. But why was it concealed in a reed? Becauſe a reed is cavernous (συριγγωδης), and therefore ſignifies the flowing body (το ῥευστον σωμα), in which the ſoul is carried. But why was the fire ſtolen, contrary to the will of Jupiter? Again, the fable ſpeaks as a fable: for both Prometheus and Jupiter are willing that the ſoul ſhould abide on high; but as it is requiſite that ſhe ſhould deſcend, the fable fabricates particulars accommodated to the perſons. And it repreſents, indeed, the ſuperior character, which is Jupiter, as unwilling; for he wiſhes the ſoul always to abide on high: but the inferior character, Prometheus, obliges her to deſcend. Jupiter, therefore, ordered *Pandora* to be made. And what elſe is this than *the irrational ſoul* *, which is of a feminine characteriſtic? For, as it was

* The reader muſt remember, that the true man, or the rational ſoul, conſiſts of *intellect, the dianoëtic power*, and *opinion*; but the ſummit of the irrational life is the *phantaſy*, under which *deſire*, like a many-headed ſavage beaſt, and *anger*, like a raging lion, ſubſiſt.

neceſſary

faculty in them ceaſe: and afterwards they muſt be judged diveſted of all theſe things; for it is requiſite that they ſhould be judged when dead. It is likewiſe requiſite that the judge ſhould be naked and dead, ſpeculating the ſoul itſelf, with the ſoul itſelf, every one dying ſuddenly, deſtitute of all his kindred, and leaving all that ornament on the earth, that the judgment may be juſt. I therefore having known theſe things before you, have made my ſons judges; two indeed from Aſia [1], Minos and Rhadamanthus; and one from Europe, Æacus. Theſe then, after their death, ſhall judge in the meadow, in the highway, where two roads extend, the one to the iſlands of the bleſſed, and the other to Tartarus. And Rhadamanthus ſhall judge thoſe from Aſia, but Æacus thoſe from Europe. But I will confer this additional dignity upon Minos, that he ſhall decide whatever may be inſcrutable to the other judges, that the judgement reſpecting the path of men may be moſt juſt.

Theſe are the things, O Callicles, which I have heard, and believe to be true: and from this narration I infer that a thing of the following kind muſt take place. Death, as it appears to me, is nothing elſe than the diſſolution of two things, viz. of the ſoul and body from each other. But when

neceſſary that the ſoul ſhould deſcend to theſe lower regions, but, being incorporeal and divine, it was impoſſible for her to be conjoined with body without a medium, hence ſhe becomes united with it through the irrational ſoul. But this irrational ſoul was called Pandora, becauſe each of the Gods beſtowed on it ſome particular gift. And this ſignifies that the illuminations which terreſtrial natures receive take place through the celeſtial bodies*.

[1] Aſia is eaſtern, but Europe has a more weſtern ſituation. But eaſtern parts are analogous to celeſtial natures, through light; but Europe through its curvature to terreſtrial natures. Through theſe two, therefore, viz. Aſia and Europe, a celeſtial and terreſtrial polity are ſignified. There is alſo a middle polity, which Plato ſignifies through the doctrine of the extremes. For, having ſpoken of a celeſtial and terreſtrial polity, he alſo manifeſts that which has a middle ſubſiſtence; juſt as above, having ſpoken of thoſe that are ſent to the iſlands of the bleſſed, and thoſe that are hurled into Tartarus, he likewiſe manifeſts ſouls which are characterized by a middle life.

In the next place, in order to know what is meant by the meadow, and the roads in which they judge, it is neceſſary to obſerve that the antients call generation moiſt, on account of its flowing nature, and becauſe the mortal life flouriſhes here. The place of judgment, therefore, is ſaid to be in æther, after the places under the moon, and this is called a meadow through its moiſture and variety.

* For the irrational ſoul is an *immaterial body*, or, in other words, *vitalized extenſion*, ſuch as the mathematical bodies which we frame in the phantaſy; and the celeſtial bodies are of this kind.

they are mutually ſeparated, each of them poſſeſſes its own habit, not much leſs than when the man was living; the body conſpicuouſly retaining its own nature, attire, and paſſions. So that, for inſtance, if the body of any one while living was large by nature, or aliment, or from both, the body of ſuch a one when dead will alſo be large; and if corpulent, it will be corpulent when dead; and ſo with reſpect to other things. And if any one while living was ſtudious to obtain long hair, the hair alſo of the dead body of ſuch a one will be long. Again, if any one while living had been whipped, and retained as veſtiges of the blows in his body ſcars from ſcourges, or other wounds, his dead body alſo is ſeen to preſerve the ſame marks. And if the limbs of any one were broken or diſtorted while he lived, theſe alſo will be conſpicuous when he is dead. And, in ſhort, whatever was the condition of the body of any one while living, ſuch will be its condition entirely, or for the moſt part, for a certain time, when dead. The ſame thing alſo, Callicles, appears to me to take place reſpecting the ſoul; viz. that all things are conſpicuous in the ſoul, after it is diveſted of body, as well whatever it poſſeſſes from nature [1], as thoſe paſſions which the man acquired in his ſoul, from his various purſuits. When, therefore, they come to the judge [2], thoſe from Aſia to Rhadamanthus, Rhadamanthus ſtopping them contemplates the ſoul of each, not knowing to whom it belongs; but often ſeizing the ſoul of the great king, or of any other king

[1] We muſt not think from this, ſays Olympiodorus, that vice is natural to the ſoul. For, ſince the ſoul is incorporeal and immortal, if it naturally poſſeſſed vice, vice alſo would be immortal; which is abſurd. By the term *from nature*, therefore, Plato means the ſoul living in conjunction with things baſe; ſo that vice is as it were coeſſentialized with it, the ſoul becoming ſubſervient to the temperaments of the body. The ſoul, therefore, ſuffers puniſhment for this, becauſe, being in ſhort ſelf-motive, and connected with anger and deſire, and certain corporeal temperaments, ſhe does not harmonize theſe, and lead them to a better condition, by her ſelf-motive power. For, as a phyſician very properly ſcourges him who has an ophthalmy, not becauſe he labours under this diſeaſe, but becauſe he has touched and agitated his eyes, and has not preſerved the form enjoined by the phyſician; in like manner the demiurgus puniſhes ſouls, as not ſubduing by their ſelf-motive power the paſſions which were imparted to them for their good: for it is neceſſary that they ſhould be vanquiſhed, and employed to a good and not to a bad purpoſe.

[2] Plato here preſents us with a fable, but he does not ſuffer it to be poetical, but likewiſe adds demonſtrations: for this is the peculiarity of philoſophical fables. See the general Introduction to this work.

or potentate, he beholds nothing ſound in ſuch a ſoul, but ſees that it has been vehemently whipped, and that it is full of ſcars, through the perjuries and injuſtice impreſſed in it by its ſeveral actions; that all things in it are diſtorted [1] through falſehood and arrogance, and that nothing is right, in conſequence of its having been educated without truth. He likewiſe ſees that ſuch a ſoul through power, luxury, and intemperate conduct, is full of inelegance and baſeneſs. On ſeeing however a ſoul in this condition, he directly [2] ſends it into cuſtody with diſgrace; whither when arrived, it will ſuffer

[1] For when the ſoul is defiled and wounded by the paſſions nothing in it is *ſtraight*.

[2] Again, Olympiodorus obſerves as follows: It is neceſſary to know that ſouls which have moderately ſinned, are puniſhed but for a ſhort time, and afterwards being purified aſcend. But when I ſay they aſcend, I do not mean locally, but vitally: for Plotinus ſays that the ſoul is elevated, not with feet, but by life. But ſouls that have committed the greateſt crimes are *directly* ſent to Tartarus; Plato uſing the word ευθυς, *directly*, inſtead of *ſwiftly*; a right line being the ſhorteſt of lines which have the ſame extremities. It is here however worth while to doubt why Plato ſays they are always judged, and are never purified. What then, is there never any ceſſation of their puniſhment? If however the ſoul is always puniſhed, and never enjoys good, ſhe is always in vice. But puniſhment regards ſome good. It is not proper, therefore, that the ſoul ſhould always continue in a ſtate contrary to nature, but that ſhe ſhould proceed to a condition according to nature. If, therefore, puniſhment does not in any reſpect benefit us, nor bring us to a better condition, it is inflicted in vain. Neither God, however, nor nature does any thing in vain.

What then are we to underſtand by the *ever?* We reply as follows: There are ſeven ſpheres, that of the moon, that of the ſun, and thoſe of the other planets; but the inerratic is the eighth ſphere. The lunar ſphere, therefore, makes a complete revolution more ſwiftly: for it is accompliſhed in thirty days. That of the ſun is more ſlow: for it is accompliſhed in a year. That of Jupiter is ſtill ſlower: for it is effected in twelve years. And much more that of Saturn; for it is completed in thirty years. The ſtars, therefore, are not conjoined with each other in their revolutions, except rarely. Thus, for inſtance, the ſphere of Saturn and the ſphere of Jupiter are conjoined with each other in their revolutions, in ſixty years. For, if the ſphere of Jupiter comes from the ſame to the ſame in twelve years, but that of Saturn in thirty years, it is evident that when Jupiter has made five, Saturn will have made two revolutions: for twice thirty is ſixty, and ſo likewiſe is twelve times five; ſo that their revolutions will be conjoined in ſixty years. Souls, therefore, are puniſhed for ſuch like periods. But the ſeven planetary ſpheres conjoin their revolutions with the inerratic ſphere, through many myriads of years; and this is the period which Plato calls τον αει χρονον, *for ever*. Souls, therefore, that have been patricides or matricides, and univerſally ſouls of this deſcription, are puniſhed *for ever*, i. e. during this period. Should however ſome one ſay, If a ſoul that has been guilty of parricide ſhould die to-day, and ſixty months, or years, or days after, a conjunction of the revolutions of the ſeven planets with the inerratic ſphere ſhould take place,

ſuffer the puniſhment which it deſerves. But it is proper that every one who is puniſhed if he is rightly puniſhed by another, ſhould either become better, and derive advantage from his puniſhment, or become an example[1] to others, that others perceiving his ſufferings may be terrified and made better. But thoſe are benefited and ſuffer puniſhment both from Gods and men, who have been guilty of curable offences: but at the ſame time the

place, will ſuch a ſoul be puniſhed only for that time? we reply, that ſuch a ſoul is puniſhed for as many years as are ſufficient to effect this conjunction of revolutions. Thus, for inſtance, if this conjunction ſhould take place in a thouſand years, ſuch a perſon when he dies will be puniſhed for a thouſand years. This time, therefore, and this period are denominated by Plato *always*; ſince it is impoſſible for the ſoul to be puniſhed to infinity. Hence the ſoul converts herſelf to herſelf gradually, and again receives an organ on the earth adapted to her deſert. It is neceſſary, therefore, to know that a pneumatic vehicle is ſuſpended from the ſoul, and that this is puniſhed by becoming either very much heated or refrigerated. It may alſo be ſaid, that certain dreadful things preſent themſelves to the view, ſuch as the tragedian ſpeaks of, viz. virgins with a bloody aſpect, and the like.

It is likewiſe neceſſary to know that puniſhment makes the ſoul more ſane, and renders her more adapted to be purified. We muſt not, therefore, think that puniſhments are purification itſelf. For, if the ſoul ſhould be puniſhed without being converted to herſelf, ſhe would not be purified. When, therefore, ſhe becomes ſober and converted to herſelf, as being ſelf-motive, then ſhe is purified; ſince a phyſician alſo purifies a depraved body, but he does not render it ſtrong by his purification. The diſeaſed perſon however recovers his health afterwards, by taking care of himſelf, and not acting in a diſorderly and irregular manner by the aſſumption of improper food. And again, as he who comes from health to diſeaſe forgets what he did when he was well, but as he recovers his health again remembers; ſo the ſoul coming into the preſent life forgets the puniſhments which ſhe formerly endured, and thus acts erroneouſly. For, if ſhe was always conſcious of this, ſhe would not ſin. This forgetfulneſs, however, happens to her for a good purpoſe: for, if ſhe remembered, and did not err through fear, ſhe would preſerve through fear her proper good, and thus would no longer be well conditioned, or act like a ſelf-motive nature. She becomes oblivious, therefore, that ſhe may explore good as being ſelf-motive; ſince we alſo love ſervants, and conſider them as of more worth when they ſerve us voluntarily, and not through fear.

Souls, therefore, are puniſhed here, but they appear to be eſpecially purified hereafter; ſince a life without body is more adapted to them. If however ſome one ſhould aſk, why the poor alſo are not puniſhed who have the will to act unjuſtly, but only the powerful; ſince the poor, if they had inſtruments ſubſervient to their will, ſuch as wealth and the like, would likewiſe ſin, we reply, that the poor alſo if they had an unjuſt will in the preſent life are puniſhed; but the meaſures are different. For he whoſe injuſtice extended no further than to his will, is not puniſhed ſimilarly with him whoſe will has proceeded into energy, and who has acted unjuſtly.

[1] For the ſoul by ſuffering becomes herſelf amended, and is an example to thoſe that behold her.

advantage

advantage which they derive both here and in Hades, takes place through torments and grief: for they cannot by any other means be liberated from injuſtice. But thoſe who have acted unjuſtly in the extreme, and have through ſuch crimes become incurable, ſerve as examples to others. And theſe no longer derive any advantage, as being incurable: but others are benefited on perceiving theſe ſuffering through the whole of time the greateſt, moſt bitter, and moſt horrid puniſhments for their guilt, being indeed ſuſpended in the priſon of Hades as examples, ſpectacles, and warnings to the unjuſt men that come thither. One of whom I ſay Archelaus will be (if Polus ſays true), and every other tyrant who reſembles him. I think too, that the greateſt part of theſe examples will conſiſt of tyrants, kings, and potentates, and ſuch as have governed the affairs of cities. For theſe through their power commit the greateſt and the moſt impious crimes. Homer alſo teſtifies the truth of theſe aſſertions. For he makes thoſe to be kings and potentates, that are puniſhed in Hades through the whole of time, viz. Tantalus, Siſyphus and Tityus[1]; but he does not make Therſites, or any other private unworthy individual, oppreſſed by the greateſt puniſhments as if incurable: for I do not think he could be guilty of incurable offences; on which account, he was more happy than thoſe who could. But, Callicles, men extremely unworthy are among the number of the powerful: at the ſame time, nothing hinders but that good men alſo may ſubſiſt among theſe; and when this is the caſe they deſerve the greateſt admiration. For it is a difficult thing, Callicles, and deſerves much praiſe,

[1] Ulyſſes, ſays Olympiodorus, deſcending into Hades, ſaw among others Siſyphus and Tityus and Tantalus. And Tityus he ſaw lying on the earth, and a vulture devouring his liver; the liver ſignifying that he lived ſolely according to the deſiderative part of his nature, and through this was indeed internally prudent; but earth ſignifying the terreſtrial condition of his prudence. But Siſyphus, living under the dominion of ambition and anger, was employed in continually rolling a ſtone up an eminence, becauſe it perpetually deſcended again; its deſcent implying the vicious government of himſelf; and his rolling the ſtone, the hard, refractory, and as it were rebounding condition of his life. And laſtly, he ſaw Tantalus extended by the ſide of a lake, and that there was a tree before him, with abundance of fruit on its branches, which he deſired to gather, but it vaniſhed from his view: and this indeed indicates that he lived under the dominion of the phantaſy; but his hanging over the lake, and in vain attempting to drink, implies the eluſive, humid, and rapidly-gliding condition of ſuch a life.

for a man who has great power of acting unjuſtly, to paſs through life juſtly. Yet there are a few men of this kind; for they have exiſted both here and elſewhere, and I think there will be hereafter worthy and good men, who will be endued with the virtue of adminiſtering juſtly things committed to their truſt. A character of this kind, and of great celebrity among the other Greeks, was Ariſtides the ſon of Lyſimachus. But the greater part, O moſt excellent man, of potentates are bad men. As I ſaid, therefore, after Rhadamanthus has taken any ſoul into his cuſtody, he does not know any thing elſe reſpecting it, neither who it is, nor from whom it originated. But he only knows that it is a depraved ſoul; and ſeeing this, he ſends it to Tartarus; ſignifying at the ſame time whether it appears to be curable or incurable. But the ſoul arriving thither ſuffers the puniſhments due to its offences. Sometimes, too, Rhadamanthus beholding the ſoul of one who has paſſed through life with truth, whether it is the ſoul of a private man, or of any other—but I ſay, Callicles, eſpecially of a philoſopher, who has tranſacted his own affairs, and has not been engaged in a multiplicity of concerns in life—when this is the caſe, Rhadamanthus is filled with admiration, and diſmiſſes the ſoul to the iſlands of the bleſſed. The ſame things alſo are done by Æacus. And each of them judges, holding a rod [1] in his hand. But Minos, who is the inſpector, is the only one that ſits having a golden [2] ſceptre, as the Ulyſſes of Homer [3] ſays he ſaw him:

> A golden ſceptre in his hand he holds,
> And laws promulgates to the dead.

I therefore, Callicles, am perſuaded by theſe narrations, and conſider how I may appear before my judge, with my ſoul in the moſt healthy condition. Wherefore, bidding farewell to the honours of the multitude, and looking to truth, I will endeavour to live in reality in the beſt manner I am able, and when I die to die ſo. I likewiſe call upon all other men, and you alſo I exhort to this life, and this conteſt, inſtead of that which you have adopted,

[1] By the *rod*, ſays Olympiodorus, the ſtraight, and the equality of juſtice, are ſignified.

[2] Again, ſays Olympiodorus, the *ſceptre* ſignifies *equality*, but *golden the immaterial*. For gold alone does not ruſt, to which all other material natures are ſubject.

[3] Odyſſ. xi. ver. 756.

and

and which I ſay is to be preferred to all the conteſts here. And I upbraid you becauſe you will not be able to aſſiſt yourſelf, when that judicial proceſs ſhall take place of which I have juſt been ſpeaking. But when you ſhall come before that judge who is the ſon of Ægina, and he laying hold of ſhall examine you, you will there yawn, and be ſeized with a giddineſs, no leſs than I am here. Some one too, perhaps, will ſtrike you ignominiouſly on the face, and treat you in a manner perfectly diſgraceful. Theſe things, however, perhaps appear to you to be nothing more than the tales of an old woman, and you accordingly deſpiſe them. Nor would it be at all wonderful that theſe things ſhould indeed be deſpiſed by us, if by inveſtigation we could find any thing better and more true. But now you three, who are the wiſeſt of all the Greeks exiſting at preſent, viz. you, Polus, and Gorgias, ſee it cannot be ſhown that it is requiſite to live any other life than this, which appears alſo to be advantageous hereafter. But among ſo many arguments, while others are confuted this alone remains unmoved, viz. that we ought to be more afraid of doing an injury than of being injured; and that a man ought more than any thing to endeavour not to appear to be good, but to be ſo in reality, both in private and public. Likewiſe, that if any one is in any reſpect vicious, he ſhould be puniſhed; and that this is the next good to the being juſt, viz. to become juſt, and to ſuffer through chaſtiſement the puniſhment of guilt. And further, that all adulation, both reſpecting a man's ſelf and others, and reſpecting a few and a many, is to be avoided; and that rhetoric, and every other action, is always to be employed with a view to the juſt. Being, therefore, perſuaded by me, follow me to that place, whither when you arrive you will be happy, both when living and dead, as my diſcourſe evinces. Suffer, too, any one to deſpiſe you as ſtupid, and to load you with diſgrace if he pleaſes. And, by Jupiter, do you, being confident, permit him to ſtrike this ignominious blow. For you will not ſuffer any thing dire, if you are in reality worthy and good, and cultivate virtue: and afterwards, when we have thus exerciſed ourſelves in common, then, if it ſhall appear to be requiſite, we will betake ourſelves to political concerns, or deliberate on whatever we pleaſe, as we ſhall then be better qualified to deliberate than now. For it is ſhameful, in the condition we appear to be in at preſent, to boaſt of ourſelves with juvenile audacity, as if we were ſomething;

thing; we who are never unanimous about the ſame things, and things of the greateſt conſequence; at ſuch a degree of unſkilfulneſs have we arrived. Let us employ, therefore, as a leader, the reaſoning which now preſents itſelf to the view,—I mean, that which ſignifies to us that the beſt mode of life conſiſts in cultivating juſtice and the other virtues. This, then, let us follow, and exhort others to the ſame, but not that, in which you confiding exhorted me: for it is, Callicles, of no worth.

THE END OF THE GORGIAS.

THE

THE PHILEBUS:

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE CHIEF GOOD OF MAN.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE PHILEBUS.

THE deſign of this dialogue is to diſcover what is the chief good of man; and in order to effect this in the moſt perfect manner, it is divided into twelve parts. In the firſt part, therefore, Plato propoſes the ſubject of diſcuſſion, viz. what the good of man is, and whether wiſdom or pleaſure is more conducive to the attainment of this good. In the ſecond part, he explains the condition of a voluptuous life, and alſo of a life according to wiſdom, that it may be ſeen which of the two moſt contributes to felicity, and alſo whether ſome third ſtate of life will appear, which is better than either of theſe; and that, if this ſhould be the caſe, it may be ſeen whether pleaſure or wiſdom is more allied to the perfection of this life. In the third part, he ſhows how this diſcuſſion ſhould be conducted, and that diviſion and definition ſhould precede demonſtration. In the fourth, he deſcribes the conditions of the good, and ſhows that neither wiſdom nor pleaſure is the chief good of man. In the fifth part, he inveſtigates the genus of pleaſure, and alſo of wiſdom, and unfolds thoſe two great genera of things *bound* and *the infinite*, principles the next in dignity to the ineffable cauſe of all; from which two he exhibits that which is mixt, and preſages the cauſe of the mixture. In the ſixth part, becauſe through thoſe genera certain ſparks of knowledge are enkindled, he enters on the compariſon between pleaſure and wiſdom. In the ſeventh, he more largely explains the cauſe of the mixture, and continues the compariſon more clearly. In the eighth part, the principles and genera being now unfolded, he inveſtigates the

the differences; inquires, in what pleaſure and pain conſiſt, which among theſe are properly produced from paſſion, and how many parts they contain. In the ninth part, he inveſtigates, in what ſcience properly conſiſts, and, having divided it, ſhows that a certain third life preſides over wiſdom, and wiſdom over pleaſure. In the tenth part, it appears how pleaſure and wiſdom are mingled together, and that our good conſiſts in a compoſition of this kind. In the eleventh part, he inquires what it is in that compoſition from the dominion of which felicity is produced; in which part both our good and good itſelf become conſpicuous. And, in the twelfth and laſt part, all the kinds of good which are purſuable as ends are enumerated in order, according to the relative value of each of them to man.

"The ſubject of this dialogue," ſays Mr. Sydenham, "is introduced by ſtating the different opinions of Socrates and Philebus concerning the nature of that good wherein the happineſs of man is to be found; opinions which, it ſeems, they had juſt before ſeverally avowed. Philebus, a man ſtrongly prepoſſeſſed with the doctrine of Ariſtippus, had aſſerted that this good was pleaſure, meaning pleaſurable ſenſation, or pleaſure felt through the outward ſenſes. On the other hand Socrates had ſuppoſed the ſovereign good of man to be placed in mind, and in the energies of mind on mental ſubjects. Philebus, in ſupport of his own aſſertion, had been haranguing for a long time together, after the manner of the ſophiſts, until he found his ſpirits and imagination, or perhaps his ſtock of plauſible arguments, quite exhauſted. He had, therefore, deſired his friend Protarchus, a young gentleman who appears to have been a follower of Gorgias, to take up the controverſy, and carry it on in his ſtead and behalf. Protarchus had conſented, and had engaged himſelf ſo to do. Immediately on this engagement, at this very point of time the preſent dialogue commences: accordingly it is carried on chiefly between Socrates and Protarchus. But as Philebus is the principal perſon whoſe opinion combats againſt that of Socrates, and as no higher character is given to Protarchus than that of acceſſary, or ſecond to Philebus, in this argumentative combat, the dialogue now before us, very properly and conſiſtently with the rule which Plato ſeems to have laid down to himſelf in naming his dialogues, has the name given to it of Philebus."

This admirable dialogue is replete with ſome of the moſt important dogmas

of the Platonic theology, as will appear from our notes upon it; and by thoſe who are capable of knowing wholes from parts it may be collected from what is here ſaid, that intellect has not the ſame order with the firſt cauſe of all. For, if our intellect is the image of the firſt intellect, and the good of the whole of our life is not to be defined according to this alone, it neceſſarily follows that the cauſe of good is eſtabliſhed above intellectual perfection. *The good*, therefore, or the ineffable principle of things, has a ſuper-intellectual ſubſiſtence, agreeably to what is aſſerted in the Sixth Book of the Republic.

I ſhall only add, as is well obſerved by Mr. Sydenham, that the apparent form of this dialogue is *dramatic*; the genius of it, *didactic*; and the reaſoning, for the moſt part *analytical*.

THE PHILEBUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, PROTARCHUS, PHILEBUS.

SCENE.—The LYCEUM.

SOCRATES.

CONSIDER[1] now, Protarchus, what the doctrine of Philebus is, which you are taking upon yourself to second and support; and what things said by me you are going to controvert, if they should be found such as are not agreeable to your mind. Will you permit me to state, in a summary way, the difference between my positions and those of Philebus?

PROT. By all means.

SOC. Philebus then says, that the good of all animals is joy, and pleasure, and delight[2], and whatever else is congenial to them, and harmonizes with all other things of the same kind. And what I contend for is, that those things are not the best; but that to be wise, and to understand[3], and to

[1] The beginning of this dialogue supposes that much conversation had passed, immediately before, between Socrates and Philebus.—S.

[2] This part of the sentence, to give it a literal translation, runs thus: *that it is good for all animals to rejoice, and* (to feel) *pleasure and delight*, &c.—But in translating it we chose to give it that meaning which is rightly presumed by Socrates to be agreeable to the sentiments of Philebus; for otherwise there would be no opposition between the opinion of Philebus and his own.—S.

[3] How is intellect, says Olympiodorus, spoken of with relation to pleasure? For, in the first place, appetite (ορεξις) rather is divided in opposition to knowledge; but appetite and pleasure are not the same. And, in the next place, there is a certain pleasure in knowledge. To this we may reply,

remember, and whatever is of kin to them, right opinions, and true reaſonings, are better things than pleaſure, and more eligible to all beings univerſally, that is, to ſuch as are capable of receiving the participation of them; and that to all beings which have that capacity, the actual partaking of them is of all things the moſt advantageous, not only to thoſe beings which are, but to thoſe alſo which are to come. Do we not, O Philebus, you and I, ſeverally lay down ſome ſuch hypotheſes as theſe?

PHIL. Exactly ſuch, O Socrates!

reply, that there is a pleaſure in knowledge, in conſequence of its participation of appetite. For to be pleaſantly affected when we apprehend the object of knowledge, ariſes from the aſſumption of appetite. But to the other queſtion we may reply, that the inveſtigative is analogous to the orectic power: for inveſtigation, being as it were a gnoſtic orexis (appetite), is a way to a certain end; juſt as orexis haſtens to a certain thing. But the poſſeſſion of the object of appetite is analogous to knowledge, which is the poſſeſſion of truth.

Again, the vital and the orectic are not the ſame. For life is alſo predicated of knowledge; ſince knowledge moves, and that which knows is moved, which is eſpecially the peculiarity of life. But that which knows is moved when it inveſtigates, not when it has arrived at the end, which knowledge ſignifies.

Again, good is predicated both of knowledge and orexis: for knowledge is beneficial, and is the cauſe of union with the object of knowledge. But the good of orexis is, as it were, practic, and we wiſh not to know, but to be paſſive to it, and we embrace it more nearly, but do not endure to have it at a diſtance. But we can endure the object of knowledge, though at a diſtance; for we wiſh to know and not to be it. What, however, ſhall we ſay the orectic is? For it is not common good; ſince this alſo pertains to knowledge. Nor is it ſomething unknown: for orexis ſubſiſts together with knowledge. It is, therefore, a certain good which is known. Hence, it moves from itſelf the perceiver. But this is the beautiful; ſince orexis, conſidered according to its common acceptation, is nothing elſe than love; though love is a ſtrenuous orexis. For the more and the leſs produce no alteration according to ſpecies; but the ſtrenuous is intenſeneſs alone. Further ſtill, the pleaſant is the attendant of orexis; but the pleaſant is apparent beauty. For apparent good is benignant and lovely to all animals. But may not the beautiful be thus related to the good, according to indication? For, in the firſt place, the good is above idea; but things which are in forms are more allied to us. For the good is the formal object of orexis; but the beautiful is the formal object of love; juſt as being is the formal object of knowledge. Orexis, however, differs in ſpecies from love. For, if orexis is aſſumed in common, it is extended to one common good. But, if the ends are ſeparated, the powers alſo which haſten towards them muſt be ſeparated. For the contact which, according to its idiom, is called friendſhip, φιλια, and which makes a union with good, is one thing, and the power which harmonizes with this muſt be called deſire, εφεσις; but the power which, according to indigence, urges the multitude is another; and a thing of this kind is denominated love, ερως, and haſtens to the beautiful.—Γ.

Soc. And will you, Protarchus, take up the controverſy, as I have juſt now ſtated it?

Prot. Of neceſſity[1] I muſt. For Philebus, the champion of our ſide, is tired and gives out.

Soc. Now it is right and proper for us to diſcover, by all means poſſible, the full force and meaning of both thoſe hypotheſes; and not to give over till we have determined the controverſy between them.

Prot. I agree with you, it is.

Soc. Let us agree in this too, beſides.

Prot. In what?

Soc. That we ſhould, each of us[2], endeavour to ſet forth what ſtate and what affection[3] of the ſoul is able, according to our different hypotheſes, to procure for every man a happy life. Is it not our buſineſs ſo to do?

Prot.

[1] Neceſſity is threefold: for it is either ſelf-perfect, aſſociating with *the good*; or material, with which indigence and imbecility aſſociate; or it is as that which is referred to an end, as navigation with a view to gain. Thus Proclus.—T.

[2] The Greek of this ſentence, in all the editions of Plato, is αυτων εκατερος. But all the tranſlators interpret, as if they read in the MSS. ημων εκατερος: a reading which is clearly agreeable to the ſenſe of the paſſage, and makes it eaſier to be underſtood. In the printed reading the word αυτων muſt refer to λογων, which is more remote, and has been rather implied than expreſſed; αυτων εκατερος will then mean *the argument of each*; but to ſay, *the argument ſhould endeavour*, is in a ſtyle too figurative and bold to be uſed by any proſaic writer.—S.

[3] In the Greek,—εξιν και διαθεσιν.—All the differences between εξις and διαθεσις are accurately ſhown by Ariſtotle in his Categories, cap. viii. and in his Metaphyſics, lib. iv. ſec. 19. In the ſentence now before us, the difference between them is this: διαθεσις ψυχης, *an affection of the ſoul*, is the ſoul's preſent but tranſient ſtate; εξις ψυχης, *a ſtate of the ſoul*, is the ſoul's permanent affection. Thus we ſay of a man, that he is in a joyous ſtate of mind, when the joy with which he is affected is of ſome ſtanding, and is likely to continue: but of a man in whoſe ſoul joy is juſt now ariſen, we ſay, that he is ſeized (that is, affected ſuddenly) with joy. And thus again we ſay, that the mind is in a thoughtful ſtate, when it has been for ſome time actually thinking, and is not eaſy to be diverted from thinking on: but when a thought ariſes ſuddenly within us, in an unthinking ſtate of mind, and amidſt the wanderings of fancy, we ſay that a thought ſtrikes us, that is, ſuddenly affects our mind. It muſt not however be concealed, that εξις and διαθεσις, which we have here tranſlated by the words *ſtate* and *affection*, uſually mean *habit* and *diſpoſition*. But the affinity between this their uſual meaning, and that which they have in the paſſage now before us, will appear, from conſidering, that, as the ſoul acquires certain habits of acting, through frequently-repeated acts of the ſame kind,—ſo ſhe is fixed in ſome certain ſtate, through frequent impreſſions made on her where ſhe is paſſive, or through frequent energies of her own where ſhe is active;

PROT. Certainly it is.

SOC. Well then: You ſay that it is that of rejoicing; we, that it is that of underſtanding and thinking rightly.

PROT. True.

SOC. But what if there ſhould appear ſome other, preferable to both of theſe, but more nearly of kin to pleaſure? ſhould we not in this caſe be both of us confuted, and obliged to yield the preference to a life which gives the ſtable poſſeſſion of thoſe very things wherein you place human happineſs? However, at the ſame time it muſt be agreed, that a life of pleaſure would be found more eligible than a life of knowledge or intellection.

PROT. Without doubt.

SOC. But if that better ſtate of the ſoul ſhould appear to be more nearly allied to knowledge, in that caſe, knowledge would be found to have the advantage over pleaſure, and pleaſure muſt give place. Do ye not agree with me, that theſe things are ſo? or how otherwiſe ſay ye that they are?

PROT. To me, I muſt confeſs, they ſeem to be as you repreſent them.

SOC. But to Philebus how ſeem they? What ſay you, Philebus?

PHIL. To me pleaſure ſeems, and will always ſeem, to be the ſuperior, whatever it be compared with. And you, Protarchus, will be at length convinced of it yourſelf.

PROT. After having reſigned to me the management of the debate, you can no longer be the maſter of what ſhould be yielded to Socrates, and what ſhould not.

PHIL. You are in the right. But, however, I have diſcharged my duty; and I here call the Goddeſs herſelf to witneſs it.

PROT. We too are witneſſes of the ſame; and can teſtify your making of the aſſertion which you have juſt made. But now, as to that examination, O Socrates! which is to follow after what you and I have agreed in, whether Philebus be willing to conſent, or however he may be diſpoſed, let us try to go through with it, and bring it to a concluſion.

active; a ſtate, to which thoſe impreſſions from without, and thoſe energies within, gradually lead her;—and alſo that, in like manner as ſome certain previous diſpoſition of the ſoul is neceſſary to every ſingle act which is voluntary, ſo is it alſo neceſſary to the receiving of every impreſſion from without, and to the performing of every energy within.—S.

Soc. By all means, let us; beginning with that very Goddeſs who, according to him, is called Venus, but whoſe true name is Pleaſure [1].

Prot. Perfectly right.

Soc. The fear [2] which I have always in me concerning the proper names of the Gods, is no ordinary kind of fear; but ſurpaſſes the greateſt dread. Hence, in the preſent caſe, with regard to Venus, whatever name be agreeable to the Goddeſs, by that would I chooſe to call her. But as to pleaſure [3], how various a thing it is, I well know. And with this, as I juſt now ſaid, ought we to begin, by conſidering and inquiring into the nature of pleaſure firſt. For we hear it called, indeed, by one ſingle name, as if it were one ſimple thing: it aſſumes, however, all ſorts of forms, even ſuch as

[1] Why is Pleaſure, ſays Olympiodorus, a Goddeſs, according to Philebus? May we not ſay, As that which is the object of deſire, and as an end? But why is Venus a Goddeſs? Shall we ſay, As lovely? Perhaps they are Goddeſſes, becauſe they are both concerned in the procreations of animals, the one as a preſiding power, the other as a paſſion. Why, too, is Pleaſure not conſidered as a Goddeſs by any of the antients*? Becauſe, ſays Proclus, it neither is a preceda-neous good, nor immediately beautiful, nor has a middle ſubſiſtence, and different from both theſe. We muſt ſay, however, that Pleaſure, according to Jamblichus, is a Goddeſs, and is recognized in temples by Proclus the Laodicean.

Again, no one of the antients ſays that Venus is Pleaſure. What then is the reaſon of this? May we not ſay, that it is becauſe Venus has a copulative power, and that a certain pleaſure follows copulation? And alſo, that this pleaſure is accompanied with much of the deformed? Venus, however, is beautiful, not only that Venus which is divine, but that alſo which belongs to nature. And in theology, the idiom of *Venus* is different from that of Ευφροσυνη, *Delight*.—T.

[2] Why does Socrates, ſays Olympiodorus, ſo much venerate the names of the Gods? Shall we ſay, Becauſe formerly things adapted were conſecrated to appropriate natures, and becauſe it is unbecoming to move things immovable? or, that names are adapted to the nature of the Gods, according to what is ſaid in the Cratylus? or, that theſe names are vocal images of the Gods, according to Democritus? But how does a worthy man fear? Either very properly the divine wrath; or this fear is a veneration, but not a certain paſſion attended with dread. I ſhall only obſerve, in addition to what is ſaid by Olympiodorus, that this paſſage, among a multitude of others, proves, beyond all poſſibility of contradiction, that Socrates believed in the exiſtence of divine beings, the immediate progeny of the ineffable cauſe of all, or, in other words, was a polytheiſt.—T.

[3] Pleaſure ſubſiſts together with motion; for it is the attendant of it. But the motion of intellect is an immutable energy; that of ſoul, a mutable energy; and that of an animal, a paſſive energy. But that of a plant is paſſion only.—T.

* Viz. by none of the Greek theologiſts.

are the moſt unlike one to another. For obſerve: we ſay that the intemperate man has pleaſure; and that the temperate man has pleaſure alſo,—pleaſure in being what he is, that is, temperate. Again: we ſay that pleaſure attends on folly, and on the man who is full of fooliſh opinions and fooliſh hopes; that pleaſure attends alſo on the man who thinks wiſely,—pleaſure in that very mental energy, his thinking wiſely. Now any perſon who would affirm theſe pleaſures to be of ſimilar kind, would be juſtly deemed to want underſtanding.

PROT. The pleaſures which you mention, O Socrates, are indeed produced by contrary cauſes; but in the pleaſures themſelves there is no contrariety. For how ſhould pleaſure not be ſimilar to pleaſure, itſelf to itſelf, the moſt ſimilar of all things[1]?

SOC. Juſt ſo, colour too, my friend, differs not from colour in this reſpect, that it is colour, all. And yet, we all of us know that black, beſides being different from white, happens to be alſo its direct contrary. So figure, too, is all one with figure, after the ſame manner, in the general. But as to the parts of that one general thing, ſome are directly contrary to others; and between the reſt there happens to be a kind of infinite diverſity. And many other things we ſhall find to be of this nature. Believe not then this poſition, that things the moſt contrary are all of them one. And I ſuſpect that we ſhall alſo find ſome pleaſures quite contrary to other pleaſures.

PROT. It may be ſo. But how will that hurt my ſide of the queſtion?

SOC. In that *you* call them, diſſimilar as they are, by another name; (ſhall we ſay?) for all *pleaſant* things you call *good*. Now that all pleaſant things are pleaſant, admits of no diſpute. But though many of them are evil, and many indeed good, as I readily acknowledge, yet all of them you call good; and at the ſame time you confeſs them to be diſſimilar in their natures, when a man forces you to this confeſſion. What then is that, the ſame in every

[1] This was the very language, or manner of expreſſion, uſed by a ſect of philoſophers called Cyrenaïcs, from Cyrene, the native city of Ariſtippus, their maſter. For the Cyrenaïcs held, ſays Laërtius, μη διαφερειν ἡδονην ἡδονης, *that pleaſure differs not from pleaſure*. Whence it appears probable, that Philebus derived his notions and expreſſions on this point from ſome of the diſciples of Ariſtippus, if not from Ariſtippus himſelf. For this philoſopher, after he had for ſome time converſed with Socrates, for the ſake of whoſe converſation he came to Athens, departed thence, and went to Ægina; where he profeſſed the teaching of philoſophy, and where he reſided till after the death of Socrates.—S.

pleaſure,

pleaſure, in the evil pleaſures equally with the good, from which you give to all pleaſures the denomination of good?

PROT. What is that, O Socrates, which you ſay? Do you imagine that any perſon, after having aſſerted that pleaſure is the good, will admit your ſuppoſition? or will ſuffer it to paſs uncontradicted, that only ſome pleaſures are good, but that other pleaſures are evil?

SOC. However, you will acknowledge that pleaſures are unlike one to another, and ſome even contrary to others?

PROT. By no means; ſo far as they are pleaſures, every one of them.

SOC. We are now brought back again to the ſame poſition, O Protarchus! There is no difference between pleaſure and pleaſure; all pleaſures are alike, we muſt ſay: and the ſimilar inſtances, juſt now produced, in colours and in figures, have had, it ſeems, no effect upon us. But we ſhall try, and talk after the manner of the meaneſt arguers, and mere novices in dialectic.

PROT. How do you mean?

SOC. I mean, that if I, to imitate you, and diſpute with you in your own way, ſhould dare to aſſert that two things, the moſt unlike, are of all things the moſt like to each other, I ſhould ſay nothing more than what you ſay: ſo that both of us would appear to be rawer diſputants than we ought to be; and the ſubject of our diſpute would thus ſlip out of our hands, and get away. Let us reſume it, therefore, once more: and, perhaps, by returning to ſimilitudes[1], we may be induced to make ſome conceſſions each of us to the other.

[1] The ſenſe and the reaſoning require a ſmall alteration to be here made in the Greek copies of Plato, by reading, inſtead of τας ὁμοιας,—τας ὁμοιοτητας, *ſimilitudes*, or rather τα ὁμοια, *ſimiles*.—Similes of the kind here meant are by Ariſtotle, in his Art of Rhetoric, lib. ii. cap. 20. edit. Du Vall, juſtly ſtyled τα Σωκρατικα, *Socratic*, becauſe frequently employed by Socrates. They are not ſuch as thoſe for which the imagination of a poet ſkims over all nature, to illuſtrate ſome things by ſuperficial reſemblances to them in other things: neither are they ſuch as the memory of an orator ranſacks all hiſtory for, to prove the certainty of ſome doubtful fact by examples on record, which agree with it in a few circumſtances: but they are ſuch as the reaſon of an accompliſhed maſter of dialectic chooſes out from ſubjects near at hand, to prove the truth of ſome uncertain or controverted poſition, by the analogy it bears to ſome other truth which is obvious, and clear, and will be readily admitted. Such a ſimile, bearing the plaineſt and moſt ſtriking analogy with what is to be proved, is actually produced, immediately after this preface to it, by Socrates. But not a word is there in what follows concerning ſimilar pleaſures; and τας ὁμοιας, *alike* or *ſimilar*, cannot be joined with, or belong to, any preceding noun, beſide ἡδονας. As to the word *returning*, in the preſent ſentence, it refers to thoſe ſimiles produced before of colour and of figure.—S.

PROT.

PROT. Say how.

SOC. Suppoſe me to be the party queſtioned; and ſuppoſe yourſelf, Protarchus, to interrogate me.

PROT. Concerning what?

POL. Concerning prudence, and ſcience, and intelligence, and all the reſt of thoſe things which in the beginning of our converſation I ſaid were good, when I was aſked what ſort of a thing good was; muſt I not acknowledge theſe to be attended with the ſame circumſtance which attends thoſe other things celebrated by you?

PROT. What circumſtance?

SOC. The ſciences, viewed all of them together, will ſeem to both of us not only many, and of diverſe kinds, but diſſimilar too, ſome to others. Now if beſides there ſhould appear a contrariety [1] in any way, between ſome of them and others, ſhould I deſerve to be diſputed with any longer, if, fearful of admitting contrariety between the ſciences, I were to aſſert that no one ſcience was diſſimilar to any other ſcience? For then the matter in debate between us, as if it were a mere fable, being deſtroyed, would vaniſh: while we ſaved ourſelves by an illogical retreat. But ſuch an event ought not to happen, except this part of it,—the ſaving of ourſelves. And now the equality, which appears thus far between your hypotheſis and mine, I am well enough pleaſed with. The pleaſures happen to be found many and diſſimilar; many alſo and diverſe are the ſciences. The difference, however, between your good and mine, O Protarchus, let us not conceal: but let us dare to lay it fairly and openly before us both; that we may diſcover, (if thoſe who are cloſely examined will make any diſcovery,) whether pleaſure or wiſdom ought to be pronounced the chief good of man, or whether any third thing, different from either: ſince it is not, as I preſume, with this view that we contend, that my hypotheſis, or that yours, may prevail over its antagoniſt; but that which hath the truth on its ſide, we are both of us to contend for and ſupport.

PROT. This is certainly our duty.

[1] *Contrariety* in the ſciences is nothing more than *diverſity*. For one ſcience is not in oppoſition to, or hoſtile to, another; ſince ſecondary are ſubſervient to prior ſciences, and from them derive their proper principles.—T.

Soc. But this point further we ſhould, both of us together, ſettle on the ſureſt ground.

Prot. What point do you mean?

Soc. That which puzzles and perplexes all perſons who chooſe to make it the ſubject of their converſation: nay, ſometimes ſome others, who have no ſuch intention, are led to it unawares in converſation upon other ſubjects.

Prot. Expreſs what you mean in plainer terms.

Soc. I mean that which fell in our way but juſt now, the nature of which is ſo full of wonders. For that many are one [1], and that one is many, is wonderful to have it ſaid; and either of thoſe poſitions is eaſy to be controverted.

Prot. Do you mean ſuch poſitions as this,—that I Protarchus, who am by nature one perſon, am alſo many? and ſuch as theſe others,—that myſelf, and other perſons the reverſe of me,—the great alſo and the little, the heavy and the light, are one and the ſame? with a thouſand poſitions more which might be made of like kind?

Soc. The wonders, O Protarchus, which you have now ſpoken of, relating to the one and many, have been hackneyed in the mouths of the vulgar; but by the common agreement, as it were, of all men, they are now laid aſide, and are never to be mentioned: for they are conſidered as childiſh and eaſy objections, and great impediments alſo to diſcourſe. It is now alſo agreed, never to introduce into converſation, as an inſtance of one and many, the members or parts into which any ſingle thing may be conſidered as diviſible. Becauſe, when a reſpondent has once admitted and avowed, that all theſe [*members or parts*] are that *one* thing, which is thus at the ſame time *many*, he is refuted and laughed at by his queſtioner, for having been driven to aſſert ſuch monſtrous abſurdities as theſe,—that a ſingle one is an infinite multitude, and an infinite multitude only one.

Prot. What other things, then, not hackneyed among the vulgar, nor as yet univerſally agreed on, do you mean, O Socrates, relating to this point?

Soc. I mean, young man, when a thing is propoſed to be conſidered, which is one, but is not of the number or nature of things generated and pe-

[1] See the Parmenides.—T.

riſhable.

riſhable. For as to the ones of this latter ſort, it is agreed, as I juſt now ſaid, to reject them, as unworthy of a ſerious confutation. The ones which I mean are ſuch as man, ox, beauty, good. When theſe *henads* [1], or ſuch as theſe, are propoſed for ſubjects of debate, much ſerious attention is given them; and when they come to be divided, any one of them into many, much doubt and controverſy ariſes.

PROT. Upon what points?

SOC. In the firſt place, whether ſuch monads ſhould be deemed to have true being. In the next place, how it is that theſe monads, every one of them being always the ſame, and never generated, nor ever to be deſtroyed, have, notwithſtanding, one and the ſame ſtability common to them all [2]. And laſtly, Whether we ſhould ſuppoſe every ſuch monad to be diſperſed and ſpread abroad amongſt an infinity of things generated or produced, and thus, from being one, to become many; or whether we ſhould ſuppoſe it to remain entire, itſelf by itſelf [3], ſeparate and apart from that multitude. But, of all ſuppoſitions, this might appear the moſt impoſſible, that one and the ſame

[1] Plato, ſays Olympiodorus, calls the ſummits of forms *monads* and *henads*. He calls them *henads*, with reference to the appropriate multitude of which they are the leaders: but *monads*, with reference to the ſupereſſential. Or we may ſay, that there are twofold ſummits of forms, the one *eſſential*, and the other *characterized by unity*, as it is ſaid in the Parmenides.—See the Notes on the firſt hypotheſis of the Parmenides. From hence the ignorance of Cudworth is apparent, who, in his Intellectual Syſtem, p. 555, conſiders the doctrine of *henads* derived from the firſt one, or *the one itſelf*, as a fiction of the latter Platoniſts.—T.

[2] This ſecond queſtion ſuppoſes the firſt queſtion decided in favour of the true being of the monads. For, if univerſals are held to be only names, invented to denote unreal fancies or factitious notions, it is trifling and idle to inquire whence they derive ſtability; this being an affection, or property, of real beings only,—unleſs it be as merely nominal, notional, or fantaſtic, as thoſe things are to which it is attributed.—The ſentence now before us in the Greek is printed thus: πως αυ ταυτας, μιαν εκαστην ουσαν αει την αυτην, και μητε γενεσιν μητε ολεθρον προσδεχομενην, ὁμως ειναι βεβαιοτητα μιαν ταυτην. The Greek text muſt here be faulty; and, to make good ſenſe of it, it is neceſſary to make a ſmall alteration or two,—by reading εχειν inſtead of ειναι, and και αυτην inſtead of ταυτην. In tranſlating this paſſage, we have preſumed it ought to be ſo read; and the meaning, intended to be conveyed by it, we ſuppoſe to be this:—"it muſt needs ſeem ſtrange, that diſtinct beings, not generated, ſome of them by others, but all equally eternal, without intercommunity or interchange between them, ſhould, nevertheleſs, have one and the ſame nature, that of *monad* or *unity*, and one and the ſame property of their being, that of *ſtability*."—S.

[3] In the Greek we here read—αυτην αὐτης χωρις. But it is preſumed that we ought to read—αυτην εφ' αὑτης χωρις.—S.

thing ſhould be in a ſingle one, and in many, at the ſame time. Theſe points, O Protarchus, which regard ſuch inſtances as I have mentioned, and not ſuch as were mentioned by you, theſe are they, which, for want of being rightly ſettled, create all the difficulties and doubts we meet with in diſcourſe; but when once they are ſettled rightly, they clear the way with eaſe.

PROT. Then, it ſeems, we are to labour theſe points firſt.

SOC. I ſhould think we ought.

PROT. And that we conſent to it, you may take for granted, all of us here. Philebus, indeed, it is beſt perhaps, at preſent, not to diſcompoſe by aſking him queſtions, now that he is quiet.

SOC. Very well; but in what way ſhall we begin the diſcuſſion of theſe points in ſo wide a field of controverſy? Shall we begin thus?

PROT. How?

SOC. We ſay, in ſpeaking of theſe monads, (each of which is one, but, on a logical examination of it, appears to be diviſible into many,) that they run throughout every ſentence in our diſcourſe, every where and always; and that, as their being ſhall never have an end, ſo neither does it firſt begin in the preſent age. Now this perpetual attendant upon all ſpeech proceeds, as it ſeems to me, from ſomething immortal and undecaying within ourſelves. And hence it is, that the youth every where, when they have thus had a taſte of it, are overjoyed at their having thus found a treaſure of wiſdom. Tranſported, therefore, with the delight it gives them, they apply it to every ſubject of diſcourſe: ſometimes they collect particulars from all quarters, and roll them into one; then they unroll them again, and part them aſunder. After having in this way puzzled themſelves in the firſt place, they queſtion and puzzle the perſon next at hand, whether he be their equal in age, or younger than themſelves, or older, ſparing neither father nor mother, nor any one elſe who will attend to them, ſcarcely other animals more than man: it is certain they would not exempt any who ſpeak a foreign language only, could they but find ſomewhere an interpreter.

PROT. Do you not ſee, O Socrates, how numerous we are, and that all of us are young? and are you not afraid that, if you rail at us, we ſhall all join Philebus, and attack you jointly? However (for we apprehend your meaning), if you can by any means or contrivance eaſily rid of us of theſe perplexities,

perplexities, which hinder the progreſs of our inquiry, and can deviſe ſome better way of managing the argument, do you but give your mind to the proſecution of it, and we ſhall do our utmoſt to follow and attend you. For the preſent debate is of no trifling concern, Socrates.

Soc. Indeed it is not, O boys! as Philebus called you. No better way then is there, nor can there be, than that, which I am always a great lover of; but often before now it has ſlipped away from my ſight, and has left me, as it were, in a deſert, at a loſs whither to turn me.

Prot. Let us but know what way you mean.

Soc. To point out the way is not very difficult; but to travel in it, is the moſt difficult of all things. For all ſuch human inventions as depend on art are, in this way, diſcovered and laid open. Conſider then the way which I am ſpeaking of.

Prot. Do but tell it us then.

Soc. A gift [1] of the Gods to men, as it appears to me, by a certain Prometheus [2] hurled from the Gods along with a fire the moſt luminous. From the

[1] This gift is the *dialectic* of Plato, of which we have given an ample account in the Introduction to, and Notes on, the Parmenides. I ſhall only obſerve at preſent, that this vertex of the ſciences conſiſts of four parts, viz. *diviſion*, *definition*, *demonſtration*, and *analyſis*. Of theſe, the *diviſive* art, ſays Olympiodorus, is connate with the progreſſion of things; but the *analytic* with their converſion. And the *definitive* and *demonſtrative* arts, which have a middle ſituation, are ſimilar to the hypoſtaſis, or ſubſiſting nature of things. The *definitive*, however, is analogous to that hypoſtaſis which ſubſiſts from itſelf; but the *demonſtrative* to that which is ſuſpended from its cauſe.—T.

[2] Prometheus, ſays Olympiodorus, does not produce good, as unfolding into light, but as a Titan. For he employs a providential care upon rational eſſences which proceed to the extremity, juſt as Epimetheus provides for irrational natures. For irrational natures proceed to a care of things ſubordinate, and, having proceeded, diſtribute the whole of divine Providence. Again, the fire which Prometheus ſtole, and gave to men, is every anagogic eſſence and perfection, diſtributed through him to the laſt of things. Hence it is ſaid to have been *ſtolen*, becauſe an *anagogic* eſſence is *deduced*; but through him, becauſe it is alone deduced Titanically,—but other Gods give ſubſiſtence to a form of this kind.

Again, that every generated nature is one and many, is nothing wonderful; for theſe natures are partible, and participate of many habitudes; but how is this the caſe with every intelligible eſſence? In the firſt place, we may ſay that each is a monad, and alſo a number, according to the ſeries of the monad; as, for inſtance, the beautiful, and things beautiful. In the ſecond place, that the monad is both that which it is, and all other things according to commixtion. In the third place,

the men of antient times, men better than we are, and dwelling nigher to the Gods, this tradition of it hath deſcended to us,—that thoſe beings ſaid to be for ever derive their eſſence from one and many; and therefore have in themſelves bound and infinity connatural to them: that, being in the midſt of things ſo conſtituted as they are, we ought to ſuppoſe and to ſearch for ſome one idea in every thing around us; for that, ſince it is there, we ſhall, on ſearching, be ſure to find it: that, after we have found it, we are next to look for two, if two only are next; otherwiſe three, or ſome other number: again, that every one of this number we are to examine in like manner: until at length a man not only perceives, that the one, with which he began, is one, and many, and infinite, but diſcovers alſo how many it contains: for, that a man never ſhould proceed to the idea of infinite, and apply it immediately to any number, before he has fully diſcovered all the definite number which lies between the infinite and the one: but that, having completed this

place, it both conſiſts from the genera of being and one idiom. In the fourth place, the idiom is multiplied together with the many; but there is a certain impartible ſummit in all the many. In the fifth place, this ſummit is an united form, but there is alſo ſomething in it above form. And, in the ſixth place, this ſummit is at the ſame time the united, but not *the one*. Further ſtill, as all things are from one and many, it is neceſſary that theſe two principles ſhould be arranged prior to all things; the former being the cauſe to all things of unity, and the latter of multitude. They muſt likewiſe evidently be poſterior to the firſt cauſe; for that is *at once* the cauſe of all things.

Again, in the extremities of things infinite multitude is beheld, but in the ſummit a monad preſubſiſts, according to every form. But infinite multitude would not be generated, unleſs in the monad which generates it an infinite power was preaſſumed. Nor would every individual in infinites be bounded, unleſs bound proceeded to the laſt of things. Progreſſion ſubſiſts through all appropriate media, from the monad to infinite multitude. And, in the firſt place, this is ſeen in multitude capable of being participated. For progreſſion is not immediately from *the one* to the infinite, but to two and three, and the following numbers. And, in the next place, the progreſſion of bodies is of this kind, for it has no vacuum together with its variety. In the third place, the generative power of the monad being both one and many, at once generates all things according to the whole of itſelf; things ſecondary being always conſequent to ſuch as are prior.

Further ſtill, ſays Olympiodorus, the diviſive method proceeds together with the progreſſion of forms, not cutting off the continuity of ſubjection, nor introducing a vacuum, but proceeding through all the media, from the one to the infinite. The buſineſs of the diviſive method is firſt to place *the one* every where before the many. Secondly, to place the finite before infinite multitude. Thirdly, always to define according to quantity, the leſſer before the greater number. Fourthly, to omit no number of things which give completion to progreſſion. Fifthly, to ſelect numbers

this diſcovery, we ſhould then finiſh our ſearch; and diſmiſſing into infinity every one of all thoſe numbers, we ſhould bid farewell to them. The Gods, as I before ſaid, have given us to conſider things in this way, and in this way to learn them, and teach them one to another. But the wiſe men of theſe days take any monad whatever, and divide it into many with more conciſeneſs than they ought, and with more prolixity too, ſince they never come to an end: for immediately after the monad they introduce infinity, overlooking all the intermediate numbers; the expreſs mention of which, or the omiſſion of them, diſtinguiſhes ſuch dialectical and fair debates as ours, from ſuch as are contentious and ſophiſtical.

PROT. Part of what you ſay, Socrates, I ſeem to apprehend tolerably well: but the meaning of ſome things which you have now ſaid, I ſhould be glad to hear you expreſs in plainer terms.

numbers adapted to reſpective forms; the triadic, for inſtance, or the hebdomadic, to Minerva, and in a ſimilar manner in all the reſt. For different numbers proceed according to different forms; as alſo of the Gods, there are different numbers according to different Divinities. For of monads themſelves, one progreſſion is monadic, as that of the monad; another dyadic, as that of the dyad; and in a ſimilar manner with the reſt: ſo that there is not a diviſion of all things into two. Sixthly, to divide through forms, but not through form and negation, according to the opinion of Ariſtotle: for no number is produced from form and negation. Seventhly, to produce every monad into diviſion in its proper order, whether it be in that of bound, or in that of infinity: for each is every where. Ninthly, to produce things oppoſitely divided, according to antitheſis, whether certain media are diſcovered, or not. Tenthly, not to leave the media in the extent (εν τῳ πλατει). Eleventhly, to aſcribe different numbers appropriately to different orders, as the number twelve to ſupermundane natures, and the number ſeven to intellectuals. Twelfthly, to ſee where the leſſer numbers are more excellent, and where they are ſubordinate, and in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to the greater. For the mundane decad is ſubordinate to the ſupermundane duodecad; but the intellectual hebdomad is ſuperior to it.

Again, the analytic art is ſubordinate to the diviſive: for the latter is from a cauſe, but the former from a ſign; and the latter from on high ſurveys things more ſubordinate, but the former beholds downwards things on high; and the latter ſtops at nothing ſenſible, but the former at firſt ſtands in need of ſenſe. Thus, the latter giving ſubſiſtence and producing, nearly makes the whole of the proceeding eſſence; but the former converting, confers on that which has proceeded a departure from the ſubordinate, and an adherence to the more excellent nature. On which account progreſſion is more eſſential than converſion, and is therefore more excellent. So that proceſſion is ſuperior to converſion, and the eſſential to the anagogic. In the deſcent of the ſoul, however, ſince progreſſion is here an apoſtacy from better natures, aſcent which correſponds to converſion is better than progreſſion or deſcent.—T. Soc.

Soc. The whole of what I have ſaid, Protarchus, is evident in letters. In theſe, therefore, which have been taught you from your childhood, you may eaſily apprehend my meaning.

Prot. How in letters?

Soc. Voice, that iſſues out of the human mouth, may be conſidered as one general thing, admitting of an infinite number of articulations, not only in all men taken together, but alſo in every individual man.

Prot. Without doubt.

Soc. Now we are not made knowing in ſpeech, or ſound articulate, through the knowledge either of the infinity or of the oneneſs of its nature: but to know how many, and what, are the parts into which it is naturally divided,—this it is which makes any of us a grammarian, or ſkilled in grammar.

Prot. Moſt certainly.

Soc. And further, that by which a man comes to be ſkilled in muſic is this very thing.

Prot. How ſo?

Soc. Muſical ſound[1], which is the ſubject matter of this art, may be conſidered in itſelf as one general thing.

Prot. Without diſpute.

[1] In the Greek, the term uſed here, as well as juſt before, (where this tranſlation hath the word *voice*,) is φωνη. It there ſignified *articulated* vocal ſound, or *ſpeech*: it here ſignifies *muſical* ſound of the voice, or *vocal muſic*. We ſee then that φωνη, *human voice*, is by Plato ſuppoſed to be a common genus, diviſible into thoſe two ſorts or ſpecies. It is expreſsly ſo laid down by Nicomachus, (Harmonic. Enchirid. pag. 3, edit. Amſt.) in theſe words:—Της ανθρωπινης φωνης οι απο του Πυθαγορικου διδασκαλειου δυο εφασκον, ὡς ἑνος γενους, ειδη ὑπαρχειν· και το μεν συνεχες ιδιως ωνομαζον· το δε διαστηματικον. *Such* [writers concerning muſic] *as came out of the Pythagorean ſchool ſay, that of human voice* [in general], *as of one genus, there are two ſpecies. One of theſe two they properly named continuous, the other diſcrete.* Theſe two technical terms he afterward explains, by ſhowing us that the *continuous* is that voice which we utter in diſcourſing and in reading; (and therefore, by Ariſtoxenus and by Euclid termed φωνη λογικη·) and that the *diſcrete* is the voice iſſued out of our mouths in ſinging; (and thence termed φωνη μελωδικη·) for, in this latter caſe, every ſingle ſound is diſtinguiſhed by a certain or meaſured tone of the voice. The ſame diviſion of φωνη is laid down, and a ſimilar account of it is given, by Ariſtoxenus in Harmonic. Element. pag. 8 & 9, edit. Amſt.—S.

Soc.

Soc. And let us ſuppoſe two kinds of it, the grave and the acute, and a third kind between thoſe two, the homotonous, or how otherwiſe [1]?

Prot. Muſical ſound in general is ſo to be diſtinguiſhed.

Soc. But with the knowledge of this diſtinction only, you would not yet be ſkilled in muſic; though without knowing it you would be, as to muſic, quite worthleſs.

Prot. Undoubtedly.

Soc. But, my friend, when you have learnt the intervals [2] between all muſical ſounds, from the more acute to the more grave, how many they are in number, and into what ſorts they are diſtinguiſhed; when you have alſo learnt the bounds [3] of theſe intervals, and how many ſyſtems [4] are compoſed

[1] Homotony of ſound is made when a ſtring of ſome ſtringed inſtrument of muſic, having the ſame degree of tenſion with a ſimilar ſtring of ſome other, yields, in conjunction with it, the ſame muſical tone; or when two different voices utter at the ſame time muſical ſounds, neither of which is more acute, or more grave, than the other. In both caſes, the ſameneſs of the ſound is alſo termed ὁμοφωνια: for φωνη, *voice*, is (metaphorically) attributed to all muſical inſtruments; (ſee Nicomachus, pag. 5 and 6.) as, on the other hand, tone is (by an eaſy metaphor) attributed to the human voice, modulated by the will in the trachea, or aſpera arteria: for this natural wind-inſtrument, in Engliſh aptly named the wind-pipe, while it tranſmits the air breathed out from the lungs, receives any degree of tenſion it is capable of, at the pleaſure of the mind. In like manner, a repetition of the ſame tone from a ſingle human voice, as well as from a ſingle monochord, is termed a monotony.—S.

[2] An interval is the diſtance [or difference κατα τοπον, with regard to place] between any two muſical ſounds, (between that which is acute relatively to the other, and that other which is relatively a grave,) however near together they may be, or however remote from each other, on any ſcale of muſic. In proportion to the nearneſs or remoteneſs of theſe two ſounds, the interval between them is, in mathematical language, ſaid to be ſmall or great; that is, it is ſhort or long. So that different muſical intervals, like all other different diſtances from place to place, eſſentially differ one from another in magnitude or length. And on this eſſential difference are founded all the other diverſities of the intervals.

[3] The bounds of each interval are thoſe two muſical ſounds, from either of which there is made an immediate ſtep or tranſition to the other. Of all muſical ſounds the three principal were: ὑπατη *the moſt grave*, νητη *the moſt acute*, and μεση *the middle* between thoſe other two, on the moſt antient ſcale of muſic; which conſiſted of only ſeven ſounds, produced by ſtriking on the ſame number of ſtrings, all of different lengths. We account thoſe three juſt now mentioned the principal, becauſe the firſt and eaſieſt diviſion of any quantity, whether it be continuous or diſcrete, is into two equal parts, or halves: the moſt diſtinguiſhable points or bounds of it, therefore, however it be afterwards ſubdivided, are the two extremes and the middle. Accordingly

poſed out of them; (which our predeceſſors having diſcovered, delivered down to us, who come after them, by the name of harmonies [1]; and having diſcovered

ingly Plato, in his 4th book De Republicâ, edit. Cantab. pag. 314, ſpeaking of the νεατη, the ὑπατη, and the μεση, the higheſt, the loweſt, and the middle ſound in muſic, calls them ὁρους τρεις ἁρμονιας, the *three bounds of harmony*; and likens to them the three moſt evidently diſtinguiſhed parts of the ſoul,—the rational part, the higheſt; the concupiſcible, the loweſt; and the iraſcible, between them both.—S.

[a] A ſyſtem is a compoſition of three or more muſical ſounds; or (what amounts to the ſame thing) it is an extent, comprehending two or more intervals. Of theſe ſyſtems the general diverſities are laid down by Ariſtides, pag. 15 & ſeq. But in his definition of a ſyſtem (as it is printed) an important error deſerves notice. For we there read—πλειονων ἢ δυοιν, *more than two*: inſtead of which we ought to read—δυοιν ἢ πλειονων, *two or more*; or elſe—πλειονων ἢ ἑνος, *more than one*: which laſt are the very words uſed by Ariſtoxenus, Euclid, and Gaudentius, in their definitions of a ſyſtem. The error probably aroſe from ſome manuſcript copy of Ariſtides happening to be not eaſily legible in this place. The tranſcriber of it, therefore, we ſuppoſe, conſulted Baccheius; who in his definition of a ſyſtem uſeth the words—πλειονων ἢ δυοιν. Theſe words are right indeed in Baccheius, becauſe they are by him applied to φθογγων, muſical ſounds, agreeably to our firſt definition; but they would be wrong in Ariſtides, where he is ſpeaking, not of φθογγων, but of διαστηματων, the intervals of thoſe ſounds, agreeably to our ſecond definition. On the many diverſities and variations to be made in ſo large a field of ſyſtems, are founded thoſe many different forms, figures, or modes of harmony, or ſorts of tunes, (the Greek writers call them εἰδη, μορφαι, σχηματα, τροποι, and τονοι ἁρμονιας,) the general kinds of which, according to Ariſtides, pag. 25, are theſe—the Doric, the Phrygian, and the Lydian. If this be true, all the other modes are to be conſidered as ſubordinate to theſe three; and indeed they ſeem, ſome of them, to be intenſions, others to be remiſſions, and others to be mixtures, of thoſe the more moderate and ſimple.—S.

[1] The word ἁρμονια, *harmony*, was uſed in different ſenſes by the old Grecian writers. We learn from Nicomachus, that the moſt antient writers on muſic gave the name of harmony to that moſt perfect conſonance, the diapaſon. Ariſtoxenus and Euclid mean, by the term harmony, that kind of melody which is called enharmonic. Plato and Ariſtotle, when they ſpeak of harmony in the ſingular number, without the addition of an epithet denoting the ſort, mean by that term the idea which is commonly now-a-days expreſſed by the term muſic; probably, becauſe it was the firſt diſcovered of thoſe ſciences, as well as the firſt invented of thoſe arts, which were antiently comprehended together in one general idea, expreſſed in one word, and termed muſic. But when the ſame great philoſophers ſpeak of harmonies in the plural number, they mean thoſe different forms or modes of harmony whoſe ſpecific differences depend on the different ſyſtems, or on the different order of thoſe ſyſtems of which they are ſeverally compoſed. To the term harmony in this latter ſenſe only, (as it ſignifies a mode of harmony,) agrees the following definition of it, given us by Theo, and, long after him, by Pſellus:—

diſcovered other ſuch affections [1] in the motions of the body, and in words [2]; meaſuring theſe by numbers, they have taught us to call them rhythms [3] and metres; bidding us to infer from hence, that every *one-and-many* ought to be ſearched into and examined in the ſame way;) when you have learnt all thoſe things, and comprehend them in this ample manner, with all their ſeveral diverſities and diſtinctions, then are you become ſkilled in muſic. And by conſidering in the ſame way the nature of any other kind of being, when you thus fully comprehend it, you are become in that reſpect intelligent and wiſe. But the infinite multitude of individuals, their infinite variety, and the infinite changes incident to each, keep you *infinitely far off* from intelligence and wiſdom: and as they make you to be behind other men in every path of knowledge, they make you inconſiderable, and of no

Pſellus:—Ἁρμονία ἐστι συστημάτων συντάξις· *A harmony* (not harmony in general) *is a compoſition* (or an ordering together) *of ſyſtems.* On this definition Bouillaud, in his Notes to Theo, pag. 250, judiciouſly obſerves,—*Vocat hic harmoniam quos alii appellant τροπους ſeu τονους.* On this ſubject we ſhall only obſerve further, that the ſyntheſis of harmony, preſented to us by Plato, in the whole paſſage now before us, beginning from ſimple φθογγοι, or muſical ſounds, (which are the elements or primary conſtituent parts of harmony,) is exactly the ſame, and proceeds in the ſame order, with that ſyntheſis which is taught by all the antient Greek writers on muſic: one proof among many, this, of Plato's knowledge in the theory of muſic. Agreeably to which obſervation, Plutarch, in his Treatiſe περι Μουσικης, informs us, that Plato applied his mind cloſely to the ſcience of muſic; having attended the Lectures of Draco the Athenian, and thoſe of Metellus of Agrigentum. Or if we ſuppoſe that Plato, in this part of the preſent dialogue, did no more than faithfully record the doctrine of Socrates, our ſuppoſition is very juſtifiable; for Socrates in his old age ſtudied muſic under Connus.—S.

[1] That is, ſuch relations and proportions, (or, to make uſe of muſical terms,) ſuch ſteps and tranſitions, intervals and bounds, ſyſtems and compoſitions, in the motions of the body, and in words, as are analogous to the affections of muſical ſounds, called by thoſe very names. The Greek word, which we have rendered into Engliſh by the word *affections*, in the paſſage of Plato now before us is παθη, and, tranſlated literally, ſignifies *paſſions*. For, whatever ſituation, condition, or circumſtance, any being or thing is placed in by ſome other,—or by its relation to ſome other,—in whatever way it is acted on, or affected by, that other,—ſuch ſituation, &c. of the being or thing ſo placed, ſo acted on, or ſo affected, was by the Greek philoſophers termed a παθος, a *paſſion* of ſuch being; becauſe in that reſpect the being is paſſive.—S. I ſhall only obſerve, in addition to what Mr. Sydenham has ſaid, that the word *paſſion* always ſignifies, both with Plato and Ariſtotle, *a participated property* of any being.—T.

[2] In the printed Greek of this paſſage we read only,—εντε ταις κινησεσιν αυ του σωματος—immediately after which,—εντε ῥημασιν,—ought to follow, but is omitted.—S.

[3] Rhythm, in general, is an order of homogeneous motions meaſured by time.

account, not to be numbered amongſt the knowing in any ſubject; becauſe you never conſider any thing thoroughly, and are unable to give a true account of it, never looking at the definite number which it contains.

PROT. Excellently well, O Philebus, as it appears to me, has Socrates ſpoken in what he has now ſaid.

PHIL. It appears ſo too to me myſelf. But how does all this ſpeech of his concern our controverſy? What was the deſign or drift of it?

SOC. A very pertinent queſtion, O Protarchus, this, propoſed to us by Philebus.

PROT. Indeed it is: and by all means give it an anſwer.

SOC. That will I do, as ſoon as I have gone through the little yet remaining of the ſubject on which I have been ſpeaking. For, as the man who applies himſelf to the conſideration of any kind of things whatever ought not, as I have ſaid, to throw his eye at once upon the infinite, but upon ſome definite number in the firſt place; ſo, on the other hand, when a man is obliged to ſet out from the infinite, he ought not to mount up immediately to the one, but to ſome certain number, in each of whoſe ones a certain multitude is contained; and thus gradually riſing from a greater to a leſs number, to end in one. As an inſtance of what I have now ſaid, let us reſume the conſideration of letters.

PROT. In what way?

SOC. Whoever it was, whether ſome God, or ſome divine man, (the Egyptian reports ſay that his name was Theuth [1],) who firſt contemplated the infinite nature of the human voice, he obſerved, that amongſt the infinity of the ſounds it uttered the vowel ſounds [2] were more than one, they were many. Again, other utterances he obſerved, which were not indeed vowels [3], but

[1] See the Notes on the Phædrus, vol. iii.—T.

[2] That is, ſounds purely vocal; whence the letters by which they are diſtinguiſhed are called vowels; in the utterance of which ſounds the voice ſolely is employed, whilſt the other organs of ſpeech remain inactive.—S.

[3] In the Greek of this paſſage, as it is printed by Aldus and by Stephens, we here read—φωνης μεν ου, φθογγου δε μετεχοντα τινος·—a reading which may be tolerably well ſupported by what ſoon follows. But the margin of the firſt Baſil edition of Plato has ſuggeſted to us a reading, in which appears a diſtinction more obvious and plain than there is between φωνη and φθογγος, *voice* and *ſound of the voice*. For, in that margin, we are directed to read the word ενια (found, perhaps, in

but partook, however, of ſome kind of vocal ſound [1]; and that of theſe alſo there was a certain number [2]. A third ſort of letters alſo he ſet apart, thoſe which are now called mutes by us [3]. After this he diſtinguiſhed every one of theſe letters which are without any vocal ſound, whether perfect or imperfect [4]: the vowels alſo, and thoſe of middle ſort, every one of them, he diſtinguiſhed

in ſome manuſcript copy of Plato) immediately after the word φωνης, and before the words μεν ου, in this ſentence. Now theſe two words φωνης οντα, put together, very little differ from φωνηεντα, a word which gives to this part of the ſentence a meaning quite agreeable to the tenor of the whole of it, and to the language of all grammarians.—S.

[1] Theſe were by the old grammarians called ἡμιφωνα, *ſemi-vowels*; becauſe, in their very formation by the organs of ſpeech, they are, of neceſſity, ſo far accompanied by the voice, as to give a half-vocal ſound, without the open aid of any vowel.—S.

[2] The Greek grammarians enumerate eight of theſe ſemi-vowels.—S.

[3] Socrates, by expreſſing himſelf in this manner, concerning the general name of this third ſort of letters, as if it were then newly given them at Athens, ſeems to diſapprove it. Perhaps the antient term συμφωνα, *conſonants*,—a term applied by the new grammarians to the ἡμιφωνα, *ſemi-vowels*, as well as to the αφωνα, *mutes*,—was, in his judgment, properly applicable to thoſe letters only which yield of themſelves no ſound at all. For mutes, as they are called, cannot be pronounced even imperfectly and obſcurely, as ſemi-vowels can, without the concurrence of ſome vowel, ſome ſound perfectly vocal.—S.

[4] In the Greek,—αφθογγα και αφωνα·—evidently meaning ſuch as are neither vowels nor ſemi-vowels. It ſhould ſeem, therefore, that by φωνη Plato meant a perfect and clear vocal ſound, ſuch as we utter in pronouncing a vowel ſingly; and that by φθογγος he meant that imperfect and obſcure ſound of the voice made in the forming and pronouncing of a ſemi-vowel, unaided by a vowel. Now if this be true, then may the printed reading of that paſſage, to which belongs note 3 in the preceding page, be juſtified. Ariſtotle, however, who treats of this ſubject in his Poetics, cap. 20, recognizes not any ſuch diſtinction between φωνη and φθογγος: for he attributes φωνη ακουστη, *a vocal ſound*, ſuch as may be heard, to the ſemi-vowels no leſs than to the vowels; and ſtates the difference between theſe two ſorts of letters thus:—The voice in uttering the vowels proceeds ανευ προσβολης, that is, it *makes no alliſion* againſt any parts of the mouth, thoſe upper organs of ſpeech, ſo as to be impeded in its free and full exit: but the expreſſing of the ſemi-vowels is μετα προσβολης, the voice in uttering them *makes ſuch alliſion*, and meets with ſome degree of *reſiſtance*: by the alliſion it is, indeed, articulated; but by the reſiſtance, the paſſages through the mouth being ſtraitened, it becomes weaker, and is diminiſhed,—except it be in ſome ſyllable; for here a vowel will never fail to aſſiſt in the delivery, by giving the voice a free paſſage into the air. Now Ariſtotle is indiſputably right in attributing to a ſemi-vowel, by itſelf, φωνην, *vocem*, a vocal ſound: but his learned commentator Victorius is equally right in giving to this vocal ſound the epithets *obſcura, tenuis, & exilis*; ſince it is but half of the full and whole vowel-ſound: and Plato may fairly be allowed to diſtinguiſh the half-ſound by a particular name, and

diſtinguiſhed in the ſame manner: and when he had diſcovered how many letters there were of each ſort, to every one, and to all of them together, he gave the name of element. But perceiving that none of us could underſtand any one of them by itſelf alone, without learning them all, he conſidered that this connection, or common bond between them, was one; and that all theſe letters made in a manner but one thing: and as he perceived that there was one art in all theſe, he called it, from its ſubject matter, the art of letters.

PHIL. This which Socrates now ſays, O Protarchus, I underſtand ſtill more plainly than what he ſaid juſt before; and am at no loſs to apprehend what relation each of the ſubjects about which he has ſpoken has to the other. But as to that article in which his argument on the firſt of thoſe ſubjects appeared to me to be defective, I am at a loſs ſtill.

SOC. To know what thoſe inſtances are to the purpoſe; is not this your meaning?

PHIL. Juſt ſo. This very thing it is that Protarchus and myſelf are all this while in ſearch of.

SOC. In ſearch ſtill, do you ſay, when you are juſt now arrived at it?

PHIL. How ſo?

SOC. Was not the point originally in diſpute between us this: Whether wiſdom or pleaſure was the more eligible?

PHIL. Certainly it was.

SOC. And do we not admit that each of them is one thing?

PHIL. Without doubt.

SOC. Now then muſt come this queſtion, ariſing naturally from what was ſaid a little before the mention of muſic and grammar,—In what way (or by what diviſion) are wiſdom and pleaſure, each of them, one and many? or how is it, that neither of them breaks into infinite multitude directly; but that each contains ſome certain number before it paſs into infinity?

PROT. Upon no trivial queſtion, O Philebus, on a ſudden has Socrates, after having led us a large round-about way, I know not how, thrown us. And now conſider, which of us two ſhall anſwer to the queſtion he has pro-

to call it φθογγος. But we know not how to agree with him, if he ſays that a ſemi-vowel does not partake of the vowel-ſound; becauſe the half of any thing whatever ſeems to partake, to be a part, or to have a ſhare of its whole. For this reaſon it is that we incline to that emendation of the printed Greek text propoſed in note 3 in page 484.—S.

poſed.

poſed. It would be ridiculous in me, who have undertaken the ſupport of your argument, to make an abſolute revolt on account of my diſability in regard to the preſent queſtion; and ſo to remit over again to you the taſk of giving an anſwer to it: but I think it would be much more ridiculous for both of us to fail. Conſider, then, what we ſhall do in this caſe, where Socrates ſeems to interrogate us concerning the ſpecies of pleaſure;—whether it is diviſible into different ſpecies, or not; and, if it be, what is the number of theſe ſpecies, and how they differ in their nature: and the like queſtions he ſeems to put to us concerning knowledge and intelligence.

Soc. Your conjecture is perfectly right, O ſon of Callias! and, if we are not able to anſwer to theſe queſtions upon every monad, as to its likeneſs, ſameneſs, and contrariety,—unleſs, I ſay, we can do this,—the inſtances juſt now produced have ſhown, that none of us, in any matter we had to handle, would ever be of any worth at all.

Prot. The caſe, O Socrates, ſeems indeed to be not very different from your repreſentation of it. Well, it is certainly a fine thing to know all things, for a wiſe and prudent perſon: but I think the beſt thing next to that is for a man not to be ignorant of himſelf. With what deſign I have now ſaid this, I ſhall proceed to tell you. This converſation, O Socrates, you have granted to us all, and have given yourſelf up to us, for the purpoſe of inveſtigating what is the beſt of human goods. For, when Philebus had ſaid that it conſiſted in pleaſure, and delight, and joy, and all things of the like nature, you oppoſed him on this point, and ſaid, it conſiſted not in theſe things, but in thoſe which we often repeat the mention of; and we are right in ſo doing, that the opinions on each ſide, being always freſh in our memories, may the more eaſily be examined. You then, it ſeems, ſay, what I ſhall be right in again repeating, that intellect, ſcience, art, and whatever is allied to them, are better things than Pleaſure with her allies; and therefore, that the poſſeſſion, not of theſe, but of thoſe greater goods, ought to be the object of our aim. Now theſe poſitions being laid down ſeverally on each ſide, as ſubject-matters of our debate, we in a jocoſe way threatened, that we would not ſuffer you to go home quietly before it was brought to a fair determination. You complied, and promiſed us to contribute all you could towards the accompliſhment of that end. We inſiſt therefore that, as children

children ſay, you muſt not take away again what is fairly given. But, in the preſent inquiry, forbear proceeding in your uſual way.

Soc. What way do you mean?

Prot. Bringing us into ſtraits and embarraſſments; propounding queſtions to which we ſhould not be able on the ſudden to give a proper anſwer. For we are not to imagine that our preſent inquiry is brought to a concluſion, merely becauſe all of us are at a loſs what to anſwer. If, therefore, we are unable to extricate ourſelves from theſe difficulties, you muſt help us out; for ſo you promiſed. Conſider, then, what to do on this occaſion; whether to diſtinguiſh pleaſure and knowledge, each of them, into their proper ſpecies; or whether to paſs it by, if you chooſe to take a different way, and can find ſome other means of deciding the matter now controverted between us.

Soc. No harm then need I be afraid of any longer to myſelf, ſince you have ſaid this[1]. For your leaving to my own choice what ways and means to make uſe of, frees me from all apprehenſions on my own private account. But, to make it ſtill eaſier to me, ſome God, I think, has brought things to my remembrance.

Prot. How do you mean? What things?

Soc. Having formerly heard, either in a dream[2], or broad awake, certain ſayings, I have them now again preſent to my mind;—ſayings concerning pleaſure and knowledge, that neither of them is of itſelf good, but ſome third thing, different from both of thoſe, and better than either. Now if this ſhould diſcover itſelf to us clearly, pleaſure is then to be diſmiſſed from any pretenſions to the victory. For we ſhould then no longer expect to find that pleaſure and good are the ſame thing: or how ſay you?

Prot. Juſt ſo.

Soc. We ſhall have no occaſion then, in my opinion, for diſtinguiſhing the

[1] Alluding to thoſe jocular threats employed by the young gentlemen, then in the Lycæum, and gathered around Socrates, to engage him in this dialectic inquiry.—S.

[2] Olympiodorus here juſtly obſerves, that we poſſeſs the reaſons of things as in a dream, with reſpect to a ſeparate life ſupernally perfected; but as in a vigilant ſtate with reſpect to the exertion of them through ſenſe. Perhaps however, ſays he, it is better to conſider the vigilant ſtate with reſpect to the diſtinct evolution, but the dreaming ſtate, with reſpect to the indiſtinct ſubſiſtence of knowledge.—T.

ſeveral

ſeveral ſpecies of pleaſure. And in the progreſs of our inquiry it will appear more evidently ſtill that I am in the right.

PROT. Having begun ſo happily, proceed, and finiſh with the ſame ſucceſs.

SOC. Let us, firſt, agree upon a few little points beſide.

PROT. What are thoſe?

SOC. In what condition or ſtate of being is *the good?* Muſt it of neceſſity be perfect[1]? or may it want perfection?

PROT. Of all things, O Socrates, it is the moſt perfect.

SOC. Well; and is it alſo ſufficient?

PROT. Without doubt: and in this reſpect it excells all other things.

SOC. But further: This alſo, I preſume, is of all things the moſt neceſſary to ſay of it, that every being to whom it is known, hunts after, and deſires it, as chooſing the poſſeſſion of it above all things; and, indeed, caring for no other things, except ſuch as are conſtantly attended with the enjoyment of good.

PROT. There is no poſſibility of contradicting this.

SOC. Now, then, let us conſider and judge of the life of pleaſure and the life of knowledge: and to do this the better, let us view them each apart from the other.

[1] *The deſirable,* ſays Olympiodorus, proceeds from the intelligible father*; *the ſufficient* from power; and *the perfect* from the paternal intellect. In reality, however, perfection is the third from eſſence: for the middle is life. But if this be true, it is evident that *the end* is different from *perfection*; for the latter is the laſt; but the former the firſt, to which eſſence, life, and intellect, and therefore all things converge. So that in every form, in a ſimilar manner, *the end* will be the ſummit, and that which connectedly contains the whole; but *perfection* will be the third, ſubſiſting after eſſence and life: for it is neceſſary that a thing ſhould be, and ſhould live, that it may become perfect.

Again, *the perfect* is ſpread under *the ſufficient,* in the ſame manner as *the full* under *the ſuperfull,* and *the ſufficient* under *the deſirable.* For things when full excite to deſire. The *firſt end,* likewiſe, is above *the deſirable, the ſufficient,* and *the perfect.* For that is ſimple and ineffable; and hence Socrates does not ſay that it is compoſed from the elements; but that theſe elements poſſeſs indefinitely a portion of *the good.* It is better, however, to call the coordinated common contraction (συναιρεμα) of the three a portion of the good, though this is anonymous. For *the good* is all things, and not only theſe three; nor is it alone the end, but is truly all things prior to all. Beſides, the end which is now the object of conſideration is knowable, ſo that there will be another end more common than this.—T.

* That is, from the ſummit of the intelligible order.—See the Parmenides.

PROT. How do you mean?

SOC. Thus: Let us ſuppoſe a life of pleaſure, unaccompanied by intelligence; and, on the other hand, a life of intelligence, unaccompanied by pleaſure. For, if either of them be good, it muſt be complete and ſufficient, in want of no aid from any other quarter. But, if either of them ſhould appear to be indigent of aught, or inſufficient, we are no longer to imagine this to be that real and true good we are in ſearch of.

PROT. In ſuch a caſe, how could we?

SOC. Shall we then examine their pretenſions thus ſeparately, making your own mind the judge?

PROT. With all my heart.

SOC. Anſwer then to my queſtions.

PROT. Propoſe them.

SOC. Would you, Protarchus, accept the offer, were it made you, to live all your life with a ſenſe and feeling of pleaſures the moſt exquiſite?

PROT. Undoubtedly. Why not?

SOC. Suppoſe you were in full poſſeſſion of this, would you not think that ſomething beſide was ſtill wanting to you?

PROT. I certainly ſhould not.

SOC. Conſider now, whether you would not be in want of wiſdom, and intelligence, and reaſoning, and ſuch other things as are the ſiſters of theſe; at leaſt whether you would not want to *ſee* ſomething.

PROT. Why ſhould I, when I had in a manner all things, in having continual joy?

SOC. Living thus then continually all your life, would the moſt exquiſite pleaſures give you any joy?

PROT. Why not?

SOC. Having neither intellect, nor memory, nor ſcience, nor opinion,—in the firſt place of this very thing, your poſſeſſion of joy, you muſt of neceſſity be ignorant, and unable to ſay whether you then had any joy, or not, being void of all juſt diſcernment or knowledge of things preſent.

PROT. I muſt.

SOC. Being alſo void of memory, it would be impoſſible for you to remember that you ever had any joy; or to preſerve even the leaſt memorial of a joy then preſent: wanting alſo right opinion, you could not ſo much

as think you had any joy, though in the midſt of it: unable alſo to reaſon or draw conſequences, you could not poſſibly conclude that ever you ſhould have any joy to come. Thus you would live the life, not of a man, but of a ſea-ſponge, or of an oyſter. Are theſe things ſo? or ought we to think otherwiſe concerning them?

PROT. A life of mere pleaſure muſt be ſuch as you have deſcribed it.

SOC. Do we think, then, that ſuch a life is eligible?

PROT. The deſcription of it, O Socrates, has ſilenced me entirely for the preſent.

SOC. Nay; let us not ſhrink ſo ſoon from purſuing our inquiries; but proceed to the conſideration of that other life, the life of intellect.

PROT. What kind of life is that?

SOC. Let us conſider, whether any of us would chooſe to live with wiſdom, and intellect, and ſcience, and a perfect memory of all things; but without partaking of pleaſure, whether great or ſmall; and, on the other hand, without partaking of pain; wholly exempt from all feelings of either kind.

PROT. To me, O Socrates, neither of theſe lives appears eligible; and I think never would appear ſo to any other man.

SOC. What think you of a middle life, where both of them are mixed together—a life compoſed of the other two?

PROT. Compoſed of pleaſure do you mean, on the one hand, and of intellect and wiſdom on the other hand?

SOC. Juſt ſo: ſuch a life do I mean.

PROT. Every man would certainly prefer ſuch a kind of life to either of the other two.

SOC. Perceive we now what the reſult is of our diſcourſing thus far on the ſubject now before us?

PROT. Perfectly well; it is this: that three lives have been propoſed for our conſideration, and that neither of the two firſt-mentioned appears ſufficient or eligible for any one, neither for man, nor any other animal.

SOC. Is it not evident, then, with regard to the point in controverſy, that neither of thoſe two lives can give the poſſeſſion of the good? for, whichever of them had ſuch a power, that life would be ſufficient, perfect, and eligible

alſo to all thoſe animals[1] who are capable of living in the continual enjoyment of the good all their lives. And whoever of us ſhould give any other life the preference to that, would make his election contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, though not willingly, becauſe through ignorance, or ſome unhappy neceſſity.

PROT. What you ſay is highly probable indeed.

SOC. That we ought not to think that Goddeſs of Philebus to be the ſame thing with the good, has been ſhown, I think, ſufficiently.

PHIL. Neither is that intellect of yours, O Socrates, the good; for it will be found deficient in the ſame reſpects.

SOC. Mine perhaps, O Philebus, may; but not that intellect which is divine and true; for it is otherwiſe, I preſume, with this. However, I do not contend for the chief prize of victory, in behalf of the life of intellect againſt the middle or mixed life. But what to do with the ſecond prize, and which life to beſtow it on, is next to be conſidered. For the cauſe of that happineſs which the mixed life affords, one of us, perhaps, may aſcribe to intellect, the other of us to pleaſure. And thus, neither of theſe two would be man's ſovereign good, and yet one or other of them may perhaps be ſuppoſed the cauſe of it. Now on this point I would ſtill more earneſtly contend againſt Philebus,—that not pleaſure, but intellect, is the neareſt allied, and the moſt ſimilar to that, whatever it be, by the poſſeſſion of which the mixed life becomes eligible and good. And if this account be true, pleaſure can never be ſaid to have any juſt pretenſions either to the firſt or to the ſecond prize of excellence. Still further is ſhe from coming in for the third prize, if any credit may be given for the preſent to that intellect of mine.

PROT. Indeed, O Socrates, it ſeems to me that Pleaſure is now fallen: your reaſons have been like ſo many blows given her; under the force of which, fighting for the maſter-prize, ſhe lies vanquiſhed. But I think, how-

[1] In the Greek,—*παση φυτοις και ζωοις, to all plants and animals.* But are plants capable of living a life of ſenſual pleaſure? or brute animals, a life of ſcience and underſtanding? We are, therefore, inclined to think, that Plato's own words were *παση τοις ζωοις*· for immediately he ſubjoins an explanation of his meaning, and limits the word *παση, all,* to ſuch only as are endued with reaſon; and that the word *φευ* was written in the margin of ſome manuſcript, oppoſite to the words *παση τοις*, by a reader, aſtoniſhed at the boldneſs of the expreſſion *παση τοις ζωοις*, and not ſufficiently attentive to the qualifying words ſubjoined.—S.

ever, that we muſt ſay it was prudent in Intellect not to contend for that prize; for ſhe would otherwiſe have met with the ſame fate. Now if Pleaſure ſhould alſo loſe the prize of ſecond value, as already ſhe has loſt the higheſt, ſhe muſt entirely fall into diſgrace with her own lovers: for even to them ſhe would no longer appear to merit ſuch honour as they paid to her before.

Soc. Well then; is it not the better way to diſmiſs her now directly, and not give her pain, by inſpecting into her too nicely, and diſcovering all her imperfections?

Prot. What you now ſay goes for nothing, Socrates.

Soc. Do you mean, becauſe I ſuppoſed an impoſſible thing when I ſuppoſed that pain might be given to pleaſure?

Prot. Not on that account only, but becauſe you are ſenſible that none of us will give you a diſcharge before you have brought theſe arguments to a concluſion.

Soc. Ah! the copious matter of argument, O Protarchus, ſtill behind! and ſcarcely is any part of it very manageable on the preſent occaſion [1]. For, whoever ſtands forth as the champion of Intellect to win the ſecond prize for her, muſt, as it appears to me, take another way of combating, and has need of other weapons different from thoſe reaſons I before made uſe of: ſome, however, of the ſame may, perhaps, be of uſe again. Muſt we then proceed in that manner?

Prot. By all means.

Soc. But let us begin cautiouſly, and endeavour to lay down right principles.

Prot. What principles do you mean?

Soc. All things which are now in the univerſe let us divide into two ſorts, or rather, if you pleaſe, into three.

[1] Aldus's edition of Plato, by omitting the word οὐδὲ in this ſentence, gives a quite contrary turn to it. Stephens, in his edition, has inſerted the οὐδὲ: and this reading we have preferred to the former; becauſe it makes much better ſenſe, and is agreeable alſo to Ficinus's tranſlation from the Medicean manuſcript. It is ſtrange that Grynæus, who undertook to reviſe that tranſlation, ſhould depart from it here, where it is evidently right, to follow the erroneous reading in the Aldine edition. Cornarius, Serranus, Bembo, and Grou, were not ſo miſled.—S.

Prot.

PROT. You ſhould tell us what difference between things it is, with reſpect to which you make that diviſion.

SOC. Some things which have been already mentioned let us reaſſume.

PROT. What things?

SOC. God, we ſaid, has exhibited[1] *the infinite*, and alſo *the bound* of beings.

PROT. Very true.

SOC.

[1] Proclus, in Platon. Theol. p. 132, obſerves, that Plato here, according to the theology of his country, eſtabliſhes two principles after *the one*. And, according to Philolaus, the nature of beings is connected from things *bounded* and things *infinite*. If beings, therefore, ſubſiſt from *bound* and *the infinite*, it is evident that theſe two muſt be prior to beings, or, in other words, muſt be ſupereſſential. Hence, as *bound* and *the infinite* are ſupereſſential, Socrates with great propriety ſays that "God has *exhibited* them." For their proceſſion from the higheſt God is ineffable, and they may be rather ſaid to be *arcane manifeſtations* from him than his *productions*. Mr. Sydenham, from being unacquainted with the ſublime theology of the Greeks, has totally miſtaken the profound meaning of this paſſage in his tranſlation, which is as follows:—"The Gods, we ſaid, have ſhown us the infinite of things, and alſo their bound." For the original is τον θεον ελεγομεν που, το μεν απειρον δειξαι των οντων, το δε περας.

Should it be aſked, ſays Olympiodorus, how the two elements *bound* and *infinity* are better than that which is mixed, ſince theſe two elements are the principles of being; we reply, that theſe principles muſt be conſidered as total orders more ſimple than that which is mixt; and that ſecondary principles proceed from theſe two, in the firſt mixt, which are ſubordinate to the mixt, in the ſame manner as elements are every where ſubordinate to that which is compoſed from them.

Again, neither is perfect ſeparation in the ſecond* order: for the fabrication of form firſt pertains to intellect; and the firſt intellect is pure intellect. Hence, Jamblichus ſays that the monads of forms ſubſiſt in this, meaning by monads that which is unſeparated in every form. On this account it is intellectual as in intellectuals, and is the cauſe of formal eſſence, juſt as the ſecond is the cauſe of life, and the third of the fabrication of form in intellectuals.

Again, the egg, the paternal intellect, occult number; and, in ſhort, that which is the third from *bound*, reſpectively ſignify the third God, according to theologiſts, and conſequently each is the ſame as that which is mixt from bound and infinity.

Further ſtill, the one principle which gives ſubſiſtence to, and is the end of, all things, contains the final as ſuperior to the producing; for hypoſtaſis is through the ends. But the firſt principle is both theſe according to *the one*: and the two principles *bound* and *infinity* diſtribute theſe; *bound* ſubſiſting according to the final, and *infinity* according to the producing cauſe.

* The reader muſt remember that the intelligible order conſiſts of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*, and that each of theſe receives a triadic diviſion.—See the Notes on the Parmenides.

Again,

Soc. Let us take theſe for two of the ſpecies of things; and for a third let us take that, which is compoſed of thoſe two mixed together. But I deſerve, methinks, to be laughed at for pretending thus to diſtinguiſh things, and to enumerate their ſeveral ſpecies.

Prot. Why ſo, my good friend?

Soc. A fourth kind appears to have been omitted by me.

Prot. Say, What?

Soc. Of that commixture, the combination of the former two, conſider the cauſe: and beſide thoſe three ſpecies, ſet me down this cauſe[1] for a fourth.

Prot. Will you not want a fifth ſpecies too, for a cauſe of diſunion and ſeparation?

Soc. Perhaps I may; but not, I believe, at preſent. However, ſhould there be occaſion for it, you will pardon me, if I go in purſuit of a fifth life.

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Of theſe four ſpecies, then, in the firſt place dividing the three, and perceiving that two of theſe, when both are divided, and their diviſions ſeparated, are, each of them, many;—then, gathering together the many of each, and uniting them again, let us endeavour to underſtand in what manner each of them is, at the ſame time, one and many.

Prot. Would you but expreſs your meaning more plainly, I might, perhaps, apprehend it.

Soc. I mean, then, by the two, which I propoſe to be now conſidered, the ſame which I mentioned at the firſt; one of them *the infinite*, and the other *bound*. That *the infinite* is, in ſome manner, many, I will attempt to ſhow: and let *bound* wait a while.

Prot. It ſhall.

Again, Socrates eſtabliſhing that which is mixt as a certain cauſe of union, the cauſe of ſeparation is alſo inveſtigated. This cauſe, however, will be the *difference* which ſubſiſts after the intelligible, as we learn from the Parmenides. For the intelligible is united alone. But it would be better to make *the one* the cauſe of all things; *bound* the cauſe of union; *infinite* of ſeparation; and *the mixt* that which participates of both. Obſerve, too, that the more and the leſs are everywhere, but in intelligibles according to a ſuperior and inferior degree of power.—T.

[1] That is, the ineffable principle of things.—T.

Soc.

Soc. Give me now your attention. It is, I confeſs, a difficult and doubtful thing, that, which I would have you to conſider. Conſider it, however. Firſt, with regard to hotter and colder, in things, ſee if you can think of any bound. Or would not the more and the leſs, reſiding in the kinds themſelves of things, hinder, ſo long as they reſide there, an end from being fixed to them? For, if ever they receive an end, to an end alſo are their very beings then brought.

Prot. Moſt certainly true.

Soc. And in ſpeaking of either the colder or the hotter of any two things, we conſtantly attribute to them the more and the leſs.

Prot. And very much ſo.

Soc. Reaſon then conſtantly ſuggeſts to us that the *colder* and the *hotter* have no end: and being thus without any end, they are altogether boundleſs.

Prot. I am ſtrongly inclined to agree with you, Socrates in this point.

Soc. Well have you anſwered, my friend Protarchus; and well have you reminded me, that the *ſtrongly*, which you mentioned, and the *faintly*, have the ſame power as the *more* and the *leſs*. For, wherever they reſide, they ſuffer not any thing to be juſt *ſo much*; but infuſing either the more *intenſe* or the more *remiſs* into every action, they always produce in it either the *more* or the *leſs*; while the juſt *ſo much* flies away and vaniſhes from before them. For, as it was juſt now obſerved, were they not to drive away the juſt *ſo much*, or did they permit *this*, and the *moderate*, to enter into the regions of the *more* and the *leſs*, or of the *intenſe* and the *remiſs*, theſe very beings muſt quit their own places: becauſe, if they admitted the juſt *ſo much*, the *hotter* and the *colder* would be gone. For the *hotter*, and in like manner the *colder*, is always advancing forward, and never abides in the ſame ſpot: but the juſt *ſo much* ſtops, and ſtays, having finiſhed its progreſs. Now, according to this reaſoning, the *hotter* muſt be *boundleſs*; and ſo muſt alſo be the *colder*.

Prot. So it appears indeed, Socrates. But, as you rightly ſaid, it is not eaſy to apprehend theſe things. Queſtions, however, relating to them, again and again repeated, might perhaps ſhow that the queſtioner and the reſpondent were tolerably well agreed in their minds concerning them.

Soc. You ſay well: and we ſhould try ſo to do. But at preſent, to avoid lengthening

lengthening out this argument, by enumerating every infinite, conſider, whether we may take this for the characteriſtic mark of the nature of all infinites.

PROT. What mark do you mean?

SOC. Whatever things appear to us to be increaſing or diminiſhing, or to admit of intenſeneſs and remiſſion, or the too much, and all other ſuch attributes, we ought to refer all theſe to the genus of the infinite; collecting, as it were, all of them in one, agreeably to what was before ſaid; that whatever things were divided and ſeparated we ought to aſſemble together and combine, as well as we are able, affixing to all of them the mark of ſome one nature;—if you remember.

PROT. I remember it well.

SOC. Every thing, then, which rejects all ſuch attributes, and admits only ſuch as are quite the contrary,—in the firſt place, the equal and equality, and, after the equal, the double, and every other relation which one number bears to another, and one meaſure to another,—all theſe things, I ſay, in ſumming up, and referring them to bound, think you not that we ſhould do right? or how ſay you?

PROT. Perfectly right, O Socrates.

SOC. Well: but the third thing made up, and conſiſting of the other two, what characteriſtic ſhall we aſſign to this?

PROT. You, as I preſume, will ſhow it to me.

SOC. Divinity indeed may; if any of the Gods will hearken to my prayers.

PROT. Pray, then, and *ſurvey*.

SOC. I ſurvey: and ſome God, O Protarchus, is now, methinks, become favourable to us.

PROT. How do you mean? and by what ſign do you know it?

SOC. I will tell you in plain words: but do you follow them cloſely.

PROT. Only ſpeak.

SOC. We mentioned juſt now the hotter and the colder; did we not?

PROT. We did.

SOC. To theſe then add the drier and the moiſter; the more numerous and the fewer; the ſwifter and the ſlower; the larger and the ſmaller; and whatever things beſide, in our late account of them, we ranked under one head,—that which admits of the nature of the more and the leſs.

PROT. You mean the infinite.

SOC. I do: and mingle together with this that which we ſpoke of next afterward,—the race of bound.

PROT. What race do you mean?

SOC. Thoſe things which we did not (as we ought to have done) aſſemble together under one head, in the ſame manner as we aſſembled together the race of the infinite. But you will now, perhaps, do what was then omitted. And when both the ſorts are aſſembled, and viewed together, the race of bound will then become manifeſt.

PROT. What things do you ſpeak of? and how are they to be aſſembled?

SOC. I ſpeak of that nature in which are compriſed the equal and the double; and whatever elſe puts an end to conteſt between contrary things; and, introducing number, makes them to be commenſurate one with another, and to harmonize together.

PROT. I apprehend your meaning to be, that, from the commixture of thoſe two, a certain progeny will ariſe between them in every one of their tribes.

SOC. You apprehend me rightly.

PROT. Relate then the progeny of theſe commixtures.

SOC. In *diſeaſes*, does not the right commixture of thoſe two produce the *recovery of health?*

PROT. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And in the acute and the grave, in the ſwift alſo and the ſlow, which are all of them infinite, does not the other ſort, received among them, and begetting bounds, conſtitute the perfection of all the Muſe's art?

PROT. Certainly ſo.

SOC. And in weather exceſſively either cold or hot, does not the entrance of that other kind take off the exceſs, the vehement, and the infinite,—generating in their ſtead, not only the moderate and the meaſured, but ſymmetry alſo, and correſpondence between their meaſures?

PROT. Without diſpute.

SOC. And do not propitious ſeaſons, and all their fair productions, ariſe to us from hence, from the mixture of things which are infinite with things which have a bound?

PROT. Doubtleſs.

Soc. A thouſand other things I forbear to mention; as, for inſtance, ſtrength and beauty, the attendants upon health of body; and in the ſoul other excellencies, very many and very noble. For Venus herſelf, O good Philebus! obſerving lawleſs luſt, and all manner of vice every where reigning, the love of pleaſure being in all men boundleſs, and their deſires of it inſatiable, ſhe herſelf eſtabliſhed a law and an order, ſetting bounds to pleaſure and deſire. This you ſaid was to leſſen and to impair pleaſure; but I maintain, that, on the contrary, it preſerved pleaſure from decay. And you, Protarchus! what think you of it?

Prot. For my part, I am entirely of your mind, Socrates.

Soc. I have ſhown you then thoſe three kinds, if you apprehend my meaning.

Prot. Partly, I ſuppoſe, I do. By one of thoſe three, I ſuppoſe, you mean the infinite; by another, the ſecond ſort, you mean that which in all beings is the bound; but what you mean by the third ſort, I have no ſtrong apprehenſion of.

Soc. Becauſe the care of that third ſort, my friend, has amazed you with its multitude. And yet, the infinite alſo appeared to contain many tribes: but as they were all of them ſtamped with the character of more and leſs, they were ſeen clearly to be one.

Prot. True.

Soc. Then, as to bound; that neither contained many, nor found we any difficulty in admitting the nature of it to be one.

Prot. How could we?

Soc. It was not at all poſſible, indeed. Of thoſe two ſorts, then, all the progeny,—all the things produced into being through thoſe meaſures, which are effected in the immoderate, when bounds are ſet to the infinite,—in ſumming up all theſe things together, and comprehending them in one, underſtand me to mean, by the third ſort, this one.

Prot, I underſtand you.

Soc. Now, beſides theſe three, we are further to conſider, what that kind is which we ſaid was the fourth. And as we are to conſider it jointly, ſee whether you think it neceſſary, that all things which are produced into being ſhould have ſome cauſe of their production.

Prot. I think it is: for, without a cauſe, how ſhould they be produced?

Soc. The nature then of the efficient differs from the cauſe in nothing but in name: ſo that the efficient and the cauſe may be rightly deemed one.

Prot. Rightly.

Soc. So, likewiſe, the thing effected, and the thing produced into being, we ſhall find to differ in the ſame manner, in nothing but in name, or how?

Prot Juſt ſo.

Soc. In the nature of things, does not the efficient lead the way? and does not the effect follow after it into being?

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Cauſe, therefore, is not the ſame thing with that which is ſubſervient to cauſe in the producing of its effect, but a thing different.

Prot. Without doubt.

Soc. Did not the things which are produced into being, and the things out of which they are all of them produced, exhibit to us the three genera?

Prot. Clearly.

Soc. That, then, which is the artificer of all theſe, the cauſe of them, let us call the fourth cauſe; as it is fully ſhown to be different from thoſe other three.

Prot. Be it ſo.

Soc. But the four ſorts having been now deſcribed, every one of them diſtinctly, we ſhould do well, for memory's ſake, to enumerate them in order.

Prot. No doubt of it.

Soc. The firſt then I call infinite; the ſecond bound; the third eſſence[1] mixt and generated from theſe: and in ſaying[2] that the cauſe of this mixture and this production is the fourth, ſhould I ſay aught amiſs?

Prot. Certainly not.

Soc. Well now: what is next? How proceeds our argument? and with what deſign came we along this way? Was it not this? We were inquiring

[1] As eſſence, therefore, is plainly aſſerted by Socrates to be mixt and generated from bound and infinity, it is evident that *bound* and *infinity* are ſupereſſential. For cauſe is every where ſuperior to its effect.—T.

[2] The edition of Plato by Aldus, and that by Stephens, in this place erroneouſly give us to read λεγω, inſtead of the evidently right reading, which is λεγων, exhibited in the Baſil editions.—S.

who

who had a right to the ſecond prize of victory; whether Pleaſure had, or Wiſdom: was it not ſo?

PROT. It was.

SOC. Now then, ſince we have thus divided theſe genera, may we not happily form a more finiſhed judgment concerning both the very beſt and the ſecond-beſt of thoſe things which originally were the ſubjects of diſpute between us?

PROT. Perhaps we may.

SOC. We made no difficulty, I think, of ſetting down for conqueror, the mixt life, the life of pleaſure and wiſdom together. Was it not ſo?

PROT. It was.

SOC. We perceive then of what ſort the mixt life is, and to which kind it is to be referred.

PROT. Evidently.

SOC. And I think we ſhall agree, that it is part of the third ſort. For the mixt life is not to be referred ſolely to any one of the infinites, mixed with ſome one only of the bounds: it is a life of all ſuch things together as are infinite in their own nature, but are under the reſtraint of bound. So that the mixt life, this winner of the prize, may be rightly ſaid to be a part of the third ſort.

PROT. Moſt rightly.

SOC. It is well. But that life of yours, O Philebus, a life of pleaſure ſimple and unmixed, to which of the three ſorts may we rightly ſay that it belongs? But before you pronounce, anſwer me firſt to this queſtion.

PHIL. Propoſe it then [1].

SOC. Concerning pleaſure and pain; have they in their own nature any bounds? or are they among thoſe things which admit the more and the leſs [2]?

PHIL. Pleaſure, O Socrates! to be ſure, admits the more. For it would not comprehend every good in it, if it were not by nature infinite, with re-

[1] Aldus, in his edition of Plato, gave theſe words to Protarchus; though nothing is more plain than that Plato meant them for Philebus. The Baſil editors reſtored them to the right owner: and it is ſtrange that Stephens either knew it not, or did not acknowledge it.—S.

[2] In all the editions of the Greek we here read εστι inſtead of εστον. We are ignorant of any authority for uſing ſo ſtrange an enallage; and therefore we ſuppoſe it an erroneous reading.—S.

ſpect.

ſpect to the multitude which it contains, and the increaſe which it is capable of.

Soc. Nor can pain be imagined, O Philebus, to comprehend every evil. So that we muſt conſider of ſome other thing, different from the nature of the infinite, for the imparting of any good to pleaſures. It is admitted, that your life of pleaſure is the iſſue of things unbounded, and belongs, therefore, to the infinite. But to which of the ſorts before mentioned, O Protarchus and Philebus, may we refer wiſdom, and ſcience, and intellect, without being guilty of impiety? For it appears to me that we incur no trifling danger in anſwering the preſent queſtion, whatever be our anſwer, whether right or wrong.

Phil. You magnify that God of yours, O Socrates, very highly, methinks.

Soc. So do you, my friend, that Goddeſs of yours. The queſtion, however, ought to be anſwered by us.

Prot. Socrates ſays what is right, O Philebus, and we muſt do as he ſays we ought.

Phil. Have not you, Protarchus, taken upon yourſelf my part in the debate?

Prot. It is true that I have. But in the preſent caſe I find myſelf much at a loſs how to anſwer. I muſt therefore requeſt, O Socrates, that you yourſelf will take the office of prophet to us; leſt, by ſome miſtake, I ſhould offend the combatant[1] whom you favour, and by ſinging out of tune ſhould ſpoil the harmony[2].

[1] This evidently is a metaphor taken from the contentions uſual at that time between dramatic poets during the feaſts of Bacchus, for the fame of ſuperiority in their art. For the Grecians of thoſe days had an emulation to excell in the muſical entertainments of the mind, as well as in the gymnic exerciſes of the body. To inſpire them with that emulation, combats in poetry and muſic, as well as in gymnaſtic, were inſtituted by their legiſlators: and the contenders in either kind were alike termed αγωνισται, combatants. The metaphorical combatants meant by Protarchus are Mind and Pleaſure.—S.

[2] In continuing the metaphor taken from theatrical conteſts, Protarchus likens himſelf to one of the chorus in a tragedy or comedy, and Socrates to the κορυφαιος, or χορηγος, the chief or leader of the whole band. For, in the chorus ſongs, it was the office of the chief, or preſident, to lead the vocal muſic, keeping it in time and tune with the inſtrumental: and in the dialogue ſcenes, wherever the chorus bore a part, their preſident ſpoke alone for them all.—S.

Soc.

Soc. You muſt be obeyed, Protarchus. Indeed there is nothing difficult in your injunctions. But, in aſking you to which of the two abovementioned kinds intellect and ſcience were to be referred,—when I was magnifying, as Philebus ſays, the ſubject of my queſtion,—the joke, which I intended to ſoften the ſolemnity of it, confuſed your thoughts, I find, in good earneſt.

Prot. Very thoroughly ſo, I confeſs, O Socrates.

Soc. And yet it was an eaſy queſtion. For, on this point, there is a conſent and harmony among all the wiſe, dignifying thus themſelves,—that *Intellect is king of heaven and earth.* And this which they ſay is perhaps [1] well ſaid. But let us, if you are willing, conſider the nature of this genus more amply, and not in ſo conciſe a manner.

Prot. Conſider it in what manner you think beſt, without regarding the length of the inquiry: for the length will not be diſagreeable to us.

Soc. Fairly ſpoken. Let us begin, then, by propoſing this queſtion.

Prot. What?

Soc. Whether ſhall we ſay that the power of the irrational principle governs all things in the whole univerſe, fortuitouſly and at random? or ſhall we, on the contrary, agree with our anceſtors and predeceſſors, in affirming that a certain admirable intellect and wiſdom orders all things together, and governs throughout the whole?

Prot. Alike in nothing, O Socrates, are theſe two tenets. That which you mentioned juſt now is, in my opinion, impious. But, to hold that Intellect diſpoſes all things in a beautiful order, is agreeable to that view which we have of the world, of the celeſtial bodies, and of the whole circumvolution of the heavens. For my own part, I ſhould never ſpeak nor think any otherwiſe on this ſubject.

Soc. Is it then your pleaſure that we add our voices to thoſe of the antients, and openly avow that tenet to be ours; not contenting ourſelves with a bare repetition of the ſayings of others, in hopes of eſcaping danger to ourſelves; but reſolved to run all riſk together, and to ſhare in undergoing the

[1] Socrates does not ſay this as being himſelf doubtful whether Intellect is king of heaven and earth, but becauſe thoſe with whom he was converſing had not arrived at a ſcientific knowledge of this dogma.—T.

cenſures

cenſures of ſome great and formidable man, when he aſſerts that in the whole of things there is no order[1]?

PROT. How can I do otherwiſe than join with you in this?

SOC. Attend now to the argument which comes on next to be conſidered.

PROT. Propoſe it then.

SOC. In the bodies of all animals, ſomehow, we diſcover that fire, water, and air, muſt be in their compoſition by nature; and earth, which gives ſupport to the other ingredients in their frame, we ſee plainly: as mariners ſay, when they are toſſed about in a thunder-ſtorm at ſea, and deſcry land.

PROT. True: and toſſed about indeed are we too in theſe diſcourſes; but for a port to anchor in we are entirely at a loſs.

SOC. Let us proceed then: Concerning each of thoſe elementary ingredients in our frame, underſtand this.

PROT. What?

SOC. That which there is in us of each element is ſmall and inconſiderable; no where in any part of our frame have we it at all unmixed and pure; neither has it in us a power worthy of its nature. Take one of them for a ſample, by which you may eſtimate all the reſt. Fire in ſome manner there is in us; fire[2] there is alſo in the univerſe.

PROT. Moſt certainly.

SOC. Now the fire which is in our compoſition is weak and inconſiderable: but that which is in the univerſe is admirable for the multitude of it, for the beauty which it exhibits, and for every power and virtue which belong to fire.

PROT. Perfectly true.

SOC. Well then: is the fire of the univerſe generated, fed, and ruled by the fire which we have in us? or, on the contrary, does my fire, and yours, and that of every other living thing, receive its being, ſupport, and laws, from the fire of the univerſe?

[1] That the perſon here alluded to is Critias, one of the thirty oligarchic tyrants, cannot be doubted of by thoſe who are acquainted with his character, and the injurious treatment he gave to Socrates. A conſiderable fragment of his atheiſtic poetry is extant in Sextus Empiricus, pag. 562.—S.

[2] Socrates is here ſpeaking of the difference between the *wholes* of the univerſe, and the *parts* to which theſe wholes are prior, as being their cauſe. See the Introduction to the Timæus.—T.

PROT.

PROT. This queſtion of yours does not deſerve an anſwer.

SOC. Rightly ſaid. And you would anſwer in the ſame manner, I ſuppoſe, if your opinion was aſked concerning the earthy part of every animal here, compared with the earth in the univerſe; and juſt ſo concerning the other elementary parts of animal bodies mentioned before.

PROT. What man, who made a different anſwer, would ever appear to be of ſound mind?

SOC. Scarcely would any man. But attend to what follows next. Whereever we find theſe four elements mixed together and united, do we not give to this compoſition the name of body?

PROT. We do.

SOC. Apprehend the ſame thing then with regard to this, which we call the world. This ſhould be conſidered as a body in the ſame manner, being compoſed of the ſame elements.

PROT. You are perfectly in the right.

SOC. To the whole of this great body, then, does the whole of that little body of ours owe its nouriſhment, and whatever it has received, and whatever it poſſeſſes? or is the body of the univerſe indebted to ours for all which it is and has?

PROT. There is no reaſon, O Socrates, for making a queſtion of this point, neither.

SOC. Well: what will you ſay to this point then?

PROT. What point?

SOC. Muſt we not affirm theſe bodies of ours to be animated with ſouls?

PROT. It is evident that we muſt.

SOC. But from whence, O my friend Protarchus, ſhould our bodies derive thoſe ſouls of theirs, if that great body of the univerſe, which has all the ſame elements with our bodies, but in much greater purity and perfection, was not, as well as ours, animated with a ſoul?

PROT. It is evident, O Socrates, that from no other origin could they derive them.

SOC. Since, therefore, O Protarchus, we acknowledge theſe four genera, bound, infinite, the compound of both thoſe, and the genus of cauſe, to be in all bodies; and ſince we find, that in this part of the univerſe to which we

belong there are beings of that fourth ſort,—cauſes, which produce ſouls, build up bodies for thoſe ſouls to dwell in [1], and heal thoſe bodies when diſeaſed;—cauſes, alſo, which create and frame other compoſitions, and amend them when impaired;—cauſes theſe, to every one of which we gave a particular name, betokening a particular kind of wiſdom or ſkill:—ſince, I ſay, we are perſuaded of theſe things, ſurely we can by no means think that the whole heaven, in the larger parts of which are the ſame four genera, and theſe undepraved and pure, can have any other cauſe than a nature who is full of contrivance and deſign, and in whom the moſt beautiful and noble things all unite.

PROT. It would not be at all reaſonable to think it can.

SOC. If this then be abſurd, we may the better aſſert, as a conſequence of our reaſoning, that in the univerſe there are, what we have ſeveral times repeated, *infinite* in great quantity, and *bound* ſufficient; and beſides theſe, a *cauſe*, not inconſiderable or mean, which, by *mixing* them properly together, marſhals and regulates the years, the ſeaſons, and the months,—a cauſe, which with the greateſt juſtice we may term *wiſdom* and *intellect*.

PROT. With the greateſt juſtice, indeed.

SOC. But further, wiſdom and intellect could never be without ſoul [2].

[1] In the Greek of this paſſage we read—ψυχην τε παρεχον και σωμα σκιαν εμποιουν.—Ficinus tranſlates the two laſt words of it thus:—"*dum imprimit umbram.*" But this being obſcure, an error in the Greek manuſcripts was juſtly ſuſpected by the ſubſequent tranſlators, Cornarius and Serranus; the former of whom propoſes inſtead of σκιαν to read ὑγειαν; and the latter imagines that we ſhould read σωμασκιαν as one word. Grynæus and Bembo never attempt an emendation of the printed Greek, even where it is moſt apparently erroneous. And Monſ. Grou has taken the eaſy way of not tranſlating the two laſt words. But all the difficulty vaniſhes, if, inſtead of σκιαν we read σκηνος, a *tabernacle* or *tent*; a word metaphorically uſed by the Pythagoreans to ſignify the human body, as being but a ſlight temporary dwelling for the ſoul. See Timæus the Locrian, in ſeveral paſſages; and a fragment of Ocellus the Lucanian, de Lege, in Stobæus's Eclogæ Phyſ. cap. 16. See alſo Æſchines the Socratic, pag. 128, edit. Horrei; the Greek index to which will furniſh the learned reader with examples of the ſame metaphor, uſed by ſeveral Greek writers in the ſucceeding ages.—S.

[2] That is, ſoul is conſubſiſtent with wiſdom and intellect. If this be the caſe, it is evident that when Plato in the Timæus ſpeaks of the *generation* of ſoul by the *demiurgus*, whom he there expreſsly calls *intellect*, he does not mean by *generation* a *temporal* production, but an *eternal proceſſion* from cauſe. And in the ſame manner, what he there ſays of the *generation* of the univerſe is to be underſtood. Hence, thoſe are to be derided who aſſert that the world, according to Plato, was produced in time.—T.

PROT.

PROT. By no means.

SOC. You will affirm, then, that in the nature of Jupiter there is a kingly ſoul and a kingly intellect, through the power of cauſe[1]; and that in the other Gods there are other beautiful things, whatever they are, by which their Deities love to be diſtinguiſhed, and from which they delight in taking their reſpective denominations.

PROT. Certainly I ſhall.

SOC. The diſcourſe we have now had together on this ſubject, O Protarchus, think it not idle, and to no purpoſe. For it ſupports that doctrine of our anceſtors, that the univerſe is for ever governed by intellect.

PROT. Indeed it does.

SOC. And beſides, it has furniſhed us with an anſwer to my queſtion,—to what genus intellect is to be referred; in making it appear that intellect is allied to that which we ſaid was the cauſe of all things, one of our four genera. For now at length you plainly have our anſwer.

PROT. I have; and a very full and ſufficient anſwer it is: but I was not aware what you were about.

SOC. A man's attention to ſerious ſtudies, O Protarchus, is ſometimes, you know, relaxed by amuſements.

PROT. Politely ſaid.

SOC. And thus, my friend, to what genus intellect belongs, and what power it is poſſeſſed of, has been now ſhown tolerably well for the preſent.

PROT. It has, indeed.

SOC. And to what genus alſo belongs pleaſure, appeared before.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. Concerning theſe two, then, let us remember theſe concluſions,—that intellect is allied to cauſe, and is nearly of this genus; and that pleaſure is infinite in her own nature, and belongs to that genus which, of itſelf, neither has nor ever will have in it either a beginning, or a middle, or an end.

PROT. We ſhall not fail to remember them both.

[1] That is to ſay, a kingly ſoul, and a kingly intellect, ſubſiſt in Jupiter, the artificer of the univerſe according to cauſe. For Jupiter, as a Deity, is a ſupereſſential unity, in which all things have a cauſal ſubſiſtence.—T.

Soc. Now we ought to conſider next, in which genus either of thoſe two things, intelligence and pleaſure, is found to have a ſeat; and in what ſtate or condition thoſe beings muſt be in whom either of them is produced, at the time of its production. And firſt in the caſe of pleaſure: for, as we inquired to which genus ſhe belonged, before we conſidered of which ſort was intellect; ſo, with regard to the points alſo now propoſed, ſhe is the firſt to be examined[1]. But, ſeparately from the conſideration of pain, we ſhould never be able fully to explore the nature of pleaſure.

Prot. Well: if we are to proceed in this way, let us then in this way proceed[2].

Soc. Are you of the ſame opinion with me concerning their riſe and production?

Prot. What opinion is that?

Soc. Pain and pleaſure appear to me, both of them, to ariſe, according to nature, in that which is a common genus.

Prot. Remind us, friend Socrates, which of the genera mentioned before is meant by the term common.

Soc. What you deſire, O wonderful man! ſhall be done, to the beſt of my ability.

Prot. Fairly ſaid.

Soc. By this common genus, then, we are to underſtand that which, in recounting the four ſorts, we reckoned as third.

Prot. That which you mentioned next after both the infinite and bound: that in which you ranked health, and alſo, as I think, harmony.

Soc. Perfectly right. Now give me all poſſible attention.

Prot. Only ſpeak.

Soc. I ſay, then, that whenever the harmony in the frame of any animal is broken, a breach is then made in its conſtitution, and at the ſame time riſe is given to pains.

[1] Cornarius and Stephens, both of them, perceived the Greek of this ſentence to be erroneous. But the emendations propoſed by them appear inſufficient. Ficinus's tranſlation from the Florentine MS. helps to reſtore the right reading thus:—Δει δη,—ιδειν ημας· και πρωτον περι την ηδονην, ὡσπερ—ουτω και ταυτα προτερον [ſc. δει ιδειν].—S.

[2] In the edition of Plato by Aldus, and in that alſo by Stephens, this ſentence, by a ſtrange miſtake, is printed as if it were ſpoken by Socrates.—S.

Prot.

PROT. You ſay what is highly probable.

SOC. But when the harmony is reſtored, and the breach is healed, we ſhould ſay that then pleaſure is produced: if points of ſo great importance may be diſpatched at once in ſo few words.

PROT. In my opinion, O Socrates, you ſay what is very true: but let us try if we can ſhow theſe truths in a light ſtill clearer.

SOC. Are not ſuch things as ordinarily happen, and are manifeſt to us all, the moſt eaſy to be underſtood?

PROT. What things do you mean?

SOC. Want of food makes a breach in the animal ſyſtem, and at the ſame time gives the pain of hunger.

PROT. True.

SOC. And food, in filling up the breach again, gives a pleaſure.

PROT. Right.

SOC. Want of drink alſo, interrupting the circulation of the blood and humours, brings on us corruption, together with the pain of thirſt; but the virtue of a liquid, in moiſtening and repleniſhing the parts dried up, yields a pleaſure. In like manner, preternatural ſuffocating heat, in diſſolving the texture of the parts, gives a painful ſenſation: but a cooling again, a refreſhment agreeable to nature, affects us with a ſenſe of pleaſure.

PROT. Moſt certainly.

SOC. And the concretion of the animal humours through cold, contrary to their nature, occaſions pain: but a return to their priſtine ſtate of fluidity, and a reſtoring of the natural circulation, produce pleaſure. See, then, whether you think this general account of the matter not amiſs, concerning that ſort of being which I ſaid was compoſed of infinite and bound,—that, when by nature any beings of that ſort become animated with ſoul, their paſſage into corruption, or a total diſſolution, is accompanied with pain; and their entrance into exiſtence, the aſſembling of all thoſe particles which compoſe the nature of ſuch a being, is attended with a ſenſe of pleaſure.

PROT. I admit your account of this whole matter; for, as it appears to me, it bears on it the ſtamp of truth.

SOC. Theſe ſenſations, then, which affect the ſoul by means only of the body, let us conſider as one ſpecies of pain and pleaſure.

PROT. Be it ſo.

SOC. Conſider now the feelings of the ſoul herſelf, in the expectation of ſuch.

ſuch a pain or of ſuch a pleaſure,—antecedent to the pleaſure expected, an agreeable feeling of hope and alacrity,—antecedent to the pain expected, the uneaſineſs of fear.

PROT. This is, indeed, a different ſpecies of pleaſure and pain, independent of the body, and produced in the ſoul herſelf through expectation.

SOC. You apprehend the matter rightly. Now the conſideration of theſe feelings of pain and pleaſure, which immediately affect the ſoul herſelf, (and ſeem to be produced in her, each of them, unmixed and genuine,) will, as I imagine, clear up that doubt concerning pleaſure,—whether the whole kind be eligible, or whether a particular ſpecies of it be the proper object of our choice. And in the latter caſe, pleaſure and pain (in general), like heat and cold, and all other things of this ſort, will deſerve ſometimes to be embraced, and at other times to be rejected; as not being good in themſelves, but admitting the nature of good to be ſuperadded to them only at ſome times, and ſome of them only.

PROT. You are perfectly in the right. It muſt be in ſome ſuch way as this that we ought to inveſtigate the things we are in purſuit of.

SOC. If, then, what we agreed in be true,—that animal bodies feel pain, when any thing befalls them tending to their deſtruction,—pleaſure, when they are uſing the means of their preſervation,—let us now conſider what ſtate or condition every animal is in, when it is neither ſuffering aught that tends to its deſtruction, nor is engaged in any action, or in the midſt of any circumſtances, tending to its preſervation. Give your earneſt attention to this point, and ſay, whether it is entirely neceſſary, or not, that every animal at that time ſhould feel neither pain nor pleaſure, in any degree, great or ſmall.

PROT. It is quite neceſſary.

SOC. Beſides the condition then of an animal delighted, and beſides the oppoſite condition of it under uneaſineſs, is not this a different, a third, ſtate or condition of an animal?

PROT. Without diſpute.

SOC. Be careful then to remember this judgment of ours. For on the remembering of it, or not, greatly will depend our judgment concerning the nature of pleaſure. But, to go through with this point, let us, if you pleaſe, add a ſhort ſentence more.

PROT. Say what.

SOC.

Soc. You know, nothing hinders a man who prefers the life of wiſdom from living all his life in that ſtate.

Prot. In the ſtate, do you mean, of neither pleaſure nor uneaſineſs?

Soc. I do: for, when we compared together the different lives, it was ſuppoſed, that whoever ſhould chooſe the life of intellect and wiſdom was not to have pleaſure either in a great or in a ſmall degree.

Prot. That was the ſuppoſition.

Soc. He muſt live, therefore, ſuch a life[1]. And perhaps it is by no means abſurd, to deem that life to be of all lives the moſt Godlike.

Prot. It is not indeed probable, that the Gods feel either the pleaſurable ſenſation, or its oppoſite.

Soc. Highly, indeed, is it improbable. For neither of them is conſiſtent with the divine nature. But we ſhall conſider further of this point afterwards, if it ſhould appear to be of any ſervice to our argument; and ſhall apply it to the purpoſe of winning the ſecond prize for intellect, though we ſhould not be able to make uſe of it ſo as to win for her the firſt.

Prot. Very juſtly ſaid.

Soc. Now that ſpecies of pleaſure which we ſaid is proper to the ſoul herſelf, is all produced in her by means of memory.

Prot. How ſo?

Soc. But, before we conſider of this point, I think we ſhould premiſe ſome account of memory,—what it is: and ſtill prior to an account of memory, ſome mention too, methinks, ought to be made of ſenſe, if we are to have this ſubject appear tolerably plain to us[2].

Prot. Explain your meaning.

Soc. Of thoſe things which are incident to our bodies in every part, coming from all quarters around us, and affecting us in various ways,—ſome

[1] In the Greek, the firſt words of this ſentence of Socrates, and the firſt word alſo of the next ſentence, ſpoken by Protarchus, ought for the future to be printed thus—Ἦ οὖν and not Οὐκοῦν.—The wrong accentuation of theſe paſſages in all the editions ſeems owing to the error of Ficinus, who miſtook both the ſentences for interrogations: and the miſtakes are continued by Grynæus. Serranus's tranſlation is guilty of the ſame miſtakes: but in thoſe of Cornarius, Bembo, and Grou, they are corrected.—S.

[2] The Greek of this paſſage, it is preſumed, ought to be read thus—εἰπερ μελλει ταυθ' ἡμιν κ. τ. λ.—S.

ſpend all their force upon the body, without penetrating to the ſoul, leaving this entirely untouched and free; others extend their power through the ſoul as well as through the body; and ſome of this latter ſort excite a vehement agitation in them both, jointly and ſeverally. Do you admit this?

PROT. Be it admitted.

SOC. If we ſhould ſay of thoſe things, the power of which is confined to the body, and reaches not the ſoul, that the ſoul is deprived of knowing them; but of other things which befall us, and have a power to pervade both the body and the ſoul, that of theſe the ſoul hath the knowledge; ſhould we not thus ſay what is moſt true?

PROT. Without diſpute.

SOC. But when I ſay that the ſoul is deprived of knowing the former ſort, do not ſuppoſe my meaning to be, that oblivion happens to her in this caſe. For oblivion is the departure of memory. But of the accidents now ſpoken of the ſoul never had a memory. And of that which neither is nor ever was, it is abſurd to ſay that any loſs can happen to us. Is it not?

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Only then alter the terms.

PROT. In what manner?

SOC. Inſtead of ſaying that the ſoul is deprived of knowing what the body ſuffers, when ſhe is not affected by any motions produced in the body by thoſe ordinary occurrences,—what we termed a privation of knowledge, let us now term inſenſibility.

PROT. I apprehend your meaning.

SOC. But when the ſoul and the body are affected, both of them in common, by any of thoſe occurrences, and in common alſo are moved or agitated[1],—in giving to this motion the name of ſenſation, you would not ſpeak improperly.

[1] In the Greek of this paſſage, inſtead of γιγνομενον, the participle ſingular, agreeing with σωμα, we ought to read γιγνομενα, the plural, agreeing with the two preceding ſubſtantives, ψυχην and σωμα, coupled together; according to a rule, the ſame in the grammars of the Greek and Latin languages. For the words of this ſentence, placed in the order of their grammatical conſtruction, are theſe,—Τῳ κοινῃ κινεισθαι την ψυχην και το σωμα, κοινῃ γιγνομενα εν ἑνι παθει,—ταυτην την κινησιν κ. τ. λ. If Stephens had perceived this, he would not have adopted Cornarius's alteration of the text.—S.

PROT.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. Now then do we not apprehend what it is which is commonly called ſenſe or ſenſation?

PROT. What ſhould hinder us?

SOC. And of memory [1], if one ſhould ſay that it was the retaining of ſenſations, it would not be ill defined, in my opinion.

PROT. I think ſo too.

SOC. Do we not hold, that memory differs from remembrance?

PROT. Perhaps it does.

SOC. Do they not differ in this reſpect?

PROT. In what reſpect?

SOC. When the ſoul alone, unaided by the body, recovers and reſumes within herſelf as much as poſſible the ſtate which heretofore ſhe was in, when ſhe was affected jointly with the body, we ſay that the ſoul then remembers. Do we not?

PROT. Certainly we do.

SOC. So we do alſo, when the ſoul, after having loſt the memory of ſomething which ſhe had ſenſibly perceived, or of ſomething which ſhe had learnt, recalls and recollects the memory of it again, herſelf within herſelf: and all this we term remembrance, and a recovery of things ſlipt out of our memory [2].

PROT. Very true.

SOC. Now the end for the ſake of which we have been conſidering theſe faculties of the ſoul is this.

PROT. For the ſake of what?

SOC. That we may apprehend [3], as well and as clearly as we are able, what is the pleaſure of the ſoul abſtracted from the body, and at the ſame

[1] Memory, ſays Olympiodorus, is triple, viz. irrational, rational, and intellectual. Each of theſe likewiſe is twofold, viz. phantaſtic, ſenſitive; dianoëtic, doxaſtic; eſſential, divine.—T.

[2] In the printed Greek we here read—*αναμνησεις και μνημας.*—So that *memory* and *remembrance* are now confounded together; and the difference but juſt before made between them is annulled. It is therefore apprehended, that we ought to read—*αναμνησεις και μνημης ανακτησεις.*—S.

[3] All the editions of Plato give us here to read—*Ινα μη—λαβοιμεν κ. τ. λ.* From this ſentence, thus abſurdly printed, Cornarius, in his marginal lemmas, extracted the following curious precept,—"Voluptas & cupiditas animæ, abſque corpore, vitanda." *Pleaſure and deſire in the ſoul herſelf, abſtracted from the body, are both to be avoided.* The French tranſlator has judiciouſly rejected the negative particle in this ſentence.—S.

time may apprehend alſo what is deſire. For the nature of both theſe things ſeems to be diſcovered in ſome meaſure by ſhowing the nature of memory and of remembrance.

PROT. Let us then, O Socrates, now explain how ſuch a diſcovery follows from perceiving the nature of theſe faculties of ours.

SOC. In treating of the riſe of pleaſure, and of the various forms which ſhe aſſumes, it will be neceſſary for us, I believe, to conſider a great variety of things. But, before we enter on ſo copious a ſubject, we ſhould now, I think, in the firſt place, conſider the nature and origin of deſire.

PROT. Let us then: for we muſt not loſe any thing.

SOC. Nay, Protarchus! we ſhall loſe one thing, when we ſhall have found the objects of our inquiry; we ſhall loſe our uncertainty about them.

PROT. You are right in your repartee. Proceed we then to what is next.

SOC. Was it not juſt now ſaid, that hunger, and thirſt, and many other things of like kind, were certain deſires?

PROT. Without doubt.

SOC. What is it, then, which is the ſame in all theſe things,—that, with reſpect to which we give to all of them, notwithſtanding the great difference between them, one and the ſame appellation?

PROT. By Jupiter, Socrates! it is, perhaps, not eaſy to ſay: it ought, however, to be declared.

SOC. Let us reſume the mention of that with which we began the conſideration of this ſubject.

PROT. Of what in particular?

SOC. Do we not often ſpeak of being thirſty?

PROT. We do.

SOC. And do we not mean by it ſome kind of emptineſs?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. Is not thirſt a deſire?

PROT. It is.

SOC. A deſire of drink is it?

PROT. Of drink.

SOC. Of being repleniſhed by drink: is it not[1]?

[1] A future editor of Plato may conſider, in the Greek of this ſentence, whether διὰ ſhould no be inſerted before the word πομάτος.—S.

PROT.

PROT. I ſuppoſe it is.

SOC. Whoever of us then is emptied, deſires, it ſeems, a condition the reverſe of what has befallen him. For whereas he is emptied, he longs to be filled again.

PROT. Moſt evidently ſo.

SOC. Well now: is it poſſible that a man, who at the firſt[1] is empty, ſhould apprehend, either by ſenſe or by memory, what it is to be full,—a condition, in which he neither is at the time, nor ever was heretofore.

PROT. How can he?

SOC. We are agreed, that the man who deſires has a deſire of ſomething.

PROT. Without diſpute.

SOC. Now it is not the condition in which he is that he deſires. For he ſuffers thirſt, that is, an emptineſs: but he deſires to be full.

PROT. True.

SOC. Something, therefore, belonging to the man who is thirſty muſt apprehend in ſome manner what it is to be full.

PROT. It muſt, of neceſſity.

SOC. But it is impoſſible that this ſhould be his body: for his body is ſuppoſed to ſuffer emptineſs.

PROT. Right.

SOC. It remains, therefore, that his ſoul apprehends what it is to be full, by means of her memory.

PROT. Plainly ſo.

SOC. For, indeed, by what other means could his ſoul have ſuch an apprehenſion?

PROT. Hardly by any other.

SOC. Perceive we now, what conſequence follows from this reaſoning of ours?

PROT. What conſequence?

SOC. It proves that deſire doth not ariſe in the body.

PROT. How ſo?

SOC. Becauſe it ſhows that the aim and endeavour of every animal is to

[1] That is, at the beginning of his ſenſitive life.—S.

be in a condition oppoſite to the feelings with which the body is at that time affected.

PROT. It certainly ſhows this.

SOC. And the inclination by which it moves toward this oppoſite condition, ſhows the remembrance of a condition oppoſite to thoſe preſent feelings and affections.

PROT. Clearly.

SOC. Our reaſoning, then, in proving that memory leads us toward the objects of our deſire, ſhows at the ſame time what is the general inclination and deſire of the ſoul; and what is the moving principle in every animal.

PROT. Perfectly right.

SOC. Our concluſion, therefore, will by no means admit of an opinion that the body ſuffers hunger, or thirſt, or is affected with any other ſuch deſire.

PROT. Moſt true.

SOC. Let us obſerve this alſo further, regarding theſe very ſubjects now under conſideration. Our reaſoning ſeems to me as if it meant to exhibit in thoſe very things a certain kind of life.

PROT. What things do you mean? and what kind of life do you ſpeak of?

SOC. I mean the being filled, and the being emptied, and all other things tending either to the preſervation of animal life, or to the deſtruction of it; and whatever things ordinarily give pain,—yet, coming in a change from things contrary, are ſometimes grateful.

PROT. True.

SOC. But what when a man is in the midſt of theſe contrary conditions, and is partaking of them both?

PROT. How do you mean in the midſt?

SOC. When he is afflicted with an anxious ſenſe of his preſent bad condition, but at the ſame time has a remembrance of paſt delights; he may enjoy an intermiſſion of his pain, without having as yet the cauſe of it removed[1]; now

[1] Thus have we rendered into Engliſh the Greek of this ſentence as it is printed. But we are much inclined to adopt the emendation και παυεται μεν, propoſed by Stephens in the margin of his edition:

now do we affirm, or do we deny, that he is at that time in the midſt of two contrary conditions?

PROT. It muſt be affirmed.

SOC. Is he afflicted or delighted wholly?

PROT. By Jupiter, he is in a manner afflicted doubly: in his body, from his preſent condition; in his ſoul, from a tedious expectation, longing for relief.

SOC. How is it, O Protarchus, that you ſuppoſe his affliction to be doubled? Is not a man whoſe ſtomach is empty ſometimes in a ſtate of hopefulneſs, with aſſurance of having it filled? and on the contrary, is he not at other times in a condition quite hopeleſs?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. Do you not think that, when he is in hopes of being filled, he is delighted with the remembrance of fulneſs? and yet that, being empty at the ſame time, he is in pain?

PROT. He muſt be ſo.

SOC. In ſuch a ſtate, therefore, man and other animals are at the ſame time afflicted and delighted.

PROT. It ſeems ſo to be.

SOC. But what think you when a man is empty, and hopeleſs of obtaining fulneſs? muſt he not, in ſuch a condition, ſuffer double pain? with a view to which particular condition it was, that juſt now you ſuppoſed the memory of paſt delight, in all caſes, to double the preſent pain.

PROT. Moſt true, Socrates.

SOC. Now of this inquiry into theſe feelings of ours we ſhall make this uſe.

PROT. What uſe?

SOC. Shall we ſay that all theſe pains and pleaſures are true? or that they are all falſe? or that ſome of them are true, and others falſe?

PROT. How ſhould pleaſures or pains, O Socrates, be falſe?

edition: only changing *καὶ* into *ἢ*. If our learned readers are of the ſame opinion, and think with us, that two different caſes are here ſtated by Socrates; in both of which there is a mixture of anxiety and delight, but not a mixture of the ſame kind; then, inſtead of—*he may enjoy*, the tranſlation ſhould be—*or when he enjoys*, &c.—S.

SOC.

Soc. How is it then, O Protarchus, that fears may be either true or falſe? that expectations may be true, or not? Or, of opinions, how is it that ſome are true, and others falſe?

Prot. Opinions, I admit, may be of either kind: but I cannot grant you this of thoſe other feelings.

Soc. How ſay you? We are in danger of ſtarting a diſquiſition of no ſmall importance.

Prot. That is true.

Soc. But whether it has any relation to the ſubjects which have preceded, this, O ſon of an illuſtrious father[1]! ought to be conſidered.

Prot. Perhaps, indeed, it ought.

Soc. Tell me then: for, as to myſelf, I am continually in a ſtate of wonderment about theſe very difficulties now propoſed.

Prot. What difficulties do you mean?

Soc. Falſe pleaſures are not true; nor true pleaſures falſe[2].

Prot.

[1] We cannot conceive to what purpoſe this compliment to Protarchus is here introduced, unleſs it be by way of a ſimile; to repreſent the dignity and excellence of the matters before diſcuſſed; and, by reminding Protarchus of his illuſtrious birth, to ſignify to him,—that, as he ought not to degenerate from his anceſtors, ſo neither ought any new matters to be brought upon the carpet, if, in their weight and value, they fall ſhort of thoſe which have preceded. Perhaps alſo an intimation is thus given by Plato to his readers, that one of the ſubjects of inquiry juſt now mentioned by Socrates,—that concerning *opinions*,—immediately related to that other concerning *pleaſures*, as to their truth or falſehood. In the Greek of this paſſage, it is probable that the printed reading κεινου του ανδρος is erroneous; and that Plato wrote κλειτου ανδρος; but that, in after ages, a reader of ſome manuſcript copy of this dialogue, where inſtead of κλειτου was written κλεινου, (and Heſychius interprets κλεινος by the more uſual terms ενδοξος, ονομαστος,) on collating it with another MS. copy, where he found κλειτου written, wrote του in the margin of the former copy, oppoſite to the ſyllable νου, with which, perhaps, a new line began; that afterwards a tranſcriber of this copy received του into the text of his own tranſcript, juſt before ανδρος, ſuppoſing it to be a word caſually omitted in the former copy; and that, laſt of all, when κλεινου του ανδρος was diſcovered to be a ſoleciſm in the Greek ſyntaxis, κλεινου, a word very uncommon, was eaſily changed into κεινου, and the conſtruction was thus purified.—S.

[2] In the Greek we read only,—ψευδεις, αι δ' αληθεις ουκ εισιν ηδοναι. All the tranſlators of Plato into other languages juſtly ſuppoſe this ſentence to be imperfect in the beginning of it: but in their way of ſupplying the words omitted, it is nothing more than a repetition of the queſtion propoſed before, without any new additional matter. Socrates, in fact, is now entering on a proof of the diſtinction between the true pleaſures and the falſe: and we preſume, that he here builds

PROT. How is it poſſible they ſhould?

SOC. Neither in a dream, then, nor awake, is it poſſible, as you hold, not even if a man is out of his ſenſes through madneſs, or has loſt the ſoundneſs of his judgment any other way, is it poſſible for him ever to imagine that he feels delight, when he is by no means ſenſibly delighted; or to imagine that he feels pain, when actually the man feels none.

PROT. All of us, O Socrates, conſtantly ſuppoſe theſe facts to be as you have now ſtated them.

SOC. But is it a right ſuppoſition? or ſhould we examine whether it is right, or not?

PROT. We ought to examine it, I muſt own.

SOC. Let us then explain a little more clearly what was juſt now ſaid concerning pleaſure and opinion. Do we not hold the reality of our having an opinion?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. And the reality of our having pleaſure?

PROT. To be ſure.

SOC. Further: it is ſomething, that which is the object of our opinion.

PROT. Without doubt.

SOC. And ſomething alſo that is with which whatever feels a pleaſure is delighted.

PROT. Moſt certainly.

SOC. In the having, then, of an opinion, whether we are right or wrong in entertaining that opinion, the reality of our having it abides ſtill.

PROT. How can a man loſe an opinion whilſt he has it?

SOC. In the enjoying alſo of any pleaſure, whether we do right or wrong to enjoy it, it is certain that the reality of the enjoyment ſtill remains.

PROT. To be ſure, theſe things are ſo.

SOC. On what account is it, then, that we are uſed to call ſome opinions true, and others falſe; yet to pleaſures only we allow the attribute of true;

his proof on that prime axiom on which is founded all demonſtration, viz. "Things cannot be what they are, and yet different from what they are, at the ſame time."—In the paſſage, therefore, now before us, it ſeems probable that the ſentence, to be made agreeable to the ſenſe of it, is to be completed thus,—Αληθεις αι μεν ψευδεις, ψευδεις αι δ' αληθεις, ουκ εισιν ηδυναι. The error of omitting the firſt words is eaſy to be accounted for.—S.

notwith-

notwithſtanding that pleaſure and opinion, both of them, equally admit reality in the having of them?

PROT. This ought to be conſidered.

SOC. Is it that falſehood and truth are incident to opinion? ſo that, by the ſupervening of one or other of theſe, opinion becomes ſomething beſide what in itſelf it is; and every opinion is thus made to have the quality of being either falſe or true. Do you ſay that this ought to be conſidered?

PROT. I do.

SOC. And beſide this: ſuppoſing that opinions univerſally do admit of attributes and qualities; whether only pleaſure and pain are what they are in themſelves ſimply, and never admit any quality to ariſe in them; ought we not to ſettle this point alſo by agreement between us?

PROT. It is evident that we ought.

SOC. But it is eaſy enough to perceive, that theſe alſo admit the acceſſion of ſome qualities. For of pleaſures and pains we agreed awhile ſince, that ſome are great, others little; and that each ſort admits of vehemence and of intenſion.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. And if either to any pleaſure, or to any opinion, there be added the quality of evil, ſhall we not affirm the opinion thus to become evil, and the pleaſure evil in the ſame manner?

PROT. Without doubt, O Socrates.

SOC. And what, if rectitude, or the oppoſite to rectitude, accede to any of them, ſhall we not ſay, that the *opinion* is *right*, if rectitude be in it? and ſhall we not aſcribe the ſame quality to *pleaſure*, on the ſame ſuppoſition?

PROT. Of neceſſity we muſt.

SOC. And if the object of our *opinion* be miſtaken by us, muſt we not in ſuch a caſe acknowledge that our *opinion* is *erroneous*, and not right; and that we are not right ourſelves in entertaining ſuch an opinion?

PROT. Certainly we muſt.

SOC. But what, if we diſcover ourſelves to be miſtaken in the object of our *grief* or of our *pleaſure*, ſhall we give to this *grief*, or to this *pleaſure*, the epithet of *right*, or *good*, or any other which is fair and honourable?

PROT. We certainly cannot, where a miſtake is in the pleaſure.

SOC.

Soc. And ſurely pleaſure is apt to ariſe in us oftentimes, accompanied, not with a *right* opinion, but with an opinion which is *falſe*.

Prot. Indiſputably ſo. And the opinion, O Socrates, then and in that caſe, we ſhould ſay was a falſe opinion. But to the *pleaſure* itſelf no man would ever give the appellation of *falſe*.

Soc. You are very ready, O Protarchus, at ſupporting the plea made uſe of by Pleaſure on this occaſion.

Prot. Not at all ſo. I only repeat what I have heard.

Soc. Do we make no difference, my friend, between ſuch a pleaſure as comes accompanied with right opinion or with ſcience, and that kind of pleaſure which often ariſes in every one of us at the ſame time with falſe opinion or ignorance[1]?

Prot. It is probable, I own, that no little difference is between them.

Soc. Let us now come to the conſideration of what the difference is.

Prot. Proceed in whatever way you think proper.

Soc. I ſhall take this way then.

Prot. What way?

Soc. Some of our opinions are falſe, and others of them are true: this is agreed.

Prot. It is.

Soc. Pleaſure and pain, as it was juſt now ſaid, oftentimes attend on either of them indifferently; on opinions, I mean, either true or falſe.

Prot. Certainly ſo.

Soc. Is it not from memory and from ſenſe that opinion is produced in us, and that room is given for a diverſity of opinions on every ſubject?

Prot. Moſt undoubtedly.

Soc. I aſk you, then, whether or no, as to theſe things, we deem ourſelves to be of neceſſity affected thus?

Prot. How?

Soc. Oftentimes, when a man looks at ſomething which he diſcovers at a

[1] Stephens's edition of Plato agrees with all the prior editions in giving us to read ανοιας in this place: but that learned printer, in his latter annotations, pag. 75, juſtly obſerves, that inſtead of ανοιας we ought to read αγνοιας. That emendation was made before Stephens by Cornarius, in his Eclogæ, pag. 333. Ignorance is here oppoſed to knowledge, as falſe opinion is oppoſed to true. The Medicean manuſcript exhibits the right reading, as appears from the Latin of Ficinus.—S.

great diſtance, but does not diſcern very clearly, will you admit that he may have an inclination to judge of what he ſees?

PROT. I do admit the caſe.

SOC. Upon this, would not the man queſtion himſelf in this manner?

PROT. In what manner?

SOC. What is that which appears as if it was ſtanding under ſome tree by the cliff there? Do you not ſuppoſe that he would ſpeak thoſe words to himſelf, looking at ſome ſuch appearances before him, as I have mentioned?

PROT. No doubt of it.

SOC. Hereupon, might not this man then, making a conjecture, ſay to himſelf, by way of anſwer,—It is a man?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. But walking on, perhaps he might diſcern it to be but the work of ſome ſhepherds, and would ſay again to himſelf,—It is only a ſtatue.

PROT. Moſt certainly he would.

SOC. And if he had any companion with him, he would ſpeak out aloud what he had firſt ſpoken within himſelf, and repeat the very ſame words to his companion: ſo that what we lately termed an opinion would thus become a ſpeech.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. But if he were alone, this very thing would be a thought ſtill within him; and he might walk on, keeping the ſame thought in his mind, a conſiderable way.

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Well now: does this matter appear to you in the ſame light as it does to me?

PROT. How is that?

SOC. The ſoul in that caſe ſeems to me to reſemble ſome book.

PROT. How ſo?

SOC. The memory, coinciding with the ſenſes, together with thoſe paſſions of the ſoul which attend this memory and the preſent ſenſation, ſeem to me as if they concurred in writing ſentences at that time within our ſouls. And when the ſcribe writes what is true, true opinions and true ſentences are by him produced within us: but when our ſcribe writes what is falſe, then what we think, and what we ſay to ourſelves, is contrary to the truth.

PROT.

PROT. I heartily agree to your account of this matter, and acknowledge thoſe joint ſcribes within the ſoul.

SOC. Acknowledge alſo another workman within us, operating at that time.

PROT. What is he?

SOC. An engraver, who follows after the ſcribe; engraving within the ſoul images of thoſe thoughts, ſentences, and ſayings.

PROT. How and when is this done?

SOC. It is, when that which a man thinks and ſays to himſelf, concerning the object of his ſight, or of any other outward ſenſe, he ſeparates from the ſenſation which he has of it; and views ſomehow within himſelf the image of that thought, and of that ſaying. Or is there no ſuch thing as this ever produced within us?

PROT. Nothing is more certain.

SOC. The images of true thoughts and true ſentences, are they not true? and the images of thoſe which are falſe, are they not themſelves alſo falſe?

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Now if we have pronounced thus far rightly, let us proceed to the conſideration of one point further.

PROT. What is that?

SOC. Whether all the operations of this kind, ſuch as are naturally performed within our ſouls, regard only things preſent and things paſt, but not things to come; or whether any of them have a reference to theſe alſo.

PROT. Difference of time makes no difference in theſe matters.

SOC. Did we not ſay before, that pleaſures and pains of the ſoul, by herſelf, ariſe in us prior to thoſe pleaſures and pains which affect the body? ſo as that we feel antecedent joy and grief in the proſpect of things to come hereafter.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. Thoſe writings, then, and thoſe engravings, which, as we held juſt now, are performed within us, do they reſpect the paſt and the preſent time only? and have they no concernment with the future?

PROT. About the future very much are they concerned, and chiefly.

SOC. In ſaying this, do you mean that all theſe things are expectations of the future; and that we are, all of us, throughout life, full of expectations?

PROT. The very thing I mean.

Soc. Now, then, ſince we are thus far agreed, anſwer to this further queſtion.

PROT. What is it?

Soc. A man who is juſt, and pious, and entirely good, is he not beloved by Divinity?

PROT. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And what of the unjuſt and entirely bad man? is not the reverſe of it true of him?

PROT. How can it be otherwiſe?

Soc. Now every man, as we ſaid juſt now, is full of a multitude of expectations.

PROT. True.

Soc. Sayings there are, written within every one of us, to which we give the name of expectations.

PROT. There are.

Soc. And phantaſies alſo, engraven in us. Thus, for inſtance, a man often ſees in imagination plenty of money flowing into him, and by thoſe means many pleaſures ſurrounding him; and views himſelf, engraven within himſelf, as highly delighted.

PROT. That often is the caſe.

Soc. Of theſe engravings, ſhall we ſay that good men, becauſe of the divine favour, have generally thoſe which are true; and bad men, generally thoſe of the contrary ſort? or ſhall we deny it?

PROT. It cannot be denied.

Soc. Bad men, then, have pleaſures engraven within them alſo; but theſe are of the falſe ſort.

PROT. No doubt of it.

Soc. Wicked men, therefore, delight moſtly in falſe pleaſures; the good, in pleaſures which are true.

PROT. It muſt of neceſſity be ſo.

Soc. According to this account, there are, in the ſouls of men, ſuch pleaſures as are falſe; though in a moſt ridiculous manner they imitate, and would fain paſs for, true pleaſures: pains alſo there are with the like qualities.

PROT.

PROT. Such pleaſures and ſuch pains there are.

SOC. May not a man who indulges fancy at random, and embraces opinions of any kind whatever, always really [1] think and believe ſome things to be, which neither are nor ever were, and ſometimes ſuch as never will be?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. And they are the falſe ſemblances and ſeemings of theſe unreal things, which produce in him thoſe falſe opinions, and occaſion him to think thus falſely. Are they not?

PROT. They are.

SOC. Well then: ſhould we not ſay of the pains and pleaſures felt by thoſe bad men, that their condition correſponds with the caſe of falſe opinions?

PROT. How do you mean?

SOC. May not a man who courts and embraces pleaſure at random, pleaſure in general, of any kind whatever, may not ſuch a man always really feel delight from things which are not, and ſometimes from things which never were,—often too, and perhaps the moſt frequently, from things which will never be?

PROT. This muſt of neceſſity be granted.

SOC. Should not the ſame be ſaid of fears and deſires, and all things of the like ſort, that theſe alſo are ſometimes falſe?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. Well now: can we ſay of opinions, that they are bad, or that they are good, any otherwiſe than as they prove to be falſe, or prove to be true [2]?

PROT. No otherwiſe.

SOC. And I ſhould think, that pleaſures too we apprehend not to be bad on any other account, than as they are falſe.

PROT. Quite the contrary, O Socrates. For hardly would any man put to the account of falſehood any of the evils brought on by pain and pleaſure; ſince many and great evils accede to them from other quarters.

[1] In the Greek of this ſentence, before the word *αει*, we ought to read *οντως* inſtead of *οὐτως*. This appears from a ſentence ſoon after, concerning a man *really delighted* with the thoughts of *things unreal*. Both the ſentences refer to what was ſaid before, where the ſame word is uſed in the ſame ſenſe as it is here.—S.

[2] It is obſerved by Cornarius, that after the word *ψευδεις*, in the Greek of this ſentence, all the printed editions omit the words *και αληθεις*: the ſenſe evidently demands them; and they are not wanting in the Medicean MS., as appears from Ficinus's Latin tranſlation.—S.

SOC.

Soc. Pleaſures which are evil, through the evil they occaſion, we ſhall ſpeak of by and by, if we ſhall continue to think it requiſite: but we are now to ſpeak of a multitude of pleaſures felt by us, and frequently ariſing in us,—pleaſures which are falſe in yet another way. And this other way of conſidering pleaſure we ſhall have occaſion, perhaps, to make uſe of in forming a right judgment of the ſeveral ſorts of it.

PROT. By all means let us ſpeak of theſe, if any ſuch pleaſures there are.

Soc. And there are ſuch, O Protarchus, in my opinion. But as long as this opinion lies by us unexamined, it is impoſſible for it to become certain or inconteſtable.

PROT. Fairly ſaid.

Soc. Now, therefore, let us advance to this other argument, like champions to the combat.

PROT. Come we on then.

Soc. We ſaid, if we remember, a little while ſince, that as long as the wants of the body, which are called deſires in us, remain unſatisfied, the body all that time will be affected diſtinctly, and in a different manner from the ſoul.

PROT. We remember that it was ſo held.

Soc. In ſuch a caſe, that within us, which deſired, would be the ſoul, deſiring to have her body in a ſtate contrary to its preſent condition; and that which felt uneaſineſs or pain from the condition it was in, would be the body.

PROT. Things would be thus with us.

Soc. Now compute theſe things together, and conſider the amount.

PROT. Say what.

Soc. In ſuch a caſe, it comes out that pains and pleaſures are placed together, each by the other's ſide; and that together, each by the other's ſide, ariſe in us a feeling of emptineſs, and a deſire of its contrary, fulneſs: for ſo it has juſt now appeared.

PROT. It is indeed apparent.

Soc. Has not this alſo been ſaid? and does it not remain with us a point ſettled between us by agreement?

PROT. What?

Soc. That pain and pleaſure, both of them, admit of the more and of the leſs; and that they both are of the infinites.

PROT.

PROT. It was ſo ſaid and agreed.

SOC. Is there not, then, ſome way in which we may judge of pain and pleaſure rightly?

PROT. What way, and how do you mean?

SOC. In judging of them, are we not wont, in every caſe, readily to try them by theſe marks,—which of them is the greater, and which is the leſs,—which of them hath the nature of its kind the moſt,—and which is more intenſe than the other,—in comparing either a pain with a pleaſure, or one pain with another pain, or one pleaſure with another pleaſure?

PROT. Such compariſons are often made: and from theſe compariſons we are wont to form our judgment and our choice.

SOC. Well now: in the caſe of magnitudes, does not the diſtance of viſible objects, ſome of which are ſeen remote, and others near, render their real magnitudes uncertain, obſcuring the truth of things, and producing falſe opinions? and does not the ſame thing hold true with regard to pains and pleaſures? is not the ſame effect produced by the ſame means in this caſe alſo?

PROT. Much more feelingly, O Socrates.

SOC. But in this caſe it happens contrary to what was in the caſe mentioned a little before.

PROT. What happens, ſay you?

SOC. In that caſe, the true and the falſe opinions entertained by us impart to the pains and pleaſures which attend them, their own qualities of truth and falſehood.

PROT. Very right.

SOC. But, in the caſe which I am now ſpeaking of, the pains and pleaſures being viewed afar off and near, continually changing [their aſpects with their diſtances], and being ſet in compariſon together, [it happens that] the pleaſures [at hand] compared with the [remote] pains, appear greater and more intenſe [than they really are], and [that] the pains, compared with the pleaſures, [have an appearance] quite the contrary.

PROT. Such appearances muſt of neceſſity ariſe by theſe means.

SOC. As far, therefore, as the pains and pleaſures appear leſs or greater than they really are, if from the reality you ſeparate this appearance of what neither of them is, and take it by itſelf thus ſeparated, you will not ſay that

it is a right appearance; nor will you venture to aſſert, that this additional part of pain and pleaſure is right and true.

PROT. By no means.

SOC. After theſe diſcoveries, let us look if we can meet with pleaſures and pains ſtill falſer, and more remote from truth, than thoſe already mentioned, which are not only in appearance what they are called, but are felt alſo by the ſoul.

PROT. What pleaſures and pains do you ſpeak of?

SOC. We have more than once ſaid, that when the frame of any animal is on its way to diſſolution, through mixtures and ſeparations, repletions and evacuations, the increaſe of ſome, and the diminution of other parts of it, that in ſuch a condition of its body, pains, aches, and oppreſſions, with many other uneaſy feelings, to which are given various names, are wont to ariſe in us.

PROT. True: this obſervation has been again and again repeated.

SOC. And that, when all things in our bodily frame return to their natural and ſound ſtate, together with this recovery, we receive ſome pleaſure from within ourſelves.

PROT. Right.

SOC. But how is it when none of theſe changes are operating in our bodies?

PROT. At what times, O Socrates, may this be?

SOC. The queſtion, O Protarchus, which you have now put to me is nothing to the purpoſe.

PROT. Why not?

SOC. Becauſe it will not hinder me from putting again my queſtion to you.

PROT. Repeat it then.

SOC. I ſhall put it thus: If at any time none of thoſe things were paſſing within us, what condition ſhould we of neceſſity be in, as to pleaſure and pain, at ſuch a time?

PROT. When no motion was in the body either way, do you mean?

SOC. Exactly ſo.

PROT. It is plain, O Socrates, that we ſhould feel neither any pleaſure nor any pain at ſuch a time.

SOC.

Soc. Perfectly well anſwered. But now in your queſtion I ſuppoſe you meant this,—that ſome or other of thoſe things were of neceſſity paſſing within us continually at all times; agreeably to this ſaying of the wiſe,—"that all things are in perpetual flow, going upward and downward."

Prot. So they tell us: and this ſaying of theirs is, methinks, worthy of regard.

Soc. Undoubtedly it is: for it is ſaid by men who are worthy, themſelves, to be regarded. But this ſubject, which we have thus lighted on, I would willingly decline. Now I have it in my thoughts to avoid it this way; but you muſt accompany me.

Prot. What way?

Soc. Be it ſo, then, let us ſay to theſe wiſe men: but you, Protarchus, anſwer me to this queſtion: Do animals feel all the alterations which they continually undergo? or, whilſt we are growing, or ſuffering in any part of our bodies any other change, are we ſenſible of theſe internal motions? Is not quite the contrary true? for almoſt every thing of this kind paſſing within us paſſes without our knowledge.

Prot. Certainly ſo.

Soc. It was, therefore, not right in us to ſay, as we did juſt now, that all the alterations which happen to our bodies, and all the motions within them, produce either pains or pleaſures.

Prot. Certainly not right.

Soc. And it would be better, and leſs liable to cenſure, to lay down this poſition.

Prot. What poſition?

Soc. That great changes within give us pains and pleaſures; but that ſuch as are inconſiderable, or only moderate, produce neither pleaſures nor pains.

Prot. This is more juſtly ſaid than the other ſentence, indeed, Socrates.

Soc. If, then, theſe things are ſo, we meet with the life mentioned before recurring to us here again.

Prot. What life?

Soc. That which is exempt from all ſenſations, both of pain and pleaſure.

Prot. Very true.

Soc. Hence, we find there are three kinds of life propoſed to our conſider-

ation: one of them full of pleaſure, another full of pain; the third neutral, and free from both. Or how otherwiſe would you determine upon theſe points?

PROT. No otherwiſe I, for my part: for three different kinds of life appear to me in what has been ſaid.

SOC. To have no pain, therefore, cannot be the ſame thing as to have pleaſure.

PROT. Certainly it cannot.

SOC. But whenever you hear a man ſay, that it is the moſt pleaſurable of all things to live all one's life free from pain, what do you take to be his thought and meaning?

PROT. He means and thinks, as I take it, that it is a pleaſure not to have any pain.

SOC. Well now: let there be any three things whatever: to inſtance in things of honourable name, let us ſuppoſe one of them to be gold, another to be ſilver, and the third to be neither gold nor ſilver.

PROT. We ſhall ſuppoſe ſo.

SOC. That which is neither, is it poſſible for it any way to become either gold or ſilver?

PROT. By no means.

SOC. The middle life, therefore, if it were ſaid to be pleaſurable, or if it were ſaid to be painful, would not be ſpoken of in either way, rightly and agreeably to the true nature of things; nor would any perſon who entertains either of thoſe opinions concerning it think rightly.

PROT. Certainly not.

SOC. And yet, my friend, we find that there are perſons who actually ſpeak and think thus amiſs.

PROT. It is very evident.

SOC. Do theſe perſons really feel pleaſure[1] whenever they are free from pain?

[1] We have ventured to ſuppoſe an error in the Greek of this paſſage; and that we ought to read χαιρουσιν ουτοι, inſtead of the printed words—χαιρειν οιονται. For, without ſuch an alteration, Socrates in his next ſentence (where theſe very words—χαιρειν οιονται—appear again, and where they are very proper) is guilty of mere tautology; and his argumentation proceeds not the leaſt ſtep, but halts during that whole ſentence.—S.

PROT.

PROT. So they ſay.

SOC. They muſt imagine, then, that they are pleaſed; for otherwiſe they would not ſay ſo.

PROT. They do, it ſeems, imagine it.

SOC. They have a wrong opinion then of pleaſure; if it be true that pleaſure, and freedom from pain, have each a diſtinct nature, different from that of the other.

PROT. Different, indeed, we have concluded them to be.

SOC. And are we willing to abide by our late concluſion, that the ſubjects ſtill under examination are three diſtinct things? or do we chooſe to ſay that they are only two? Do we now ſay that pain is man's evil, and that deliverance from pain is man's good, and is that to which is given the appellation of pleaſure?

PROT. How come we, O Socrates, to propoſe this point to be reconſidered by us now? for I do not apprehend your drift.

SOC. In fact, O Protarchus, you do not apprehend who are the direct enemies to Philebus.

PROT. To whom do you give that character?

SOC. To perſons who are ſaid to have a profound knowledge of nature: theſe perſons ſay that pleaſures have no reality at all.

PROT. What do they mean?

SOC. They ſay that all thoſe things which Philebus and his party call pleaſures are but deliverances from pain.

PROT. Is it your advice, then, O Socrates, that we ſhould hearken to theſe perſons? or how otherwiſe?

SOC. Not ſo: but to conſider them as a kind of diviners, who divine not according to any rules of art; but, from the auſterity of a certain genius in them not ignoble, have conceived an averſion to the power of Pleaſure, and deem nothing in her to be ſolid; but all her attractive charms to be mere illuſions, and not [true] pleaſure. It is thus that we ſhould regard theſe perſons, eſpecially if we conſider their other harſh maxims. You ſhall in the next place hear what pleaſures ſeem to me to be true pleaſures: ſo that, from both the accounts compared together, we may find out the nature of Pleaſure, and form our judgment of her comparative value.

PROT. Rightly ſaid.

Soc. Let us then follow after them, as our allies, wherever their auſterity ſhall lead us. For I ſuppoſe they would begin their argument with ſome general principle, and propound to us ſome ſuch queſtion as this,—whether, if we had a mind to know the nature of any particular quality of things, for inſtance, the nature of the hard, whether or no we ſhould not comprehend it better by examining the hardeſt things, than we ſhould by ſcrutinizing a various multitude of the leſs hard. Now, Protarchus, you muſt make an anſwer to theſe auſtere perſons, as if you were making it to me.

Prot. By all means: and I make this anſwer to them,—that to examine ſuch bodies as exceed all others in hardneſs is the better way.

Soc. In like manner, then, if we had a mind to know the nature of pleaſure in general, we are not to conſider the multitude of little or mean pleaſures, but thoſe only which are called extreme and exquiſite.

Prot. Every man would grant you the truth of this your preſent argument.

Soc. The pleaſures which are always within our reach, thoſe which we often call the greateſt, do they not belong to the body?

Prot. There is no doubt of it.

Soc. Are the [bodily] pleaſures which are produced in thoſe perſons who labour under diſeaſes, greater than the pleaſures [of the ſame kind] felt by thoſe who are in health? Now let us take care not to err, by making too precipitate an anſwer.

Prot. What danger is there of erring?

Soc. Perhaps we might pronounce in favour of thoſe who are in health.

Prot. Probably we ſhould.

Soc. But what? are not thoſe pleaſures the moſt exceſſive which are preceded by the ſtrongeſt deſires?

Prot. This cannot be denied.

Soc. The afflicted with fevers, or with diſeaſes of kin to fevers, are they not more thirſty than other perſons? do they not more ſhake with cold? and ſuffer they not in a greater degree other evils which the body is ſubject to? Do they not feel their wants more preſſing? and feel they not greater pleaſures when they have thoſe wants ſupplied[1]? Or ſhall we deny all this to be true?

[1] In all the editions of the Greek we here read *αποπληρουμενων* but certainly we ought to read *αποπληρουμενοι*.—S.

Prot.

PROT. Your repreſentation of thoſe caſes clearly is right.

SOC. Well then: ſhould we not be clearly right in ſaying, that whoever would know what pleaſures are the greateſt muſt not go to the healthy, but to the ſick, to look for them? Be careful now not to imagine the meaning of my queſtion to be this,—whether the ſick enjoy pleaſures more, in number, than the healthy: but conſider me as inquiring into high degrees of pleaſure; and by what means, and in what ſubjects, the vehemence or extreme of it always is produced. For we are to find out, we ſay, what the nature is of pleaſure, and what thoſe perſons mean by pleaſure who pretend that no ſuch thing as pleaſure has any being at all.

PROT. Tolerably well do I apprehend your argument.

SOC. And poſſibly, O Protarchus, you will equally well ſhow the truth of it. For, tell me; in a life of boundleſs luxury ſee you not greater pleaſures (I do not mean more in number, but more intenſe and vehement,) than thoſe in the life of temperance? Give your mind to the queſtion firſt, and then anſwer.

PROT. I apprehend what you ſay: and the great ſuperiority of the pleaſures enjoyed in a luxurious life I eaſily diſcern. For ſober and temperate perſons are on all occaſions under the reſtraint of that maxim, now become a proverb, which adviſes them to avoid the too much of any thing; to which advice they are obedient. But an exceſs of pleaſure, even to madneſs, poſſeſſing the ſouls of the unwiſe and intemperate, as it makes them frantic, it makes them conſpicuous, and famed for being men of pleaſure.

SOC. Well ſaid. If this, then, be the caſe, it is evident that the greateſt pleaſures, as well as the greateſt pains, are produced in a morbid and vicious diſpoſition of the ſoul or of the body; and not when they are in their ſound and right ſtate.

PROT. Certainly ſo.

SOC. Ought we not then to inſtance in ſome of theſe pleaſures, and to conſider what circumſtances attend them on account of which it is that they are ſtyled the greateſt?

PROT. That muſt be done.

SOC. Conſider now what circumſtance attends the pleaſures which are produced in certain maladies.

PROT. In what maladies?

Soc. In thoſe of the baſe or indecent kind;—pleaſures, to which the perſons whom we termed auſtere have an utter averſion.

Prot. What pleaſures do you mean?

Soc. Thoſe which are felt in curing the itch, for inſtance, by friction; and in other maladies of like kind, ſuch as need no other medicine.

Now the ſenſation thence ariſing in us, in the name of the Gods, what ſhall we ſay of it? Pleaſure is it? or ſhall we term it pain?

Prot. A mixt ſort of ſenſation, O Socrates, ſeems to ariſe from this malady, partaking of both pain and pleaſure.

Soc. It was not, however, for the ſake of Philebus that I brought this laſt ſubject into our diſcourſe: it was becauſe we ſhould never be able to determine the point now before us, unleſs we had taken a view of theſe mixt pleaſures, and of others alſo which depend on theſe. Let us proceed, therefore, to conſider ſuch as have an affinity with them.

Prot. Such, do you mean, as partake of pleaſure and pain by means of their commixture?

Soc. That is my very meaning. Of theſe mixt feelings, then, ſome belong to the body; and in the body are theſe generated. Others are of the ſoul; and theſe have in the ſoul their reſidence. We ſhall find alſo pleaſures mingled with pains, where the ſoul and the body have, each of them, a ſhare. Now theſe mixtures [though compoſed of contraries] are, in ſome caſes, termed only pleaſures; in other caſes, only pains.

Prot. Expreſs yourſelf more fully.

Soc. When a man, whether in a ſound or in a decaying ſtate of his body, feels two contrary ſenſations at the ſame time; as when, chilled with cold, he is warming himſelf; or ſometimes, when overheated, he is cooling himſelf; with a view, I ſuppoſe, to his enjoying one of thoſe ſenſations, and to his deliverance from the other: in ſuch caſes, what is called the bitter-ſweet, through the difficulty met with in driving away the bitter part, cauſeth a ſtruggle within, and a fierce meeting together of oppoſite qualities and ſenſations.

Prot. It is perfectly true, what you have now ſaid.

Soc. Are not ſome of theſe mixt ſenſations compoſed of pain and pleaſure in equal proportion? and in others is not one of them predominant?

Prot. Without doubt.

Soc. Among thoſe, then, in which there is an overplus of pain, I reckon that of the malady termed the itch, and all other pruriencies and itchings, when nothing more than a ſlight friction or motion is applied to them, ſuch as only diſſipates what humours are at the ſurface, but reaches not the fermentation and turgeſcence of thoſe humours which lie deep within. In this condition, the diſeaſed often apply heat to the parts which pain them, and then the oppoſite extreme, through impatience, and uncertainty which way to take. Thus they excite inexpreſſible pleaſures firſt, and then the contrary, in the interior parts, compared with the pains felt in the exterior, which yet are mixed with pleaſures, according as the humours are driven outwardly or inwardly. For by violently diſperſing the morbific matter where it is collected, and by compelling it together from places where it lies diſperſed, pleaſures and pains are at once excited, and ariſe by each other's ſide.

Prot. Moſt true.

Soc. Now wherever, in any caſe of this kind, a greater quantity of pleaſure is mingled, the ſmaller quantity of pain creates but a ſlight uneaſineſs, no more than what ſerves to tickle: whilſt, on the other hand[1], the great exceſs of pleaſure ſpread throughout convulſeth the whole frame, and ſometimes cauſeth involuntary motions; operating alſo every change of colour in the countenance, every variety of poſture in the limbs, and every different degree of reſpiration;—and within the ſoul it energizes in tranſports, uttered madly in exclamations.

Prot. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Further: a man in ſuch a condition, O my friend! is apt to ſay of himſelf, and others are apt to ſay of him, that he is dying, as it were, through exceſs of pleaſure. From this time for ever after he is wholly intent on purſuing the like pleaſures; and the more ſo, the more he happens to be intemperate, and leſs under the government of prudence. Thus he calls theſe pleaſures the greateſt, and accounts him the happieſt of men who ſpends his whole time, as far as poſſible, in the enjoyment of them.

Prot. You have deſcribed all this, O Socrates, juſt as it happens to the bulk of mankind, according to their own ſenſe and opinion.

Soc. But all this, O Protarchus, relates only to ſuch pleaſures mixed with

[1] In the Greek, as it is printed, we read το δ' αυτης ἡδονης: but we ſhould chooſe to read το δ' αυ της ἡ.—S.

pains

pains as ariſe ſolely in the body, in its ſuperficial parts and interior parts alternately. And as to thoſe feelings of the ſoul which meet with a contrary condition of the body, when pleaſure in the one is mixed with pain in the other, ſo as that both are ingredients in one compoſition, we ſpake of thoſe before; ſuch as a deſire of fulneſs, under a ſenſe of emptineſs in the body; when hope adminiſters delight, while the emptineſs gives a pain. We did not, indeed, conſider them at that time as evidences of the preſent point; but we now ſay, that in all thoſe caſes (and the number of them is infinite) where the condition of the ſoul is different from that of the body, a mixture of pain and pleaſure happens to be produced.

PROT. You are, I believe, perfectly in the right.

SOC. Among the mixtures of pain and pleaſure, there is a third kind remaining, yet unmentioned.

PROT. What kind is that?

SOC. That where ſuch pleaſures and pains as we ſaid ariſe frequently in the ſoul, herſelf by herſelf, are mixed together.

PROT. In what caſes, ſay we, are theſe mixtures found?

SOC. Anger, fear, and deſire, and lamentation, love, emulation, and envy, and all other ſuch paſſions of the ſoul herſelf, do you not ſuppoſe them to give pain and uneaſineſs to the ſoul?

PROT. I do.

SOC. And ſhall we not find theſe very paſſions fraught with wondrous pleaſures? In the paſſions of reſentment and anger, do we need to be reminded of what the poet ſays[1],—that

> ——————— though reſentment raiſe
> Choler, like ſmoke, in even the prudent breaſt;
> The luſcious honey from its waxen ſeat
> Diſtills not half ſuch ſweetneſs.

And do we not remember, in lamentations and deſires, the pleaſures we have felt mingled with the pains which thoſe paſſions produce?

PROT. It is true: our paſſions do affect us in the manner you have mentioned, and no otherwiſe.

SOC. And have you not obſerved, at tragic ſpectacles preſented on the ſtage, with how much pleaſure the ſpectators ſhed tears?

[1] Homer, in the eighteenth book of his Iliad, ver. 108, &c.

PROT.

PROT. I certainly have.

SOC. But have you attended to the diſpoſition of your ſoul at the acting of a comedy? Do you know that there alſo we feel pain mixed with pleaſure?

PROT. I do not perfectly well comprehend that.

SOC. It is not perfectly eaſy, O Protarchus, at ſuch a time, to comprehend what mixed paſſions poſſeſs the ſoul in every caſe of that kind.

PROT. Not at all eaſy, I believe.

SOC. However, let us conſider what our feelings are at that time; and the more attentively, on account of their obſcurity; that we may be able to diſcover with the greater eaſe what mixture there is of pain and pleaſure in other caſes.

PROT. Say on, then.

SOC. The paſſion known by the name of envy, will you ſet it down for a ſort of pain in the ſoul, or how?

PROT. Even ſo.

SOC. And yet the man who envies another will plainly appear to be delighted with the evils which befall him.

PROT. Clearly ſo.

SOC. Now ignorance is an evil; and ſo is what we term want of ſenſe.

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. From theſe premiſes you may perceive what is the nature of ridicule and the ridiculous.

PROT. You muſt tell me what it is.

SOC. Every particular vice takes its name from ſome particular bad habit in the ſoul. But total viciouſneſs, the habit of wickedneſs in all reſpects, is the direct contrary of that habit which the Delphic inſcription adviſeth us to acquire.

PROT. That of knowing one's ſelf do you mean, O Socrates?

SOC. I do. And the contrary to this advice of the oracle would be,—not to know one's ſelf in any reſpect at all.

PROT. Certainly it would.

SOC. Try now to divide this ignorance of ourſelves into three kinds.

PROT. How, ſay you, ſhould this be done? for I am not able to do it.

SOC. Do you ſay that I ſhould make this diviſion in your ſtead?

PROT. I not only ſay it, but deſire you ſo to do.

SOC. Well then: whoever is ignorant of himſelf, muſt he not be thus ignorant, in one or other of theſe three reſpects?

PROT. What three?

SOC. Firſt, with reſpect to external poſſeſſions, in imagining himſelf wealthier than he really is.

PROT. Many perſons there are who labour under this ſort of ignorance.

SOC. Yet more numerous are they, in the next place, who imagine themſelves handſomer in their perſons, nobler in their air, or graced with ſome other corporeal advantage in a higher degree than actually they are.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. But the number is by far the greateſt, I preſume, of ſuch as are miſtaken in themſelves, with reſpect to the third kind of excellence, that which belongs to the ſoul, by fancying themſelves poſſeſſed of more virtue than in truth they have.

PROT. Nothing is more certain.

SOC. Among the virtues and excellencies of the ſoul, is not wiſdom that to which the generality of mankind lay claim with the greateſt earneſtneſs, and in regard to which they are full of contention, opinionativeneſs, and falſe notions?

PROT. Evidently ſo.

SOC. Now the man who ſhould ſay that ignorance and error, in any of theſe reſpects, were evils, would ſay what is true.

PROT. Very right.

SOC. But we are to make ſtill another diviſion of this ignorance of a man's ſelf, O Protarchus, if we would diſcover the odd mixture of pain and pleaſure in that mirthful envy which is excited by comedy,—a diviſion into two ſorts.

PROT. Into what two ſorts do you mean?

SOC. To thoſe perſons who fooliſhly entertain any ſuch falſe opinion of themſelves it neceſſarily happens, as it does to all men in general, that ſtrength and power attend on ſome; while the fate of others is quite the contrary.

PROT. It muſt be ſo.

SOC. According to this difference then between them, diſtinguiſh thoſe ignorant

ignorant perſons into two ſorts. And all thoſe whoſe ſelf-ignorance is attended with weakneſs, and with a want of power to be revenged on ſuch as laugh at them, you may juſtly ſay that they are open to ridicule, and may call their characters properly ridiculous. But as to the others, who have power to take their revenge, if you ſhould ſay that theſe are to be dreaded, as being powerful and hoſtile, you would give a very right account of them. For ſuch ignorance, armed with power, is powerful to do miſchief; and not only itſelf is hoſtile and hurtful to all perſons within its reach, but ſo likewiſe are all its images and repreſentatives. But ſelf-ignorance, without ſtrength and power, is to be ranked among the things which are ridiculous, and is a proper object of ridicule.

PROT. There is much of truth in what you ſay. But I do not as yet perceive clearly what mixture there is of pain and pleaſure in our feelings on ſuch occaſions.

SOC. You are, in the firſt place, to apprehend the force of envy in theſe caſes.

PROT. Show it me then.

SOC. Is not ſorrow, on ſome occaſions, felt unjuſtly? and is it not the ſame caſe with joy and pleaſure?

PROT. No doubt can be made of it.

SOC. There is neither injuſtice, nor envy, in rejoicing at the evils which befall our enemies.

PROT. Certainly there is not.

SOC. But if at any time, when we ſee an evil happening to our friends, we feel no ſorrow,—if, on the contrary, we rejoice at it,—are we not guilty of injuſtice?

PROT. Without diſpute.

SOC. Did we not ſay that it was an evil to any perſon to be ignorant of himſelf?

PROT. We did, and juſtly too.

SOC. If there be in any of our friends a falſe conceit of their own wiſdom, or of their own beauty, or of whatever elſe we mentioned, when we divided ignorance of one's ſelf into three kinds, is not this conceit an object of ridicule, where it is attended with impotence and weakneſs; but an object

of hatred, if power and ſtrength[1] are joined with it? or do we deny, what I juſt now ſaid, that the having of ſuch a falſe opinion, if it be not hurtful to others, is an object of ridicule?

PROT. You ſaid what is entirely true.

SOC. And do we not acknowledge this falſe conceit to be an evil, as being built on ignorance?

PROT. Moſt heartily.

SOC. Whether do we feel delight or ſorrow when we laugh at it?

PROT. It is plain that we feel delight.

SOC. Did we not ſay, that whenever we feel delight from the evils which happen to our friends, it is envy which operates in us that unjuſt delight?

PROT. It muſt be envy.

SOC. Our reaſoning then ſhows, that when we laugh at what is ridiculous in a friend, mixing thus delight with envy, we mix together pleaſure and pain. For we acknowledged long ago that envy gives uneaſineſs and pain to the ſoul; and we have admitted, that laughing yields delight. Now in theſe caſes they ariſe, both of them, at the ſame time.

PROT. True.

SOC. We ſee, then, from the concluſion of our argument, that in mournful ſpectacles, and no leſs in comedies, not only as they are acted on the ſtage, but as they are preſented to us alſo in the tragedy and comedy of real life, and in a thouſand intermediate occurrences, pains and pleaſures are blended together.

PROT. It would be impoſſible, O Socrates, for a man not to acknowledge this, were he ever ſo zealous an advocate for the oppoſite ſide.

SOC. When we entered on the preſent ſubject, we propoſed to conſider anger, deſire and grief, fear and love, jealouſy and envy, and ſuch other paſſions of the ſoul; promiſing ourſelves to find in them thoſe mixed feelings which again and again we had been ſpeaking of: did we not?

PROT. We did.

SOC. Do we perceive that we have diſpatched already all which relates to grief, and envy, and anger?

[1] It is hoped that no future editor of Plato will be either ſo abſurd, or ſo careleſs, as to follow all the former editors in printing μη (inſtead of αν η) ερρωμενα, in the Greek of this paſſage.—S.

PROT.

PROT. We perceive it clearly.

SOC. But there is much yet remaining.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. For what reaſon, principally, do you ſuppoſe it was that I explained to you the mixed feeling which a comedy occaſions in us? Do you not conceive, that it was to ſhow myſelf able to explain to you with much more eaſe, the like mixture of pain and pleaſure in fear, in love, and in the other paſſions? and that after you had ſeen the truth of it in one inſtance, you might diſcharge me from the neceſſity of proceeding to the reſt, or of lengthening out the argument any further; but might receive it for a truth, without limitation or exception, that the body without the ſoul, and the ſoul without the body, and both together likewiſe, are, in many things, which affect them ſeverally or jointly, full of a ſenſe of pleaſures mingled with pains. Say, then, whether you will diſmiſs me, or make it midnight before we finiſh. But I imagine that, after I ſhall have added a few things more, I ſhall obtain from you my diſmiſſion: for I ſhall be ready to give you an account of all theſe things at large tomorrow; but at preſent am deſirous of proceeding to what remains on this ſubject; that we may come to a deciſion of the point in controverſy, as Philebus hath enjoined us.

PROT. You have well ſpoken, O Socrates; and as to what remains, go through with it in whatever way it is agreeable to yourſelf.

SOC. Well then: after the mixed pleaſures we are to proceed, by a kind of natural neceſſity, to the ſeveral pleaſures which are unmixed and pure.

PROT. Perfectly well ſaid.

SOC. The nature of theſe I ſhall endeavour to explain to you, by converting to my own uſe, with a little alteration, what is ſaid of them by others. For I do not entirely give credit to thoſe perſons who tell us, that all pleaſure conſiſts in a ceſſation from uneaſineſs and pain. But, as I ſaid before, I make uſe of theſe perſons as witneſſes, in confirmation of this truth,—that ſome things there are which ſeem to be pleaſures, but by no means are ſo in reality; and of this alſo,—that ſome other pleaſures there are, many and great in imagination, accompanied with pains, but at the ſame time with relief from greater pains, amid the diſtreſſes of the body and of the ſoul.

PROT. But what pleaſures are thoſe, O Socrates, which a man would deem rightly of, in ſuppoſing them to be true?

SOC.

Soc. The pleaſures[1] which are produced in us from ſeeing beauteous colours and beauteous figures; many pleaſures alſo of the ſmell, and many others ariſing in us from the hearing of ſounds; in a word, whatever pleaſures we feel from perceiving the preſence of any thing, whoſe abſence we are inſenſible of, or at leaſt occaſions no pain in us, all theſe are unmixed and pure.

Prot. How do you explain this general account, O Socrates?

Soc. The meaning of it, indeed, is not directly obvious: but we muſt endeavour to make it evident. I mean, then, by beauteous figures, not, as moſt men would ſuppoſe I meant, the beauty of living forms, or their ſtatues; but the ſtraight and the round, whether in ſurfaces[2], or in ſolids[3]; according to which are faſhioned the turner's works, and thoſe of the carpenter, by means of his rules and angles. For the figures which I mean, if you apprehend me, have no relative beauty, like thoſe other beauteous forms[4]; but in their own nature, ſeparately conſidered, are always abſolutely beautiful; and the beholding of them gives us certain peculiar pleaſures, not at all ſimilar to the pleaſures excited in us by any kind of motion. And as to colours, I mean ſuch as bear the like ſtamp of abſolute beauty[5], and yield alſo pleaſures of a peculiar nature. But do we apprehend theſe things? or what ſay we to them?

[1] Of pleaſures, ſays Olympiodorus, thoſe that excite a vehement agitation are ſuch as are attended with pain, but the energetic alone are ſuch as are beheld in a perfect animal when energizing. Again, of pure pleaſures, the corporeal are ſuch as the viſion of commenſurate light; thoſe pertaining to the ſoul are ſuch as reſult from the ſpeculation and apprehenſion of a certain intelligible; but thoſe which belong to both, viz. to body and ſoul, are ſuch as thoſe of health, in which the ſoul alſo rejoices; the pleaſure in this caſe beginning from the motion of the ſoul, but deſcending as far as to the body.—T.

[2] That is, rectilinear plane figures, ſuch as triangles, rectangles, and circles.—S.

[3] Such as pyramids and cubes, ſpheres, cylinders and cones.—S.

[4] The parts of every mathematical ſimple figure, whether it be right-lined or circular, are, all of them, ſimilar and commenſurable.—The beauty of figure in all animals, on the contrary, ariſes from the proportions of diſſimilar parts, meaſured, not by any common meaſure, but by the reſpective ends and uſes for which they are ſeverally deſigned by nature.—S.

[5] Such as the beautiful colours of many flowers; or as thoſe of a clear morning or evening ſky: not ſuch as the colour of a complexion, the tincture of a ſkin,—in the human ſpecies,—a colour belonging only to that ſpecies, and relatively agreeable, as it indicates health of body, and a purity of the blood and humours.—S.

Prot.

PROT. I endeavour, O Socrates, to comprehend your full meaning: but endeavour you yourſelf to explain thoroughly the whole of it.

SOC. As to ſounds, I mean ſuch as are ſmooth, clear, and canorous, conveying ſome pure and ſimple melody [1], without relation to any other ſounds, but ſingly of themſelves muſical: of ſuch I ſpeak, and of the connatural pleaſures which attend them.

PROT. That ſuch pleaſures alſo there are, I readily acknowledge.

SOC. The pleaſures felt by us from certain odours are, indeed, of a kind leſs divine than the pleaſures juſt now mentioned; but in reſpect of their being equally pure, and not, of neceſſity, mixed with pains, I rank them all under the ſame head. For in whatever pleaſures there happens to be found this quality of entire freedom from pain, all theſe I oppoſe to thoſe other pleaſures with which pain is complicated. Now, if you obſerve, we have already ſpoken of two different kinds of pleaſure.

PROT. I do obſerve.

SOC. To theſe let us now add the pleaſures taken in the mathematical ſciences; unleſs we are of opinion that ſuch pleaſures are of neceſſity preceded by a thirſt of learning them; and that, when taſted and enjoyed, they raiſe a thirſt of more and more; ſo that, from our beginning to learn them, they are all along attended with uneaſineſs.

PROT. I think that ſuch uneaſineſs is not at all neceſſary.

SOC. Well: but ſuppoſe that, having attained to full poſſeſſion of them, we happen afterwards to loſe ſome part through forgetfulneſs, do you ſee no uneaſineſs ariſing hence?

PROT. None at all from the nature of the thing itſelf: but when the knowledge is wanted to be applied to ſome uſe in human life, then a man is uneaſy at having loſt it, on account of its uſefulneſs.

SOC. And we are at preſent, my friend, actually concerned about thoſe feelings only which ariſe in us from the nature of the knowledge itſelf, without any regard to the uſefulneſs of it in computing or meaſuring.

PROT. You are right then in ſaying, that, in mathematical knowledge, a forgetfulneſs frequently befalls us, without giving us any uneaſineſs.

[1] Such is that of many ſpecies of birds, whoſe whiſtling is all monotonous. Such alſo is that of the Æolian harp, on which the vibrations are made ſolely by the air in motion.—S.

Soc. Theſe pleaſures, therefore, the pleaſures of ſcience, we muſt acknowledge to be unmixed with pains. But theſe pleaſures belong not to the vulgar multitude, being enjoyed only by a very few.

Prot. All this muſt certainly be acknowledged.

Soc. Now, then, that we have tolerably well diſtinguiſhed between the pure pleaſures and thoſe which are rightly called impure, let us further add theſe diſtinctions between them,—that the vehement pleaſures know not moderation nor meaſure; while thoſe of the gentler kind admit of meaſure, and are moderate: and that greatneſs and intenſeneſs, and the contrary qualities, the frequency alſo and the rareneſs of repetition, are attributes of ſuch pleaſures only as belong to the boundleſs genus,—to that which is perpetually varying in its quantities and motions through the body and through the ſoul,—while the pleaſures to which the like variations never happen, belong to the contrary genus, and are allied to all things wherein ſymmetry is found.

Prot. Perfectly right, O Socrates.

Soc. The pleaſures, beſide theſe aſſortments of them, are to be further diſtinguiſhed thus.

Prot. How?

Soc. We ſhould conſider whether the purity and the ſimplicity of pleaſures ſerve to diſcover what true pleaſure is: or whether the truth of pleaſures may beſt be known from their intenſeneſs, their multitude, their greatneſs and their abundance.

Prot. What is your view, Socrates, in propoſing this to be conſidered?

Soc. To omit nothing by which the nature of pleaſure, and that of knowledge, may be ſet in the cleareſt light; and not to leave it undiſcovered, whether or no ſome kinds of each of them are pure, while other kinds are impure; that thus, what is pure and ſimple in each being brought before us to be judged of, you and I, and all this company, may the more eaſily form a right judgment.

Prot. Very rightly ſaid.

Soc. Well then: all thoſe kinds of things which we commonly ſay are pure, let us conſider of in the following way: but firſt let us chooſe out ſome one among them for an inſtance to conſider of.

Prot. Which would you have us chooſe?

Soc.

Soc. Among the principal of thoſe kinds, let us, if you pleaſe, conſider the white kind of things.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. In what way, then, might we have any thing which is called white, with the moſt perfect and pure whiteneſs? whether by having the greateſt number of things which are white, and the largeſt of the kind in ſize, or by having what is white in the higheſt degree, and not tinged with the leaſt degree of any other colour?

Prot. Evidently, by having what is of the moſt ſimple and unmixed whiteneſs.

Soc. Rightly ſaid. Shall we not then determine that this pure white is the trueſt, and at the ſame time the moſt beautiful of all whites; and not that which is of the largeſt ſize, and whoſe number is the greateſt?

Prot. Moſt certainly we ſhall.

Soc. In pronouncing, then, that a little of purely white is whiter, and of a more beautiful and true whiteneſs, than a great quantity of the mixed white, we ſhall ſay what is entirely right.

Prot. Without the leaſt doubt.

Soc. Well then: I ſuppoſe we ſhall have no occaſion to produce many ſuch inſtances to prove the truth of our concluſion concerning pleaſure; the inſtance already brought ſeems ſufficient for us to perceive at once, that a little of pleaſure, pure, and free from pain, is more pleaſant, more true, and perfect, as well as more comely, than pleaſure where pain is mingled, be there ever ſo much of it, or be it ever ſo vaſt and vehement.

Prot. By all means: the inſtance you gave in whiteneſs, is an argument from analogy, ſufficient for the proof of it.

Soc. But what think you now of this? Have we not heard it ſaid concerning pleaſure, that it is a thing always in generation, always produced anew, and having no ſtability of being, cannot properly be ſaid to be at all? For ſome ingenious[1] perſons there are who endeavour to ſhow us, that ſuch

[1] In the Greek—κομψοι, *neat* and *trim*, that is, in their reaſonings and diſcourſes;—ſubtle arguers, or fine logicians;—a character which diſtinguiſhed the ſchool of Zeno the Eleatic. It will preſently be ſeen, that the perſons here ſpoken of philoſophized on the principles of the Eleatic ſect, and probably were ſome of the ſame Zeno's Athenian diſciples.—S.

is the nature of pleaſure; and we are much obliged to them for this their account of it.

PROT. Why ſo?

SOC. I ſhall recount to you the whole of their reaſoning on this point, my friend Protarchus, by putting a few queſtions to you.

PROT. Do ſo: and begin your queſtions.

SOC. Are there not in nature two very different kinds of things: this, in itſelf alone complete; that, deſirous always of the other?

PROT. How do you mean? and what things do you ſpeak of?

SOC. One of them is by nature always of high dignity and value; the other, falling far ſhort of it, and always indigent.

PROT. Expreſs yourſelf a little more clearly.

SOC. Have we not ſeen ſome of the fair ſex who excelled in beauty and in virtue? and have we not ſeen their lovers and admirers?

PROT. Often.

SOC. Analogous then to theſe two different ſorts of perſons, ſee if you cannot diſcover two different kinds of things, to one or other of which different kinds belongs every thing, commonly ſaid to have a being: the third be to the ſaviour[1].

PROT. Speak your meaning, O Socrates, in plainer terms.

SOC. I mean nothing, O Protarchus, but what is very ſimple and eaſy to be ſeen. But our preſent argument is pleaſed to ſport itſelf. However, it means no more than this,—that there is a kind of things which are always

[1] This whole ſentence in all the editions of the Greek is thus printed,—Τουτοις τοινυν εοικοτα δυοιν ουσι, δυ' αλλα ζητει, κατα παντα ὁσα λεγομεν ειναι το τριτον ἑτερῳ.—A ſentence quite unintelligible to us. Monſ. Grou very juſtly apprehends ſome error in the text. We preſume, that this ſenſible and elegant tranſlator never ſaw the emendation propoſed by Cornarius; for that, otherwiſe, he would have embraced it, and have made his verſion, as we have ours, agreeable to that emendation: which is no more than a change of the laſt word—ἑτερῳ into σωτηρι. The ſentence, thus amended, concludes with this proverbial ſaying,—*the third to the ſaviour*. It was a form of words antiently uſed at the feaſt of every victor in the Olympic games, when he made an accuſtomed libation out of the third cup or glaſs, Διι σωτηρι, *to Jupiter*, in his character of *ſaviour* in all difficulties and dangers. A ſpeech ſo well known to all the Grecians, eaſily paſſed into a proverb: and it is alluded to as ſuch by Plato in his Charmides, in his Republic, and in his Seventh Epiſtle.—S.

for

for the ſake of ſome other; and there is alſo a kind of things for whoſe ſake always is produced whatever hath any final cauſe of its production.

PROT. I find it difficult to underſtand your meaning, after your many explanations of it.

SOC. Perhaps, young man, it will be underſtood better as we proceed in the reaſoning on this ſubject.

PROT. I make no doubt of it.

SOC. Let us now make another diviſion of things into two different kinds.

PROT. What kinds are they?

SOC. The generation [1] of all things is one kind of things; and the being of all is a different kind.

PROT. I admit your difference between being and generation.

SOC. You are perfectly in the right. Now, whether of theſe two is for the ſake of the other? Shall we ſay that generation is for the ſake of being? or ſhall we ſay that being is for the ſake of generation?

PROT. Whether or no that which is termed being, is what it is for the ſake of generation, is this your preſent queſtion?

SOC. Apparently it is.

PROT. In the name of the Gods, how can you aſk ſo ſtrange a queſtion?

SOC. My meaning in that queſtion, O Protarchus, is of ſuch a kind as this other;—whether you would chooſe to ſay that ſhip-building is for the ſake of ſhipping, rather than you would ſay that ſhipping is for the ſake of ſhip-building: and all other things of like kind, O Protarchus, I include in the queſtion which I aſk you.

PROT. But for what reaſon, O Socrates, do you not give an anſwer to it yourſelf?

SOC. I have no reaſon to refuſe that office; do you but go along with me in my anſwer.

PROT. Certainly I ſhall.

[1] *Eſſence* and *generation*, ſays Olympiodorus, are fourfold. For that which is ſenſible is generation, and the intelligible is eſſence. In a ſimilar manner, that which is ſubceleſtial is generation, and that which is celeſtial is eſſence. Further ſtill, in the third place, generation is a proceſſion to form, and form itſelf is eſſence. In the fourth place, mutation about a ſubject is generation, and the ſubject itſelf is eſſence; as, for inſtance, quality about body. But every where generation is for the ſake of eſſence: for eſſence is the cauſe of generation—T.

Soc. I ſay, then, that for the ſake of generation, it is true, that medicines are compoſed; the inſtrumental parts, prepared by nature, and all the materials of it, provided: but that every act of generation is for the ſake of ſome being; generation in every ſpecies, for the ſake of ſome being belonging to that ſpecies; and univerſally, all generation, for the ſake of univerſal being.

Prot. Moſt evidently ſo.

Soc. If pleaſure, then, be of ſuch a nature as to be generated always anew, muſt not the generating of it be always for the ſake only of ſome being?

Prot. Without doubt.

Soc. Now that, for the ſake of which is always generated whatever is generated for ſome end, muſt be in the rank of things which are good: and that which is generated for the ſake of any other thing, muſt of neceſſity, my friend, be placed in a different rank of things.

Prot. Certainly it muſt.

Soc. Shall we not be right, then, in placing pleaſure in a rank of things different from that of good; if it be true, that pleaſure has no ſtable being, but is always generated anew?

Prot. Perfectly right.

Soc. Therefore, as I ſaid in beginning this argumentation, we are much obliged to the perſons who have given us this account of pleaſure,—that the eſſence of it conſiſts in being always generated anew, but that never has it any kind of being. For it is plain, that theſe perſons would laugh at a man who aſſerted, that pleaſure and good were the ſame thing.

Prot. Certainly they would.

Soc. And theſe very perſons would certainly laugh at thoſe men, whereever they met with them, who place their chief good and end in generation.

Prot. How, and what ſort of men do you mean?

Soc. Such, as in freeing themſelves from hunger, or thirſt, or any of the uneaſineſſes from which they are freed by generation, are ſo highly delighted with the action of removing thoſe uneaſineſſes, as to declare they would not chooſe to live without ſuffering thirſt and hunger, nor without feeling all thoſe other ſenſations which may be ſaid to follow from ſuch kinds of uneaſineſs.

Prot. Such, indeed, there are, who ſeem to be of that opinion.

Soc. Would not all of us ſay that corruption was the contrary of generation?

Prot. It is impoſſible to think otherwiſe.

Soc. Whoever, then, makes ſuch a life his choice, muſt chooſe both corruption and generation, rather than that third kind of life, in which he might live with the cleareſt diſcernment of what is right and good, but without the feeling of either pain or pleaſure.

Prot. Much abſurdity, as it ſeems, O Socrates, is to be admitted by the man who holds that human good conſiſts wholly in pleaſure.

Soc. Much, indeed. For let us argue further thus.

Prot. How?

Soc. Since no good nor beauty is in bodies, nor in any other things beſide the ſoul; is it not abſurd to imagine, that in the ſoul pleaſure ſhould be the only good; and that neither fortitude, nor temperance, nor underſtanding, nor any of the other valuable attainments of the ſoul, ſhould be numbered among the good things which the ſoul enjoys? Further too, is it not highly irrational to ſuppoſe, that a man afflicted with pain, without feeling any pleaſure, ſhould be obliged to ſay that evil only, and no good, was with him at the time when he was in pain, though he were the beſt of all men? And is it not equally abſurd, on the other hand, to ſuppoſe that a man in the midſt of pleaſures muſt be, during that time, in the midſt of good; and that the more pleaſure he feels, the more good he is filled with, and is ſo much the better man?

Prot. All theſe ſuppoſitions, O Socrates, are abſurdities in the higheſt degree poſſible.

Soc. It is well. But now let us not employ ourſelves wholly in ſearching into the nature of pleaſure; as if we induſtriouſly declined the examination of intellect and ſcience; but in theſe alſo, if there be any thing putrid or unſound, let us have the courage to cut it all off, and throw it aſide; till, coming to a diſcovery of what is entirely pure and ſound therein, the diſcovery may be of uſe to us in comparing the trueſt parts of intellect and ſcience with the trueſt parts of pleaſure, and in forming our judgment concerning the ſuperiority of either from that compariſon.

Prot. Rightly ſaid.

Soc. Do we not hold, that mathematical ſcience is partly employed in the

the ſervice of the mechanic arts, and partly in the liberal education and diſcipline of youth? or how think we on this ſubject?

PROT. Exactly ſo.

SOC. Now, as to the manual arts[1], let us conſider, in the firſt place, whether ſome of theſe depend not on ſcience more than others; and whether we ought not to look on thoſe of the former ſort as the more pure, and on theſe others as the more impure.

PROT. Certainly we ought.

SOC. And in each of theſe we ſhould diſtinguiſh and ſeparate the leading arts from the arts which are led and governed by them.

PROT. What arts do you call the leading arts? and why do you give that epithet to them?

SOC. I mean thus: from all the arts were a man to ſeparate and lay aſide thoſe of numbering, of meaſuring, and of weighing, what remained in every one of them, would become comparatively mean and contemptible.

PROT. Contemptible, indeed.

SOC. For room would be then left only for conjecture, and for exerciſe of the ſenſes, by experience and habitual practice; and we ſhould then make uſe of no other faculties beſide thoſe of gueſſing and aiming well, (to which, indeed, the multitude give the name of arts) increaſing the ſtrength of thoſe faculties by dint of aſſiduity and labour.

PROT. All which you have now ſaid muſt, of neceſſity, be true.

SOC. The truth of it is evident in all muſical performances throughout. For, in the firſt place, harmony is produced, and one ſound is adapted to another, not by meaſuring, but by that aiming well which ariſes from conſtant exerciſe. It is evident too in muſical performances on all wind-inſtruments: for in theſe the breath, by being well aimed as it is blown along, ſearches and attains the meaſure of every chord beaten. So that muſic has in it much of the uncertain, and but a little of the fixed and firm.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. And we ſhall find the caſe to be the ſame in the arts of medicine and agriculture, in the art of navigation alſo, and the military art.

[1] In the Greek of this paſſage it is preſumed that we ought to read χειροτεχνιαις, and not, as it is printed, χειροτεχνικαις,—and alſo to read εστι inſtead of επι.—S.

PROT.

PROT. Moſt clearly ſo.

SOC. But in the art of building we ſhall find, as I preſume, many meaſures made uſe of, and many inſtruments employed; by which it is made to ſurpaſs in accuracy many things which are called ſciences.

PROT. How ſo?

SOC. It is ſo in ſhip-building, and houſe-building, and in many other works of carpentry. For in theſe, I think, the art uſeth the ſtraight-rule, and the ſquare, the turning-lath and the compaſſes, the plummet and the marking-line.

PROT. You are entirely right, O Socrates: it is ſo as you ſay.

SOC. The arts, therefore, as they are called, let us now diſtinguiſh into two ſorts;—thoſe which muſic is at the head of, as they are leſs accurate than ſome others; and theſe others which partake of accuracy the moſt, at the head of which is architecture.

PROT. This diſtinction is allowed of.

SOC. And let us ſet down thoſe arts for the moſt accurate which we lately ſaid were the prime or leading arts.

PROT. You mean, if I miſtake not, arithmetic, and thoſe other arts which you mentioned together with it but juſt now [1].

SOC. The very ſame. But, O Protarchus, muſt we not ſay that each of theſe arts is twofold? or how otherwiſe?

PROT. What arts do you ſpeak of?

SOC. Arithmetic, in the firſt place. Muſt we not ſay of this, that the arithmetic of the multitude is of one ſort, and that the arithmetic of thoſe who apply themſelves to philoſophy [2] is of another ſort?

PROT. What is the difference by which the one may be diſtinguiſhed from the other?

SOC. The difference between them, O Protarchus, is far from being inconſiderable. For the multitude in numbering, number by unequal ones put together; as two armies of unequal force; two oxen of unequal ſize; two things, the ſmalleſt of all,—or two, the greateſt,—being compared with others of the ſame kind. But the ſtudents in philoſophy would not under-

[1] Namely, *menſuration* and *ſtatics*.—S.

[2] Meaning the ſtudents in mathematics. For the ſtudy of the mathematical ſciences was deemed by Plato the beſt introduction to the knowledge of intelligible things.—S.

ſtand

ſtand what a man meant, who, in numbering, made any difference between ſome and other of the ones which compoſed the number.

PROT. You are perfectly right in ſaying that no inconſiderable difference lies in the different manner of ſtudying and uſing numbers; ſo as to make it probable that two different ſorts there are of arithmetic.

SOC. Well: and what of calculation in trade, and of menſuration in building? Does the latter of theſe arts not differ from mathematical geometry? nor the other from calculations made by the ſtudents in pure mathematics. Shall we ſay that they are, each of them, but one art? or ſhall we ſet down each of them for two?

PROT. For my part, I ſhould give my opinion agreeably to your diviſion of arithmetic; and ſhould ſay that each of theſe arts alſo was twofold.

SOC. You would give a right opinion. But with what deſign I brought theſe diſtinctions on the carpet do you conceive?

PROT. Perhaps I do. But I could wiſh that you yourſelf would declare what was your deſign.

SOC. Theſe diſtinctions ſeem to me to have ſhown to us, that in ſcience there is that very circumſtance attending it which we had before diſcovered to be in pleaſure; the one thus anſwering to the other. For, having found that ſome ſort of pleaſure was purer than ſome other ſort, we were inquiring whether the ſame difference was to be found with regard to ſcience; and whether one ſort of this alſo was purer than ſome other.

PROT. It is very manifeſt that your diſtinctions between the ſeveral arts were introduced for this very purpoſe.

SOC. Well then: have we not diſcovered, in what has been ſaid, that ſome arts are clearer than others, having more light within them; and that others are more involved in obſcurity and darkneſs?

PROT. Evidently ſo.

SOC. And has not the courſe of our argument led us to take notice of ſome art, bearing the ſame name with ſome other art; and firſt, to ſuppoſe them both to be, as they are commonly imagined, but one art; then, to conſider them as two different arts; to examine each with regard to its clearneſs and purity; and to inquire which of the two has in it the moſt accuracy, whether that which is cultivated by ſtudents in philoſophy, or that which is exerciſed by the multitude?

PROT.

PROT. Our argument ſeems to bring on this inquiry.

SOC. And what anſwer, O Protarchus, ſhould we make to ſuch a queſtion?

PROT. O Socrates, we are now advanced ſo far as to diſcover an amazingly wide difference between the parts of our knowledge in point of clearneſs.

SOC. It will, therefore, be the eaſier for us to anſwer to that queſtion.

PROT. Without doubt. And let us affirm, that thoſe leading arts greatly excel the others with regard to clearneſs; and that ſuch of thoſe brighter arts themſelves as are ſtudied by real ſtudents in philoſophy, diſplay, in meaſures and in numbers, their vaſt ſuperiority to all other arts, with regard to accuracy and truth [1].

SOC. Granting theſe things to be what you ſay they are, let us, on the credit of what you have ſaid, boldly anſwer to thoſe perſons who are ſo formidable in argumentation, thus:

PROT. How?

SOC. That there are two ſorts of arithmetic; and that, dependant on theſe, there is a long train of arts, each of them, in like manner, twofold under one denomination.

PROT. Let us give to the perſons whom you call formidable that very anſwer, O Socrates, with a confidence of its being right.

SOC. Do we then affirm, that in theſe ſciences there is an accuracy the higheſt of all.

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. But the power of dialectic, O Protarchus, if we gave to any other ſcience the preference above her, would deny that ſuperiority.

PROT. What power is it to which we are to give that name?

SOC. Plainly that power, O Protarchus, by which the mind perceives all that accuracy and clearneſs of which we have been ſpeaking. For I am entirely of opinion, that all perſons, endued with even the ſmalleſt portion of underſtanding, muſt deem the knowledge of the real eſſence of things—the knowledge of that kind of being whoſe nature is invariable—to be by far the

[1] This whole ſentence, beginning with the words "and let us affirm," is, in Stephens's edition, very improperly given to Socrates; and conſequently the ſentence following, with equal impropriety, to Protarchus. The Baſil editions are both right; the Aldine not clear.—S.

moſt certain and true knowledge. But you, Protarchus, to what art or ſcience would you give the diſtinction of pre-eminence?

PROT. As to me, O Socrates, I have often heard Gorgias maintaining in all places, that the art of perſuaſion has greatly the advantage over all other arts in overruling all things, and making all perſons ſubmit to it, not by conſtraint, but by a voluntary yielding; and therefore, that of all arts it is by far the moſt excellent. Now I ſhould not chooſe to contradict or oppoſe either you or him.

SOC. As much as to ſay, if I apprehend your meaning rightly, that you cannot for ſhame deſert your colours.

PROT. Let your opinion of theſe matters now prevail; and the ranks of the ſeveral arts be ſettled as you would have them.

SOC. Am I now to blame for your making a miſtake?

PROT. What miſtake have I made?

SOC. The queſtion, my friend Protarchus, was not which art, or which ſcience, is ſuperior to all the reſt, with regard to greatneſs, and excellence, and uſefulneſs to us; but of which art the objects are the brighteſt, the moſt accurate, and true, though the art itſelf brought us little or no gain: this it is, which is the preſent ſubject of our inquiry. Obſerve, then, Gorgias will have no quarrel with you: for you may ſtill allow to his art the preference above all others, in point of utility and profit to mankind. But, as I ſaid before concerning white, that be there ever ſo little of it, ſo it be pure, it excels a large quantity of an impure white, with regard to the truth of whiteneſs; juſt ſo is it with the ſtudy which I have been commending; it excels all others with regard to truth itſelf. And now that we have conſidered this ſubject attentively, and diſcuſſed it ſufficiently, laying aſide all regards to the uſefulneſs of the ſciences and arts, as well as to the reputation which they bear in the world, and thoroughly ſifting them to find out the purity of intellect and wiſdom,—if there be in the ſoul any faculty of loving truth above all things, and of doing whatever ſhe does for the ſake of truth,—let us conſider whether it is right to ſay that we we have this faculty improved chiefly by dialectic, or whether we muſt ſearch for ſome other art fitter for that purpoſe, and making it more her proper buſineſs.

PROT. Well: I do conſider the point propoſed; and I imagine it no eaſy matter

matter to admit that any other ſcience or art ſeeks and embraces truth ſo much as this.

Soc. Say you this from having obſerved that many of the arts, even ſuch as profeſs a laborious inquiry after truth, are, in the firſt place, converſant only with opinions, and exerciſe only the imagination; and that methodically, and according to a ſet of rules, they then ſearch into things which are the ſubjects only of ſuch opinions[1]? and do you know, that the perſons who ſuppoſe themſelves to be inquiring into the nature of things are, all their lives, inquiſitive about nothing more than this outward world, how it was produced, what cauſeth the changes which happen therein, and how thoſe changes operate their effects? Should we acknowledge all this ſo to be, or how otherwiſe?

Prot. Juſt ſo.

Soc. Whoever of us then addicts himſelf to the ſtudy of nature in this way, employs his time and care, not about the things which always are in being, but about things which are either newly come into being, or which are to come, or which have been already, and are paſt.

Prot. Very true.

Soc. What clearneſs, therefore, what certainty, or exact truth, can we expect to find in theſe things, none of which had ever any ſtability or ſameneſs in them, nor ever will have any, nor have ſuch of them as now exiſt any, even during their exiſtence?

Prot. How can it be expected?

Soc. Concerning things in which there is not the leaſt ſtability, how can we form any ſtable notions?

Prot. I ſuppoſe it not poſſible.

Soc. Of thoſe things, then, there is neither intelligence, nor any ſort of

[1] Meaning, as we preſume, ſuch as the philoſophers of the Ionic ſect, by Ariſtotle ſtyled φυσικοι, *naturaliſts*. For we learn from D. Laertius that Archelaus, a diſciple of Anaxagoras, and the laſt profeſſor and teacher of the doctrine of thoſe philoſophers, did, in the time of Socrates, introduce into Athens their way of philoſophizing; which was none other than that ſpoken of in this paſſage. It ſeems therefore probable, that the Athenian ſcholars of Archelaus are the very perſons whoſe ſtudies are here ſhown to fall ſhort of attaining to the knowledge of truth, or the true nature of things. The ſame judgment of Socrates concerning theſe Ionic phyſiologers we find recorded by Xenophon in Memorabil. lib. i. cap. 1. ſec. 11.—S.

ſcience to be acquired; at leaſt not ſuch as contains the higheſt degree of certainty.

PROT. It is not probable that there is.

SOC. We ought, therefore, both you and I, to lay aſide the conſideration of what Gorgias or Philebus ſaid, and to eſtabliſh on a firmer baſis this truth.

PROT. What truth?

SOC. This:—Whatever is in us of ſtable, pure, and true, it has for the objects of it—either the beings which always are, and remain invariable, entirely pure and unadulterate; or [if theſe are beyond the reach of our ſight] then ſuch as are the neareſt allied to them, and are ſecond in the ranks of being: for all other things come after thoſe firſt beings; ſecond, and ſo on in order.

PROT. Perfectly right.

SOC. The nobleſt, therefore, of the names given to things of this kind, is it not perfectly right to aſſign to thoſe of this kind, which are the nobleſt?

PROT. It is reaſonable ſo to do.

SOC. Are not intellect and wiſdom the nobleſt of thoſe names?

PROT. They are.

SOC. Rightly then are theſe names in accurate ſpeech appropriated to the intelligence and contemplation of real being.

PROT. Certainly ſo.

SOC. And the things for the excellency of which I at the firſt contended, are the very things to which we give theſe names.

PROT. Clearly are they, O Socrates.

SOC. Well now: were a man to ſay that the nature of intellect and the nature of pleaſure lay ſeverally before us, like two different ſorts of materials before ſome workman, for him to mix or join together, and from them, and in them, to compoſe his deſigned work,—would he not make a fair compariſon ſuitable to the taſk which our inquiry has engaged us in?

PROT. A very fair compariſon.

SOC. Should we not, then, in the next place, ſet about mixing them together?

PROT. Why ſhould we not?

SOC. Would it not be our beſt way to begin this work by recollecting and repeating thoſe things over again?

PROT.

PROT. What things?

SOC. Thoſe we have often mentioned before. For, I think, the proverb ſays well:—"Again and again that which is right, by repeating it, to recall into our minds."

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. In the name of Jupiter, then, come on. The whole of our controverſy began, I think, with ſtating the point in queſtion, to this effect.

PROT. How?

SOC. Philebus affirms that pleaſure is the right mark ſet up by nature for all animals to aim at; that they all ought to purſue pleaſure; that the good of them all is this very thing, pleaſure; and that *good* and *pleaſant*, theſe two attributes, belong but to one ſubject, as they both have but one and the ſame nature: on the other hand, Socrates denies this to be true; and maintains, in the firſt place, that as the two names, *good* and *pleaſant*, are two different names, different alſo are the things ſo denominated; in the next place, that the nature of good differs from that of pleaſure; and that intelligence, or mind, partakes of the properties of good more than pleaſure does, and is allied nearer to its nature. Were not ſome ſuch poſitions as theſe, O Protarchus, ſeverally laid down by us?

PROT. They were.

SOC. But was not this point agreed on between us at that time, and do we not ſtill agree in it?

PROT. What point?

SOC. That the nature of good itſelf is more excellent than the nature of any other thing in this reſpect?

PROT. In what reſpect?

SOC. This: that whatever animal being hath the conſtant, entire, and full poſſeſſion of good itſelf, ſuch a being has no want of any thing beſide, having always a moſt perfect and complete ſufficiency. Is it not ſo?

PROT. It certainly is.

SOC. Have we not endeavoured to conſider ſeparately a life of pleaſure and a life of intellect, each unmixed with the other,—a life of pleaſure without intellect, and in like manner, a life of intellect without the ſmalleſt degree of pleaſure?

PROT. We have.

SOC.

Soc. Did either of thoſe lives appear to us at that time to be ſufficient for the happineſs of any man?

Prot. How was it poſſible?

Soc. But if at that time any miſtake was committed, let it be now reviſed and rectified. In order to which, let us take memory, ſcience, wiſdom, and right opinion, comprehending them all in one idea, and conſider whether any man, without having ſomething of that kind, would accept of pleaſure, were it offered to him, either in the greateſt abundance, or in the moſt exquiſite degree; whether, indeed, he would regard the having or the receiving of any thing whatever; as he would not, in that caſe, have a right thought or opinion of his having any pleaſure; neither would he know what he felt or had at preſent; nor would he remember in what condition or circumſtances he had been at any time before. In like manner concerning wiſdom, conſider, whether a man would chooſe to have it without a mixture of any pleaſure in the leaſt, rather than to have the ſame wiſdom attended with pleaſures of certain kinds; and whether a man would prefer the having of all poſſible pleaſures, without wiſdom, to the having of them accompanied with ſome portion of wiſdom.

Prot. It is impoſſible, O Socrates, for a man to make any ſuch choice as you have ſuppoſed. And there is no occaſion to repeat theſe queſtions again and again.

Soc. Not pleaſure, then, nor wiſdom, either of them alone, can be the perfect and conſummate good, eligible to all men, that which we are inquiring after.

Prot. Certainly not.

Soc. Of this good, then, we are to give a clear and full deſcription, or at leaſt ſome ſketch, that we may know where the ſecond prize of excellence, as we called it, ought to be beſtowed.

Prot. Perfectly right.

Soc. Have we not, then, taken a way by which we may find out our chief good?

Prot. What way do you mean?

Soc. As if we were in ſearch of any particular man, and were already well informed of the place of his abode, we ſhould have made a great progreſs toward finding the man himſelf.

Prot.

PROT. Without doubt.

SOC. And our reaſoning has now declared to us clearly, what it pointed to before, that, not in the unmixed life, but in the mixed, we are to ſeek for happineſs.

PROT. Certainly ſo.

SOC. But in a proper and well-tempered mixture we may reaſonably hope to diſcover what we are in ſearch of with more certainty than we could by an ill-made compoſition.

PROT. With much more.

SOC. Let us, then, ſet about mixing and making the compoſition, firſt praying to the Gods for their aſſiſtance; whether it be Bacchus[1], or Vulcan, or ſome other of the Gods, who preſides over the mixture of theſe ingredients.

PROT. Let us, by all means, do ſo.

SOC. And now, as it were, two ciſterns, or vaſes, are ſet before us; the vaſe of pleaſure[2], as of honey; and the vaſe of intellect, cool and ſober, as of ſome hard and healthful water. Theſe, then, we are to mix together in the beſt manner we are able.

PROT. With all my heart.

SOC. Come, then: but firſt ſay, whether by mingling all pleaſure with all wiſdom we may beſt obtain our end, the having of a proper and due mixture.

[1] There are Gods, ſays Olympiodorus, that preſide over temperament; over the phyſical and mundane, Vulcan; but over the pſychical and ſupermundane, Bacchus. The mingling idiom, indeed, proceeds as far as to the laſt hyparxis. Thus, for inſtance, Vulcan being the leader of phyſical temperament, firſt produces this idiom in himſelf; afterwards, in the mundane intellect which preſides over nature; in the third place, in a ſoul of this kind, in a ſimilar manner; and laſtly, in the phyſical world according to hyparxis. In like manner, Bacchus unfolding in himſelf the principle of pſychical temperament after a divine manner, in the next place eſtabliſhes this in intellect intellectually, according to hyparxis in ſoul, and in a binding mode in the animated body. And ſtill higher than theſe, Jupiter is the principle of intellectual temperament. There are alſo other principles of temperament more partial than Bacchus and Vulcan. Plato mentions theſe two, as being about to mingle all the ſupermundane and mundane mixtures; but he omits the Jovian temperament, as being ſuperior to the things propoſed in this dialogue.—T.

[2] Pleaſure is compared to honey, ſays Olympiodorus, becauſe it poſſeſſes ſweetneſs and the ecſtatic. And hence the Pythagoric ſaying, that ſouls fall into generation through honey (διο και πυθαγορειος λογος, δια μελιτος πιπτειν εις γενεσιν τας ψυχας). But intellect is compared to water, becauſe it is ſober.—T.

PROT. Perhaps we might.

SOC. But it is dangerous to make the experiment. And I believe that I can point out a way to mix them with more ſafety.

PROT. Say what way.

SOC. Concerning pleaſures, I think, we held, that ſome more truly deſerved that name than others of them; and of arts, that ſome were more accurate and exact than others.

PROT. Undoubtedly ſo.

SOC. And that the ſciences alſo differed one from another in like manner: for that ſome kinds of ſcience have for their objects only ſuch things as ariſe into being and afterwards periſh; whereas another kind directs its view to things which are neither generated nor deſtroyed, but always are in being, always have the ſame properties, and preſerve always the ſame relations. And this kind of ſcience, with regard to the truth of it, we deemed more excellent than the other kinds.

PROT. Entirely right.

SOC. In the firſt place, therefore, mixing together the pureſt parts of pleaſure and of wiſdom, when they have been thus diſtinguiſhed from the leſs pure, if we view thoſe pureſt parts of each in combination, are they not, thus combined, ſufficient to furniſh out, and preſent us with, an ample view of that life which is deſirable? or is any thing further, any ingredient of a different kind, wanting to perfect the compoſition?

PROT. So as you propoſe, and only ſo, it ſeems to me neceſſary for us to do.

SOC. Let us, then, ſuppoſe a man to have in his mind the idea of juſtice itſelf, ſo as to know what it is in its own eſſence, and to be able to give an account of it in conſequence of that knowledge. Let us alſo ſuppoſe him to have the like knowledge of all other beings.

PROT. Be ſuch a man ſuppoſed.

SOC. Will this man now ſufficiently poſſeſs ſcience by knowing the nature of the circle, and of the divine ſphere itſelf; whilſt he is ignorant of that ſphere, and of thoſe circles with which the eyes of men are converſant? Will that knowledge of his be ſufficient for his uſe in building, and in other arts where lines and circles are to be drawn?

PROT. Ridiculous we ſhould call our condition here, O Socrates, if our knowledge were thus confined to things ideal and divine.

Soc. How do you ſay? Arts which are neither certain nor pure, uſing untrue rules, and converſant with untrue circles, are we to throw ſuch arts into the compoſition, and mix them with the other ingredients?

Prot. It is neceſſary for us; if, whenever we are any where abroad, we are deſirous of finding our way home.

Soc. Are we to add muſic too?—an art which, not long ſince we ſaid, is wanting in purity, as being full of conjecture and imitation?

Prot. Of neceſſity we muſt, as it appears to me, if the life which we are to lead ſhall ever deſerve to be called life, or be at all worth the having.

Soc. Would you, then, like a door-keeper, when he is puſhed and preſſed by a throng of people, yield to them, ſet the doors wide open, and ſuffer all the ſciences to ruſh in, the leſs pure mingling themſelves among the perfectly pure?

Prot. I ſee not, O Socrates, for my part, how any man would be hurt by receiving all the other ſciences, if he was already in poſſeſſion of the firſt and higheſt.

Soc. I may ſafely then admit them all to come pouring in, like the torrents of water in that fine poetical ſimile of Homer's [1], ruſhing down into a valley from the mountains which ſurround it.

Prot. By all means, let them be all admitted.

Soc. Let us now return to the vaſe of pleaſure. For when we thought of mixing pleaſure and knowledge together, the purer parts of pleaſure did not preſent themſelves immediately to our minds: but, from our affectionate regard to ſcience, we ſuffered all kinds of it to crowd in before any of the pleaſures.

Prot. Very true.

Soc. It is now time for us to conſult about the pleaſures; whether we ſhould let them all come thronging in, or whether we ſhould admit thoſe of the true ſort firſt.

Prot. It makes a great difference in point of ſafety, to let in, the firſt, ſuch only as are true.

Soc. Let theſe, then, be admitted. But how ſhall we proceed? Muſt we not do, as we did with the ſeveral kinds of ſcience, admit as many pleaſures alſo as are of the neceſſary ſort?

[1] Iliad, lib. iv. ver. 453.

PROT. Without doubt, the neceſſary pleaſures alſo, by all means.

SOC. But now, as we held it both ſafe and advantageous in going through life to be acquainted with every art,—if we are of the ſame opinion with regard to pleaſures,—if we hold it conducive to our good, and at the ſame time harmleſs, to enjoy every ſort of pleaſure in the courſe of our lives,—in this caſe, we are to intermix all ſorts of pleaſure with all the kinds of ſcience.

PROT. What ſay we then as to this point? and how ought we to act?

SOC. This queſtion, O Protarchus, ſhould not be put to us. But the pleaſures themſelves, and the other aſſembly alſo, that of the ſciences and arts, are to be examined, each party concerning the other, in this manner.

PROT. In what manner?

SOC. Friends, we ſhall ſay, [*addreſſing our queſtion to the pleaſures firſt*] whether we ought to call you pleaſures, or whatever is your right name, would ye chooſe to live in the ſame place with all kinds of wiſdom, or to live without wiſdom? To this interrogatory they muſt, I think, anſwer thus:

PROT. How?

SOC. That ſeeing, as was ſaid before, were wiſdom and pleaſure to be left, each of them, alone, ſingle, and deſtitute of aid, neither of them would have any virtue or power at all, nor would any advantage ariſe from either,—we deem it beſt that all the kinds of wiſdom ſhould dwell with us, one kind of wiſdom with each of us, one who is ſuitable to the peculiar nature of its companion, and is perfectly acquainted with her power and influence.

PROT. And well have ye now anſwered, we ſhall ſay to them.

SOC. After this, we are to demand of wiſdom and intellect, in the ſame manner, thus:—Have ye any occaſion for pleaſures to be mixed among you? On the other ſide, we may ſuppoſe wiſdom and intellect to interrogate us; and what ſort of pleaſures, they would perhaps ſay, is it that ye mean?

PROT. Probably they would.

SOC. And to this queſtion of theirs our anſwer would be this:—Beſide thoſe true pleaſures, we ſhould ſay, do ye further want the pleaſures of the intenſe and exquiſite kind to dwell with you? How is it poſſible, O Socrates, they would then perhaps ſay, that we ſhould want theſe? Theſe, who give a thouſand hindrances to all our proceedings; and who, by their fury and madneſs, are always creating diſturbance in the ſouls where we dwell;—theſe, who had they been there firſt, would never have ſuffered us

to

to have admittance; and who entirely ſpoil our children, there born, by letting forgetfulneſs in upon them, for want of care to guard the dwelling-place. But the other pleaſures mentioned by you, the true and the pure, you are to know that they are nearly related to us, and belong to our family: and beſide theſe, the pleaſures who are accompanied by health and ſobriety; ſuch, alſo, as are the followers of all virtue, like the train of ſome Goddeſs, every where attending her; let all of theſe come and mix amongſt us. But thoſe pleaſures who are always found in company with folly, and with all kinds of vice, it is very abſurd for a man to mingle with intellect,—if he deſires to ſee a mixture as clear, untroubled, and well-attempered as poſſible to be made;—and if he would from thence try to diſcover what the nature is of good, not only in man, but alſo in the univerſe; from which diſcovery ſome notion is to be gained, by a ſort of divination, of what the idea is of good itſelf. Shall we not ſay that intellect and ſcience, in thus anſwering, have ſpoken prudently and conſiſtently with themſelves, pleading in their own cauſe, and at the ſame time in behalf of memory and right opinion?

PROT. By all means ought we.

SOC. But in our mixture it is neceſſary to add this alſo; for without it no one thing could ever be.

PROT. What is that?

SOC. Whatever has not truth mixed with it in the compoſing of it, can never be produced into true exiſtence; or, could it be produced, it never can be laſting.

PROT. How is it poſſible that it ſhould?

SOC. Certainly no way. Now if any thing further be yet wanting to perfect our compoſition, declare it, you and Philebus. For the mixture which we have now made in ſpeculation, appears to me to have been as perfectly well compoſed as if it were ſome incorporeal world meant for the good government of an animated body.

PROT. And be aſſured, O Socrates, that to me it has had the ſame appearance.

SOC. Might we not, then, rightly ſay, that we were now arrived at the dwelling-place of the good, and were ſtanding in its veſtibules?

PROT. I think we might.

SOC. And now what ſhould we deem to be the greateſt excellence in the

compoſition, and to be alſo the chief cauſe that ſuch a mixture muſt be grateful to all? For when we ſhall have diſcerned what this is which is ſo grateful and ſo excellent, we ſhall then conſider to which of the two, to pleaſure or to intellect, it is related the moſt nearly, and familiar the moſt intimately, in the conſtitution of the univerſe.

PROT. Right: it will be of the greateſt ſervice to us in determining this point.

SOC. And there is, indeed, no difficulty in diſcovering the cauſe, why ſome mixtures are moſt valuable, and others good for nothing.

PROT. Explain your meaning.

SOC. No perſon is ignorant of this.

PROT. Of what?

SOC. That in every mixture, whatever it be, and whatever be the quantity of it[1], if meaſure pervades it not, and if thence it obtains not ſymmetry and proportion, all the ingredients muſt of neceſſity be ſpoiled, beſides the ſpoiling of the whole compoſition. For, in ſuch a caſe, no one thing is really tempered by any other thing; but a confuſed and diſorderly aſſemblage is made of various things jumbled together; which, like a concurrence of bad accidents in life, is a real misfortune to the perſons who are to uſe it.

PROT. It is very true.

SOC. The power of the good then is transferred, we find, into that province where dwells the nature of the beautiful. For every where, from meaſure and mediocrity, and from ſymmetry and proportion, ariſe beauty and virtue.

PROT. Certainly ſo.

SOC. And we ſaid before that truth alſo was an ingredient in the compoſition.

PROT. We did.

SOC. If, then, we are not able to diſcover the nature of good itſelf in one ſingle idea,—yet, taking it in three ideas together, in beauty, ſymmetry, and

[1] In all the editions of the Greek we here read—*ὁπωσοῦν, however it be made.* But this is contradictory to the meaning of the ſentence; for the meaning is this,—that "every right and good mixture muſt be made *in one certain manner only*, viz. by *meaſure*."—We may fairly therefore preſume, that Plato wrote, not *ὁπωσοῦν*, but *ὁποσαοῦν*, (or, by eliſion, *ὁποσοῦν*,) with a view to the magnitude of the univerſe.—S.

truth,

truth[1], we may conceive it as one thing; and moſt juſtly attributing to it the cauſe of whatever is graceful or agreeable in the compoſition, we may moſt truly ſay, that by means of this, as being good itſelf, the whole proves to be ſuch as it is, thus agreeable, and thus graceful.

PROT. Moſt truly, indeed.

SOC. Now then, O Protarchus, any perſon may be a competent judge between pleaſure and wiſdom to decide, whether of the two is neareſt allied

[1] The one principle of all things, ſays Olympiodorus, preſides over every thing, according to that which he is. Hence, the light proceeding from him is truth, and ſubſiſts as the object of deſire to all things. On this account, too, this light is the *firſt* beauty, the cauſe of things beautiful, bounding every thing in its proper meaſure; and hence it is celebrated as meaſure. Again, the one principle is not a contracted comprehenſion of the three monads, beauty, ſymmetry, and truth: for it is the cauſe of all things. But that which is mixed is the contraction of all things, as the end, and not as the contraction of eſſences; ſo that the one principle may be more juſtly denominated the end of ends. Again, the three monads ſubſiſt arcanely in the firſt principle; unically, and according to one, in bound; multiformly, and as it were according to the parturition of ſeparation, in infinity; but according to the firſt ſeparation, though not perfectly divided, nor yet intellectually, in the third God, who is the cauſe of the mixed, ſo far as it is mixed. Again, *the good* is analogous to truth: for the good to every thing is to be that which it in reality is; but the juſt is analogous to ſymmetry. For this is the meaſure of that which pertains to every thing, in the ſame manner as the commenſurate. Further ſtill, Jamblichus ſays, that the three monads proceeding from *the good* adorn intellect; but it is unmanifeſt what intellect, whether that which ſubſiſts after life, or the paternal intellect which is celebrated in eſſence. Beſides, in the Orphic writings, theſe three monads become apparent in the mythological egg. The followers of Syrianus, however, make a diviſion, and ſurvey truth in the *firſt being*, as being perfectly replete with that which it is, and in no reſpect admitting in itſelf non-being. But they ſurvey beauty in *life*, as being prolific, and rejoicing in progreſſions. For, after that which is perfectly without ſeparation, life introduces a parturition, as it were, of ſeparation. And they contemplate ſymmetry in *intellect*, becauſe in this forms are firſt ſeparated and harmoniouſly coordinated. You may alſo divide them into the principles after the one principle of all things. For you may juſtly aſcribe *truth* to *bound*; *beauty* to *infinity*, through its progreſſion; and *ſymmetry* to *that which is mixed*.

Proclus, in Theol. Plat. p. 140, obſerves, "that Jamblichus appears to him to have bounded the intelligible in theſe three monads, ſymmetry, truth, and beauty; and through theſe to have unfolded the intelligible Gods in the Platonic theology." He adds, "it is alſo apparent why Socrates ſpeaks of this triad as ſubſiſting in the veſtibules of *the good*. (See p. 563). For that which is primarily being, in conſequence of its union with *the good*, participates of this triad. Hence, becauſe *the good* is the meaſure of all things, the firſt being is commenſurate. Becauſe *the good* is prior to being, the firſt being truly ſubſiſts. And becauſe the former is deſirable, the latter ſhines forth as the beautiful itſelf."—T.

to

to the ſupreme good, and of higher value than the other is, both to men and Gods.

PROT. What the deciſion muſt be is clear. However, it is the better way to go through the recital of it in explicit words.

SOC. Each of thoſe three, then, let us compare, ſeverally, with pleaſure, and again with intellect. For we are to ſee and determine whether of theſe two it is that each of thoſe three is moſt congenial to, and to give ſentence accordingly.

PROT. Do you ſpeak of beauty, and truth, and mediocrity?

SOC. I do. Now take, in the firſt place, O Protarchus, truth; and look at all the three together, intellect, truth, and pleaſure: and after you have conſidered them a ſufficient time, ſay whether, in your opinion, intellect, or whether pleaſure, is nearer of kin to truth.

PROT. What need is there of time to conſider of this point? for, I preſume, that very great is the difference between intellect and pleaſure in this reſpect. Of all things in the world, pleaſure is the moſt addicted to lying: and it is ſaid, that in the pleaſures of Venus, which ſeem to be the greateſt, even perjury is pardoned by the Gods; it being ſuppoſed that pleaſures, like children, have not the leaſt intellect in them to know what they ſay. But intellect is either the ſame thing with truth, or it is of all things the moſt like to it, and the trueſt.

SOC. Next, then, conſider mediocrity in the ſame manner[1]; and ſay whether you think that pleaſure poſſeſſes more of it than wiſdom, or that wiſdom poſſeſſes more of it than pleaſure.

PROT. This which you have now propoſed for a ſubject of conſideration is not leſs eaſy than the other. For there cannot, in my opinion, be found any thing more immoderate in its nature than pleaſure and extravagant joy; nor any thing which has more of meaſure in it than intellect and ſcience.

SOC. You have well ſaid. But proceed further now to the third. Do you ſay that intellect partakes of beauty more than any ſpecies of pleaſure partakes of it? and that intellect is more excellent than pleaſure in this reſpect? or that the contrary is true?

[1] Cornarius, and Stephens after him, rightly obſerve, that in the Greek of this ſentence we ought to read ὡσαυτως, and not, as it is printed, ὡς ὀυτως.—S.

PROT.

PROT. Did ever any man then, O Socrates, whether awake or dreaming, ſee or imagine wiſdom and intellect to be in any matter, or in any manner, unhandſome or unbecoming, whether in reflecting on the paſt, or in peceiving the preſent, or in looking forward to the future?

SOC. Right.

PROT. But whenever we ſee any perſon immerſed in pleaſures, in thoſe pleaſures too which are of all perhaps the greateſt,—when we behold what a ridiculous figure the man makes in the very act of enjoying them,—or view what is of all ſpectacles the moſt unſeemly, the conſequence of his enjoyment,—we ourſelves are aſhamed; and all ſuch things, as far as poſſible, we conceal, veiling them with night and darkneſs, as not being fit objects for the light to look on.

SOC. Every where then, O Protarchus, you will declare, ſpeaking yourſelf to all perſons about you, and publiſhing abroad by meſſengers, that the poſſeſſion of pleaſure is neither of ſupreme nor of ſecondary worth: but that whatevever is of all things the moſt excellent and valuable, is to be found in meaſure, in the moderate, and the ſeaſonable, and in all things[1] of that kind, whoſe nature and eſſence we ought to deem eternal.

PROT. Their ſupreme excellence appears from what has been ſaid and proved.

SOC. And that the next in value are ſymmetry and beauty, the perfect and the ſufficient, and whatever elſe is congenial to theſe.

PROT. So it ſeems.

SOC. In the third degree of excellence, if I divine aright, you would not greatly miſtake the truth if you were to place intellect and wiſdom.

PROT. Perhaps I ſhould not.

SOC. And is not the fourth rank due to thoſe things which we aſſigned to the ſoul herſelf, as her own proper goods, ſciences, and arts, and right opinions, a fourth order of goods, following next after the firſt three? ought we

[1] Monſ. Grou has obſerved, very juſtly, that the word εἰρησθαι, in the latter part of this ſentence, is an error in the text: and inſtead of it, he propoſes the word ἠρησθαι. Grynæus, the corrector of Ficinus's tranſlation of Plato, ſeems, in his rendering the Greek word in this place into Latin by the words *ſortita eſſe*, (*to have obtained an allotment of*,) either to have read εἰληχθαι in ſome manuſcript, or elſe to have thus amended the text by a happy conjecture of his own.—S.

not here to place them, if they are more nearly related to the good than they are to pleaſure?

PROT. Perhaps we ought.

SOC. Then follow, fifth in order, the pleaſures of that ſort which we deſcribed to be unmixed with pain, and denominated pure, ſuch as thoſe conſequent to ſenſation, but belonging to the ſoul herſelf when ſhe is engaged in the ſciences [1].

PROT. It may be ſo.

SOC.

With the ſixth race———(ſays Orpheus)
Cloſe we the finiſh'd ſeries of our ſong [2].

Our diſquiſition, too, ſeems to be now finiſhed, and to cloſe with paſſing our ſixth ſentence. After all this, nothing remains for us to do but to affix a head, as it were, to the whole body of our inquiry.

PROT. It is fit that we ſhould.

SOC. Come, then: the third to the ſaviour. Let us commemorate him whoſe aid brought the argument to a concluſion; calling him to witneſs the truth of it.

PROT. Whom do you mean?

SOC. Philebus laid down this poſition: that the good was all and every kind of pleaſure in full abundance.

PROT. By commemorating the ſaviour, it ſeems then, Socrates, you meant that we ſhould reſume the original argument of our inquiry.

SOC. Well: but let us obſerve what followed. I, viewing with diſlike that poſition juſt now mentioned,—the tenet, not of Philebus only, but of

[1] In the Greek of this ſentence, the word επιστημας ought to be either quite expunged, or changed for the word ηδονας, or immediately preceded by the prepoſition περι. The pureſt pleaſures, thoſe of ſcience, are certainly not ſciences themſelves.—S.

[2] This verſe of Orpheus we meet with again in Plutarch's Treatiſe concerning the Delphic Inſcription Ει, and in no other antient author whom we are acquainted with. It is introduced by Plutarch no otherwiſe than as a part of the preſent paſſage in Plato, which is there quoted; and not ſo as to give us any light into the poet's own meaning in that verſe. But if we may form a probable conjecture from Plato's application of it, it was the end of a deſcription of five different ages of the world, with regard to men's manners and ways of life.—S.

thouſands

thouſands beſide in all ages,—on the other hand aſſerted, that intellect was a thing far better and more beneficial to human life than pleaſure.

PROT. That was your poſition.

SOC. But then, ſuſpecting that many other things had pretenſions to the ſame character of being the good, I engaged, if ſomething[1] ſhould appear better than both of thoſe, to combat for the ſecond prize, in behalf of intellect againſt pleaſure; that pleaſure, in her claim to ſo much as this, might be defeated.

PROT. You did engage ſo to do.

SOC. Afterwards, on trial, it was very ſufficiently proved that neither of our favourites anſwered the character of complete good.

PROT. Perfectly true.

SOC. Intellect, therefore, and pleaſure, were, both of them, quite diſmiſſed from having any thing to do in the controverſy concerning good itſelf; as each of them wanted ſelf-ſufficience, and that power which attends the ſufficient and perfect.

PROT. Very right.

SOC. But after we had diſcovered a third thing preferable to either of thoſe two, we found the nature of intellect to approach nearer to the nature of this conqueror, and to be much more familiar with this form than pleaſure.

PROT. We certainly did.

SOC. The ſixth[2] *and loweſt* place, then, according to the judgment now given as the reſult of this inquiry, belongs to the power of pleaſure *unbounded.*

PROT. So it appears.

[1] All the editions of Plato give us to read το inſtead of τι in this ſentence. Ficinus, however, tranſlates as if in the Medicean manuſcript he read τι, which undoubtedly is the true reading; and herein he is followed by all the tranſlators who came after him.—S.

[2] A very groſs error has infected all the editions and all the tranſlations of Plato in this place. For in all the editions we read πεμπτον the *fifth*, inſtead of ἑκτον the *ſixth*. Now the *fifth* rank was before aſſigned ſolely to the *pure* pleaſures. The *ſixth* and laſt rank, therefore, remains to *Pleaſure*, one of the three great ſubjects of this dialogue; to *pleaſure*, pretending to be the only or the chief good of man, and by Philebus avowed and contended for as ſuch; *pleaſure in general* and undiſtinguiſhed; *pleaſure at random*, from whatever quarter it comes;—in Plato's own words, vol. ii, p. 40, edit. Steph. παραπαν, ὁπωσουν, και εικη χαιρειν. But the very next ſentence of Socrates puts it beyond all doubt, that pleaſure of ſenſe, *ſenſual pleaſure*, is here meant.—S.

Soc. But the firſt place belongs to her, as bulls [1] would ſay, and horſes [2], and all beaſts whatever of the ſavage kind: for it appears ſo from the manner in which they purſue pleaſure. And on the credit of theſe animals, juſt as the judgment of diviners depends on the flight of birds, ſentence is pronounced by the multitude, that pleaſures have the greateſt power in making our lives happy. For the loves and joys of brute animals they deem a ſtronger evidence, and fitter to be credited, than the ſayings of men prophetically uttered in all places though inſpiration of the philoſophic muſe.

Prot. That you have ſaid what is moſt agreeable to truth, O Socrates, we are, all of us, now agreed.

Soc. Now then ye will diſmiſs me.

Prot. There is a little, O Socrates, ſtill remaining to be conſidered. For you muſt not quit the company before it breaks up: and I will put you in mind of what you have left unſaid. [3]

[1] In the Greek of this ſentence, we preſume that the word *ουκ* ought to be changed into *ὡς*.—S.

[2] Porphyry, in his Treatiſe *περι αποχης εμψυχων*, lib. iii. ſec. 1. writes thus: *Σωκρατης προς τους ηδονην διαμφισβητουντας ειναι το τελος, ουδ' αν παντες, εφη, συες και τραγοι τουτω συναινοιεν, πεισθησεσθαι αν εν τωη δεσθαι το ευδαιμον ημων κεισθαι, εστ' αν νους εν τοις πασι κρατη.* "To certain perſons who were diſputing on this point,—whether pleaſure was the ultimate end *of man*, Socrates ſaid that, were all the ſwine and goats in the world to join in applauding this man, (*the advocate for pleaſure*) yet he ſhould never be perſuaded that human happineſs conſiſted in being pleaſed, ſo long as mind excelled and prevailed in all things." If Porphyry in this alluded to the very emphatical paſſage in Plato now before us, he ſeems to have improved the force of it not a little; unleſs, in his copy of this dialogue, he read *συες και τραγοι* inſtead of *βοες και ιπωοι*.—S.

[3] This dialogue both begins and ends abruptly. Hence Olympiodorus aſks, why it is without a beginning and an end? And he ſolves this queſtion very properly as follows: "Shall we ſay that this is becauſe *the good* is uncircumſcribed, and has neither beginning nor end? But it may be ſaid, that on the contrary it is neceſſary *the good* ſhould have a beginning and end; a beginning of ſuch a kind, that there is not another beginning prior to it, and an end beyond which there is not any other end. Perhaps therefore, it is better to ſay with our preceptor, that the mixt life has an end, and ſuch a one as is adapted to all animals. So that the dialogue is very properly without a beginning, for the purpoſe of indicating that there is a certain good beyond that which it inveſtigates. And again, for the ſame reaſon, it is without an end: for there is alſo another end more antient than its end."

THE END OF THE PHILEBUS.

THE

THE

SECOND ALCIBIADES:

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

PRAYER.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE SECOND ALCIBIADES.

THE Second Alcibiades, which in the ſuppoſed time of it is ſubſequent to the firſt of the ſame name, is on a ſubject which ranks among the moſt important to a rational being; for with it is connected piety, which is the ſummit of virtue. Hence, as all nations in the infinity of time paſt have believed in the exiſtence of certain divine powers ſuperior to man, who beneficently provide for all inferior natures, and defend them from evil; ſo likewiſe they worſhipped theſe powers by numerous religious rites, of which prayer formed no inconſiderable part. The exceptions, indeed, to this general belief of mankind are ſo few that they do not deſerve to be noticed. For we may ſay, with the elegant Maximus Tyrius [1], that, "if through the whole of time there have been two or three atheiſts, they were govelling and inſenſate men, whoſe eyes wandered, whoſe ears were deceived, whoſe ſouls were mutilated, a race irrational, barren, and uſeleſs, reſembling a timid lion, an ox without horns, a bird without wings." All others, as well thoſe engaged in public affairs, as philoſophers who explored the hidden cauſes of things, moſt conſtantly believed that there were Gods, viz. one firſt ineffable ſource of all things, and a multitude of divine powers proceeding from, and united with, him; and always endeavoured to render theſe divine natures propitious, by ſacrifice and prayer. Hence, the Chaldæans among the Aſſyrians, the Brahmins among the Indians, the Druids among the Gauls, the Magi among the

[1] In his Diſſertation "What God is according to Plato." See Reiſke's edition, p. 317.

Perſians,

Perſians, and the tribe of prieſts among the Egyptians, conſtantly applied themſelves to the worſhip of Divinity, and venerated and adored the Gods by various ſacred ceremonies, and ardent and aſſiduous prayers.

As the leading deſign, therefore, of the following dialogue is to ſhow the great importance of prayer, I perſuade myſelf, that I cannot do any thing more illuſtrative of this deſign, or more beneficial to the reader, than to preſent him with the divinely luminous conceptions of Porphyry, Jamblichus, Proclus, and Hierocles on prayer, together with what the pſeudo Dionyſius has ſtolen from the Platonic philoſophers on this ſubject. As theſe obſervations never yet appeared in any modern language, and as they are not to be equalled in any other writer for their profundity and ſublimity, I truſt no apology will be requiſite for their length. Previous to their inſertion, therefore, I ſhall only give the following definition of prayer, viz. that it is a certain force ſupernally imparted to the ſoul, elevating and conjoining her to Divinity, and which always unites in a becoming manner ſecondary with primary natures.

Porphyry then obſerves[1], that prayer eſpecially pertains to worthy men, becauſe it is a conjunction with a divine nature. But the ſimilar loves to be united to the ſimilar. And a worthy man is moſt ſimilar to the Gods. Since thoſe alſo that cultivate virtue are encloſed in body as in a priſon, they ought to pray to the Gods that they may depart from hence. Beſides, as we are like children torn from our parents, it is proper to pray that we may return to the Gods, as to our true parents: and becauſe thoſe that do not think it requiſite to pray, and convert themſelves to more excellent natures, are like thoſe that are deprived of their fathers and mothers. To which we may add, that as we are a part of the univerſe, it is fit that we ſhould be in want of it: for a converſion to the whole imparts ſafety to every thing. Whether, therefore, you poſſeſs virtue, it is proper that you ſhould invoke that which cauſally comprehends[2] the whole of virtue. For that which is all-good will alſo be the cauſe to you of that good which it is proper for you to poſſeſs.

[1] Vide Procl. in Tim. p. 64.—T.

[2] The word uſed by Porphyry here is προειληφος, which always ſignifies in Platonic writings *cauſal comprehenſion*; or the occult and indiſtinct prior to the actual and ſeparate ſubſiſtence of things. After this manner numbers ſubſiſt cauſally in the monad.—T.

Or whether you explore ſome corporeal good, there is a power in the world which connectedly contains every body. It is neceſſary, therefore, that the perfect ſhould thence be derived to the parts of the univerſe. Thus far Porphyry, who was not without reaſon celebrated by poſterior philoſophers for his ἱεροπρεπη νοημματα, or conceptions adapted to ſacred concerns.

Let us now attend to Jamblichus [1], whom every genuine Platoniſt will acknowledge to have been juſtly ſurnamed *the divine*.

As prayers, through which ſacred rites receive their perfect conſummation and vigour, conſtitute a great part of ſacrifice, and as they are of general utility to religion, and produce an indiſſoluble communion between the Divinities and their prieſts, it is neceſſary that we ſhould mention a few things concerning their various ſpecies and wonderful effects. For prayer is of itſelf a thing worthy to be known, and gives greater perfection to the ſcience concerning the Gods. I ſay, therefore, that the *firſt* ſpecies of prayer is *collective*, producing a contact with Divinity, and ſubſiſting as the leader and light of knowledge. But the *ſecond* is the *bond of conſent and communion with the Gods*, exciting them to a copious communication of their benefits prior to the energy of ſpeech, and perfecting the whole of our operations previous to our intellectual conceptions. But the *third* and moſt perfect ſpecies of prayer is *the ſeal of ineffable union with the Divinities*, in whom it eſtabliſhes all the power and authority of prayer: and thus cauſes the ſoul to repoſe in the Gods, as in a divine and never-failing port. But from theſe three terms, in which all the divine meaſures are contained, ſuppliant adoration not only conciliates to us the friendſhip of the Gods, but ſupernally extends to us three fruits, being, as it were, three Heſperian apples of gold [2]. The *firſt* pertains to *illumination*; the ſecond, to *a communion of operation*; but through the energy of the *third* we receive *a perfect plenitude of divine fire*. And ſometimes, indeed, ſupplication *precedes*; like a forerunner, preparing the way before the ſacrifice appears. But ſometimes it *intercedes as a mediator*: and ſometimes *accompliſhes the end of ſacrificing*. No operation, however, in ſacred concerns can ſucceeed without the intervention of prayer. Laſtly,

[1] De Myſt. ſec. 5, cap. 26.—T.

[2] This particular reſpecting the *apples of gold* is added from the verſion of Scutellius, who appears to have made his tranſlation of Jamblichus from a more perfect manuſcript than that which was uſed by Gale.—T.

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the continual exercise of prayer nourishes the vigour of our intellect, and renders the receptacles of the soul far more capacious for the communications of the Gods. It likewise is the *divine key* which unfolds to men the penetralia of the Gods; accustoms us to the splendid rivers of supernal light; in a short time perfects our inmost recesses, and disposes them for the ineffable embrace and contact of the Gods; and does not desist till it raises us to the summit of all. It likewise gradually and silently draws upwards the manners of our soul, by divesting them of every thing foreign from a divine nature, and clothes us with the perfections of the Gods. Besides this, it produces an indissoluble communion and friendship with Divinity, nourishes a divine love, and enflames the divine part of the soul. Whatever is of an opposing and contrary nature in the soul it expiates and purifies; expels whatever is prone to generation, and retains any thing of the dregs of mortality in its ethereal and splendid spirit; perfects a good hope and faith concerning the reception of divine light; and in one word, renders those by whom it is employed the familiars and domestics of the Gods. If such, then, are the advantages of prayer, and such its connection with sacrifice, does it not appear from hence, that the end of sacrifice is a conjunction with the demiurgus of the world? And the benefit of prayer is of the same extent with the good which is conferred by the demiurgic causes on the race of mortals. Again, from hence the *anagogic*, *perfective*, and *replenishing* power of prayer appears; likewise how it becomes efficacious and unific, and how it possesses a common bond imparted by the Gods. And in the third and last place, it may easily be conceived from hence how prayer and sacrifice mutually corroborate, and confer on each other a sacred and perfect power in divine concerns.

The following translation (from p. 64) of Proclus on the Timæus, containing the doctrine of Jamblichus on prayer, with the elucidations of Proclus, may be considered as an excellent commentary on the preceding observations.

All beings are the progeny of the Gods, by whom they are produced without a medium, and in whom they are firmly established. For the progression of things which perpetually subsist and cohere from permanent causes, is not alone perfected by a certain continuation, but immediately subsists from the Gods, from whence all things are generated, however distant they may be from the Divinities: and this is no less true, even though asserted of matter itself.

itſelf. For a divine nature is not abſent from any thing, but is equally preſent to all things. Hence, though you conſider the laſt of beings, in theſe alſo you will find Divinity: for *the one* is every where; and in conſequence of its abſolute dominion, every thing receives its nature and coherence from the Gods. But as all things proceed, ſo likewiſe they are not ſeparated from the Gods, but radically abide in them, as the cauſes and ſuſtainers of their exiſtence: for where can they recede, ſince the Gods primarily comprehend all things in their embrace? For whatever is placed as ſeparate from the Gods has not any kind of ſubſiſtence. But all beings are contained by the Gods, and reſide in their natures after the manner of a circular comprehenſion. Hence, by a wonderful mode of ſubſiſtence, all things proceed, and yet are not, nor indeed can be, ſeparated from the Gods; (for all generated natures, when torn from their parents, immediately recur to the wide-ſpreading immenſity of non-being,) but they are after a manner eſtabliſhed in the divine natures: and, in fine, they proceed in themſelves, but abide in the Gods. But ſince in conſequence of their progreſſion it is requiſite that they ſhould be converted, and return, and imitate the egreſs and converſion of the Gods to their ineffable cauſe, that the natures, thus diſpoſed, may again be contained by the Gods, and the firſt unities, according to a *teleſiurgic*, or perfective triad, they receive from hence a certain ſecondary perfection, by which they may be able to convert themſelves to the goodneſs of the Gods; that after they have rooted their principle in the Divinities, they may again, by converſion, abide in them, and form as it were a circle, which originates from, and terminates in, the Gods. All things, therefore, both abide in, and convert themſelves to, the Gods; receiving this power from the Divinities, together with twofold ſymbols according to eſſence: the one, that they may abide there; but the other, that having proceeded, they may convert themſelves: and this we may eaſily contemplate, not only in ſouls, but alſo in inanimate natures. For what elſe ingenerates in theſe a ſympathy with other powers but the ſymbols which they are allotted by nature, ſome of which contract a familiarity with *this* and ſome with *that* ſeries of Gods? For nature ſupernally depending from the Gods, and being diſtributed from their orders, impreſſes alſo in bodies the ſymbols of her familiarity with the Divinities. In ſome, indeed, inſerting ſolar ſymbols, but in others lunar, and in others again the occult characters of ſome other God. And theſe, indeed,

convert themſelves to the Divinities: ſome as it were to the Gods ſimply, but others as to paticular Gods; nature thus perfecting her progeny according to different peculiarities of the Gods. The Demiurgus of the univerſe, therefore, by a much greater priority, impreſſed theſe ſymbols in ſouls, by which they might be able to abide in themſelves, and again convert themſelves to the ſources of their being: through the ſymbol of unity, conferring on them ſtability; but through intellect affording them the power of converſion.

And to this converſion prayer is of the greateſt utility: for it conciliates the beneficence of the Gods through thoſe ineffable ſymbols which the father of the univerſe has diſſeminated in ſouls. It likewiſe unites thoſe who pray with thoſe to whom prayer is addreſſed; copulates the intellect of the Gods with the diſcourſes of thoſe who pray; excites the will of thoſe who perfectly comprehend good, and produces in us a firm perſuaſion, that they will abundantly impart to us the beneficence which they contain: and laſtly, it eſtabliſhes in the Gods whatever we poſſeſs.

But to a perfect and true prayer there is required, firſt, a knowledge of all the divine orders to which he who prays approaches: for neither will any one accede in a proper manner, unleſs he intimately beholds their diſtinguiſhing properties: and hence it is that the Oracle[1] admoniſhes, "*that a fiery intellection obtains the firſt order in ſacred veneration.*" But afterwards there is required a conformation of our life with that which is divine; and this accompanied with all *purity*, *chaſtity*, *diſcipline*, and *order*. For thus while we preſent ourſelves to the Gods, they will be provoked to beneficence; and our ſouls will be ſubjected to theirs, and will participate the excellences of a divine nature. In the third place, a certain contact is neceſſary, from whence, with the more exalted part of the ſoul, we touch the divine eſſence, and verge to a union with its ineffable nature. But there is yet further required an acceſſion and inheſion, (for thus the Oracle calls it, while it ſays, "*the mortal adhering to fire will poſſeſs a divine light,*") from whence we receive a greater and more illuſtrious part of the light proceeding from the Gods. In the laſt place, a union ſucceeds with the unity of the Gods, reſtoring and eſtabliſhing unity to the ſoul, and cauſing our energy to become

[1] Viz. one of the Chaldæan Oracles.—T.

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one with divine energy: ſo that in this caſe, we are no longer ourſelves, but are abſorbed, as it were, in the nature of the Gods; and reſiding in divine light, are entirely ſurrounded with its ſplendour. And this is, indeed, the beſt end of prayer, the conjunction of the ſoul's converſion with its permanency; eſtabliſhing in unity whatever proceeds from the divine unities; and ſurrounding our light with the light of the Gods.

Prayer, therefore, is of no ſmall aſſiſtance to our ſouls in aſcending to their native region: nor is he who poſſeſſes virtue ſuperior to the want of that good which proceeds from prayer, but the very contrary takes place; ſince prayer is not only the cauſe of our aſcent and reverſion, but with it is connected piety to the Gods, that is, the very ſummit of virtue. Nor, indeed, ought any other to pray than he who excels in goodneſs: (as the Athenian gueſt in Plato admoniſhes us,) for to ſuch a one, while enjoying by the exerciſe of prayer familiarity with the Gods, an efficacious and eaſy way is prepared for the enjoyment of a bleſſed life. But the contrary ſucceeds to the vicious: ſince it is not lawful for purity to be touched by impurity. It is neceſſary, therefore, that he who generouſly enters on the exerciſe of prayer ſhould render the Gods propitious to him; and ſhould excite in himſelf divine conceptions, full of intellectual light: for the favour and benignity of more exalted beings is the moſt effectual incentive to their communication with our natures. And it is requiſite, without intermiſſion, to dwell in the veneration of Divinity: for, according to the poet, "*the Gods are accuſtomed to be preſent with the mortal conſtantly employed in prayer.*" It is likewiſe neceſſary to preſerve a ſtable order of divine works, and to produce thoſe virtues which purify the ſoul from the ſtains of generation, and elevate her to the regions of intellect, together with *faith*, *truth*, and *love*: to preſerve this triad and hope of good, this immutable perception of divine light, and ſeggragation from every other purſuit; that thus ſolitary, and free from material concerns, we may become united with the ſolitary unities of the Gods: ſince he who attempts by multitude to unite himſelf with unity, acts prepoſterouſly, and diſſociates himſelf from Divinity. For as it is not lawful for any one to conjoin himſelf by that which is not, with that which is; ſo neither is it poſſible with multitude to be conjoined with unity. Such, then, are the conſequences primarily apparent in prayer, viz. that its eſſence is the cauſe of aſſociating our ſouls with the Gods; and that on this account it unites and

copulates all inferior with all ſuperior beings. For, as the great *Theodorus*[1] ſays, *all things pray, except the FIRST.*

But the perfection of prayer, beginning from more common goods, ends in divine conjunction, and gradually accuſtoms the ſoul to divine light. And its efficacious and vigorous energy both repleniſhes us with good, and cauſes our concerns to be common with thoſe of the Gods. We may alſo rationally ſuppoſe that the cauſes of prayer, ſo far as they are *effective*, are the vigorous and efficacious powers of the Gods, converting and calling upwards the ſoul to the Gods themſelves. But that, ſo far as they are *perfective*, they are the immaculate goods of the ſoul, from the reception of which, ſouls are eſtabliſhed in the Gods. And again, that ſo far as they are *paradigmatical*, they are the primary fabricating cauſes of beings; proceeding from *the good*, and conjoined with it by an ineffable union. But that ſo far as they are *formal*, or poſſeſs the proportion of forms, they render ſouls ſimilar to the Gods, and give perfection to the whole life of the ſoul. Laſtly, ſo far as they are *material*, or retain the proportion of matter, they are the marks or ſymbols conferred by the Demiurgus on the eſſences of ſouls, that they may be wakened to a reminiſcence of the Gods who produced both them and whatever elſe exiſts.

But we may alſo deſcribe the modes of prayer, which are various, according to the genera and ſpecies of the Gods. For of prayers, ſome are *fabricative*; others of *a purifying nature*; and others, laſtly, are *vivific*. I call thoſe *fabricative* which are offered for the ſake of ſhowers and winds. For the fabricative Gods (δημιουργοι) are alſo the cauſes of theſe: on which account, it is cuſtomary with the Athenians to pray to ſuch Divinities for the ſake of obtaining winds procuring ſerenity of weather. But I call thoſe prayers of *a purifying nature*, which are inſtituted for the purpoſe of averting diſeaſes originating from peſtilence, and other contagious diſtempers: ſuch as are written in our temples. And laſtly, thoſe prayers are *vivific* with which we venerate the Gods who are the cauſes of vivification, on account of the origin and maturity of fruits. Hence it is that prayers are of a perfective nature, becauſe they elevate us to theſe divine orders: and thoſe who conſider ſuch prayers in a different manner, do not properly apprehend in what their na-

[1] Viz. Theodorus Aſinæus, a diſciple of Porphyry.—T.

ture

ture and efficacy conſiſt. But again, with reſpect to the things for which we pray, thoſe which regard the *ſafety of the ſoul* obtain the firſt place; thoſe which pertain to *the proper diſpoſition and ſtrength of the body*, the ſecond; and thoſe claim the laſt place which pertain to *external concerns*. And laſtly, with reſpect to the diſtribution of the times in which we offer up prayers, it is either according to the ſeaſons of the year, or the centres of the ſolar revolution; or we eſtabliſh multiform prayers according to other ſuch-like conceptions.

With the above admirable paſſages the following extract from Jamblichus de Myſt. ſec. 1. cap. 12. may be very properly conjoined. Its deſign is to ſhow, that the Gods are not agitated by paſſions, though they appear to be moved through the influence of prayer.

Prayers are not to be directed to the Gods, as if they were paſſive, and could be moved by ſupplications: for the divine irradiation which takes place through the exerciſe of prayer, operates ſpontaneouſly, and is far remote from all material attraction; ſince it becomes apparent through divine energy and perfection; and as much excels the voluntary motion of our nature, as the divine will of *the good* ſurpaſſes our election. Through this volition, the Gods, who are perfectly benevolent and merciful, pour their light without any parſimony on the ſupplicating prieſts, whoſe ſouls they call upwards to their own divine natures; impart to them a union with themſelves, and accuſtom their ſouls, even while bound in body, to ſeparate themſelves from its dark embrace, and to be led back by an ineffable energy to their eternal and intelligible original. Indeed it is evident that the ſafety of the ſoul depends on ſuch divine operations. For while the ſoul contemplates divine viſions, it acquires another life, employs a different energy, and may be conſidered, with the greateſt propriety, as no longer ranking in the order of man. For it often lays aſide its own proper life, and changes it for the moſt bleſſed energy of the Gods. But if an aſcent to the Gods, through the miniſtry of prayer, confers on the prieſts purity from paſſion, freedom from the bonds of generation, and a union with a divine principle, how can there be any thing paſſive in the efficacy of prayer? For invocation does not draw down the pure and impaſſive Gods to us who are paſſive and impure; but, on the contrary, renders us who are become through generation impure and paſſive, immutable and pure.

But

But neither do invocations conjoin, through paſſion, the prieſts with the Divinities, but afford an indiſſoluble communion of connection, through that friendſhip which binds all things in union and conſent. Nor do invocations incline the intellect of the Gods towards men, as the term ſeems to imply; but, according to the deciſions of truth, they render the will of men properly diſpoſed to receive the participations of the Gods; leading it upwards, and connecting it with the Divinities by the ſweeteſt and moſt alluring perſuaſion. And on this account the ſacred names of the Gods, and other divine ſymbols, from their anagogic nature, are able to connect invocations with the Gods themſelves.

And in chap. 15 of the ſame ſection, he again admirably diſcourſes on the ſame ſubject as follows:

That which in our nature is divine, intellectual, and one, or (as you may be willing to call it) intelligible, is perfectly excited by prayer from its dormant ſtate; and when excited, vehemently ſeeks that which is ſimilar to itſelf, and becomes copulated to its own perfection. But if it ſhould ſeem incredible that incorporeal natures can be capable of hearing ſounds, and it is urged, that for this purpoſe the ſenſe of hearing is requiſite, that they may underſtand our ſupplications; ſuch objectors are unacquainted with the excellency of primary cauſes, which conſiſts in both knowing and comprehending in themſelves at once the univerſality of things. The Gods, therefore, do not receive prayers in themſelves through any corporeal powers or organs, but rather contain in themſelves the effects of pious invocations; and eſpecially of ſuch as through ſacred cultivation are conſecrated and united to the Gods: for, in this caſe, a divine nature is evidently preſent with itſelf, and does not apprehend the conceptions of prayers as different from its own. Nor are ſupplications to be conſidered as foreign from the purity of intellect: but ſince the Gods excel us both in power, purity, and all other advantages, we ſhall act in the moſt opportune manner, by invoking them with the moſt vehement ſupplications. For a conſciouſneſs of our own nothingneſs, when we compare ourſelves with the Gods, naturally leads us to the exerciſe of prayer. But through the benefits reſulting from ſupplication we are in a ſhort time brought back to the object of ſupplication; acquire its ſimilitude from intimate converſe; and gradually obtain divine perfection, inſtead of our own imbecility and imperfection.

Indeed he who conſiders, that ſacred prayers are ſent to men from the Gods themſelves; that they are certain ſymbols of the divine natures; and that they are only known to the Gods, with whom in a certain reſpect they poſſeſs an equal power; I ſay, he who conſiders all this, cannot any longer believe that ſupplications are of a ſenſible nature, and that they are not very juſtly eſteemed intellectual and divine: and muſt acknowledge it to be impoſſible that any paſſion ſhould belong to things the purity of which the moſt worthy manners of men cannot eaſily equal.

Nor ought we to be diſturbed by the objection which urges, that material things are frequently offered in ſupplications; and this as if the Gods poſſeſſed a ſenſitive and animal nature. For, indeed, if the offerings conſiſted ſolely of corporeal and compoſite powers, and ſuch as are only accommodated to organical purpoſes, the objection would have ſome weight: but ſince they participate of incorporeal forms, certain proportions, and more ſimple meaſures; in this alone the correſpondence and connection of offerings with the Gods ought to be regarded. For, whenever any affinity or ſimilitude is preſent, whether greater or leſs, it is ſufficient to the connection of which we are now diſcourſing: ſince there is nothing which approaches to a kindred alliance with the Gods, though in the ſmalleſt degree, to which the Gods are not immediately preſent and united. A connection, therefore, as much as is poſſible, ſubſiſts between prayers and the Gods: at the ſame time prayers do not regard the Divinities as if they were of a ſenſitive or animal nature; but they conſider them as they are in reality, and according to the divine forms which their eſſences contain.

In the third place, let us attend to the admirable obſervations on prayer of Hierocles, who, though inferior in accuracy and ſublimity of conception to Jamblichus and Proclus, yet, as Damaſcius well obſerves, (in his Life of Iſidorus apud Phot.) he uncommonly excelled in his dianoëtic part, and in a venerable and magnificent fluency of diction. The following is a tranſlation of his Comment on the Pythagoric verſe:

———Αλλ' ερχευ επ' εργον
Θεοισιν επευξαμενος τελεσαι.

i. e. "Betake yourſelf to the work, having implored the Gods to bring it to perfection."

The verſe briefly deſcribes all that contributes to the acquiſition of good, viz.

viz. the ſelf-moved nature of the ſoul, and the co-operation of Divinity. For, though the election of things beautiful[1] is in our power, yet, as we poſſeſs our freedom of the will from Divinity, we are perfectly indigent of his co-operating with and perfecting the things which we have choſen. For our endeavour appears to be ſimilar to a hand extended to the reception of things beautiful; but that which is imparted by Divinity is the ſupplier and the fountain of the gift of good. And the former, indeed, is naturally adapted to diſcover things beautiful; but the latter to unfold them to him by whom they are rightly explored. But prayer is the medium between two boundaries, viz. between inveſtigation by us, and that which is imparted by Divinity, properly adhering to the cauſe which leads us into exiſtence, and perfects us in well-being. For how can any one receive well-being unleſs Divinity imparts it? And how can Divinity, who is naturally adapted to give, give to him who does not aſk, though his impulſes ariſe from the freedom of his will? That we may not, therefore, pray only in words, but may alſo corroborate this by deeds; and that we may not confide only in our own energy, but may alſo beſeech Divinity to co-operate with our deeds, and may conjoin prayer to action, as form to matter; and, in ſhort, that we may pray for what we do, and do that for which we pray, the verſe conjoining theſe two, ſays, "Betake yourſelf to the work, having implored the Gods to bring it to perfection." For neither is it proper alone to engage with alacrity in beautiful actions, as if it were in our power to perform them with rectitude, without the co-operation of Divinity; nor yet ſhould we be ſatisfied with the words of mere prayer while we contribute nothing to the acquiſition of the things which we requeſt. For thus we ſhall either purſue atheiſtical virtue (if I may be allowed ſo to ſpeak) or unenergetic prayer; of which the former, being deprived of Divinity, takes away the eſſence of virtue; and the latter, being ſluggiſh, diſſolves the efficacy of prayer. For how can any thing be beautiful which is not performed according to the divine rule? And how is it poſſible that what is done according to this ſhould not entirely require the co-operation of Divinity to its ſubſiſtence? For virtue is the image of Divinity in the rational ſoul; but every image requires its paradigm, in order to its generation, nor is that which it poſſeſſes ſufficient, unleſs it looks

[1] By things beautiful, with Platonic writers, every thing excellent and good is included.—T.

to

to that from the ſimilitude to which it poſſeſſes the beautiful. It is proper, therefore, that thoſe ſhould pray who haſten to energetic virtue, and having prayed, that they ſhould endeavour to poſſeſs it. It is likewiſe requiſite that they ſhould do this, looking to that which is divine and ſplendid, and ſhould extend themſelves to philoſophy, adhering at the ſame time in a becoming manner to the firſt cauſe of good. For that tetractys [1], the fountain of perennial nature, is not only the eternal cauſe of being to all things, but likewiſe of well-being, expanding proper good through the whole world, like undecaying and intellectual light. But the ſoul, when ſhe properly adheres to this light, and purifies herſelf like an eye to acutneſs of viſion, by an attention to things beautiful, is excited to prayer; and again, from the plenitude of prayer ſhe extends her endeavours, conjoining actions to words, and by divine conferences giving ſtability to worthy deeds. And diſcovering ſome things, and being illuminated in others, ſhe endeavours to effect what ſhe prays for, and prays for that which ſhe endeavours to effect. And ſuch indeed is the union of endeavour and prayer.

In the laſt place, the pſeudo Dionyſius has decorated his book On the Divine Names with the following admirable obſervations on prayer, ſtolen [2] from writers incomparably more ſublime than any of the age in which he pretended to have lived.

Divinity is preſent to all things, but all things are not preſent to him; but when we invoke him with all-ſacred prayers, an unclouded intellect, and an aptitude to divine union, then we alſo are preſent to him. For he is neither in place, that he may be abſent from any thing, nor does he paſs from one thing to another. But, indeed, to aſſert that he is in all things, falls far ſhort of that infinity which is above, and which comprehends, all things. Let us therefore extend ourſelves by prayer to the more ſublime intuition of his

[1] This *tetractys*, which is the ſame as the *planes* of Orpheus, and the *αυτοζωον*, or *animal itſelf*, of Plato, firſt ſubſiſts at the extremity of the intelligible order, and is thence participated by Jupiter, the fabricator of the univerſe. See the Introduction to the Timæus.—T.

[2] Fabricius, in the 4th vol. of his Bibliotheca Græca, has inconteſtably proved that this Dionyſius lived ſeveral hundred years after the time of St. Paul; and obſerves, that his works are, doubtleſs, compoſed from Platonic writings. In confirmation of this remark, it is neceſſary to inform the learned reader, that the long diſcourſe on Evil in the treatiſe of Dionyſius, *περι θειων ονοματων*, appears to have been taken almoſt verbatim from one of the loſt writings of Proclus On the Subſiſtence of Evil, as will be at once evident by comparing it with the Excerpta from that work, preſerved by Fabricius in Biblioth. Græc. tom. viii. p. 502.—T.

divine and beneficent rays. Juſt as if a chain, conſiſting of numerous lamps, were ſuſpended from the ſummit of heaven, and extended to the earth. For if we aſcended this chain, by always alternately ſtretching forth our hands, we ſhould appear indeed to ourſelves to drawn down the chain, though we ſhould not in reality, it being preſent upwards and downwards, but we ſhould elevate ourſelves to the more ſublime ſplendours of the abundantly-luminous rays. Or, as if we aſcended into a ſhip, and held by the ropes[1] extended to us from a certain rock, and which were given to us for our aſſiſtance; we ſhould not in this caſe draw the rock to us, but we in reality ſhould move both ourſelves and the ſhip to the rock. Juſt as, on the contrary, if any one ſtanding in a ſhip puſhes againſt a rock fixed in the ſea, he indeed effects nothing in the firm and immovable rock, but cauſes himſelf to recede from it: and by how much the more he puſhes againſt, by ſo much the more is he repelled from the rock. Hence, prior to every undertaking, and eſpecially that which is theological, it is neceſſary to begin from prayer, not as if drawing down that power which is every where preſent, and is at the ſame time no where, but as committing and uniting ourſelves to it by divine recollections and invocations.

I ſhall only add, that the antients appear very properly to have placed this dialogue in the claſs which they called *maieutic:* and, as Mr. Sydenham juſtly obſerves, "the outward form of it, from the beginning to the end, is *dramatic*; the *cataſtrophe* being a change of mind in Alcibiades, who reſolves to follow the advice of Socrates, by forbearing to ſpecify, in his addreſſes to Divinity, his wants and his wiſhes, till he ſhall have attained to a ſenſe of his real indigence through the knowledge of his real good, the only right and proper object of prayer."

[1] This part is ſtolen from the Commentaries of Simplicius on Epictetus, as is evident from the following extract: Ταυτην την ημων επιστροφην προς αυτον (θεον) ως αυτου προς ημας λεγομεν· τοιουτον τι παθχοντες, οιον οι πετρας τινος παραλιας καλων εξαψαντες, και τω εκεινον επισπασθαι εαυτους τε και το ακατιον τη πετρα προσαγοντες· και δι' απειριαν του γινομενου δοκουντες ουκ αυτοι προσιεναι τη πετρα, αλλα την πετραν κατ' ολιγον επ' αυτους ιεναι· μεταμελειαι δε, και ικετειαι, και ευχαι, και τα τοιαυτα, αναλογουσι τω καλω. p. 223, 8vo i. e. "We ſpeak of this our converſion to Divinity, as if it was a converſion of him to us; being affected in ſomewhat the ſame manner as thoſe who, faſtening a rope to a certain rock in the ſea, and drawing both themſelves and the boat to the rock by pulling it, appear, through their ignorance of this circumſtance, not to approach themſelves to the rock, but think that the rock gradually approaches to them. For repentance, ſupplication, prayer, and things of this kind, are analogous to the rope."

THE

THE SECOND ALCIBIADES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.

SCENE.—The Way to the TEMPLE of JUPITER[1].

SOCRATES.

ALCIBIADES! are you going to the temple to make your petitions to the God?

ALC. Your conjecture is perfectly right, Socrates.

[1] At Athens were two edifices, built in honour of Jupiter. One of theſe was a moſt magnificent temple, called the Olympium, and ſituate in the lower city. The other was only a chapel in the upper city, ſacred to Ζευς ὁ σωτηρ, *Jupiter the* [univerſal] *ſaviour*, and adjoining to another chapel, ſacred to Αθηνα ἡ σωτειρα, *Minerva the ſaviour* [of Athens]. Both theſe chapels ſtood at the entrance of the treaſury; one probably on each ſide, as guardians of the public money: and this treaſury ſtood at the back of that beautiful temple of Minerva, called the Parthenon. Now had Socrates met Alcibiades in the aſcent, which led firſt to the Parthenon, and thence to the chapels behind it, no reaſon appears for his ſuppoſing that Alcibiades was going to pay his devotions to Jupiter, rather than to Minerva, the guardian Deity of Athens. But the maſculine article τον, uſed in this place by Plato before the noun θεον, forbids us to imagine that Minerva could be here meant. For at Athens, as Minerva was ſtyled ἡ θεος, *the Goddeſs*, by way of eminence, ſo Jupiter was ſtyled either ſimply θεος, *God*, or ὁ θεος, *the God*, as being Supreme. Beſide this, we are to obſerve, that in the chapel of Jupiter in the upper city, he was worſhipped in a particular character, as the preſerver of his votaries in dangers from which they had eſcaped; as not only is to be preſumed from the title of Saviour, by which he was there invoked, but alſo is clearly proved from the Plutus of Ariſtophanes, act. 5, ſc. 2, and from the oration of Lycurgus againſt Leocrates, p. 168 and 253, edit. Taylor. Now there is not the leaſt appearance that Alcibiades had had any ſignal deliverance from danger, or that he was now going to offer a thankſgiving ſacrifice, as it was cuſtomary to do on ſuch occaſions. From all this we juſtly may conclude, that the ſcene of this dialogue lies in a ſtreet leading to the temple of Olympian Jupiter in the lower city.—S.

Soc. Indeed your countenance appears cloſe and cloudy; and your eyes are turned toward the ground, as if you were wrapped in ſome profound thought [1].

Alc. What profound thoughts could a man have at ſuch a time, Socrates?

Soc. Thoughts, Alcibiades, ſuch as ſeem to me of the higheſt importance. For tell me, in the name of Jupiter, do you not think, when we happen, whether in private or in public, to be making our petitions to the Gods, that ſometimes they grant a part of thoſe petitions, and reject the reſt; and that to ſome of their petitioners they hearken, but are deaf to others?

Alc. No doubt of it.

Soc. Do you not think, then, that much previous conſideration is requiſite to prevent a man from praying unwittingly for things which are very evil, but which he imagines very good; if the Gods at that time when he is praying to them ſhould happen to be diſpoſed to grant whatever prayers he happens to make? As Œdipus, they ſay, inconſiderately [2] prayed the Gods that his ſons might divide their patrimony between them by the ſword [3]. Inſtead, therefore,

[1] The firſt ſymbolical precept which the Pythagorean philoſophers gave to their diſciples was this: "When you go from your houſe with intention to perform your devotions at the temple, neither ſpeak nor do any thing in the way thither concerning any buſineſs of human life"—A precept recorded, among others of like kind, by Jamblichus, in the laſt of his λογοι προτρεπτικοι, and rightly there interpreted, p. 134, to this purport:—that a man ought to purify his mind, by abſtracting it from earthly cares, and from all objects of ſenſe, whenever he contemplates divine things; becauſe theſe are abſtracted or pure from matter themſelves; and pure naturally joins and unites with homogeneous pure. Further, divine things being ſtable, and always the ſame, but human things unſtable, and for ever changing; they are in this reſpect alſo heterogeneous, and, as the ſame great Platoniſt elſewhere elegantly ſpeaks, incommenſurable, the one ſort of things with the other; ſo that they mix not amicably together in the mind.—S.

[2] This ſentence is evidently meant to prove the neceſſity of much conſideration before a man prays; by ſhowing, from the example of Œdipus, the miſchiefs often conſequent to raſh and unpremeditated prayer. An oppoſition, therefore, ſeems intended between the αυτικα in this paſſage, and the προμηθια, *premeditation*, or *previous conſideration*, above recommended. Accordingly, we have ventured, againſt the opinion of Erneſtus, in his Notes to Xenophon's Memorab. lib. iv. cap. 7, to give this *oppoſed meaning* here to the word αυτικα, by rendering it in Engliſh *inconſiderately*; a meaning very little different from the primary and uſual ſenſe of the word, in which it ſignifies the ſame with παραυτικα, that is, *immediately*, *directly*, *without delay*.—S.

[3] The ſame relation of this curſe is given by Euripides, in Phœniſſæ, ver. 68; by Sophocles, in Œdipus Colon. ver. 1437, 1447, et ſeq. (where Œdipus himſelf reiterates the curſe:) and by the Scholiaſt on Æſchylus, in Septem apud Thebas, ver. 613, 713, 729, and 853.—S.

therefore, of praying for his family, as he might have done, that the evils which it then ſuffered might be averted, he curſed it by praying [1] that more might be ſuperadded. The event of which curſe was this, that not only what he prayed for was accompliſhed, but from that accompliſhment followed other evils, many and terrible, which there is no need to enumerate [2].

ALC. But, Socrates, you have now ſpoken of a man who was inſane, for who, think you, in his ſound mind would venture to make ſuch ſort of prayers?

SOC. Whether is it your opinion, that to be inſane is to be in a ſtate of mind contrary to that which is ſound?

ALC. I am quite of opinion that it is.

SOC. And are you not of opinion, too, that there are men who want underſtanding, and men who have not that want?

[1] Curſes in thoſe antient days were prayers addreſſed to the Infernal Deities,—to Tartarus,—to primæval Night, but chiefly to the daughters of Night, the Eumenides. For no Deities who dwelt in light were imagined to be the authors of evil ever to any. In conformity with theſe practices and opinions, Sophocles, in the laſt of the two paſſages cited from him in note 7, and Statius, in his Thebaid, lib. i. ver. 56 et ſeq., give to this curſe, pronounced by Œdipus againſt his ſons, the form of a prayer, addreſſed to thoſe powers of darkneſs. Hence appears the ignorance of the author of the κυκλικη Θηβαϊς, or old Greek ballad of the Siege of Thebes, cited by the ſcholiaſt on Sophocles, p. 577, edit. P. Steph. For, after he has told a very ſilly tale, how the two ſons of Œdipus, having had an ox killed for a ſacrifice, ſent a joint of it to their father who was then blind,—and how Œdipus had expected the prime piece of all,—he concludes this part of the ſtory in manner and form following; that is to ſay, being interpreted (as it ought to be) in ballad ſtyle and ballad metre,

As ſoon as e'er he underſtood
'Twas only the ache-bone,
For him too mean, unworthy food;
Againſt the ground, in wrathful mood,
He ſtraightway daſh'd it down.

Then pray'd he to th' immortals all,
But chief to Jove on high,
That each by th' other's hand might fall;
And ſo to Pluto's darkſome hall
They both at once might fly.—S.

[2] The particulars are briefly related by Appollodorus, in Bibliothec. lib. iii. cap. 6 and 7.—S.

ALC. I am.

SOC. Come, then, let us conſider what ſort of men theſe are. You have admitted, that men there are who want underſtanding, men who do not want it, and other men, you ſay, who are inſane.

ALC. True.

SOC. Further now; are there not ſome men in a good ſtate of health?

ALC. There are.

SOC. And are there not others in a bad ſtate of health?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. Theſe, then, are not the ſame men with thoſe.

ALC. By no means.

SOC. Whether now are there any men who are in neither of thoſe ſtates?

ALC. Certainly, none.

SOC. For every man muſt of neceſſity either *have* good health, or *want* good health.

ALC. I think ſo too.

SOC. Well: do you think after the ſame manner with regard to the having of underſtanding and the want of underſtanding?

ALC. How do you mean?

SOC. Do you think it to be neceſſary [1], that a man ſhould either *have* or *want* a good underſtanding? Or is there, beſides, ſome third and middle ſtate, in which a man neither *has* nor *wants* a good underſtanding?

ALC. There certainly is not.

SOC. Every man, then, of neceſſity muſt be either in the one or in the other of thoſe two conditions.

ALC. So it ſeems to me.

[1] In all the printed editions of the Greek we here read, Δοκει σοι οιον τε ειναι, *Do you think it poſſible*, &c. And Cornarius, as if he found this reading in the Heſſenſtein manuſcript, tranſlates it into Latin thus: *Videtur tibi fieri poſſe*, &c. Ficinus and Stephens tranſlate it, as if they had read in their manuſcripts, Δοκει σοι δειν ειναι, *Do you think that a man ought to be*, &c. Neither of theſe readings can be right, becauſe they, both of them, make this dialectical queſtion to be *fooliſh* as well as *impertinent*; and becauſe alſo either of them ſpoils the argumentation. To make the inference, in the next ſentence of Socrates, juſt and concluſive, we muſt here read Δοκει σοι αναγκαιον ειναι, as we have ſuppoſed in tranſlating it. The neceſſity of making this emendation in the Greek text was ſeen alſo by Dacier, as appears from his French tranſlation.—S.

SOC.

Soc. Do you not remember that you admitted this, that infanity was contrary to foundneſs of underſtanding?

Alc. I do.

Soc. And do you not remember that you admitted this alſo, that there was no middle or third ſtate, in which a man neither *has* nor *wants* a good underſtanding?

Alc. I admitted this too.

Soc. But how can two different things be contrary to one and the ſame thing?

Alc. It is by no means poſſible.

Soc. Want of underſtanding, therefore, and infanity, are likely to be found the ſame thing.

Alc. It appears ſo.

Soc. If then we ſhould pronounce that all fools were madmen [1], we ſhould pronounce rightly, Alcibiades.

Alc. We ſhould.

Soc. In the firſt place, your equals in age, if any of them happen to be fools, as indeed they are, and ſome of your elders too, all theſe we muſt pronounce madmen. For conſider, are you not of opinion, that in this city there are few wiſe men, but a multitude of fools, whom you call madmen?

Alc. I am of that opinion.

Soc. Can you imagine then, that, living in the ſame city with ſo many madmen, we ſhould live with any eaſe or comfort? or that we ſhould not have ſuffered from them long ago, have been buffeted, and pelted, and have met with all other miſchiefs which madmen are wont to perpetrate? But conſider, my good ſir, whether we live not here in a different ſtate of things.

Alc. What is then the truth of the caſe, Socrates, with reſpect to the multitude? For it is not likely to be what I juſt now imagined.

[1] That the philoſophers of the Stoic ſect derived from Socrates that celebrated paradox of theirs, παντας τους αφρονας μαινεσθαι, *that all fools are mad*, is a juſt obſervation of Cicero's in Tuſcul. Diſputat. l. iii. § 5; and Dr. Davis, in his notes thereon, ſhows the juſtneſs of it, by referring to the paſſage in Plato now before us.—S.

Soc.

Soc. Neither do I think it is ſo myſelf. But we ſhould conſider it in ſome ſuch way as this.

Alc. In what way do you mean?

Soc. I will tell you. We preſume that ſome men there are who are ill in health: do we not?

Alc. Certainly we do.

Soc. Do you think it neceſſary then that every man, who is ill in health, ſhould have the gout, or a fever, or an ophthalmy[1]? do you not think that a man, without ſuffering from any of theſe diſeaſes, may be ill of ſome other? For diſeaſes, we ſuppoſe, are of many various kinds, and not of thoſe only.

Alc. I ſuppoſe they are.

Soc. Do you not think that every ophthalmy is a diſeaſe?

Alc. I do.

Soc. And do you think that every diſeaſe, therefore, is an ophthalmy?

Alc. By no means, not I. Yet ſtill I am at a loſs about your meaning.

Soc. But if you will give me your attention, in conſidering the matter, both of us together, we ſhall go near to find the truth of it.

Alc. I give you, Socrates, all the attention I am maſter of.

Soc. Was it not agreed by us, that every ophthalmy was a diſeaſe; though not every diſeaſe an ophthalmy?

Alc. It was agreed ſo.

Soc. And I think it was rightly ſo agreed. For all perſons who have a fever have a diſeaſe; not all, however, who have a diſeaſe have a fever; neither have they all of them the gout, nor all of them an ophthalmy. Every thing indeed of this kind[2] is a diſeaſe; but they whom we call phyſicians ſay that diſeaſes differ in their effects on the human body. For

[1] We have no ſingle word in our language to denote that diſeaſe of the eyes, called by the Grecian phyſicians *οφθαλμια*, the word here uſed by Plato. They meant by it ſuch a ſerous inflammation of the eyes, or defluxion of humours on them, as in Latin is called *lippitudo*.—S.

[2] That is, every continued indiſpoſition of the body; whether the whole body ſuffer from it throughout, as in a fever; or whether it be ſeated in any organical part ſerving to motion, as in the gout; or ſerving to ſenſation, as in an ophthalmy. Plato, in his choice of ſimilitudes and inſtances, where they are requiſite to illuſtrate his ſubject, (and he never uſes any but on ſuch occaſions,) is always ſo exquiſitely curious, and often, as here, ſo ſcientifically judicious, that, with reſpect to this ingredient in good writing on ideal or intellectual ſubjects, we know of no writer who is his equal.—S.

all

all diſeaſes are not alike, neither are they all attended with like ſymptoms; but each of them operates with a power peculiar to itſelf, and yet diſeaſes are they all. Juſt as it is with reſpect to workmen; for workmen we ſuppoſe ſome men are, do we not[1]?

ALC. Certainly we do.

SOC. Such as ſhoemakers, ſmiths, ſtatuaries, and a great multitude of others, whom it is needleſs to enumerate diſtinctly. All theſe have different parts of workmanſhip divided amongſt them; and they all are workmen. They are not, however, ſmiths, nor ſhoemakers, nor ſtatuaries, indiſcriminately all of them together. Juſt ſo folly is divided amongſt men. And thoſe who have the largeſt ſhare of it, we call madmen; ſuch as have a portion ſomewhat leſs, we call ſenſeleſs and ſtupified[2]: but if we chooſe to ſpeak of theſe in gentler terms, ſome of us ſay they are magnanimous[3]; others call them ſimpletons; and others again, harmleſs and inexperienced in the world and ſpeechleſs[4]. You will alſo find, if you reflect, many other names given them beſide theſe. But they are all compriſed under the general term, folly or want of underſtanding. There is, however, a difference between them, as one art differs from another, one diſeaſe from another. Or how otherwiſe doth the caſe ſeem to you?

ALC. To me exactly as you repreſent it.

SOC. This point, therefore, being ſettled, let us from hence return back again. For it was propoſed, I think, in the beginning of our inquiry, to be

[1] In the Socratic manner of arguing from anſwers given to interrogations, the interrogating party aſſerts nothing poſitively; nor even lays down the moſt certain principles for a foundation of the future reaſoning, until they are admitted for truths by the reſponding party.—S.

[2] In the Greek, εμβροντητους, literally to be tranſlated thunder-ſtricken. For the effect of lightning, (when attended by thunder,) and indeed of all æthereal or electrical fire, is to ſtupify, at leaſt for a time, whatever animal it ſtrikes.—S.

[3] This euphemiſmus is applied in the way of raillery or good-humour, to ſuch men as want ſenſe or underſtanding in the common affairs of human life; as men really magnanimous, being uſually regardleſs of things really little and appearing ſo to them, are looked upon as fools or as ſenſeleſs by the multitude, to whom thoſe little things appear great and important.—S.

[4] In the Greek, Ἐννεους, a word which, in the proper ſenſe of it, is applied only to infants before they have attained to the uſe of ſpeech. This epithet, and the two preceding it, are uſed in the way of extenuation or apology; the firſt for the wholly uſeleſs or unſerviceable in any affair; the next for the ſilly or eaſy to be impoſed on; the laſt for the ſilent from want of ideas, having nothing to ſay.—S.

conſidered by us, what ſort of men wanted underſtanding, and what ſort were men of good underſtanding. For it was agreed that ſome there were of each ſort. Was it not?

ALC. It was ſo agreed.

SOC. Whether then do you ſuppoſe, that ſuch perſons have a good underſtanding who know how they ought to act, and what they ought to ſay?

ALC. I do.

SOC. And what perſons do you apprehend to be wanting in underſtanding? are they not ſuch as are ignorant in both thoſe caſes?

ALC. Theſe very perſons.

SOC. Will not theſe perſons then, who are ignorant of what they ought to do and to ſay, both ſay and do what they ought not without being ſenſible of it?

ALC. It appears ſo.

SOC. Well then, Alcibiades, of this ſort of perſons, I ſaid, was Œdipus. And you may find many in our own times, who, though they are not ſeized with ſudden anger, as he was, yet pray for things hurtful to themſelves; not ſuſpecting evil in them, and imagining nought but good. Œdipus indeed, as he did not wiſh for any thing good, ſo neither did he imagine the thing he prayed for to be good. But ſome others there are, whoſe minds are in a diſpoſition quite contrary to that of Œdipus. For you yourſelf, in my opinion, if the God to whom you are going to offer your petitions ſhould appear to you, and, before you had made any petition to him, ſhould aſk you, "whether your deſires would be ſatisfied with your becoming tyrant of Athens;" and (if you held this favour cheap, and no mighty grant) ſhould add further, "and tyrant of all Greece;" and, if he ſhould perceive that you deemed it ſtill too little for you, unleſs you were tyrant[1] of all Europe, ſhould promiſe you that alſo; and not merely promiſe, but make you ſo immediately on the ſpot, if you were in haſte to have all the Europeans acknowledge Alcibiades, the ſon of Clinias, for their lord and maſter; in this caſe, it is my opinion, that you yourſelf would march away full of joy, as if the greateſt good had befallen you.

ALC. I believe, Socrates, that I ſhould; and that ſo would any other man whatever, had he met with ſuch an adventure.

[1] The word *tyrant*, every where in Plato, ſignifies a deſpotic or arbitrary monarch.—S.

SOC.

Soc. You would not, however, accept of abſolute dominion over the eſtates and perſons of all the Grecians and Barbarians together, on condition of giving your life in exchange for it.

Alc. I ſuppoſe not. For why ſhould I, when it could be of no uſe to me?

Soc. And, if you knew that you ſhould make an ill uſe of it to your own detriment, would you not alſo in ſuch a caſe refuſe it?

Alc. Certainly I ſhould.

Soc. You ſee, then, how dangerous it is, either inconſiderately to accept of it, when offered, or to wiſh and pray for it of yourſelf; ſince a man, by having it, may ſuffer great detriment, if not the total loſs of his life. In confirmation of this, we could mention many perſons who longed after tyranny, and laboured to obtain it, as if ſome mighty good were to be enjoyed from it; but having obtained it, were, from plots and conſpiracies to deprive them of it, forced to part with their very lives. Nay, it cannot, I ſuppoſe, have eſcaped your own hearing, what happened as it were but yeſterday, that Archelaus, tyrant of the Macedonians, was murdered by his favourite; for this favourite was no leſs fond of the tyranny, than the tyrant was of him; and imagined that, by obtaining the tyranny himſelf, he ſhould be made a happy man; but that, after he had held the tyranny three or four days, he himſelf was, in his turn, ſecretly murdered by ſome others, who had conſpired againſt him. Amongſt our own fellow citizens, alſo, you ſee, (for this we have not from the report of others, but have been eye-witneſſes of it ourſelves,) that of thoſe who ſucceeded in their ambition to command our armies, ſome were baniſhed[1], and ſtill at this day live in exile from the city; others loſt their lives[2]; and ſuch as ſeem to have fared the beſt, ſuch as had gone through many terrifying dangers[3] in their campaigns,

[1] Thucydides, the ſon of Meleſias, had been baniſhed by oſtraciſm, four or five years before what we ſuppoſe the time of this dialogue; and we no where read, that ever he was recalled from exile; nor indeed is it probable that he was, at leaſt during the life of Pericles.—S.

[2] This was the caſe of Callias, the ſon of Calliades; he was ſlain in battle, about the time when the above-mentioned Thucydides was baniſhed from Athens. See Thucydides the Hiſtorian, lib. i. §. 61, 2, and 3.—S.

[3] In the Greek, διὰ πολλῶν κινδύνων ἐλθόντες καὶ φόβων.—But we ſhould be glad to have the au-

campaigns, and were returned to their own country, have ever afterwards ſuffered at home, from ſycophants and detractors, a ſiege as fierce and as dangerous as any from open enemies in the field, ſo that ſome of them at length wiſhed they had never known how to command an army, much rather than ever to have born the burden of that command. Indeed if the dangers and toils, which they underwent, had tended to their advantage, they would have had ſomething plauſible to plead in behalf of their ambition: but their caſe is quite the reverſe of that. In the ſame manner, with reſpect to the having of children, you will find many men who wiſh and pray for them; but after they have[1] them, are brought, on that very account, into the greateſt calamities and griefs: for ſome, whoſe children were incurably wicked, have ſpent all their after days in ſorrow; and ſome, who had good children, but loſt them by ſome bad accident, have been reduced to a ſtate of mind no leſs miſerable than the others, and, like them, have wiſhed that their children never had been born. And yet, notwithſtanding the evidence of theſe and many other caſes of like kind, it is rare to find a man who would refuſe thoſe gifts of fortune, were they offered to him; or who, could he obtain them by his prayers, would forbear to pray for them. Few men would reject even a tyranny, if offered them; or the chief command of an army; or many other things, which often bring more miſchief than benefit to the poſſeſſor. Nay, there are few men, of thoſe who happen not to have them at preſent, who would not be glad if ever they came into their poſſeſſion. And yet ſuch, as obtain them, every now and then recant their wiſhes, and pray to be diſencumbered of what they before prayed to have. I ſuſpect, therefore, that in reality men accuſe the Gods unjuſtly[2], in ſaying, that the evils which they ſuffer come from them:

For on themſelves they draw, through their own crimes,

thority of ſome antient manuſcript, for reading the laſt word in this ſentence πονων, inſtead of φοβων· not only becauſe the word πονων conveys a better meaning, but becauſe alſo the words οι κινδυνοι τε και πονοι in the next ſentence evidently appear to have reſpect to the mention of them both, made juſt before.—S.

[1] Perhaps the word ηδη in the Greek, which, as it is printed, precedes the word γενεσθαι, ſhould be transferred from thence hither, that we might here read ηδη γενομενων.—S.

[2] This paſſage evidently alludes to a ſpeech of Jupiter in Homer's Odyſſey, lib. i. v. 32, et ſeq.—S.

(or

(or follies ſhould we ſay?)

More griefs than fate allots to human life.

And to me, Alcibiades, it ſeems probable, that ſome wiſe man or other, happening to be connected with certain perſons void of underſtanding, and obſerving them to purſue and to pray for things, which it were better for them ſtill to be without, but which appeared to them good, compoſed for their uſe a common prayer [1]; the words of which are nearly theſe——

Sov'reign of Nature! grant us what s good,
Be it, or not, the ſubject of our pray'rs;
And from thy ſupplicants, whate'er is ill,
Tho' ſupplicating for it, ſtill avert.

Now in this prayer, it ſeems to me, that the poet ſays what is right; and that whoever makes uſe of it, incurs no danger. But if you have any thing to ſay againſt it, ſpeak your mind.

ALC. It is a difficult matter, Socrates, to ſpeak againſt any thing which is rightly ſaid. But what I am thinking of is, how many evils are brought on men by ignorance: ſince to this it ſeems owing, that we labour to procure for ourſelves the greateſt miſchiefs, without knowing what we are about; and how extreme our ignorance is, appears in our praying for them. And yet no man would imagine that to be his own caſe; and every one ſuppoſes himſelf ſufficiently knowing, to pray for things the moſt advantageous to himſelf, and to avoid praying for things the moſt miſchievous: for to pray for theſe things would in reality be like a curſe, and not a prayer.

SOC. But perhaps, my good friend, ſome man or other, who happens to be wiſer than you or I, might ſay, that we are wrong, in laying the blame ſo raſhly on ignorance, unleſs we proceed to ſpecify what things we mean

[1] It is neceſſary to obſerve, that this prayer is adapted ſolely to that part of mankind (and a very numerous part it is) who have not arrived at a *ſcientific* knowledge of divine concerns, and therefore know not what to pray for as they ought. See an excellent remark on this paſſage from Proclus in a note on the Republic, vol. i. p. 443. Mr. Sydenham, from miſtaking the intention of this prayer, has made Socrates aſſert, without any authority from the text, that the author of it compoſed it for his own uſe as well as that of the ignorant. Hence he tranſlates, "compoſed for *his own* uſe and theirs a common prayer."—T.

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the ignorance of. To ſome perſons alſo, in certain conditions and circumſtances, ignorance is a good; though it be an evil to thoſe others we have been ſpeaking of.

ALC. How ſay you? Is it poſſible there ſhould be any thing, which it is better for any perſon in any condition whatever to be ignorant of than to know?

SOC. I think it is: are not you of the ſame opinion?

ALC. Not I, by Jupiter.

SOC. Well now;—but obſerve, I am not going to charge you with having a will, diſpoſed to have ever perpetrated[1] a deed, like that of Oreſtes, upon his own mother, as it is reported; or like that of Alcmæon, or whoever elſe happened to act in the ſame manner.

ALC. Mention not ſuch a horrid deed, I beſeech you, Socrates.

SOC. The man, who acquits you of a diſpoſition to have acted in that

[1] That part of the ſtory of Oreſtes, which is here alluded to, is well known to thoſe who are verſed in Greek learning, from the Χοηφοροι of Æſchylus, the Electra of Sophocles, and the Electra of Euripides.—For the ſtory of Alcmæon, we refer them to the old Scholia on Homer's Odyſſey, lib. xi. v. 326; or to Servius's Commentary on Virgil's Æneid, lib. vi. v. 445. It is told more at large by Apollodorus, in lib. iii. cap. 6 and 7. But leſt ſuch of our readers, as happen to be unlearned in the hiſtory of antient Greece, ſhould miſtake the meaning of this paſſage, they are to be informed that Oreſtes and Alcmæon were guilty of ſo atrocious a crime, as the murder of their own mothers, out of a miſtaken notion of filial piety, and an ignorance of the bounds of duty towards a father. Oreſtes was the ſon of Agamemnon and Clytemneſtra. His mother, in the abſence of his father during the ſiege of Troy, carried on an amour with Ægiſthus, couſin-german to Agamemnon. At her huſband's return home, after the deſtruction of Troy, ſhe and her paramour procured his death; which was afterwards avenged by his children: for Oreſtes, at the inſtigation of his ſiſter Electra, ſlew the adulterous pair together. Alcmæon was the ſon of Amphiaraus and Eriphyle. This lady betrayed her huſband into a ſituation in which he muſt inevitably loſe his life. He knowing how ſhe had acted, and foreſeeing the event, enjoined his ſon Alcmæon to avenge his death on Eriphyle, by taking away her life. In neither of theſe caſes, cited here by Plato, does there appear any malice in the young princes againſt their mothers; no ſpirit of revenge for perſonal injuries done to them; no luſt of riches or of dominion; in ſhort, no ſelfiſh paſſion or appetite whatever; no other intention than to perform an imagined act of duty to their fathers, by doing ſuch an act of juſtice on their mothers as belonged not to them to execute. It appears, that both of theſe unhappy princes perpetrated a deed ſo unnatural, from erroneous notions of duty, juſtice, and honour; that is, through want of moral wiſdom, or true prudence. We apprehend, therefore, that the drift of Plato in this paſſage is to prove, from theſe ſad inſtances of the fatal effects of ignorance in the laws of nature and reaſon, the neceſſity of applying our minds to the ſtudy of moral ſcience, in order to act rightly and to be happy.—S.

manner,

manner, you ought not, Alcibiades, to bid him avoid the mention of ſuch a deed; but much rather ought you to lay that injunction on a man who ſhould expreſs a contrary opinion of you; ſince the deed appears to you ſo horrid, as not to admit a caſual mention of it in converſation. But do you think that Oreſtes, had he been a wiſe and prudent man, and had he known how it was beſt for him to act, would have dared to be guilty of any ſuch action?

ALC. By no means.

SOC. Nor, I ſuppoſe, would any other man.

ALC. Certainly, not.

SOC. The ignorance therefore of what is beſt is an evil thing; and whoever is ignorant of that beſt will always ſuffer evil.

ALC. So I think.

SOC. And did not he think ſo too? and do not all other men think the ſame?

ALC. I cannot deny it.

SOC. Further then, let us conſider this alſo. Suppoſing, that it ſhould come into your head all at once, from a ſudden fancy of its being the beſt thing you can do, to take a dagger with you, and go to the houſe of Pericles, your guardian and your friend; and ſuppoſing that, when you came there, upon your aſking if Pericles was within, with intention to kill him only and no other perſon, you ſhould receive this anſwer, He is within;—I do not ſay, that you have a will or inclination to verify any of theſe ſuppoſitions; I ſay no more than this—ſuppoſing you ſhould be ſeized with ſuch a fancy[1], (and nothing, I think, hinders a man, who is ignorant of what is beſt, from being at ſome time or other ſo ſeized,) in that caſe an opinion might be conceived, that the worſt thing a man can do is, in ſome circumſtances, the beſt: do not you think it might?

ALC. Certainly ſo.

SOC. If then, upon being admitted to his preſence, you ſhould ſee and

[1] In the Greek, *ει, οιμαι, δοξει σοι ὁπερ ουθεν κωλυει, κ. τ. λ.* The word *οιμαι* here ſeems to be out of its proper place, and to belong to the *parenthetical* part of this ſentence, thus, *ει δοξει σοι· ὁπερ,* (or rather, as Stephens conjectures, *ὁτιπερ,*) *οιμαι, ουθεν κωλυει δεσπου τῳ γε αγνοουντι το βελτιστον παραστηναι ποτε δοξαν· ὡστε, κ. τ. λ.*—S.

yet

yet not know him, but ſhould miſtake him for ſome other perſon, I aſk you, whether you would, notwithſtanding that, be ſo furious as to kill him?

ALC. No, by Jupiter; I do not imagine that I ſhould.

SOC. For you would not be ſo furious as to kill any perſon, whom chance threw in your way; but him only at whom you aimed. Is it not for this reaſon that you would not kill him?

ALC. Without doubt.

SOC. And if you attempted the ſame thing ever ſo often, and ſtill miſtook Pericles, whenever you were about to execute your deſign, you never would lay violent hands on him.

ALC. Certainly I ſhould not.

SOC. Well; and can you think that Oreſtes would ever have laid violent hands on his mother, if in like manner he had miſtaken her for ſome other perſon?

ALC. I think he would not.

SOC. For he too had it not in his mind to kill any woman he ſhould chance to meet with, nor the mother of any man whatever, but his own mother only.

ALC. It is true.

SOC. To miſtake therefore, and not to kno whings of that kind, is better for men who are in ſuch diſpoſitions, and who are ſeized with ſuch imaginations.

ALC. It appears ſo to be.

SOC. Do you now perceive, that for ſome perſons, in ſome circumſtances, to be ignorant of ſome things, is a good, and not, as you juſt now imagined it, an evil?

ALC. It ſeems to me probable.

SOC. Further; if you are willing to conſider what follows after this, though it be ſtrange and paradoxical, you may perhaps be of opinion that there is ſome truth in it[1].

ALC. Above all things, Socrates, tell me what.

[1] Immediately before εἶναι, which is the laſt word of this ſentence in the Greek, the word τι ſeems to be omitted.—S.

Soc. That the acquiſition of other ſciences, without the ſcience [1] of what is beſt, is, I may venture to ſay, likely to be found rarely beneficial, and generally hurtful to the perſon who has acquired them [2]. And conſider it in this way: do you not think it neceſſary that, when we are about to engage in any affair, or to ſpeak on any ſubject, we ſhould really know, or at leaſt ſhould fancy that we know, the ſubject we are about to ſpeak on, or the affair we are going ſo readily to engage in?

ALC. I do think it is.

Soc. And do not our public orators, either knowing, or fancying that they know, what the city ought to do, give us accordingly their counſel off hand on every occaſion? Some of them, on the ſubject of war and peace; others, when the affair of building walls, or that of furniſhing the port-towns with proper ſtores, is in debate. In a word, all the negotiations between our city and any other, and all our domeſtic concerns, are they not conducted juſt as theſe orators adviſe?

ALC. True.

Soc. Obſerve then, how we proceed in this argument, if poſſible. Some men you call wiſe, and others you call fooliſh.

ALC. I do.

Soc. Fooliſh do you not call the many, and wiſe the few?

ALC. Juſt ſo.

Soc. And do you not give thoſe different epithets to thoſe two ſorts of perſons, in conſideration of ſomething in which they differ?

ALC. I do.

Soc. Whether do you call him a wiſe man, who knows how to harangue the people on thoſe ſubjects of debate we mentioned, without knowing what advice is the beſt in general, and what on the preſent occaſion?

[1] The words *των αλλων επιστημων*, in the Greek of this ſentence, are ſufficient to ſhow, that, preſently afterwards, we ought to read *ανευ της του βελτιστου* [ſc. *επιστημης*]. And this reading, if it wanted confirmation, is indiſputably confirmed by a ſubſequent paſſage, in which the very ſame paradoxical poſition, having been proved, is repeated as a concluſion from the proofs.—S.

[2] The laſt word of this ſentence in the Greek, we preſume, ſhould be read, not *αυτα*, as it is printed; but, either *αυτας* [ſc. *επιστημας*], or *αυτο* [ſc. *κτημα*]. The latter of theſe two emendatory readings is confirmed by that paſſage, to which we have referred in the preceding note.—S.

ALC. Certainly not.

SOC. Nor him neither, I ſuppoſe, who hath the knowledge of military affairs, but knows not when it is beſt to go to war, nor how long a time to continue it. Is not my ſuppoſition juſt?

ALC. It is.

SOC. Neither then do you call him a wiſe man, who knows how to procure another man's death, or the confiſcation of his eſtate, or the baniſhment of him from his country, without knowing on what occaſion, or what perſon, it is beſt ſo to perſecute.

ALC. Indeed I do not.

SOC. The man, therefore, who poſſeſſes any knowledge of ſuch a kind, if that knowledge of his be attended with the knowledge alſo of what is beſt, (and this I preſume to be the ſame with the knowledge of what is beneficial; Is it ſo?

ALC. Certainly it is:)

SOC. We ſhall ſay, that he is a wiſe man, and ſufficiently well able to judge for himſelf, and to be alſo a counſellor to the city. But of the man who has not the knowledge of what is beneficial [1], we ſhall ſay the contrary. Or what is your opinion that we ought to ſay?

ALC. Mine agrees with yours.

SOC. Well now; let us ſuppoſe a man ſkilled in horſemanſhip, or in ſhooting with a bow, or in wreſtling, or boxing, or other combat; or in any thing elſe which art teaches: what do you ſay concerning him who knows what is executed beſt, in that art which he has learnt? The man, for inſtance, who knows what is performed beſt in horſemanſhip, do you not ſay of him, that he is ſkilled in the horſeman's art?

ALC. I do.

SOC. And the man who knows what is performed beſt in wreſtling, I preſume you ſay of him, that he is ſkilled in the wreſtler's art. Of a man who has the like knowledge in muſic, you ſay, that he is ſkilled in the

[1] In the Greek, as it is printed, we here read ποιουντα, a word which is foreign to the ſenſe. From what goes before, we conjecture the right reading to be either ωφελουντα, that is, ωφελειν επισταμενον, or elſe τοιουτον, that is, *ſuch a one* as before deſcribed, ᾧ παρεπεται ἡ του βελτιστου επιστημη, whoſe particular knowledge or ſkill is attended with the ſcience of what is beſt.—S.

muſician's

muſician's art. And of men who have the like knowledge in the performances of other arts, you ſpeak after a like manner: or how otherwiſe?

ALC. No otherwiſe than juſt as you ſay.

SOC. Do you think now, that a man, ſkilled in any of theſe arts, muſt of neceſſity be a wiſe man? or ſhall we ſay, that he wants much of being ſo?

ALC. Much indeed does he, by Jupiter.

SOC. Suppoſe then a commonwealth, compoſed of good bowmen and muſicians, of wreſtlers too and other artiſts; and mixed with theſe, ſuch perſons as we juſt now mentioned [1], ſuch as underſtand military affairs, and ſuch as know how to perſecute a man to death; and ſuperadded to them, your politicians, ſwoln with the pride of managing ſtate-affairs; all theſe people void of the ſcience of what is beſt; and not a man of them knowing when, or in what caſe, it is beſt to exerciſe the particular ſkill or knowledge that each man is maſter of; what ſort of a commonwealth do you think this would prove?

ALC. But a bad one, Socrates, I think for my part.

SOC. Neither would you, I ſuppoſe, heſitate to pronounce it ſo, when you ſaw every one of theſe men ambitious of being honoured, and making it his chief buſineſs in the commonwealth,

To attain to more, and ſtill more, excellence [2],

(by excellence I mean that which is the beſt in his own art,) but in what is

[1] Inſtead of οἷς αρτι ειρηκαμεν, printed here in the Greek, we ſuſpect that we ought to read ὧν α. ει.—S.

[2] Plutarch, towards the end of his treatiſe περι αδολεσχιας, *concerning Talkativeneſs*, cites the two following verſes, which appear to be taken out of ſome antient Greek poet,

Νεμει το πλειστον ἡμερας τουτῳ μερος,
Ἵν' αυτος αυτου τυγχανῃ κρατιστος ων.

He makes it the chief buſineſs of the day,
T' attain to more, and ſtill more, excellence.

In the paſſage now before us, we find the *latter* of theſe two verſes cited by Plato, word for word. The *former* of them indeed he has a little altered; but only juſt ſo much as to adapt it to his own purpoſe; which could not be done without weaving it into his own proſaic ſtyle.—S.

beſt for the public, and beſt alſo for himſelf[1], generally miſtaken; as being, I ſuppoſe, without rational principles, and governed only by opinion. In this caſe, ſhould we not be right in pronouncing that ſuch a commonwealth was full of great diſorder and of lawleſs doings?

ALC. Right indeed, by Jupiter.

SOC. Did we not think it neceſſary for us, either to fancy that we know, or really to know previouſly, the buſineſs we are going to engage in, or off-hand to ſpeak upon?

ALC. We did.

SOC. And did we not alſo think, that if a man engages in any buſineſs which he knows, and his knowledge of it be attended with the knowledge of what is beneficial, he will be in a way of profiting both the public and himſelf[2]?

ALC.

[1] In the Greek, *αυτον αυτῳ βελτιστου*, Stephens perceiving this to be quite ungrammatical, propoſes, by a very ſcholar-like as well as ſenſible emendation, that inſtead of *αυτον* we ſhould read *αυτου*. But perhaps the word *αυτον* was altogether intruded here by ſome tranſcriber, inattentive to the grammatical conſtruction of this ſentence, but who obſerved the words *αυτον αυτῳ* uſed in many following ſentences, which have the ſame meaning with that now before us.—S.

[2] This interrogative ſentence of Socrates no leſs evidently refers to a former ſentence beginning with theſe words, *The man therefore*—a ſentence that will greatly help us in amending this; the Greek of which, as it is printed, runs thus: *Ουκουν καν μεν πραττῃ ἁ τις οιδεν, η δοκει ειδεναι, παρεπεσται δη το ωφελιμως και λυσιτελουντως ἡμας ἐξειν, και τῃ πολει και αυτον αὐτῳ.* Now in this ſentence the words *η δοκει ειδεναι* not only are not found in the ſentence to which this refers, and the ſenſe of which it repeats with but little variation in the words, but they alſo convey a meaning contrary to the mind of Socrates. For he takes every occaſion to inculcate, that only a man's real knowledge, ſhown by his ſpeeches, or his actions, and not his own falſe conceit of it, nor other men's too high opinion of it, can be of any laſting advantage either to himſelf or to others. Of equal moment with this interpolation, (a fault to which the words *οιηθηναι ειδεναι* in the preceding ſentence, where they are uſed rightly, ſeem to have given occaſion,) is another fault in the ſentence now before us, an omiſſion of the words *ἡ του βελτιστου επιστημη*, or others to the ſame purport. For, without ſome ſuch words, this ſentence, in which Socrates delivers his opinion in the way of a queſtion, is quite contradictory to his opinion, delivered but a little before in that ſentence above referred to. Our ſuppoſition, that ſuch words are here omitted in the printed editions of Plato, but ought to be inſerted, is confirmed by the Latin of Ficinus, who tranſlated faithfully from a manuſcript copy of Plato, (probably the Medicean,) with which Grynæus afterwards compared and corrected that tranſlation. For both Ficinus and Grynæus, in their Latin, inſert theſe words; "*addit autem ſcientiam optimi.*" In this ſentence alſo are wanting

ALC. How could we think otherwiſe?

SOC. But that if it be attended with ignorance of what is beneficial, the contrary will happen; he will neither profit the public nor himſelf[1]?

ALC. Certainly we thought he would not.

SOC. And what? are you ſtill of the ſame opinion? or have you in any reſpect altered your way of thinking about theſe matters?

ALC. Not at all: I think as I did ſtill.

SOC. Let me aſk you then, whether you did not ſay that you called the many fools, and the few wiſe men?

ALC. I acknowledge it.

SOC. And do we not ſtill ſay, that the many are miſtaken in their opinion of what is beſt, for that they are generally, I ſuppoſe, without rational principles, and only governed by opinion?

ALC. We ſtill ſay the ſame.

SOC. It is the intereſt, therefore, of the many not to be knowing in any affairs, nor to conceit themſelves knowing; if what affairs they know, or conceit they know, they will be the more forward to engage in; and, engaging in them, will receive more harm than benefit.

wanting the words εδοκει ημιν; unleſs Plato purpoſely omitted them, as thinking it needleſs to repeat them, after they had been expreſſed in the queſtion immediately preceding. There remains yet another fault in this ſentence, the word ημας, a word which the grammatical conſtruction by no means admits of. If our conjectural emendation of this ſentence, which we now beg leave to offer to the learned, ſhould appear to be a juſt one, it will appear at the ſame time, on examination, that all the faults in it, as printed, are owing originally to a mere *tranſpoſition* of ſome of the words in tranſcribing it, an error frequently found in antient manuſcripts, and the cauſe of thoſe many additional errors, as well in printed as in written copies, which were afterwards committed with intention to correct the former. The propoſed reading is this; Ουκουν, καν μεν πραττη α τις οιδε, παρειται δε ειδεναι το ωφελιμον, [or παρειται δε η του βελτιστου επιστημη, as Ficinus and Grynæus ſeem to have read,] εδοκει ημιν λυσιτελουντως εξειν τη πολει, και αυτον αυτω.—S.

[1] This ſentence, interrogative alſo, is thus printed in the Greek; Εαν δε γ', οιμαι, ταναντια τουτων, ουτε τη πολει, ουτ αυτον αυτω: it plainly reſpects that paſſage cited in the laſt preceding note. The ſenſe of it therefore muſt be the ſame with the ſenſe of that: to expreſs which ſenſe exactly, we preſume that we ought here to read, as follows; Εαν δ' αγνοια [ſc. του ωφελιμου παρειται], ταναντια τουτων, κ. τ. λ. There is thus, we ſee, but little alteration made, even in the letters; and the corruption of this paſſage was not perhaps made with more eaſe, than that with which the genuine reading has been reſtored.—S.

ALC.

ALC. What you ſay is very true.

SOC. Do you ſee then; do I not appear to have been actually in the right, when I ſaid, that the acquiſition of other ſciences, without the ſcience of what is beſt, is rarely beneficial, and generally hurtful, to the perſon who has acquired them?

ALC. If I did not think ſo at that time, yet now, Socrates, I do.

SOC. It is incumbent therefore on every civil ſtate, and every private perſon, if they would manage their affairs rightly, to depend abſolutely on this ſcience; juſt as the ſick patient depends on his phyſician; or as the mariner, who would eſcape the dangers of the voyage, depends on the commander of the veſſel. For[1] without this ſcience, the more vehemently an inward gale[2] impels a man, whether it ariſe from the conſideration of his wealth, or bodily ſtrength, or ſome other advantage of the ſame kind with either of thoſe, ſo much the greater miſcarriages will of neceſſity it ſeems befall him, from thoſe very advantages. And, in like manner, the man who has acquired what is called much learning, and many arts, but is deſtitute of this ſcience, and is driven along by each of the others, will not he meet with, and juſtly too indeed, a very tempeſtuous voyage? and ſuppoſing him to continue ſtill at ſea, without a commander of the veſſel in which he ſails,

[1] Of this paſſage in the Greek, Monſieur Dacier ſays, "C'eſt un des plus difficiles endroits de Platon." Indeed, as it is printed, it is quite unintelligible. For, after a comma put at the word πλειν, it proceeds thus; ὁσῳπερ αν μη προτερον επουριση το της ψυχης. Ανευ γαρ ταυτης, ἡ περι, κ. τ. λ. But what if it were printed thus? Putting a full ſtop at πλειν, let the next ſentence immediately begin, Ανευ γαρ ταυτης, ὁσῳπερ αν λαβρωτερον επουριση το της ψυχης, ἡ περι, κ. τ. λ. All the difficulty is now vaniſhed by this ſlight tranſpoſition, and an eaſy alteration of μη προτερον to λαβρωτερον, a word perhaps miſtaken by the writer to whom it was read, from his not being ſo thoroughly well verſed in the language of Homer, as a man muſt be before he can every where underſtand the language of Plato. Προτερον therefore being, as we ſuppoſe by this miſtake, written in ſome manuſcript copy of this dialogue, it is probable that ſome reader of it afterwards, who ſaw the abſurdity of that word, condemned it by writing in the margin μη προτερον, and that the next half-learned tranſcriber, inſtead of omitting προτερον, took μη alſo into the text. Both theſe ſpurious words are rightly omitted in the Heſſenſtein manuſcript, as we are informed by Cornarius; but the genuine word, in the mean time, was loſt.—S.

[2] In the Greek, το της ψυχης, by which we underſtand το της ψυχης πνευμα in the nominative caſe *before* επουριση, and not as Cornarius imagined, το πλοιον, or ακατιον, in the accuſative caſe *after* that verb.—S.

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it will not be long [1] before he periſhes. So that to ſuch a man very applicable, I think, is that verſe where the poet ſays of ſome perſon, in diſpraiſe of him,

Much knew he, and in many things had ſkill;
But whate'er things he knew, he knew them ill.

ALC. How, Socrates, doth this verſe of the poet fall in with what we are ſpeaking of? for to me it ſeems nothing to the purpoſe.

SOC. Very much to the purpoſe is it. But poets, you muſt know, write enigmatically almoſt all of them, but this poet more eſpecially. For it is the genius of poetry in general to uſe an enigmatical language; and it is not for any ordinary perſon to underſtand it. But when, beſides this difficulty, the poetical genius, ſo enigmatical in itſelf, ſeizes a man who is backward in communicating his knowledge, unwilling to tell us plainly what he means, and deſirous to conceal his wiſdom as much as poſſible from the world [2], it appears in the higheſt degree difficult to find out the real meaning of any ſuch poet. For you can by no means think that Homer [3], ſo very divine a poet as he was, could be ignorant, how impoſſible it was for a man, who poſſeſſed any ſcience whatever, not to know it well. But he expreſſes himſelf enigmatically, I ſuppoſe, by uſing, inſtead of the words *evil* [4], and *to know*,

[1] In the Greek, χρονου ου μακρον βιον ϑεων. Stephens propoſes βιου ϑεων to be read for the two laſt words. And we embrace his propoſal of reading βιου, but conjecture the right reading of the very laſt word to be rather βιων.—S.

[2] From this paſſage it appears, what opinion either Plato himſelf, or other learned men in his time, entertained of Homer, as a philoſopher. For he here repreſents the great poet as poſſeſſed of ſome profound knowledge, which he thought proper and prudent to conceal from the bulk of mankind; and therefore making the diſcovery of it ſo difficult, on purpoſe that only thoſe, whoſe genius led them to philoſophy, and whoſe outward circumſtances of fortune permitted them to follow their genius, might be able to make ſuch a diſcovery from his writings.—S.

[3] We ſee, that the antient poem, entitled, from the name of the hero of it, Margites, in which was the verſe above cited, is expreſsly attributed to Homer by Plato in this place; as it alſo is by Ariſtotle, in his Poetics, cap. 4, and in his Nichomachean Ethicks, lib. vi. cap. 7. What antient writers have acceded to their opinion, and what others have differed from it, may be ſeen in Fabricii Bibliothecâ Græcâ, l. ii. c. 2, § 24, n° 17.—S.

[4] In the Greek, αντι του κακου, we ſuſpect the right reading to be αντι του κακον, that is, αντι του ονοματος KAKON, inſtead of the noun *evil*: as αντι του επισταϑαι, juſt after, means αντι του ῥηματος απαρεμφατου και πρωτοτυπου ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, inſtead of the infinitive and primitive verb *to know*.—S.

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the derivative words, *ill*, and *he knew* [1]. If then we uſe the two proper words, there is formed this ſentence, in plain proſe indeed, but expreſſive of the poet's meaning,—*He was knowing and ſkilled in many things, but to know all thoſe things was to him an evil.*——It is evident then, that if much knowledge was to him an evil, what knowledge he had was worthleſs, and he himſelf was ſome worthleſs fellow; ſuppoſing any credit to be due to the concluſions from our paſt reaſonings.

ALC. And I think, Socrates, it is their due: for I ſhould hardly give credit to any other rational concluſions, if I denied it to thoſe.

SOC. And you think rightly too. But in the name of Jupiter, let us proceed. For you ſee, how great are the perplexities attending the ſubject in which we are engaged; you ſee alſo, what the nature is of thoſe perplexities. And you ſeem to me to have a ſhare in them yourſelf; as you never reſt from changing your thoughts over and over again upon this ſubject; diſcarding the opinions, which you had before ſo ardently embraced, and continuing no longer in the ſame mind. Should the God then, to whom you are going to make your prayers, appear to you, now after all our concluſions; and ſhould he aſk you, before you had preſented any petition whatever to him—whether or no your deſires would be ſatisfied, if you obtained any of thoſe dominions mentioned in the beginning of our argument;—or ſhould he leave to yourſelf the naming of what you wiſhed for;—in which way, think you, could you beſt avail yourſelf of this opportunity? whether in accepting any of the grants offered you, or in naming ſome other thing you wiſhed for?

ALC. Now, by the gods, Socrates, I ſhould not know what to ſay to ſuch a propoſal. Indeed, I think, that it would be raſh in me to make any deciſive anſwer at all; and that great caution is abſolutely requiſite in ſuch a caſe; to prevent a man from praying unwarily for things evil, while he imagines them to be good; and from doing as you ſaid, ſoon afterwards recanting his choice, and praying to be delivered from what he had before prayed to have.

[1] We have here a ſpecimen of Plato's uncommon ſkill in philoſophical or univerſal grammar. It appears, not only by his deducing the adverb ΚΑΚΩΣ, *ill*, from the ſubſtantive noun ΚΑΚΟΝ, *evil*, but alſo by (what ſhows a much deeper theory of words, conſidered as the parts of ſpeech,) his deriving ΗΠΙΣΤΑΤΟ, *he knew*, a verb of the indicative mode, from the infinitive, or moſt general verb, ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, *to know*. See Mr. Harris's Hermes, b. i. ch. xi. and viii.—S.

Soc.

Soc. Did not then the poet, whom I cited in the beginning of this argument, know ſomewhat more than we do, in ſupplicating Jupiter to avert from us what is evil, even though we prayed for it?

Alc. Indeed I think ſo.

Soc. The Lacedæmonians, therefore, O Alcibiades! admiring and imitating this of the poet, or whether they had of themſelves conſidered the ſubject in the ſame manner as he did, every one of them in private, and all of them in public, make a prayer ſimilar to his: for they beſeech the Gods to grant them ſuch good things as at the ſame time are beautiful; and nothing more were they ever heard to pray for. Accordingly, no people have hitherto been more proſperous than they. And if it has happened to them not to proſper in all things, it was not becauſe they prayed amiſs; but becauſe the Gods, I preſume, have it in their choice, either to grant a man that for which he prays, or to ſend him the reverſe. I have a mind to relate to you ſomewhat elſe on this ſubject, what I once heard from certain elderly men;—that, in the differences between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians, it ſo fell out, that whenever they came to a battle, whether by land or by ſea, our city was always unſucceſsful, and was never able to get one victory:—that the Athenians therefore, uneaſy at theſe miſcarriages, and at a loſs for ſome contrivance to put an end to their preſſing evils, held a council, and came to this concluſion,—that their beſt way would be to ſend to Ammon [1], and conſult him what they ſhould do; and at the ſame time to aſk him this queſtion father,—on what account the Gods always give victory to the Spartans their enemies, rather than to them; though of all the Grecians, we, ſaid they, bring them the greateſt number of ſacrifices, and thoſe the faireſt in their kinds; and though we, beyond all other people, have decorated their temples with the preſents that are hung up in them; and in honour of the Gods have made yearly proceſſions, the moſt ſolemn and the

[1] The oracle of Ammon was highly celebrated for the truth of its predictions. It had been antiently conſulted by Hercules and by Perſeus. Long afterwards it was conſulted by Crœſus, when he was meditating to ſtop the progreſs of Cyrus's arms in Aſia. In what veneration it was held by the Romans we learn from the ninth book of Lucan. And from the preſent paſſage in Plato, as alſo from the lives of Lyſander, Cimon, and Alexander, in Plutarch, it appears to have been, among the Grecians of thoſe days, in as great vogue and credit as any oracles of their own.—S.

moſt coſtly; and have paid them a greater tribute in money than all the reſt of the Grecians put together: whilſt the Lacedæmonians, they ſaid, never regard any of theſe things; but, on the contrary, worſhip the Gods in ſo ſlighting a manner, as to make their ſacrifices commonly of beaſts full of blemiſhes; and, in all other inſtances, fall far ſhort of us, ſaid they, in honouring the Gods; at the ſame time that the riches they are maſters of are not leſs than ours. When the ambaſſadors had thus ſpoken, and had inquired of the Oracle, what they ſhould do to find an end of their preſent misfortunes, the prophet made no other anſwer than this; (for without doubt the God did not permit him:) ſending for the Athenian ambaſſadors, he ſpake to them theſe words,——Thus ſaith Ammon; he ſaith, that he prefers the pious addreſſes of the Lacedæmonians to all the ſacrifices of all the Grecians.—Theſe words, and no more, ſpake the prophet. Now it ſeems to me, that, by pious addreſſes, the God means only that prayer of theirs. And it is indeed much more excellent than the prayers of any other people. For the reſt of the Grecians, when they have either led up to the altar oxen with their horns gilded, or brought rich offerings and preſents to hang up in the temples, pray for whatever they happen to deſire, whether it be really good or evil. The Gods therefore, when they hear their impious addreſſes, accept not of their coſtly proceſſions, ſacrifices, and preſents. So that much caution and conſideration ſeem to me requiſite on this ſubject, what is fit to be ſpoken to the Gods, and what is not. You will alſo find in Homer ſentiments ſimilar to thoſe I have been expreſſing: for he tells us, that the Trojans, on a certain night, taking up their quarters without the city walls,

> In honour of the bleſt Immortals, ſlew
> Unblemiſh'd hecatombs:——[1]

and that the ſmoke from theſe ſacrifices was by the winds wafted up into heaven [2]:

Sweet

[1] In the Greek, Ἕρδειν ἀθανάτοισι τελείεσσας ἑκατόμβας; a line this not found in the copies of Homer now extant; but in Barnes's edition, ſupplied from this paſſage of Plato; and by Erneſtus, ſhown to be genuine, from the next line, which ſuppoſes the mention made of a ſacrifice juſt before.—S.

[2] Κνίση δ' ἐκ πεδίου ἀνεμοὶ φέρον οὐρανὸν ἐισω. This line of Homer appears in all the editions

Sweet odorif'rous ſmoke; yet by the Gods
Rejected, and the ſav'ry taſte refus'd.
For ſtrong averſion in their holy minds
Was rooted, againſt Troy's devoted tow'rs,
Againſt th' injurious might of Troy's proud king,
And 'gainſt the Trojan people, who withheld
Helen, unjuſtly, from her wedded lord[1].

It was of no advantage therefore, it ſeems, to them to ſacrifice, or to offer preſents, to the Gods whom they had made their enemies. For the divine nature, I preſume, is not of ſuch a kind as to be ſeduced by preſents, like thoſe whoſe trade it is to make the moſt of their money, and who care not by what means they are enriched. Beſides, we plead very fooliſhly, in our expoſtulations with the Gods, if we think to get the better of the Lacedæmonians by ſuch arguments. For it would be a ſad thing indeed, if the Gods regarded our preſents and our ſacrifices, and not the diſpoſition of the ſoul, when a religious and juſt man addreſſed them. Nay, in my opinion, they have much more regard to this, than they have to thoſe pompous proceſſions and coſtly ſacrifices. For nothing hinders, but that any, whether private perſons or civil ſtates, let them have ſinned againſt the Gods and againſt men ever ſo greatly, may be well able to pay the Gods ſuch a tribute yearly. But they not being to be bribed, diſdain all that outward worſhip; as ſaith the divine Oracle, and as alſo ſaith the Prophet of the Gods. It ſeems, therefore, that juſtice and prudence are honoured, above all things, by the Gods, and by men too, ſuch as have good ſenſe and underſtanding. Now the prudent and the juſt are no other perſons than ſuch as know what behaviour and what ſpeech is proper to be uſed in our intercourſe, whether with gods or with men. But I ſhould be glad to hear from you what your thoughts are on this ſubject.

of that poet. Plato is here obliged to take this ſentence quite out of the metre; becauſe he is relating, only at ſecond hand and as told by Homer, a fact, the narration of which Homer himſelf puts immediately into the mouth of the muſe: and, for the ſame reaſon, we have given a proſaic tranſlation of it. In the preceding line, as alſo in thoſe which follow, Plato was able to preſerve the metre, while he only changed the indicative verbs into infinitive.—S.

[1] The verſes, here tranſlated, are not found in any of the editions of Homer, except in that of Barnes; but, as Erneſtus judiciouſly obſerves, they are altogether worthy of that greateſt of all poets.—S.

ALC. For my part, I am of the ſame opinion with you, Socrates, and with the Oracle. And indeed it would ill become me to give my vote oppoſite to the judgment of the God.

SOC. Do you not remember, that you acknowledged your being much at a loſs concerning prayer; for fear you ſhould unwarily pray for evil things, imagining them to be good?

ALC. I do remember it.

SOC. You perceive then, that it is not ſafe for you to go and make your prayer at the temple, as you intended; leſt your addreſſes ſhould happen to be impious, and the God hearing them ſhould wholly reject your ſacrifice, and you perhaps ſhould draw upon your own head ſome farther evil. It ſeems to me, therefore, that your beſt way is to be at quiet. For becauſe of your magnanimity, (that faireſt of names given to folly,) I ſuppoſe you would not be willing to make uſe of the Lacedæmonian prayer. It is neceſſary, therefore, that a man ſhould wait till he has learnt what diſpoſition he ought to be in towards the Gods and towards men.

ALC. But, Socrates, how long will it be before that time comes? and who is he that will inſtruct me? for I ſhould be very glad, methinks, to ſee that man, and to know who he is.

SOC. It is he, whoſe care you are the object of. But as Homer [1] ſays of Minerva, that ſhe removed the miſt from before the eyes of Diomede,

> That he might clearly ſee, and gods from men
> Plainly diſtinguiſh, ——

ſo muſt he in the firſt place, as it ſeems to me, remove from your ſoul the miſt that now happens to ſurround it; and after that he will apply thoſe medicines, by means of which you will clearly diſtinguiſh good from evil. For, at preſent, I think you would not be able ſo to do.

ALC. Let him then remove that miſt, or any other obſtruction that he pleaſes: for he will find me readily diſpoſed to follow any of his preſcriptions, whoever the man is, if by thoſe means I may become a better man than I am at preſent.

SOC. It is wonderful to conſider how greatly he is diſpoſed towards the making you ſo.

[1] Iliad. lib. v. ver. 127.—S.

ALC.

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Government of Maharashtra
on 13 February, 2016